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	<title>Comments on: Why the Happy Talk About the Credit Crisis?</title>
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		<title>By: dh</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-23738</link>
		<dc:creator>dh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2008 08:08:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>So why is the gross negative thing such a big deal?&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Re:  The first step in measuring credit exposure in derivative contracts involves identifying those contracts where a&lt;br/&gt;bank would lose value if the counterparty to a contract defaulted today. The total of all contracts with positive&lt;br/&gt;value (i.e., derivatives receivables) to the bank is the gross positive fair value (GPFV) and represents an initial&lt;br/&gt;measurement of credit exposure. The total of all contracts with negative value (i.e., derivatives payables) to&lt;br/&gt;the bank is the gross negative fair value (GNFV) and represents a measurement of the exposure the bank poses&lt;br/&gt;to its counterparties.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Re:  During the fiscal third quarter, the Firm is expected to incur negative gross mark-to-market adjustments on assets of ($7.8) billion, including gross negative mark-to-market adjustments of &lt;br/&gt;($5.3) billion on residential mortgage-related positions, ($1.7) billion on commercial real estate positions, ($600) million on other asset-backed positions and ($200) million on acquisition finance positions.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So why is the gross negative thing such a big deal?</p>
<p>Re:  The first step in measuring credit exposure in derivative contracts involves identifying those contracts where a<br />bank would lose value if the counterparty to a contract defaulted today. The total of all contracts with positive<br />value (i.e., derivatives receivables) to the bank is the gross positive fair value (GPFV) and represents an initial<br />measurement of credit exposure. The total of all contracts with negative value (i.e., derivatives payables) to<br />the bank is the gross negative fair value (GNFV) and represents a measurement of the exposure the bank poses<br />to its counterparties.</p>
<p>Re:  During the fiscal third quarter, the Firm is expected to incur negative gross mark-to-market adjustments on assets of ($7.8) billion, including gross negative mark-to-market adjustments of <br />($5.3) billion on residential mortgage-related positions, ($1.7) billion on commercial real estate positions, ($600) million on other asset-backed positions and ($200) million on acquisition finance positions.</p>
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		<title>By: Steve</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6996</link>
		<dc:creator>Steve</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2008 03:29:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6996</guid>
		<description>thefinancedude,&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Yes, magicians really do saw their assistants in half.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>thefinancedude,</p>
<p>Yes, magicians really do saw their assistants in half.</p>
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		<title>By: doc holiday</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6995</link>
		<dc:creator>doc holiday</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2008 03:24:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Derivatives Activities &lt;br/&gt;Third Quarter 2007 &lt;br/&gt;http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/rel...e/2007- 137a.pdf&lt;br/&gt;Derivatives activity in the U.S. banking system is dominated by a small group of large financial institutions. Five &lt;br/&gt;large commercial banks represent 97% of the total industry notional amount, 78% of total trading revenues and &lt;br/&gt;87% of industry net current credit exposure. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The first step in measuring credit exposure in derivative contracts involves identifying those contracts where a&lt;br/&gt;bank would lose value if the counterparty to a contract defaulted today. The total of all contracts with positive&lt;br/&gt;value (i.e., derivatives receivables) to the bank is the gross positive fair value (GPFV) and represents an initial&lt;br/&gt;measurement of credit exposure. The total of all contracts with negative value (i.e., derivatives payables) to&lt;br/&gt;the bank is the gross negative fair value (GNFV) and represents a measurement of the exposure the bank poses&lt;br/&gt;to its counterparties.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;A bank’s net current credit exposure across all counterparties will therefore be the sum of the gross positive fair&lt;br/&gt;values for counterparties lacking legally certain bilateral netting arrangements (this may be due to the use of&lt;br/&gt;non-standardized documentation or jurisdiction considerations) and the bilaterally netted current credit&lt;br/&gt;exposure for counterparties with legal certainty regarding the enforceability of netting agreements.&lt;br/&gt;This “net” current credit exposure is the primary metric used by the OCC to evaluate credit risk in bank&lt;br/&gt;derivatives activities. A more risk sensitive measure of credit exposure would also consider the value of&lt;br/&gt;collateral held against counterparty exposures. While banks are not required to report collateral held against&lt;br/&gt;their derivatives positions in their Call Reports, they do report collateral in their published financial statements.&lt;br/&gt;Notably, large trading banks tend to have collateral coverage of 30-40% of their net current credit exposures&lt;br/&gt;from derivatives contracts.&lt;br/&gt;Net current credit exposure for U.S. commercial banks increased $53 billion in the third quarter to $252 billion.&lt;br/&gt;At the end of the third quarter, legally enforceable netting agreements allowed banks to reduce the gross credit&lt;br/&gt;exposure (GPFV) of $1.6 trillion by 84% to $252 billion in net current credit exposure</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Derivatives Activities <br />Third Quarter 2007 <br /><a href="http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/rel...e/2007-" rel="nofollow">http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/rel&#8230;e/2007-</a> 137a.pdf<br />Derivatives activity in the U.S. banking system is dominated by a small group of large financial institutions. Five <br />large commercial banks represent 97% of the total industry notional amount, 78% of total trading revenues and <br />87% of industry net current credit exposure. </p>
