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Saturday, May 24, 2008

Globalization and Network Power

Listen to this article I'm intrigued when a commentator gives high praise to a work by someone who comes from a political vantage different from his own. I get even more interested when another take on the same piece seems straight out of Rashomon, a radically different account with only a few facts in common.

The opus in question is a new book, Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization, by David Singh Grewal. It caught the attention of Christopher Caldwell of the Weekly Standard (who also writes regularly for the Financial Times), who gave it high marks, and Tyler Cowen, who was singularly unimpressed.

I have to say that although I have never mentioned him in this blog, I very much like Caldwell, and therefore am prejudiced in his favor. He often has a fresh perspective (which is hard in and of itself to pull off), is fair minded and well reasoned, and even when I don't agree with him, I have to give him credit for making a good case.

We'll get to the balance of Caldwell's article on the book in due course, but I want to give his description of what it's about versus Cowen's so you can see how they come from parallel universes. First, Caldwell in the Financial Times:

At the heart of globalisation is a basic, and politically explosive, mystery; globalisation proceeds through the breaking down of boundaries, the unfolding of diversity and freedom of choice – so why is it experienced by so many people as a constriction, an oppression and a loss of freedom? In a brilliant and subtle book*, a Harvard graduate student has solved this mystery – even if he has not solved the problem. David Singh Grewal believes the answer lies in something called “network power”. Networks are the means by which globalisation proceeds. All networks have standards embedded in them. In theory we can choose among the standards and become more free. In practice, Mr Grewal shows, our choices tend to narrow over time, so that standards are imposed on us.

Here is how it works. Networks tend to grow. As time passes, one of the most attractive things about a network will be simply that a large number of people have already chosen it. This is network power. Once a network reaches “critical mass”, Mr Grewal says, the incentives to join it can become irresistible. Certainly some standards are intrinsically better than others. “But as the network power of a standard grows,” Mr Grewal writes, “the intrinsic reasons why it should be adopted become less important relative to the extrinsic benefits of co-ordination that the standard can provide.” People defect from alternative networks. Eventually those alternatives disappear altogether. The choice of networks becomes a Hobson’s choice. You remain free to choose your network, but the distinction between choosing to join a network and being forced to join one is less evident.

Mr Grewal sees such a “merger of reason and force” in many areas, economic and non-economic – from the Windows operating system to the ISO 9000 standard of industrial control to Britain’s adoption of the metric system. Since English has become the first global lingua franca, many non-native speakers have freely chosen to speak it. But, for someone who wants to participate in the global economy – which is to say, the economy – to what extent is this really a choice?

Cowen is guardedly positive about the book. Yet (if you believe Caldwell's account), Cowen picked up on what appears to be a secondary thread as the focus of his comments:
Indeed, while this convergence in ways of thinking and living may extend to influence cultural forms like music or food, it need not necessarily do so. It is striking that in this moment of global integration producing massive convergence in economic, linguistic, and institutional standards, we should be so worried about restaurant chains and pop music, neglecting much more significant issues. Famously, Sigmund Freud argued that nationalist rivalries between neighboring countries reflected the "narcissism of minor differences," a pathological focus on relatively trivial distinctions driven by the desire to keep at bay an anxiety-provoking recognition of fundamental sameness.

That is from David Singh Grewal's Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization, one of the most interesting books on cultural globalization in recent years. He uses the ideas of social networks and peer effects to argue that widespread cultural convergence is occurring, most of all in ways of life. Here is the book's home page.

There is much wrong in the central thesis. "Ways of thinking" may be less diverse across countries (France is more like Germany than it used to be) but ways of thinking are now much more diverse within countries and in fact within the world as a whole. What's so special about having diversity distributed according to geographic or political criteria? ...

Nor is he capable of simply coming out and saying that lots of countries in the world *ought* to be doing more to emulate Anglo-American ways of thinking.

The following claim is also questionable:
To reshape or reduce the power that the social structures we create have over us, we can only summon the organized power of politics. The large-scale voluntarism of sociability, by contrast, has always delivered the most varied and elaborate forms of individual subjugation.

Cranky Tyler is about to come out of his shell, so maybe it is time to end this post. It's still a book worth reading and thinking about.

These may not be bad observations, but it appears that Cowen has mischaracterized what Grewal's main thrust is. Cowen appears to have been set off by the mention of socio-cultural issues, which seems a comparatively minor aspect of Caldwell's reading (as in, having to conduct business in English, a second language for most of the world's population, requires years of effort to attain reasonable competence and is a bloody nuisance, but given our world's Tower of Babel, any lingua franca will inconvenience many. But I don't see American cultural influence stemming from that but from the fact that the film industry was born in Hollywood and still has a considerable scale advantage).

Guess this means we all have to read the book to see who got it right.

Grewal indirectly gives support to one of Dani Rodrik's notions, that globalization presents a trilemma. You can have any two of democracy, national sovereignty and global economic integration, but you cannot have all three at once. The notion of network power is a detailed working through of how networks, which are both a force for and an element of international economic integration, are at odds with local/national power structures (e.g., the EU's ongoing battles to get Microsoft to comply with its anti-trust rules).

From the balance of Caldwell's article:
Networks, Mr Grewal believes, can impinge on our political autonomy, channelling it into situations where dissent is possible but pointless. Although people enter them freely, networks, like political systems, can bias outcomes. A new order can be camouflaged as a broadening of options. Networks vary along three dimensions, Mr Grewal thinks: “compatibility” (with other networks); “availability” (openness); and “malleability”. They tend to be open and compatible in the early stages, and open and incompatible in the later ones.

The transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organisation in the mid-1990s demonstrates this process, Mr Grewal believes. The logic of the WTO’s core principle of non-discrimination among trade partners gives the body and authority that goes far beyond regulating trade, into areas of domestic policy that were protected by sovereignty under Gatt. Mr Grewal does not deny that there are intrinsic efficiencies to a transparent and uniform trading standard. But he believes that most countries join the WTO for the extrinsic benefits of participating in the network, and find the standard the network upholds intrinsically undesirable.

Mr Grewal nails his own anti-capitalist colours firmly to the mast. But his political engagements never outrun his diagnoses. Network Power leans on Marx, Keynes and the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, to examine the more general problem of “power structures” – how power can be exercised over people even when no one is visibly giving orders. But he avoids attributing network power to “false consciousness” – the Marxian idea that people are easily fooled out of knowing their own interest. Indeed, he grants that most standards are the product of consent, although of a funny kind. “One of the interesting things about globalisation is the extent to which people consent to structures that are consciously and explicitly viewed as undesirable.”

