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	<title>Comments on: More Credit Guarantor Woes</title>
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		<title>By: Anonymous</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/11/more-credit-guarantor-woes.html#comment-1809</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Nov 2007 06:36:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/11/more-credit-guarantor-woes/#comment-1809</guid>
		<description>Take a guess where the credit enhancement cash comes from and why money mkts need to be watched!!&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Employee Benefit Security &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates employers who offer pension or welfare benefit plans for their employees. Title I of ERISA is administered by the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) (formerly the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration) and imposes a wide range of fiduciary, disclosure and reporting requirements on fiduciaries of pension and welfare benefit plans and on others having dealings with these plans. These provisions preempt many similar state laws. Under Title IV, certain employers and plan administrators must fund an insurance system to protect certain kinds of retirement benefits, with premiums paid to the federal government&#039;s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). EBSA also administers reporting requirements for continuation of health-care provisions, required under the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the health care portability requirements on group plans under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Background &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;EBSA is responsible for administering and enforcing the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure provisions of Title I of ERISA. EBSA oversees approximately 683,000 private pension plans, including 419,000 participant-directed individual account plans such as 401(k) plans, and millions of private health and welfare plans that are subject to ERISA.(1) Participant-directed individual account plans under our jurisdiction hold over $2.2 trillion in assets and cover more than 44.4 million active participants. Since 401(k)-type plans began to proliferate in the early 1980s, the number of employees investing through these types of plans has grown dramatically. The number of active participants has risen almost 500 percent since 1984 and has increased by 11.4 percent since 2000. EBSA employs a comprehensive, integrated approach encompassing programs for enforcement, compliance assistance, interpretive guidance, legislation, and research to protect and advance the retirement security of our nation’s workers and retirees.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Disclosures to Plan Fiduciaries&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;EBSA will soon be issuing a proposed regulation amending its current regulation under ERISA section 408(b)(2) to clarify the information fiduciaries must receive and service providers must disclose for purposes of determining whether a contract or arrangement is “reasonable,” as required by ERISA’s statutory exemption for service arrangements. Our intent is to ensure that service providers entering into or renewing contracts with plans disclose to plan fiduciaries comprehensive and accurate information concerning the providers’ receipt of direct and indirect compensation or fees and the potential for conflicts of interest that may affect the provider’s performance of services. The information provided must be sufficient for fiduciaries to make informed decisions about the services that will be provided, the costs of those services, and potential conflicts of interest. The Department believes that such disclosures are critical to ensuring that contracts and arrangements are “reasonable” within the meaning of the statute. This proposed regulation currently is under review within the Administration.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Disclosures to the Public&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;EBSA will soon promulgate a final regulation revising the Form 5500 Annual Report filed with the Department to complement the information obtained by plan fiduciaries as part of the service provider selection or renewal process. The Form 5500 is a joint report for the Department of Labor, Internal Revenue Service and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation that includes information about the plan’s operation, funding, assets, and investments. The Department collects information on service provider fees through the Form 5500 Schedule C.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;We intend that the changes to the Schedule C will work in tandem with our 408(b)(2) initiative. The amendment to our 408(b)(2) regulation will provide up front disclosures to plan fiduciaries, and the Schedule C revisions will reinforce the plan fiduciary’s obligation to understand and monitor these fee disclosures. The Schedule C will remain a requirement for plans with 100 or more participants, which is consistent with long-standing Congressional direction to simplify reporting requirements for small plans.