<p>The first step in measuring credit exposure in derivative contracts involves identifying those contracts where a<br />bank would lose value if the counterparty to a contract defaulted today. The total of all contracts with positive<br />value (i.e., derivatives receivables) to the bank is the gross positive fair value (GPFV) and represents an initial<br />measurement of credit exposure. The total of all contracts with negative value (i.e., derivatives payables) to<br />the bank is the gross negative fair value (GNFV) and represents a measurement of the exposure the bank poses<br />to its counterparties.</p>
<p>A bank’s net current credit exposure across all counterparties will therefore be the sum of the gross positive fair<br />values for counterparties lacking legally certain bilateral netting arrangements (this may be due to the use of<br />non-standardized documentation or jurisdiction considerations) and the bilaterally netted current credit<br />exposure for counterparties with legal certainty regarding the enforceability of netting agreements.<br />This “net” current credit exposure is the primary metric used by the OCC to evaluate credit risk in bank<br />derivatives activities. A more risk sensitive measure of credit exposure would also consider the value of<br />collateral held against counterparty exposures. While banks are not required to report collateral held against<br />their derivatives positions in their Call Reports, they do report collateral in their published financial statements.<br />Notably, large trading banks tend to have collateral coverage of 30-40% of their net current credit exposures<br />from derivatives contracts.<br />Net current credit exposure for U.S. commercial banks increased $53 billion in the third quarter to $252 billion.<br />At the end of the third quarter, legally enforceable netting agreements allowed banks to reduce the gross credit<br />exposure (GPFV) of $1.6 trillion by 84% to $252 billion in net current credit exposure</p>
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		<title>By: doc holiday</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6994</link>
		<dc:creator>doc holiday</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2008 02:55:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6994</guid>
		<description>I&#039;m so sorry for song above ... many bows, here is better song:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Money Moves&lt;br/&gt;Given a lack of visibility into counterparty risk, many CFOs are scrutinizing how they are investing precious excess cash. Investor focus has shifted from yield to risk, says Sarah Jones, co-head of liquidity and investment products at JP Morgan Treasury and Securities Services.&lt;br/&gt;Driving this is the discovery that short-term cash funds and even some money-market funds — an investment heretofore thought highly liquid — are exposed to structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that purchased toxic mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. CFOs are shedding investments in funds with SIV exposure that don&#039;t offer complete transparency or daily liquidity.&lt;br/&gt;In August 2007, Ethan Manuel, treasurer at $800 million Mentor Graphics, had migrated the company&#039;s short-term investments from asset-backed paper to money-market funds to maintain liquidity while gaining a bit on the return. He switched back to treasuries and commercial paper last November. &quot;We went away from money-market funds, because we weren&#039;t sure if there would be write-downs or liquidity concerns,&quot; says Manuel. &quot;Right now, we&#039;re being very careful.&quot; — K.M.K.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Taking the Measure of Your Banks&lt;br/&gt;Given the rockiness in the financial sector, CFOs would be remiss if they didn&#039;t question the stability of their banking partners. However, determining just how strong a specific bank is can take some doing.&lt;br/&gt;To evaluate large banks&#039; capital adequacy, many analysts look at &quot;tangible common equity,&quot; a measure of net worth relative to assets, says Brent Christ, an analyst with Fox-Pitt Kelton. Tangible common equity, a non-GAAP measure, is common shareholders&#039; equity, less intangibles and goodwill. The ratio of TCE to assets (less goodwill and intangibles) is generally considered more healthy if it is at least 6 percent for smaller banks and 4 percent for larger ones, Christ says.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;http://paradigmshiftpr.com/pedal.../ pedalingas.htm</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m so sorry for song above &#8230; many bows, here is better song:</p>
<p>Money Moves<br />Given a lack of visibility into counterparty risk, many CFOs are scrutinizing how they are investing precious excess cash. Investor focus has shifted from yield to risk, says Sarah Jones, co-head of liquidity and investment products at JP Morgan Treasury and Securities Services.<br />Driving this is the discovery that short-term cash funds and even some money-market funds — an investment heretofore thought highly liquid — are exposed to structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that purchased toxic mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. CFOs are shedding investments in funds with SIV exposure that don&#8217;t offer complete transparency or daily liquidity.<br />In August 2007, Ethan Manuel, treasurer at $800 million Mentor Graphics, had migrated the company&#8217;s short-term investments from asset-backed paper to money-market funds to maintain liquidity while gaining a bit on the return. He switched back to treasuries and commercial paper last November. &#8220;We went away from money-market funds, because we weren&#8217;t sure if there would be write-downs or liquidity concerns,&#8221; says Manuel. &#8220;Right now, we&#8217;re being very careful.&#8221; — K.M.K.</p>