This is a patient and powerful argument. The book’s concepts are presented with such extreme theoretical clarity that all readers, even those who do not share Grewal’s commitment to trammelling global capitalism, will be able to deploy his insights to other ends. What network-power effects explain the sudden spread of anti-smoking activism? How was the US institution of the Social Security number transformed into a financial tracking system? Is “political correctness” just old-fashioned cant or does it draw a sinister new force from network power?

Mr Grewal calls for a reassertion of democratic sovereignty to counter the unintended (and undesired) consequences of network choices. But he admits that the political solutions to network power are not yet obvious. Networks are transnational, while politics remains national, and Mr Grewal does not consider global government either feasible or (as far as one can tell) desirable. What is valuable about this book is its diagnosis, not its prescriptions. It may be the richest and most hard-headed explanation yet of the relationship between globalisation and diversity. Clearly the two are closely related. Since there seems to be more variety right in front of our noses than there was in the world of our parents, we are tempted to think globalisation has fostered diversity. But this is an optical illusion. Globalisation merely reveals diversity that was already there. It flushes diversity out from the places it was hidden, much as a hunter flushes his quarry out of a thicket, and to similar effect.

Senior Bear Departures: Signs of Valuation Headaches for JP Morgan?

Listen to this article When the consensus was that JP Morgan got a screaming deal in its acquisition of Bear Stearns, I thought it was way too early to make that call. Yes, it certainly looked like the New York bank pulled a master stroke in getting the Fed to eat $29 billion of exposures, guaranteed to be the worst stuff that Morgan could hoover up.

But Bear also had a very large derivatives book, and as we well know, was a large credit default swaps protection writer. Those contracts are traded bi-laterally; JPM would not have particularly strong insights (its role as Bear's clearing bank wouldn't be of much help) and a mere weekend was clearly not enough time to do more than have a few key questions answered in the heat of putting a deal together. Similarly, Bear had two valuable assets: its headquarters building and its prime brokerage operation. The building, though still a good investment, will be worth less as Wall Street fires more people and Class A vacancies rise. Moreover, Bear was losing market share in prime brokerage, and in a period of deleveraging, it's the riskiest exposures that get cut deepest (and don't kid yourself, the real money in prime brokerage is in the lending).

So just as Bank of America's once touted deal with Countrywide looks like it will turn out to be a slow-motion train wreck, the Bear deal has the potential to be a millstone rather than an asset to JP Morgan.

A further sign that all is not well in former Bear-land is the sudden exodus of two former executives who were given very senior roles at Morgan. I came across this story by happenstance; it was broken by the Financial Times on a holiday weekend at 11:11 PM EDT (no coverage on any other outlets covered by Google News, nor on a search of the big financial blogs). So the pair was evidently forced out Friday to minimize press notice. And the article makes clear that mortgage valuations played a role in their removal.

These departures could be the result of bigger-than-expected Bear-related writedowns; in other words, this may merely be another aspect of a problem that has already been disclosed. But the way this was handled is highly sus, as the Australians would say. Don't be surprised if more shoes drop at JP Morgan.

From the Financial Times:

Two senior Bear Stearns executives who moved to senior positions at JPMorgan Chase just weeks ago are leaving the bank.

The departure of Jeff Mayer and Craig Overlander comes amid questions about the value of the Bear Stearns mortgage book. The two men had been in charge of the fixed income department at Bear Stearns and were named vice-chairmen of JPMorgan’s investment bank soon after it agreed to buy Bear Stearns in mid-March. The promotion of the pair was seen as a sign of JPMorgan’s commitment to integrating Bear Stearns staff.

But they are leaving, partly because of problems with Bear’s mortgage portfolio. Their departure “is not exclusively because of marks on the mortgage book,” according to a person familiar with the matter, who added “there were plenty of other people involved with that.”

A JPMorgan internal announcement from Steve Black and Bill Winters, who run the investment bank, said: “Jeff Mayer and Craig Overlander have let us know that they plan to leave the company.”

Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s chairman and chief executive, said last week that it would take a one-off charge of $9bn to cover the losses at Bear, as well as potential litigation costs, and severance and retention payments. That number is about 50 per cent more than its original estimate of the cost of the take-over. Mr Dimon said the higher costs were driven by losses and a bigger than expected amount of bad assets on Bear’s balance sheet.

Update 3:45 AM: Alert reader Steve wrote to tell me another shoe has already dropped, and has been curiously gone largely unnoticed. JP Morgan's option to buy the headquarters is being contested by the ground lease holder. This is a huge oversight. I can't imagine someone at Bear didn't know that this is the sort of thing that its acquirer would want to know, but hey, you pay a knocked-down price in haste, it's your obligation to know what exactly you are getting. At a minimum, this is pretty embarrassing. I assume that the bank will have to pay the plaintiff to go away. Wonder if they'll be able to avoid disclosing the amount.

This story ran in Reuters on Thursday:
In the lawsuit, filed in New York state court, 383 Madison LLC claimed that under a ground lease Bear used for the property, 383 Madison was supposed to be given an opportunity to buy the building if Bear ever considered selling it.

In March, when JPMorgan offered to buy Bear Stearns, it was given an option to purchase the Bear Stearns building for $1.1 billion, even if the deal were to fall apart....

383 Madison claimed Bear committed itself to scenarios under which it would sell the building to JPMorgan without even attempting to give the land owner notice of the agreement or engage in negotiations with it. It also claimed JPMorgan ignored the company's rights under the ground lease.

"JPMorgan wrongfully and intentionally induced Bear Stearns to breach the Ground Lease and the Right of first offer for its own personal gain," the suit claims. The land owner is seeking the right to acquire Bear Stearns' interest in the building or because it believes the building is worth more than $1.1 billion it is asking for the fair market value of the building above that price, according to the lawsuit.

Links and Quick Takes 5/24/08

Listen to this article Vast cracks appear in Arctic ice BBC

Wolf whistle works, woman strips Reuters

Earth would be very happy without humans Telegraph

How the US dream foundered in Iraq MIchael Schwartz, Asia Times. If you have time for only one item, read this. A revealing, and not too long article, that gives a very different account than the one presented in the US media.