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In carrying out its enforcement responsibilities, EBSA conducts civil and criminal investigations to determine whether the provisions of ERISA or other federal laws related to employee benefit plans have been violated. EBSA regularly works in coordination with other federal and state enforcement agencies, including the Department’s Office of the Inspector General, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation), the Securities and Exchange Commission, the PBGC, the federal banking agencies, state insurance commissioners, and state attorneys general.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;EBSA is continuing to focus enforcement efforts on compensation arrangements between pension plan sponsors and service providers hired to assist in the investment of plan assets. EBSA’s Consultant/Adviser Project (CAP), created in October 2006, addresses conflicts of interest and the receipt of indirect, undisclosed compensation by pension consultants and other investment advisers. Our investigations seek to determine whether the receipt of such compensation violates ERISA because the adviser or consultant used its status with respect to a benefit plan to generate additional fees for itself or its affiliates. The primary focus of CAP is on the potential civil and criminal violations arising from the receipt of indirect, undisclosed compensation. A related objective is to determine whether plan sponsors and fiduciaries understand the compensation and fee arrangements they enter into in order to prudently select, retain, and monitor pension consultants and investment advisers. CAP will also seek to identify potential criminal violations, such as kickbacks or fraud.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Take a guess where the credit enhancement cash comes from and why money mkts need to be watched!!</p>
<p>Employee Benefit Security </p>
<p>The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates employers who offer pension or welfare benefit plans for their employees. Title I of ERISA is administered by the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) (formerly the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration) and imposes a wide range of fiduciary, disclosure and reporting requirements on fiduciaries of pension and welfare benefit plans and on others having dealings with these plans. These provisions preempt many similar state laws. Under Title IV, certain employers and plan administrators must fund an insurance system to protect certain kinds of retirement benefits, with premiums paid to the federal government&#8217;s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). EBSA also administers reporting requirements for continuation of health-care provisions, required under the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the health care portability requirements on group plans under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).</p>
<p>Background </p>
<p>EBSA is responsible for administering and enforcing the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure provisions of Title I of ERISA. EBSA oversees approximately 683,000 private pension plans, including 419,000 participant-directed individual account plans such as 401(k) plans, and millions of private health and welfare plans that are subject to ERISA.(1) Participant-directed individual account plans under our jurisdiction hold over $2.2 trillion in assets and cover more than 44.4 million active participants. Since 401(k)-type plans began to proliferate in the early 1980s, the number of employees investing through these types of plans has grown dramatically. The number of active participants has risen almost 500 percent since 1984 and has increased by 11.4 percent since 2000. EBSA employs a comprehensive, integrated approach encompassing programs for enforcement, compliance assistance, interpretive guidance, legislation, and research to protect and advance the retirement security of our nation’s workers and retirees.</p>
<p>Disclosures to Plan Fiduciaries</p>
<p>EBSA will soon be issuing a proposed regulation amending its current regulation under ERISA section 408(b)(2) to clarify the information fiduciaries must receive and service providers must disclose for purposes of determining whether a contract or arrangement is “reasonable,” as required by ERISA’s statutory exemption for service arrangements. Our intent is to ensure that service providers entering into or renewing contracts with plans disclose to plan fiduciaries comprehensive and accurate information concerning the providers’ receipt of direct and indirect compensation or fees and the potential for conflicts of interest that may affect the provider’s performance of services. The information provided must be sufficient for fiduciaries to make informed decisions about the services that will be provided, the costs of those services, and potential conflicts of interest. The Department believes that such disclosures are critical to ensuring that contracts and arrangements are “reasonable” within the meaning of the statute. This proposed regulation currently is under review within the Administration.</p>
<p>Disclosures to the Public</p>
<p>EBSA will soon promulgate a final regulation revising the Form 5500 Annual Report filed with the Department to complement the information obtained by plan fiduciaries as part of the service provider selection or renewal process. The Form 5500 is a joint report for the Department of Labor, Internal Revenue Service and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation that includes information about the plan’s operation, funding, assets, and investments. The Department collects information on service provider fees through the Form 5500 Schedule C.</p>