<p>Taking the Measure of Your Banks<br />Given the rockiness in the financial sector, CFOs would be remiss if they didn&#8217;t question the stability of their banking partners. However, determining just how strong a specific bank is can take some doing.<br />To evaluate large banks&#8217; capital adequacy, many analysts look at &#8220;tangible common equity,&#8221; a measure of net worth relative to assets, says Brent Christ, an analyst with Fox-Pitt Kelton. Tangible common equity, a non-GAAP measure, is common shareholders&#8217; equity, less intangibles and goodwill. The ratio of TCE to assets (less goodwill and intangibles) is generally considered more healthy if it is at least 6 percent for smaller banks and 4 percent for larger ones, Christ says.</p>
<p><a href="http://paradigmshiftpr.com/pedal.../" rel="nofollow">http://paradigmshiftpr.com/pedal&#8230;/</a> pedalingas.htm</p>
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		<title>By: doc holiday</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6988</link>
		<dc:creator>doc holiday</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 20:27:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6988</guid>
		<description>Yves,&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;It&#039;s all about pumping up the value of collateral and helping the poor banks make things better... , however, this new game of hot potato and or musical derivatives is sorta like the subprime game we just played, but now that recess, I mean the recession is over we can soon go back out and play!  It&#039;s nice we have a substitute Congress, Senate, DOJ, Fed, SEC...&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;http://www.gillygaloo.net/docs/07_lyrics.htm&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Re:  The more we get together, together, together,&lt;br/&gt;The more we get together, the happier we&#039;ll be,&lt;br/&gt;For your friends are my friends, and my friends are yours,&lt;br/&gt;The more we get together, the happier we&#039;ll be…&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The more we sing together, together, together,&lt;br/&gt;The more we sing together, the happier we&#039;ll be,&lt;br/&gt;For your songs are my songs, and my songs are yours,&lt;br/&gt;The more we sing together, the happier we&#039;ll be…&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The more we clap together, together, together,&lt;br/&gt;The more we clap together, the happier we&#039;ll be,&lt;br/&gt;For your beat is my beat, and my beat is yours,&lt;br/&gt;The more we clap together, the happier we&#039;ll be....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yves,</p>
<p>It&#8217;s all about pumping up the value of collateral and helping the poor banks make things better&#8230; , however, this new game of hot potato and or musical derivatives is sorta like the subprime game we just played, but now that recess, I mean the recession is over we can soon go back out and play!  It&#8217;s nice we have a substitute Congress, Senate, DOJ, Fed, SEC&#8230;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.gillygaloo.net/docs/07_lyrics.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.gillygaloo.net/docs/07_lyrics.htm</a></p>
<p>Re:  The more we get together, together, together,<br />The more we get together, the happier we&#8217;ll be,<br />For your friends are my friends, and my friends are yours,<br />The more we get together, the happier we&#8217;ll be…</p>
<p>The more we sing together, together, together,<br />The more we sing together, the happier we&#8217;ll be,<br />For your songs are my songs, and my songs are yours,<br />The more we sing together, the happier we&#8217;ll be…</p>
<p>The more we clap together, together, together,<br />The more we clap together, the happier we&#8217;ll be,<br />For your beat is my beat, and my beat is yours,<br />The more we clap together, the happier we&#8217;ll be&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: S</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6986</link>
		<dc:creator>S</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 19:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6986</guid>
		<description>Note that ML resulots included $2B gain on credit spreads widening. IE credit profile gets worse take a gain. Lehman apaprently worried about this on the flip side. So I guess when those write ups that everyone is waiting for will be fully offset by the imprioving credit spreads ats the two would appear to be highly correlated. A natural hedge perhaps. Nevertheless, disturbing&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;ML Press Release: di ytou think an analyst asked about thisor even brought up what happens on the flip side? no chance&lt;br/&gt;&quot;To a lesser&lt;br/&gt;extent, net revenues were also impacted by net write-downs related to leveraged finance&lt;br/&gt;and residential mortgage exposures, which were offset by a net benefit of $2.1 billion due&lt;br/&gt;to the impact of the widening of Merrill Lynch’s credit spreads on the carrying value of&lt;br/&gt;certain of our long-term debt liabilities.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Note that ML resulots included $2B gain on credit spreads widening. IE credit profile gets worse take a gain. Lehman apaprently worried about this on the flip side. So I guess when those write ups that everyone is waiting for will be fully offset by the imprioving credit spreads ats the two would appear to be highly correlated. A natural hedge perhaps. Nevertheless, disturbing</p>