OCC Chief Warns on Second Liens Housing Wire

The Khaki Letter Long or Short Capital

Time to do something about oil Mark Hutchinson, Prudent Bear. Key section:

Whatever the views of the IEA, it should be clear that the recent rise in oil prices is not driven by fundamentals. Economists differ about the price elasticity of oil, but the lowest plausible estimates for short term price elasticity are around 10%, with medium term elasticity being much higher. Thus if oil legend T. Boone Pickens is right that oil supplies are currently 85 million barrels per day and oil demand is 87 million, that is a supply shortfall of 2.4%, which at a 10% elasticity should produce a price increase of 24%, not 60%.

270 Illegal Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push New York Times. The proceedings were a kangaroo court. This ends-justify-the-means practice is both scary and depressing. A compelling argument for respecting the confines of law comes from Roger Bolt's screenplay about Thomas More, A Man for All Seasons:
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get at the Devil?

Roper: I`d cut down every law in England to do that.

More: Oh! (advances on Roper) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you --where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? (He leaves him) This country’s planted thick with laws --man's laws, not God's --and if you cut them down --and you’re just the man to do it --d`you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I`d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety`s sake.


Antidote du jour:

Monoline Death Watch: FASB Imposes Strict Rules On Loss Reserves

Listen to this article For those who remember the "monolines on the ropes" days, one of the big bones of contention between critics like Bill Ackman of Pershing Square and industry executives was how to account for the fact that the risks of default on the guarantees the companies had made had increased. Ackman used a conservative mark to market approach and concluded that the big bond insurers, MBIA and Ambac, needed a great deal of additional equity; the companies contented that Ackman was all wet, their contracts did not call for the losses to be paid until well off in the future, and the value impairment was far less than the shorts claimed.

While the industry's accounting standards are far more permissive regarding impaired credits than that of the banking or securities industry, some of that freedom was whittled away today. Before, remarkably, a bond insurer was not required to increase reserves against a bond guarantee until an event of default, even if there was clear evidence that the credit had deteriorated. Now, moving somewhat closer to practices in other financial institutions, the monolines must increase reserves upon evidence of a rise in repayment risk.

Both Bloomberg and Reuters provided reports. From Bloomberg:

MBIA Inc., Ambac Financial Group Inc. and the rest of the bond insurance industry will have to disclose troubled securities they insured and set aside money for them sooner under new accounting rules.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board will require bond insurers to recognize a claim liability when there is evidence of credit deterioration, rather than waiting for a default, according to a statement today on the group's Web site. Bond insurers also will be required to disclose securities on their watch lists and provide more information about risk management...

``It will be less of a wait-and-see approach,'' according to Russell Golden, Director of Technical Application and Implementation Activities at FASB. ``The increase in liabilities will be more commensurate with the increase in credit risk on the underlying exposure.''

MBIA fell 67 cents, or 8.3 percent, to $7.37 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading, after declining 89 percent in the past year. Ambac, down 97 percent in the past year, fell 17 cents, or 5 percent, to $3.22.

The rules, known as FASB Statement No. 163, Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance Contracts, are effective for fiscal years that begin after Dec. 15, FASB said. Expanded disclosure on risk management activities is required for the first reporting period after the release...

Bond insurers have used different methods to reserve against claims, making comparisons across the industry difficult, FASB said. Some insurers set aside reserves based on a percentage of premiums received during a period while others reserved based on a drop in the credit ratings of specific bonds they back.

The statement also standardizes how bond insurers are to recognize premium revenue, said Golden...

At least some bond insurers currently set aside reserves only when they believe they can estimate the losses, and the losses are likely to take place. The new rule would force those insurers to set aside money sooner.

Friday, May 23, 2008

"Power Failure on Wall Street"

Listen to this article I am overdue on a write-up of a great panel discussion hosted by the folks at RGE Monitor (Nouriel Roubini's blog/news service). It was all fundamentally oriented, so with the coming holiday weekend and lack of new news, you will not be any worse off for my delay (although I am annoyed that I haven't gotten round to it). Do check back for it.

In the meantime, a lovely post by Tim Price (of The Price of Everything) on the perversities of markets:

One of the innumerable problems with Wall Street and the City is that they never do seem to learn from their mistakes....Each generation seems obligated to re-experience the errors of its predecessors. There is little or no ‘race memory’ that might at least mean that this year’s crisis is brand new rather than a tired retread of past embarrassments.

And while Wall Street typically shies away from overly intrusive questions, it certainly seems to have all the answers. Where is the oil price headed ? $141 a barrel during the second half of 2008, according to Arjun Murti of Goldman Sachs. (Could Goldman Sachs possibly have any material interest in oil trading ?) Because Mr. Murti was also behind a prediction for higher oil prices in 2005, his apparent ability to foresee the future has led to his universal resource market canonization in the financial press. Actually, the target is $150, says T. Boone Pickens, another presumably disinterested oil trader. The last time we saw this kind of easy momentum-chasing and price target leapfrogging was during the dotcom boom....and it did not end well. As the analysts at McCall, Aitken, McKenzie have suggested, welcome to “dot.oil”.

The difficulty with commodities prices, as Bloomberg’s Caroline Baum recently pointed out, is that unlike more traditional financial instruments such as stocks or bonds, there is no fundamental yardstick of value:

“..metrics that allow us to quantify the degree to which prices have strayed from their fundamental moorings. Stock prices have an historical relationship with underlying earnings. House prices don’t stray too far from their “earnings” stream, or rental value.. With commodities, no such quantifiable ratio exists.”

So in assessing the valuation of commodities and natural resource prices, we are all left orienteering in the fog. Patrick Perret-Green of Citigroup has at least tried to square this circle using behavioural finance techniques. In his occasional ‘Chart of Shame’ he archly compares markets that have experienced classic booms and busts with contenders for the Emperor’s new clothes. Back in January he cheekily overlaid a chart of the Nikkei (grotesque peak in 1989), Nasdaq (grotesque peak in 2000), the Saudi Tadawul All Share Index (grotesque peak in 2006) and the Shanghai Composite (grotesque-looking peak in, erm, late 2007). Chinese stocks have obediently collapsed since then. One swallow, of course, doesn’t make a Murti. Last week, Patrick somewhat ominously updated the ‘Chart of Shame’ but with the FTSE 350 Mining Index as the ‘bubble’ candidate.

As anyone who holds mining stocks will confirm, the sector dutifully collapsed, albeit in the short run....

