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	<title>Comments on: Be Careful What You Wish For (Schumer/Paulson Edition)</title>
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		<title>By: bob</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/10/be-careful-what-you-wish-for.html#comment-1265</link>
		<dc:creator>bob</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Oct 2007 18:25:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;i&gt;all these folks in trouble took out ARMs because they couldn&#039;t afford the 30-year fixed, because they were biting off more than they could chew&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Not all of them - the brokers pushed those things hard because the securitizers were actually paying more for the toxic stuff than the fixed stuff.  I admit that I have no hard numbers, however:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;From &lt;a HREF=&quot;http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119318489086669202.html&quot; REL=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119318489086669202.html &lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;i&gt;Broker commissions on an option ARM ranged from 1.75% to 2.5% of the loan amount last year, estimates Tom LaMalfa, a managing director of Wholesale Access, a mortgage-research firm in Columbia, Md. That compares with 1.48% for standard fixed-rate mortgages and 1.88% on subprime mortgages....&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In one California branch office (of Countrywide), employees could win prizes, such as a trip to Hawaii, for selling the most option ARMs, says Cindy Lau, who worked for the company for more than six years.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>all these folks in trouble took out ARMs because they couldn&#8217;t afford the 30-year fixed, because they were biting off more than they could chew</i></p>
<p>Not all of them &#8211; the brokers pushed those things hard because the securitizers were actually paying more for the toxic stuff than the fixed stuff.  I admit that I have no hard numbers, however:</p>
<p>From <a HREF="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119318489086669202.html" REL="nofollow">  </a><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119318489086669202.html" rel="nofollow">http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119318489086669202.html</a> </p>
<p><i>Broker commissions on an option ARM ranged from 1.75% to 2.5% of the loan amount last year, estimates Tom LaMalfa, a managing director of Wholesale Access, a mortgage-research firm in Columbia, Md. That compares with 1.48% for standard fixed-rate mortgages and 1.88% on subprime mortgages&#8230;.</p>
<p>In one California branch office (of Countrywide), employees could win prizes, such as a trip to Hawaii, for selling the most option ARMs, says Cindy Lau, who worked for the company for more than six years.</i></p>
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		<title>By: Boom2Bust.com</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/10/be-careful-what-you-wish-for.html#comment-1259</link>
		<dc:creator>Boom2Bust.com</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Oct 2007 14:53:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Paulson knows that the majority of distressed homeowners can&#039;t be rescued by a federal bailout.  The following is from Diana Olick, CNBC&#039;s real estate reporter, on October 10:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Counseling is all well and good and communication is the right direction, but all these folks in trouble took out ARMs because they couldn&#039;t afford the 30-year fixed, because they were biting off more than they could chew and no amount of re-financing them is going to account for the fact that they just can&#039;t afford the house they&#039;re in. How do you help them? I&#039;ll give the Treasury Secretary credit. He admitted this was in no way a panacea and many borrowers were too far gone to help...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Paulson knows that the majority of distressed homeowners can&#8217;t be rescued by a federal bailout.  The following is from Diana Olick, CNBC&#8217;s real estate reporter, on October 10:</p>
<p>Counseling is all well and good and communication is the right direction, but all these folks in trouble took out ARMs because they couldn&#8217;t afford the 30-year fixed, because they were biting off more than they could chew and no amount of re-financing them is going to account for the fact that they just can&#8217;t afford the house they&#8217;re in. How do you help them? I&#8217;ll give the Treasury Secretary credit. He admitted this was in no way a panacea and many borrowers were too far gone to help&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Anonymous</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/10/be-careful-what-you-wish-for.html#comment-1254</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Oct 2007 12:50:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think you miss the other side of the discussion that got squelched in the ugly GSE politics of the last few years. Let&#039;s assume for a moment that banks are also GSE&#039;s in that 40% or so of their funding is &#039;cheap&#039; due to the explicit government guarantee. If that&#039;s acceptable, then bank size and capital also should be part of the discussion. Regarding size, nobody on Capitol Hill bothered to notice that JP Morgan Chase had $41 trillion of unspecified derivative notional contracts outstanding as of Dec 2004. Where was the outcry ? Regarding capital levels, let&#039;s just say that +- 3 months duration matching of the balance sheet requires less captail; so it&#039;s hard to evaluate your leverage concerns witout more relative risk analysis. However, I have agreed with you all along that removing GSE growth restrictions GSEs are not the answer (they wouldn&#039;t buy anyway). I do credit the GSEs with avoiding the subprime mess -- more than I can say for the banks (who were warned about the subprime risks by the GSE&#039;s as far back as 2003).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think you miss the other side of the discussion that got squelched in the ugly GSE politics of the last few years. Let&#8217;s assume for a moment that banks are also GSE&#8217;s in that 40% or so of their funding is &#8216;cheap&#8217; due to the explicit government guarantee. If that&#8217;s acceptable, then bank size and capital also should be part of the discussion. Regarding size, nobody on Capitol Hill bothered to notice that JP Morgan Chase had $41 trillion of unspecified derivative notional contracts outstanding as of Dec 2004. Where was the outcry ? Regarding capital levels, let&#8217;s just say that +- 3 months duration matching of the balance sheet requires less captail; so it&#8217;s hard to evaluate your leverage concerns witout more relative risk analysis. However, I have agreed with you all along that removing GSE growth restrictions GSEs are not the answer (they wouldn&#8217;t buy anyway). I do credit the GSEs with avoiding the subprime mess &#8212; more than I can say for the banks (who were warned about the subprime risks by the GSE&#8217;s as far back as 2003).</p>
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