<p>We intend that the changes to the Schedule C will work in tandem with our 408(b)(2) initiative. The amendment to our 408(b)(2) regulation will provide up front disclosures to plan fiduciaries, and the Schedule C revisions will reinforce the plan fiduciary’s obligation to understand and monitor these fee disclosures. The Schedule C will remain a requirement for plans with 100 or more participants, which is consistent with long-standing Congressional direction to simplify reporting requirements for small plans.</p>
<p>In carrying out its enforcement responsibilities, EBSA conducts civil and criminal investigations to determine whether the provisions of ERISA or other federal laws related to employee benefit plans have been violated. EBSA regularly works in coordination with other federal and state enforcement agencies, including the Department’s Office of the Inspector General, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation), the Securities and Exchange Commission, the PBGC, the federal banking agencies, state insurance commissioners, and state attorneys general.</p>
<p>EBSA is continuing to focus enforcement efforts on compensation arrangements between pension plan sponsors and service providers hired to assist in the investment of plan assets. EBSA’s Consultant/Adviser Project (CAP), created in October 2006, addresses conflicts of interest and the receipt of indirect, undisclosed compensation by pension consultants and other investment advisers. Our investigations seek to determine whether the receipt of such compensation violates ERISA because the adviser or consultant used its status with respect to a benefit plan to generate additional fees for itself or its affiliates. The primary focus of CAP is on the potential civil and criminal violations arising from the receipt of indirect, undisclosed compensation. A related objective is to determine whether plan sponsors and fiduciaries understand the compensation and fee arrangements they enter into in order to prudently select, retain, and monitor pension consultants and investment advisers. CAP will also seek to identify potential criminal violations, such as kickbacks or fraud.</p>
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		<title>By: Brian</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/11/more-credit-guarantor-woes.html#comment-1804</link>
		<dc:creator>Brian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Nov 2007 20:08:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/11/more-credit-guarantor-woes/#comment-1804</guid>
		<description>I agree this is not much of a model for the rest of the insurers.  The cavalry riding in here appear to be two of those classically French non-public, largely unaccountable entities, controlled or heavily influenced (that is an inference) by the government.  &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The terms of the rescue financing are completely opaque and are no doubt not at &quot;market&quot; levels.  For instance, if the S&amp;P press release is to be believed, the two parent orgs have decided to commit &quot;as much capital as is necessary&quot; to maintain CIFG&#039;s AAA rating.  It is hard to imagine that the recapitalization of FGIC, for example, will contain such an open ended commitment.  Rather, this looks like an effort to sweep the problems under the rug and minimize any political fallout from the CFIG near implosion.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;While PMI will probably get a pop on this news on Friday, the final terms of the FGIC bailout will likely not be so benign for PMI shareholders.  PMI is fighting for its life right now and doesn&#039;t have any spare change to throw at the problem, and you can be sure the other FGIC shareholders, if they haven&#039;t already had enough fun in the financial guarantee business, will be treating this effectively as a de novo investment. The terms of any rescue financing will reflect the risks in the business that are clear for all to see.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree this is not much of a model for the rest of the insurers.  The cavalry riding in here appear to be two of those classically French non-public, largely unaccountable entities, controlled or heavily influenced (that is an inference) by the government.  </p>
<p>The terms of the rescue financing are completely opaque and are no doubt not at &#8220;market&#8221; levels.  For instance, if the S&#038;P press release is to be believed, the two parent orgs have decided to commit &#8220;as much capital as is necessary&#8221; to maintain CIFG&#8217;s AAA rating.  It is hard to imagine that the recapitalization of FGIC, for example, will contain such an open ended commitment.  Rather, this looks like an effort to sweep the problems under the rug and minimize any political fallout from the CFIG near implosion.</p>
<p>While PMI will probably get a pop on this news on Friday, the final terms of the FGIC bailout will likely not be so benign for PMI shareholders.  PMI is fighting for its life right now and doesn&#8217;t have any spare change to throw at the problem, and you can be sure the other FGIC shareholders, if they haven&#8217;t already had enough fun in the financial guarantee business, will be treating this effectively as a de novo investment. The terms of any rescue financing will reflect the risks in the business that are clear for all to see.</p>
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