What makes markets so intriguing today is that equities seem largely immune to a combination of $120+ oil, softening housing markets and a likely collapse in western consumer spending. Arguing that several trillion currently either sheltering in money market funds or rapidly accumulating thanks to petrodollar wealth in sovereign wealth funds will ride in to support stock markets (a.k.a. greater fool theory) only logically goes so far in the face of such sizeable challenges. But some confusing short-term resilience on the part of stock markets does not invalidate the need for caution, it rather reinforces the need for patience. On a separate note, James Ferguson of Pali asks whether it might be time to commit heresy and talk, not of $200 oil (or $1000 oil, has anyone on Wall Street tried that yet ?), but merely $100 oil ? “The last three times, in the 7-year bull run that West Texas Intermediate (crude) has enjoyed, that the oil price got more than two standard deviations above trend, it precipitated an almost immediate profit-taking that resulted in an average -28% drop.” Wall Street’s venal salesmanship and management of subprime goes some way to underpinning its credibility in other markets, so its bandwagon-chasing on oil can be largely discounted on fundamental trustworthiness. The bigger question is how long equity markets can hold their poise in the face of the world’s mounting unbalances, and that question touches on government bond valuations too in the face of the smoke of the battle around inflation.

Sir Francis Bacon once wrote:
If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in certainties.

In the face of almost insurmountable doubts (over likely economic slowdown, the impact on consumer confidence of softening residential property prices, the robustness of Asian fundamentals in the face of the ongoing commodity rally, the impact of $130+ oil, and the health of government bond markets given growing doubts over the under-reporting of inflationary pressures) it makes absolute sense to assume ongoing and substantial macro uncertainties....Unfortunately, an especially discredited Wall Street establishment now has peculiarly weak authority in either recommending appropriate strategies or taking advantage of the resultant dislocations in markets. Happily, evolutions in financial products and the rapid democratisation of more sophisticated investment vehicles make it easier for independent asset managers and private individuals to try and resolve these questions for themselves, rather than simply overpaying to engage with a mountain of conflicted interests.

Commodities Spike: Vote of No Confidence in Central Bankers?

Listen to this article Steve Waldman, in a colorful post, "A run on central banks?" contends that the rapid rise of commodities prices isn't the result of mundane factors like negative real interest rates, but a more fundamental cause: loss of faith in the monetary authorities:

Just as the fear of a bank's insolvency can precipitate a run that drives a bank to ruin, loss of confidence in a central bank can provoke a great inflation. The Federal Reserve, much I might criticize it, has not gone on a printing spree.... The Fed's actions are best described as antideflationary, not inflationary.

But confidence is a funny thing. Central bankers are supposed to be dour and dependable. The current crop is not... Japan's central bankers hand out Yen like free acid. China's guy will give you a microwave oven and a DVD player if you draw him a picture (and sign Henry Paulson's name to it). Our man Ben is an Amadeus-cum-Macguyver, he's brilliant, unpredictable, he'll improvise a Delaware company from paper clips and vacuum up your derivative book with a toenail clipper. Even the ECB's Trichet, who at first comes off like a sourpuss, turns out to be alright, when you've got some Spanish mortgages to pawn....

So, we lose faith. When we lost faith in Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, or Lehman, the central bankers stepped into the fray, and stood behind them. So, we ask, who stands behind the central bankers? We take a peek, and all we see is our own money. Which we quickly start exchanging for something else.

Although commodity prices have been increasing for years, you'll notice that the very sharp run-up began last summer, at roughly the same time as the credit crisis. Commodities soared when interest rates were still high, but predicted to fall. Commodities are soaring today, even though US interest rates are now predicted to rise. Commodities have soared in euro terms, despite the ECB's refusal to drop interest rates.

This commodities run-up (at least as of 2008) has had the quality of not adding up. The fundamentals are not a sufficient explanation for the velocity of the move. The hype, the desperation, the conviction seem out of proportion to the underlying facts (save in some agricultural commodities). A Journal story today gives indications in the oil market of actions consistent with a price overshoot: inventory accumulation (China and airlines), traders unwinding misplaced bets, leading to further upwards price pressure. Similarly, the predictably contrary Ambrose Evans-Pritchard provides evidence that relief on the supply side is coming sooner than expected. Waldman is right that there is something more at work here.

But is lack of faith in central bankers, as much as it makes for great phrase-making, the best way to frame this? What we are seeing is a large-scale repudiation of financial assets. US stocks have been less badly hit; indeed, the real train wrecks have been in OTC markets.

In a weird way, belief in an inflationary scenario (which is the assumption underlying a commodities run-up, that is, if you accept the speculative hypothesis) reveals a limited degree of trust in central bankers. Investors believe Bernanke will ward off deflation; they see the overhang of debt to GDP and assume inflation is the only way out. Either Bernanke will inflate to diminish the real value of the liabilities, or many of these will effectively be moved over to the Federal government's balance sheet, and the resulting fiscal deficits will be inflationary.

But consider: narrow money supply growth has been negative, despite the Fed's aggressive cuts. M3 growth has been very high, due to movement of funds into deposits (that is consistent with general risk aversion and perhaps also deflationary fears). The Fed's monetary options are severely constrained at this juncture. Even if you use a magic wand and wave away inflation worries, the Fed can cut at most another 1%. It isn't willing to go into zero nominal interest rate territory. There have been some weak Treasury auctions on the longer end of the yield curve. Even if the Fed were to cut interest rates down the road, any rise in long rates would neutralize its effect via their effects on mortgage markets. Thus the Fed may not be able to provide enough easing to ward off deflation. A re-run of Japan's experience (with complications due to our lack of savings) is not out of the question.

So many investors are looking into a chasm. It's not the mind-focusing abyss of mid-March, of possible major meltdown of the financial system (although that danger is still lurking in the background with the credit default swaps market). It's that they are unmoored. What they know how to do, what they trust, no longer seems to work. Run to commodities? If you think we are going to have stagflation, that's a simple move in this unsettled environment that makes sense. Run to cash until the smoke clears? That sounds like a good precaution. Buy stocks on dips? Sure, Greenspan provided deep conditioning for that reflex (and hey, even in bad markets, there are always good stocks, right?)

But most investors are in denial about unpleasant truths:
1. Financial assets are far riskier than the press, the textbooks, and conventional methodologies indicate. The models that the pros use are based on assumptions that are fundamentally flawed. The dangers of the erroneous belief that financial assets are safe is now being revealed.

2. The people who control the markets (the intermediaries) have their own, and not the publics', best interest at heart. Due to the proliferation of OTC markets and the value of assets involved, they cannot be dispensed with. And the regulators lack the skill and will to ride herd on them. As Keynes remarked,
When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.

We see ample evidence of that problem, yet seem to lack a way out.

