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	<title>Comments on: Quelle Surprise! Commercial Real Estate Loans Looking Wobbly</title>
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		<title>By: Commercial Real Estate Problems Moving to Center Stage &#124; Jameson</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-54390</link>
		<dc:creator>Commercial Real Estate Problems Moving to Center Stage &#124; Jameson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2009 17:27:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate-loans-looking-wobbly/#comment-54390</guid>
		<description>[...] course those of us in the biz knew that it was coming &#8211; see Quelle Surprise! Commercial Real Estate Loans Looking Wobbly at NakedCapitalism for a quick overview of various commentators&#8217; past statements and Research [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] course those of us in the biz knew that it was coming &#8211; see Quelle Surprise! Commercial Real Estate Loans Looking Wobbly at NakedCapitalism for a quick overview of various commentators&#8217; past statements and Research [...]</p>
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		<title>By: mxq</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13399</link>
		<dc:creator>mxq</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Aug 2008 19:40:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate-loans-looking-wobbly/#comment-13399</guid>
		<description>(*sigh*...the above user &quot;pamela&quot; is supposed to show &quot;mxq&quot;! Sorry!)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(*sigh*&#8230;the above user &#8220;pamela&#8221; is supposed to show &#8220;mxq&#8221;! Sorry!)</p>
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		<title>By: Pamela</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13398</link>
		<dc:creator>Pamela</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Aug 2008 19:34:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Yves...good point re: the CRE breakdown in terms of constrx/devlpmnt and commercial...&lt;a HREF=&quot;http://docs.google.com/View?docid=dg9z576n_263x9whxf6&quot; REL=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;DB had a chart&lt;/a&gt; (its slightly dated, it was through ~3q 07) that illustrated the huge growth in C&amp;D loans during the past few years.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;It seems this portion of CRE failed to learn a lesson from the CRE collapse of the early 90&#039;s.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yves&#8230;good point re: the CRE breakdown in terms of constrx/devlpmnt and commercial&#8230;<a HREF="http://docs.google.com/View?docid=dg9z576n_263x9whxf6" REL="nofollow">DB had a chart</a> (its slightly dated, it was through ~3q 07) that illustrated the huge growth in C&amp;D loans during the past few years.</p>
<p>It seems this portion of CRE failed to learn a lesson from the CRE collapse of the early 90&#39;s.</p>
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		<title>By: Jim Mc</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13384</link>
		<dc:creator>Jim Mc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Aug 2008 14:19:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Actually CMBS lenders were major players on smaller commercial loans. A typical CMBS lender would go as low as a $5 million transaction. Some (such as Lehman) had units specifically dedicated to small loans.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Actually CMBS lenders were major players on smaller commercial loans. A typical CMBS lender would go as low as a $5 million transaction. Some (such as Lehman) had units specifically dedicated to small loans.</p>
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		<title>By: Yves Smith</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13366</link>
		<dc:creator>Yves Smith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 20:37:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>mxq,&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Very good points. The past comments on RE no doubt conflate some points, and I probably should have teased them out.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;1. A lot of late-cycle deals were done on very aggressive terms. Everything will have to work out for them to be viable. That probably means a restructuring at some point (ie, the original deal assumed a sale at a gain in 2-3 years, which with cap rates rising, ain&#039;t happening). That is a problem independent of the default rate. Riverton fits this model. In this case, it assumed increases in case flow that haven&#039;t happened&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;2. The CMBS stats presumably are the best (or at least biggest) deals, presumably lots of office buildings,  big malls, the very biggest apartment deals. Given the existence of Fannie and Freddie, I assume that a higher percentage of commercial real estate stays on the books of banks (office space in third tier cities, strip malls, etc). I suspect it&#039;s harder to generalize about them but they tend to be more dependent on small businesses. I suspect they will fare worse than the big deals since the small fry will have even more trouble getting credit to tide them over if they get pinched than the big dogs&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;3. Roubini tends to mix construction lending in with his discussion of the commercial real estate situation, when most treat it as a separate category. However, his general point holds: construction finance is a very big product for mid-tier and smaller banks. I don&#039;t know what the size cutoff is, but one guy told me that 29% of the regional and smaller banks have construction loans in excess of their net worth. Some of these banks will take big hits, which will make them much more stringent on refis and maturing commercial loans.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>mxq,</p>