<p>ML Press Release: di ytou think an analyst asked about thisor even brought up what happens on the flip side? no chance<br />&#8220;To a lesser<br />extent, net revenues were also impacted by net write-downs related to leveraged finance<br />and residential mortgage exposures, which were offset by a net benefit of $2.1 billion due<br />to the impact of the widening of Merrill Lynch’s credit spreads on the carrying value of<br />certain of our long-term debt liabilities.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: Anonymous</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6983</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 18:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6983</guid>
		<description>The very top of cnn.com&#039;s business page right this minute --&gt; &quot; Wall Street firm&#039;s (Merrill) quarterly loss is even wider than expected &quot;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Expected BY WHOM?  Not Yves. Not Mish. Not CalculatedRisk.  Not Minyanville.  Not Krugman. Not Roubini.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Et cetera, et cetera, and so forth.  America is a banana republic right now.  Not &quot;like&quot; a banana republic.. IS.  &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Thank your Republican lawmakers for making America into a footnote.  McCain will continue the stupidity if you vote for him.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Sorry to deviate slightly into politics, but we stand no chance of turning this around until regulation is returned.. and Republicans don&#039;t have the guts to pass the appropriate measures.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The very top of cnn.com&#8217;s business page right this minute &#8211;> &#8221; Wall Street firm&#8217;s (Merrill) quarterly loss is even wider than expected &#8220;</p>
<p>Expected BY WHOM?  Not Yves. Not Mish. Not CalculatedRisk.  Not Minyanville.  Not Krugman. Not Roubini.</p>
<p>Et cetera, et cetera, and so forth.  America is a banana republic right now.  Not &#8220;like&#8221; a banana republic.. IS.  </p>
<p>Thank your Republican lawmakers for making America into a footnote.  McCain will continue the stupidity if you vote for him.</p>
<p>Sorry to deviate slightly into politics, but we stand no chance of turning this around until regulation is returned.. and Republicans don&#8217;t have the guts to pass the appropriate measures.</p>
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		<title>By: Thefinancedude</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6982</link>
		<dc:creator>Thefinancedude</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 17:53:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6982</guid>
		<description>Steve,&lt;br/&gt;You don’t believe perception is reality? Reality is a construct of your intellectual capacity. Some of us have more and can discern fact from perception.  Most don’t.  Simple bell curves, so perception IS reality.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Steve,<br />You don’t believe perception is reality? Reality is a construct of your intellectual capacity. Some of us have more and can discern fact from perception.  Most don’t.  Simple bell curves, so perception IS reality.</p>
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		<title>By: Steve</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6980</link>
		<dc:creator>Steve</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 17:21:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6980</guid>
		<description>Galbraith&#039;s book on the 1929 crash has plenty of analogous examples of happytalk from government and industry. Even as late as 1931 Keynes had to remind his readers that the collapse wasn&#039;t going to fix itself magically (the stock market was steadily rising in 1931, btw). Today I think gov&#039;t and industry are even more convinced that perception is reality; that proposition seems almost axiomatic to them. The calculus seems to be that there&#039;s a 10% chance that all of this will blow over if negative sentiment is contained. The happytalk does seem orchestrated--safety in numbers, so no single CEO looks like a fool later.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Galbraith&#8217;s book on the 1929 crash has plenty of analogous examples of happytalk from government and industry. Even as late as 1931 Keynes had to remind his readers that the collapse wasn&#8217;t going to fix itself magically (the stock market was steadily rising in 1931, btw). Today I think gov&#8217;t and industry are even more convinced that perception is reality; that proposition seems almost axiomatic to them. The calculus seems to be that there&#8217;s a 10% chance that all of this will blow over if negative sentiment is contained. The happytalk does seem orchestrated&#8211;safety in numbers, so no single CEO looks like a fool later.</p>
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		<title>By: zak822</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-happy-talk-about-credit-crisis.html#comment-6977</link>
		<dc:creator>zak822</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 16:41:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/04/why-the-happy-talk-about-the-credit-crisis/#comment-6977</guid>
		<description>&quot;the high odds of being revealed as *****proven wrong ought to make them worry about damaging their credibility. &quot;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;I ask this in all seriousness.  Is their credibility really an issue, after all this?  Shouldn&#039;t they be genuinely, thoroughly discredited?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;the high odds of being revealed as *****proven wrong ought to make them worry about damaging their credibility. &#8220;</p>
<p>I ask this in all seriousness.  Is their credibility really an issue, after all this?  Shouldn&#8217;t they be genuinely, thoroughly discredited?</p>
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