So in a way, these gnawing issues do come around to Waldman's point. In times of crisis, people look to leaders for guidance. But in our prevailing doctrine of free markets, there are no leaders, just agents interacting in ways purported to produce virtuous outcomes. And the parties who ought to step into the breach fail to understand the need for that role right now. That is why an old fashioned (and very tall) banker like Volcker is so reassuring. He handled a crisis; he's not afraid to take the reins or say things are bad and changes are needed.

We are at the end of a paradigm: large scale OTC markets, lightly regulated players and instruments, dollar as reserve currency, US as the most important global economic actors. Waldman is good here:
People are losing faith in financial assets for good reason. Rather than organizing productive economies, the machinery of finance has recently functioned as an anesthetic, masking the pain while resources were mismanaged and stolen. We need a solid financial system, but confidence cannot be imposed or legislated. It will have to be earned. There has to be a plan.

But Yeats is better:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

So We Now Hear Renters Are Bad People (Own to Rent Edition)

Listen to this article Kevin Funnell at Bank Laywer's Blog fulminates about an idea to deal with the burgeoning homeowner debt crisis, namely a proposal by House Representative Raúl M. Grijalva based on (but different in some key respects) from a Dean Baker proposal called "own to rent".

While there are problems with the idea, there is more than a germ of something useful here, but Funnell resorts to harrumphing and class snobbery rather than deal with the plan substantively.

The House bill is worse than Baker's suggestion. Baker wanted homeowners facing foreclosure to be offered the option of continuing as tenants as long as they want at a "fair market rate" as determined by appraisal. The shortfall of Baker's proposal is that the tenant has an openended right to remain, and the rent adjustment is not to a "fair market" rate but based on local market inflation. Thus the proposal looks a great deal like rent stabilization in New York City. (We'll return to why even that may not be as bad as that appears in due course).

The problem is that the bank-as-landlord now has no security. True, someone who bought a home and presumably fixed it up a bit (at a minimum curtains) won't be as casual as a typical renter would be. I might tweak the proposal to give the tenant a somewhat better deal if they put up a one-month deposit over time, and had the lease renewals go to a true market rate rent, not inflation indexed from the base rent.

But as ideas go, this isn't a bad one (and it turns out some conservative economists support it). The bank was going to wind up owning the property anyhow. This move saves them the considerable expense of foreclosure (reported to commonly be $50,000) and gets them cash flow right away. It saves them the hassle of disposal in a down market and the burden of certain aspects of property maintenance (the tenant will mow the lawn). It also prevents the specter, which is apparently happening in some neighborhoods, of empty properties creating an image of desperation (highly damaging to the sales process) and in some cases, squatters moving in.

It is also simpler than a mod (you offer the tenant the rental deal and it's go or no go rather than having to see what you can do given the homeowner's financial state). In areas with strong renter protection (like the communist city of New York) you might get them to agree in the rent agreement to accelerated eviction in the case they miss more than two or three rent payments (note in some places they can't be waived but a lot of tenants won't know that and will comply with an eviction notice).

Now how does the House bill screw this up? Ironically, the critics get bent out of shape with the rent control aspects, when the real fly in the ointment with the House version (as reported in Housing Wire) is that the homeowner has to have had his mortgage foreclosed. He can then petition the judge to stay.

Lovely. This is a lose-lose. The bank will have incurred all those foreclosure expenses, the now-former owner has to incur costs of his own to file to get the rental offer, and has had his already-bad credit record completely trashed by the foreclosure. And the indignities of the foreclosure process guarantees he will not have a good relationship with his new landlord. The original Baker process might leave the former owner feeling good that he was able to stay in his home and neighborhood; good will is likely to produce good behavior. Having the homeowner have to endure the foreclosure process to win the right to rent will assure acrimony and increase the odds of the property being trashed upon vacancy.

But what is Funnell's main objection? Renters are bad for neighborhoods:

it's not been my personal experience that "home renters" save a single family neighborhood; it's "home owners" who do that. The value of emotional pride of "ownership" should not be underestimated, nor should the fact that ensuring that upkeep, maintenance and repairs are performed promptly as needed protects the owner's monetary investment in the home. The worst neighbors I've had have been renters of single family homes situated in neighborhoods consisting primarily of owner-occupied houses.

Let's look at the logic here, It's "Ownership Society" plain and simple. Those who own homes are responsible and take good care of it; mere tenants are low-lifes and bad for property values.

And what's the basis for his assertion? Funnell's experience with some (perhaps as few as one) bad neighbors.

Gee, when I was growing up, we moved a lot. Once we had to rent because no suitable homes were available for purchase. And the home we rented was not only in a neighborhood of primarily owner-occupied homes, it was the best neighborhood in that town. And we didn't undergo a behavior change and trash the house because we were tenants. In fact, my mother re-did the downstairs half bath and papered the walls in one of the bedrooms without a concession from the landlord (she did get approval).

I've been a tenant and homeowner myself, and have also been a landlord. I happen to live in New York where a lot of people rent. I have friends in other cities who are landlords of residential property as well as some who are tenants in precisely the same sort of neighborhood that Funnell claims are damaged by renters.

My observations (and yes, this is anecdotal):
1. I've never heard anyone complain about "they trashed the property" tenant problems or that they neglected routine care you'd expect of a tenant. Deposits are good insurance against that. (The big issue is that tenants are sometime late in payments, but from what I have heard, small commercial tenants are worse in that regard than residential).

2. I've rented my apartment furnished (my own stuff, which is very nice, while I was overseas). An now-ex friend did more damage staying there for two weeks than two tenants did in a two-year period.

3. People are house-proud whether they own or rent. Yes, a renter will focus his expenditures on things he will take with him, but people who are slovenly will live in a slovenly fashion whether they own or rent.

My other observation is that rent stabilization is not the disaster to property owners that opponents like to say it is. Yes, landlords don't get the upside they would with market rents. so they do face an opportunity loss. But guess what? Give people property rights, and they act like they have property rights.

For instance, I know of two buildings in the area (Upper East Side on or near Park). One has quite a few rent stabilized apartments; the other has some rent controlled units (for rent control, the increases are more restricted than in rent stabilization). As long as the tenant is current on the rent in either setting, he is guaranteed a lease renewal (indeed, the tenancy rights can be passed to immediate family members).