<p>Very good points. The past comments on RE no doubt conflate some points, and I probably should have teased them out.</p>
<p>1. A lot of late-cycle deals were done on very aggressive terms. Everything will have to work out for them to be viable. That probably means a restructuring at some point (ie, the original deal assumed a sale at a gain in 2-3 years, which with cap rates rising, ain&#8217;t happening). That is a problem independent of the default rate. Riverton fits this model. In this case, it assumed increases in case flow that haven&#8217;t happened</p>
<p>2. The CMBS stats presumably are the best (or at least biggest) deals, presumably lots of office buildings,  big malls, the very biggest apartment deals. Given the existence of Fannie and Freddie, I assume that a higher percentage of commercial real estate stays on the books of banks (office space in third tier cities, strip malls, etc). I suspect it&#8217;s harder to generalize about them but they tend to be more dependent on small businesses. I suspect they will fare worse than the big deals since the small fry will have even more trouble getting credit to tide them over if they get pinched than the big dogs</p>
<p>3. Roubini tends to mix construction lending in with his discussion of the commercial real estate situation, when most treat it as a separate category. However, his general point holds: construction finance is a very big product for mid-tier and smaller banks. I don&#8217;t know what the size cutoff is, but one guy told me that 29% of the regional and smaller banks have construction loans in excess of their net worth. Some of these banks will take big hits, which will make them much more stringent on refis and maturing commercial loans.</p>
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		<title>By: mxq</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13357</link>
		<dc:creator>mxq</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 16:01:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate-loans-looking-wobbly/#comment-13357</guid>
		<description>Thanks for posting this, yves.  CMBS spreads have indeed exploded --- markit shows, for instance, BBB spreads are 20%+.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;That said, i think Roubini is a bit mileading when he tells us deliquencies are on the rise.  &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Fitch releases cmbs delinquency reports monthly.  &lt;a HREF=&quot;http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/fitch-us-cmbs-delinquencies-inch/story.aspx?guid=%7BBD874BA6-A1A4-4CF3-A21C-24855E6E35C0%7D&amp;dist=hppr&quot; REL=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;This month&lt;/a&gt;, delinquencies went from 0.41 in June to 0.43 in july.  &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Yes, they did rise, but the magnitude is minute. To put that into context, Sub-prime resi default rates are in the 40+% range (thousands of basis points).&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Of course, that is not to say CRE is rolling through this mess with no problems - depreciation is already occuring at an accelerated rate and there were plenty of hideous loans underwritten...but given the structure and dynamic of CRE vs. RESI, and also taking into account that deliquency rates are at historical lows (2007 vintage shows 0.19% deqlinq. rate), I am skeptical about believing that cmbs stress is more about fundamentals than it is about lack of market liquidity.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for posting this, yves.  CMBS spreads have indeed exploded &#8212; markit shows, for instance, BBB spreads are 20%+.</p>
<p>That said, i think Roubini is a bit mileading when he tells us deliquencies are on the rise.  </p>
<p>Fitch releases cmbs delinquency reports monthly.  <a HREF="http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/fitch-us-cmbs-delinquencies-inch/story.aspx?guid=%7BBD874BA6-A1A4-4CF3-A21C-24855E6E35C0%7D&#038;dist=hppr" REL="nofollow">This month</a>, delinquencies went from 0.41 in June to 0.43 in july.  </p>
<p>Yes, they did rise, but the magnitude is minute. To put that into context, Sub-prime resi default rates are in the 40+% range (thousands of basis points).</p>
<p>Of course, that is not to say CRE is rolling through this mess with no problems &#8211; depreciation is already occuring at an accelerated rate and there were plenty of hideous loans underwritten&#8230;but given the structure and dynamic of CRE vs. RESI, and also taking into account that deliquency rates are at historical lows (2007 vintage shows 0.19% deqlinq. rate), I am skeptical about believing that cmbs stress is more about fundamentals than it is about lack of market liquidity.</p>
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		<title>By: RK</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13344</link>