Consider these examples: one tenant painted the entire apartment, re-did the floors, and put a new (fancy) refrigerator in the kitchen. One put in marble floors and new carpeting; another redid the wood floors, re-did the bath (including marble floors and tile), put in marble in the entryway and kitchen, put in new light fixtures, and re-did all the walls (paper or wall treatments). One re-did an entire three-bedroom apartment, which included entirely new kitchen with steel counters, new library (with built in wooden bookcases), new wooden herringbone flooring, new pocket doors with frosted glass (she reports the cost at over $1 million). Yes, these were all in rentals. I know other tenants in both buildings have made considerable improvements; I just don't have the details.

True to what you'd expect with rent control or rent stabilization, the public spaces in these two buildings are pretty dreary. And in at least one of these buildings, I am told that the landlord makes no effort to decontrol the rent stabilized apartments (once the rent exceeds $2,000 a month, the landlord can attempt to destablize the apartment). In other words, the owner likes having established tenants who pay reliably even if he might in theory be able to extract more (and yes, this is an old New York landlord who owns a massive office building on Park midtown, plus other rental buildings, not a bleeding heart who inherited a building).

That suggests in other settings where tenants have strong protection of their property rights and know they have a deal, they too might (contrary to popular image) act in an owner-like fashion. They may not have the disposable income that Manhattanites do to throw money at the problem, but they might do more than one would anticipate via Home Depot and elbow grease (note that I am NOT advocating the rent control aspects of the Baker proposal, but am merely pointing out that some elements of the critique are overdone).

That is a very long winded way of saying be careful about casting aspersions on renters and renting.

Links 5/23/08

Listen to this article Sharks swim closer to extinction BBC

iPhone line forms at Apple's flagship for absolutely no reason engadget

U.S. corporations massively read employee e-mail Help Net Security

Credit monopolies harm lenders and borrowers International Financial Law Review. Bobo7874 put a link to this article in comments yesterday, with this query:

I would like to hear what posters have to say about these articles by Frederick Feldkamp, suggesting that SEC and FASB rules giving big brokers and banks an advantage in doing securitizations, increase credit spreads to the detriment of the larger economy. He's got graphs showing correlation between the enactment of various rules and increases or decreases in credit spreads.

Hmmmmm? Bill Gross. The Pimco chief says US inflation stats are baloney, and points to three culprits: the use of hedonic adjustments, owner-equivalent rent, and geometric weighting/product substitution

Karl Marx Was All For Free Trade International Political Economy Zone

"The Church versus the Mall" Mark Thoma

Antidote du jour. In my youth, I had a paper route, and often saw raccoons dive into the storm sewers when I trundled by. But I would always get the rear end view.

Thursday, May 22, 2008

"Oil Declines More Than $2 a Barrel on Signs Rally Unjustified "

Listen to this article You gotta love how the reporting follows the tape. While oil prices were shooting up, the Goldman forecast and supporting views were getting the prime real estate in news coverage. Now with a reversion, the contrary and cautionary views are getting airtime.

From Bloomberg:

Crude oil fell more than $2 a barrel on signs that a 15 percent increase in prices this month isn't justified by stockpiles and demand.

Consumption averaged 20.3 million barrels a day in the past four weeks, down 1.3 percent from a year earlier, the Energy Department said yesterday. Prices climbed above $135 a barrel today as OPEC ministers said they could do nothing to prevent higher prices because they are pumping at capacity.

``The fundamentals justify a price between $80 and $100,'' said Sarah Emerson, managing director of Energy Security Analysis Inc., a consulting firm in Wakefield, Massachusetts. ``The run-up in prices has more to do with institutional investors coming into the market. There's nothing to discourage them from doing so because the returns have been so high.''

Crude oil for July delivery fell $2.36, or 1.8 percent, to settle at $130.81 a barrel at 2:46 p.m. on the New York Mercantile Exchange after reaching a record $135.09. It was the biggest one-day drop in three weeks. Prices have more than doubled over the past year.

``Even a bull market has to consolidate at some point and it looks like that's what's happening today,'' said Addison Armstrong, director of market research at TFS Energy LLC in Stamford, Connecticut.

Brent crude oil for July settlement declined $2.19, or 1.7 percent, to settle at $130.51 a barrel on London's ICE Futures Europe exchange. The contract touched a record $135.14 today.

`You have to be bullish until we see a much bigger pullback than is occurring today, and when that happens we will be looking for a correction, nothing more,'' said Eric Wittenauer, an energy analyst at Wachovia Securities in St. Louis.

Investors looking for higher returns moved to commodity markets over the past year because they outperformed stocks. The Standard & Poor's 500 Index declined 8.6 percent from a year ago to 1,393.59. The Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 6.7 percent to 12,630.83 during the same period.

``The recent surge is a function of short covering in the market,'' Wittenauer said. ``We are giving back some of this gain, but it's too early to call a top to the market.''

Traders who are ``short'' are betting on a decline. They need to purchase contracts to close out their short positions.

``We are not in charge anymore,'' Shokri Ghanem, Libya's top oil official, told Bloomberg Television today.

Short Covering Helps Fuel Oil Price Rise to $135 a Barrel

Listen to this article Not only do recent trading patterns suggest short covering played a role in the recent oil price spike, but declining open interest also says new money is holding off entering after such a fast runup.

From Bloomberg:

Oil's rally to a record above $135 a barrel came as traders bought crude to cover wrong-way bets that prices would decline, according to data from the New York Mercantile Exchange.

The number of outstanding futures contracts, known as open interest, fell 8.1 percent in a week to 1.36 million at the same time that prices rose 2.6 percent, the data show. Falling open interest and rising prices are signs that traders are buying to exit so-called short positions that would profit if oil fell, and lose money as they rose.

``In a market like today, which is trending higher while open interest is falling, it's a sign that money is moving out of the market,'' said Stephen Schork, president of Schork Group Inc. in Villanova, Pennsylvania. Open interest in Nymex crude futures peaked this year at 1.5 million on March 13....

Open interest has been sliding for months, after the number of outstanding crude futures reached a record 1.58 million on July 16, 2007.

``It is not a growing market, it is a shrinking market in terms of open interest,'' said Olivier Jakob, managing director of Petromatrix Gmbh in Zug, Swizterland. ``It is also facilitating the move upward.''

Oil prices have closed at record highs on 27 days so far this year, prompting OPEC oil ministers including Saudi Arabia's Ali al-Naimi to declare that the rally is led by investors, rather than a shortage of supply.

LInks 5/22/08

Listen to this article Japan to probe whale meat 'theft' BBC. The fraud of Japanese whaling as research is being exposed. Willem Buiter wants to save the Icelandic whales.