		<dc:creator>RK</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 12:16:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The Riverton story is not about the value of commercial property. It is about the morons at Wachovia, who knew bupkis about the rent regulation&lt;br/&gt;system, and the prospects for de-regulation, in NYC.&lt;br/&gt;I&#039;ve been a residential Manhattan landlord for 25 years&lt;br/&gt;in NYC, and the natural roll-over rate for regulated&lt;br/&gt;apts is 6% per annum or less, especially when the rents are well below market.  If you ever get bored, go&lt;br/&gt;spend a day in housing court.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Riverton story is not about the value of commercial property. It is about the morons at Wachovia, who knew bupkis about the rent regulation<br />system, and the prospects for de-regulation, in NYC.<br />I&#8217;ve been a residential Manhattan landlord for 25 years<br />in NYC, and the natural roll-over rate for regulated<br />apts is 6% per annum or less, especially when the rents are well below market.  If you ever get bored, go<br />spend a day in housing court.</p>
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		<title>By: Anonymous</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13334</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 05:24:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>This goes a step further:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;http://seattlerealestateresources.com/&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;You&#039;ve placed this great real estate deal under contract with the seller. You&#039;ve used either a purchase agreement or an option so that you have the right to buy the property at a pre-agreed price, for a specified duration of time (either the inspection period or option period depending on the type of paperwork you&#039;ve used). You have the right to assign your rights in your agreement to another investor for a fee. This will be your wholesale fee.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;After you gained control of the deal, you started to market it actively to your buyers list. Additionally, you are marketing it using yard signs (if you&#039;ve received permission to do so), CraigsList, direct mail to Absentee Owners, a classified ad in the newspaper and perhaps even flyers to neighbors.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Do I smell a new scam for flippers?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This goes a step further:</p>
<p><a href="http://seattlerealestateresources.com/" rel="nofollow">http://seattlerealestateresources.com/</a></p>
<p>You&#8217;ve placed this great real estate deal under contract with the seller. You&#8217;ve used either a purchase agreement or an option so that you have the right to buy the property at a pre-agreed price, for a specified duration of time (either the inspection period or option period depending on the type of paperwork you&#8217;ve used). You have the right to assign your rights in your agreement to another investor for a fee. This will be your wholesale fee.</p>
<p>After you gained control of the deal, you started to market it actively to your buyers list. Additionally, you are marketing it using yard signs (if you&#8217;ve received permission to do so), CraigsList, direct mail to Absentee Owners, a classified ad in the newspaper and perhaps even flyers to neighbors.</p>
<p>Do I smell a new scam for flippers?</p>
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		<title>By: Anonymous</title>
		<link>http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate.html#comment-13333</link>
		<dc:creator>Anonymous</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 05:17:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/08/quelle-surprise-commercial-real-estate-loans-looking-wobbly/#comment-13333</guid>
		<description>OT?  I wonder what happened to this siyuation?&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Re:  Zillow.com’s long-awaited mortgage lending service offers anonymous customized loan quotes to consumers, affording loan originators the opportunity to compete transparently for free mortgage leads&lt;br/&gt;http://www.bloodhoundrealty.com/BloodhoundBlog/?p=2884&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Consumers using Zillow’s new Mortgage Marketplace will be able to anonymously solicit bids for loans from participating lenders. The consumer will fill out a detailed form disclosing all pertinent financial details.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The form will be submitted anonymously to participating lenders, who will, in their turn, produce quasi-pro-forma loan quotes, submitting them, through Zillow, to the consumer. The consumer will then have the choice to make direct contact with particular lenders to decide whom to do business with.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>OT?  I wonder what happened to this siyuation?</p>
<p>Re:  Zillow.com’s long-awaited mortgage lending service offers anonymous customized loan quotes to consumers, affording loan originators the opportunity to compete transparently for free mortgage leads<br /><a href="http://www.bloodhoundrealty.com/BloodhoundBlog/?p=2884" rel="nofollow">http://www.bloodhoundrealty.com/BloodhoundBlog/?p=2884</a></p>
<p>Consumers using Zillow’s new Mortgage Marketplace will be able to anonymously solicit bids for loans from participating lenders. The consumer will fill out a detailed form disclosing all pertinent financial details.</p>
<p>The form will be submitted anonymously to participating lenders, who will, in their turn, produce quasi-pro-forma loan quotes, submitting them, through Zillow, to the consumer. The consumer will then have the choice to make direct contact with particular lenders to decide whom to do business with.</p>
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