A Modest Glass of Wine Each Day Could Improve Liver Health PhysOrg

How to Devalue Your Brand, Greg Mankiw Version Ken Houghton, Angry Bear

The next (but not new) frontier for sovereign default Carmen Reinhart, VoxEU. Another intriguing finding of her and Kenneth Rogoff's study of 300 years of financial crises (although she could take this data series back only to 1914).

The Systemic Effects of Countrywide Going Bust… Nouriel Roubini

Seniorage Profits: Fed Edition Alea

Foreclosures and More Bankruptcy Filings Bob Lawless, Credit Slips

Raise Margin Requirements NOW! Cassandra Does Tokyo. As always, apt and funny.

Antidote du jour:

Sale of Bank Hapoalim MBS Portfolio Says Prevailing Valuations Too High

Listen to this article Reader Baruch sent us this tidbit from Reuters: Bank Hapoalim, the second largest bank in Israel, sold its entire portfolio of MBS to Pimco for 75 cents on an already-written-dollar (or in this case, shekel). Note that the previous writedowns were at least $90 million on an portfolio valued before the sale at $3.42 billion.

Now why is this significant? Per a report to the London Stock Exchange on March 8, the Bank indicated that its portfolio was almost entirely AAA:

All of the securities in the MBS portfolio of the Bank are rated AAA by the international rating agencies, except for the following: MBS amounting to 60 million US Dollars (this refers to MBS guaranteed by the insurance company FGIC) the rating of which has recently been lowered by the international rating agencies from the level of AAA to A and one MBS amounting to 5 million US Dollars rated AA which was originally purchased with that rating. In addition, MBS amounting to 302 million US Dollars rated AAA are on watch lists of the rating agencies.

Amusingly, the Bank also said that even using "severe" stress tests, the losses expected on its roughly $3.5 billion portfolio should be less than 10%:
Based on the model supplied by the company, the Bank applied an even more severe scenario in which housing prices in the USA (excluding California and Florida) fell by about 30% from their peak (by 22% when compared with the present price level) and in California and Florida by about 40% from their peak (by 28% when compared with the present price level). Given such an severe scenario and assuming that the rate of default by mortgage takers will be about 47%, the accumulated loss from the portfolio is liable to reach about 340 million US Dollars over the life span of the securities. It should be noted that this test referred to the same portion of the portfolio that was tested by the company. It should be noted that the losses calculated in all of the scenarios do not take into account the annual income (after deducting the cost of financing the portfolio) which the Bank is expected to record in the future on account of the MBS portfolio and which is estimated at about 20 million US Dollars per year. Given the average life span of the securities foreseen at the present time, of about 7 years, such income is expected to exceed 100 million US Dollars.

So we have a 25.5% writedown on a portfolio already reduced by at least 2.5%, and you get a net value of roughly 72.7% of original face value.

Contrast this with the marks assigned by US and European banks to AAA-rated MBS from a Morgan Stanley report dated May 13 (click to enlarge):

International Energy Agency to Try to Gather Supply Data It Won't Get (And Other Oil Information Gaps)

Listen to this article The headline above is perhaps the most important message contained in the front page Wall Street Journal article, "Energy Watchdog Warns Of Oil-Production Crunch." Well, in fairness, it may rank as important as the thrust of the article, which is that the IEA, which recently had predicted that oil supplies would be able to more or less keep up with rising demand, now has taken a gloomier view and intends to survey oil producing nations to get a better handle on supply.

Um, that is tantamount to saying that if it is right now, the IEA was plenty wrong before. It also says that the agency tends to hew with conventional wisdom. Oil prices start rising, and then it goes out to try to survey supply. Hhhm.

Why am I so deeply cynical? Because, as the article points out, the IEA simply can't get the information it needs to make forecasts with any reasonable degree of accuracy. Now if the IEA admitted the fact that you could drive a truck through its estimates, I'd have a lot more respect for this exercise. As a management consultant/sometimes special situations analyst, I frequently have to deal with data about markets where the information is very soft. The definitive tone of the IEA's reporting (see their April report, courtesy reader Bjornar) seems to overrepresent the integrity of the underlying work.

And while the survey-in-progress will attempt to remedy some of these shortcomings, it's clear there will still be quite a lot of guesswork in the final product due to the lack of cooperation of pretty much all of the interested parties save perhaps the US and North Sea producers:

The IEA, employing a team of 25 analysts, is trying to shed light on some of the industry's best-kept secrets by assessing the health of major fields scattered from Venezuela and Mexico to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. The fields supply over two-thirds of daily world production.

The findings won't be definitive. Big producers including Venezuela, Iran and China aren't cooperating, and others like Saudi Arabia typically treat the detailed production data of individual fields as closely guarded state secrets, so it's not clear how specific their contributions will be. To try to compensate, the IEA will use computer modeling to make estimates. It will also collect information gathered by IHS Inc., a major data and analysis provider based in Colorado, as well as the U.S. Geologic Survey, a smattering of oil and oil-service companies, and national petroleum councils.

As someone who does primary research, 25 analysts does not strike me as a large enough team to do this much fieldwork.

Again, our pet peeve: no mention of Iraq, which is anywhere from number one to number three in reserves, depending on who you believe. But since they've had relatively little drilling (a mere 2000 wells as of 2002, versus a million in Texas), there are probably gaps in the geological information (the Iraqi Oil Ministry's recent claims are a confirmation of sorts) and given the security situation, they aren't likely to be remedied soon. Similarly, a recent Business Week article mentioned that Russia produces "awful data" and OPEC countries often fail to report accurately, since they don't want it known that they are pumping more than their quotas permit. (Another pet peeve: note that the price rise today was largely driven by an unexpected drop in US inventories. But those inventories are only primary inventories. End user inventory increases are counted as demand. In the 1973 oil shock, my father, who managed a large paper mill, went out and immediately bought as much fuel as he could and urged his fellow mill managers to do so as well. The company went long more than a year's supply and it made a significant difference in its bottom line. Given the bullish talk, any industrial user with an operating brain cell and storage capacity would take as much as they could).

Now despite all the foregoing, the recent spikes up in oil prices could be entirely warranted by supply/demand considerations. But I am disturbed by the lack of critical thinking and examination of the data. If a casual observer like me can see gaps and open issues, it would seem this vitally important issue merits further investigation. For instance, oil industry executives grilled by Congress said that oil prices "ought" to be between $35 to $90 a barrel (the estimate varied by company). They were being attacked, among other things, for their high profits and excessive executive pay. Why would it be in their interest to say oil prices should be lower? They've just handed the legislators a justification for imposing an excess profits tax.

Conversely, depleting supplies would argue that Big Oil needed the cash flow to reinvest, since any new finds would almost certainly be more costly to develop than their current fields. Saying oil was indeed scarce and the high prices are warranted also would argue for relaxing environmental restrictions on Alaskan drilling, a big item on the industry's wish list.

That isn't to say that the mainstream view isn't getting a once-over in some quarters, but I am not certain those views are getting the hearing they deserve. For instance, Jim Hamilton at Econbrowser states, rather cautiously, that while the oil price rise appears largely warranted by fundamentals, there appears to be a speculative element that means prices may currently be ahead of themselves. Jeff Frankel, following a recent speech by the Fed's vice chair Donald Kohn, argues that negative real interest rates in the US are playing a role in agricultural and energy commodity price increases.

Another considerable gap in the coverage: this story is being treated almost solely from an economic, not a geopolitical standpoint. But let's tease out a couple of issues as grist for thought.

The first oil shock was due to an oil embargo by OPEC to punish the US and other allies of Israel in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. But the notion of the strategic uses of oil is remarkably absent from this discussion.

Consider: the fact set may be as many observers assert: the Saudis aren't pumping because they are past their own Peak Oil (Oil Drum had some charts that suggested that might be the case for Ghawar, the biggest Saudi field, a year ago, with speculation on other possible causes, such as the Saudis taking highly productive wells offline). Thus the Saudi posturing is simply to hide their weakening power in the oil markets.

But consider some other elements in the equation: Iraq has completely eroded the US's standing and annoyed and embarrassed Riyadh. They now have an unstable neighbor and the specter of an US occupation without end, which does not go over well with its own population (the Saudis having promoted a particularly conservative form of Muslim is now causing them headaches). Having botched Iraq, the US continues to threaten Iran (the latest: Israel's Army Radio, run by the Israeli Defense Forces, claimed that Bush would attack Iran before the end of his term. The Jerusalem Post picked up the story, which was then denied by the Administration. But if you were in Saudi Arabia, who would you believe?).

Consider further: even though the Saudis are not fond of the Iranians, they are no doubt even less fond of having yet another country in the vicinity destabilized. And it is not clear at all why the Bushies have Iran in their crosshairs, save some crazy fundamentalist desire to bring about the End of Days. Stratfor, which is widely believed to be plugged into Israeli intelligence, went on for at least a year after the Iraq invasion about "the coming US-Iran alliance," describing at some length how helpful the Iranians were being. Conversely, attempts to claim that Iran has been providing materiel to Iraqi insurgents was not only revealed to be trumped-up charges, but to the US's embarrassment, the Iraqis have decided to investigate (which means they are no longer willing to participate in unsupported Iran-bashing).

Now look at a map. Iran is on one side of the Strait of Hormuz. The US has been signaling its hostile intentions for some time. If the Iranians can close the Strait, the Gulf's oil supply has nowhere to go. This doesn't seem like a great strategy, and certainly not a risk the Saudis want to see run.

So the Saudis have every reason to want to leash and collar Bush, particularly after the gaffe of coming directly to plead for oil after participating in Israel's 60th birthday celebration.

Now add another element: the IPCC climate change report. In 2007, both global warming and the role of CO2 emissions went from being a granola-head belief to widespread acceptance. There has been lots of chatter about carbon taxes, cap and trade, and carbon offsets.

Now if you were sitting on a diminishing resource and your country was a one-trick pony, why would you let governments tax it if you could drive the price up yourself and collect the windfall?

Thus if I were an OPEC member, I'd have every reason to foster the Peak Oil story, which undoubtedly is generally accurate, the question is how immediate. Second, I would not pump more if I could, or would make only token supply increases, Indeed, I'd be trying to restrict supply without looking like I was doing so, which makes the Iraq war and supply disruptions godsends.

To put it more simply, the Saudis have every reason to leave their inventory in the ground. As the Financial Times noted:
Ali Naimi, Saudi energy minister, said the demand forecasts he was reading did not warrant an expansion past the 12.5m b/d capacity Saudi Arabia’s fields will reach next year, following a laborious investment of more than $20bn (£10.3bn, €12.9bn). King Abdullah, the country’s ruler, put it more bluntly: “I keep no secret from you that, when there were some new finds, I told them, ‘No, leave it in the ground, with grace from God, our children need it’.’’

Guest Post: Nonlinear Economic Propagations III

Listen to this article Reader Richard Kline is providing a mini-series that was prompted by an anonymous reader who had observed that a complex systems theory view might raise doubts about regulatory policy. Financial overseers believe that liquidity is always and ever good, but that view may be naive:

Perhaps a lesson to be learned here is that liquidity acts as an efficient conductor of risk. It doesn't make risk go away, but moves it more quickly from one investment sector to another.

From a complex systems theory standpoint, this is exactly what you would do if you wanted to take a stable system and destabilize it.

One of the things that helps to enable non-linear behavior in a complex system is promiscuity of information (i.e., feedback loops but in a more generalized sense) across a wide scope of the system.

Richard, in a guest post last week, posed a question he wanted to take further:
To what extent have nonlinear processes promoted the Securitization Bubble, precipitated its collapse, or prolonged the resulting instabilities in the financial system?

After a background discussion, he presented five issues:
Does innovation require untrammeled information flow across social/ economic event spaces?

Is the crisis in securitized debt the result of a ‘black swan’ event?

Was the creation of the Securitization Bubble the result of nonlinear processes in the financial markets?

Is a financial event-space optimized for propagation desirable?

If not, what structure or process parameters might improve process outcomes?

His first two post elicited quite a few comments (including requests for more concrete examples, which he has taken to heart). Hopefully, this offering will elicit more reader discussion. Your observations very much appreciated.
Can nonlinear discontinuities destabilize the financial system, nationally or globally? Dynamical systems not only change their trajectory, they change their geometry. Nonlinear systems not only change their delta (roughly velocity), they change their dimension and state. To my observation, nonlinear shifts in the systemic organization of the top tier of the financial markets have neither principally caused the Securitization Bubble nor thus far precipitated its ongoing collapse; however, such shifts have exacerbated both phases. Risks going forward are far from negligible.

Before listing recent nonlinear dynamical shifts of note, a few criteria are in order. Many nonlinear events in pricing, resource allocation, and so on can be identified; large and small; brief and enduring. I focus here on conditions in major financial markets, in the US or the financial system as a whole. The dynamical nonlinearities suggested here all modified the systems in which the are active so that behavior or capital aligned differently in the ‘after