Gloom, doom, and apocalyptic musings seem to be a permanent feature of modern society. But we’ve had more in the way of dystopian movies and talk of imperial decline in the last ten years than in the preceding ten.
Quite a few readers have taken to mentioning Joseph Tainter’s classic, The Collapse of Complex Societies, in comments, a sign it might be worth discussing formally.
Tainter, an archeologist, developed his thesis out of his considerable dissatisfaction with prevailing collapse theories, which he duly enumerates and shreds.
His argument is straightforward:
1. Human societies are problem solving organizations
2. Sociopolitical systems require energy for their maintenance
3. Increasing complexity carries with it increased cost per capita
3. Investment in sociopolitical complexity often reaches a point of declining marginal returns
This section gives a good overview:
There are two general factors that combine to make a society vulnerable to collapse when investment in
complexity begins to yield a declining marginal return. First, stress and perturbation are a constant feature of any complex society, always occurring somewhere in its territory. Such a society will have a developed an operating regulatory apparatus this is designed to deal with such things as localized agricultural failures, border conflicts, and unrest. Since such continuous, localized stress can be expected to recur with regularity, it can, to a degree, be anticipated and prepared for. Major, unexpected stress surges, however, will also occur given enough time, as such things as climactic changes and foreign incursions take place. To meet these major stresses, the society must have some kind of net reserve. This can take the form of excess productive capacities in agriculture, energy, or minerals, or hoarded surpluses from past production. Stress surges of great magnitude cannot be accommodated without such a reserve.
Yet a society experiencing declining marginal returns is investing even more heavily in a strategy that is yielding proportionately less. Excess productive capacity will at some point be used up, and accumulated surpluses allocated to current operating needs. There is, then, little or no surplus with which to counter major adversities. Unexpected stress surges must be dealt with out of the current operating budget, often ineffectually, and always to the detriment of the system as a whole. Even if the stress is successfully met, the society is weakened in the process, and made even more vulnerable to the next crisis. Once a complex society develops the vulnerabilities of declining marginal returns, collapse may merely require sufficient passage of time to render probable the occurrence of an insurmountable calamity.
Secondly, declining marginal returns make complexity a less attractive problem-solving strategy. When marginal returns decline, the advantages to complexity become ultimately no greater (for society as a whole) than those for less costly social forms. The marginal cost of evolution to a higher level of complexity, or of remaining at the present level, is high compared to the alternative of disintegration.
Under such conditions, the option to decompose (that is, to sever the ties that link localized groups to a regional entity) become attractive to certain components of a complex society. As marginal returns deteriorate, tax rates rise with less and less return to the local level. Irrigation systems go untended, bridges and roads are not kept up, and the frontier is not adequately defended. Many of the social units that comprise a complex society perceive increased advantage to a strategy of independence, and begin to pursue their own immediate goals rather than long-term goals of the hierarchy. Behavioral interdependence gives way to behavioral independence, requiring the hierarchy to allocating still more of a shrinking resource base to legitimation and/or control.
As much as this argument is very persuasive, Tainter rejects explanations that rely on cultural factors (he takes the anthropologist’s view that preferring more complex societies for their cultural achievements is a form of chauvinism and has no place in good social science). But some cultures promote cooperation and lower legitimatization costs. Look at how Japan has endured a reversal of fortunes with far more grace than America would take a similar period of stagnation.
Similarly, if you look at America, the neoclassical economists started promoting their vision of society as composed of individuals operating in markets and government as inherently suspect, back in the 1950s, in a period of rising prosperity when no signs of incipient collapse were evident. So how do organizations and ideologies that undermine some of the key elements of a complex society (effective regulation, for instance) in a period of abundance fit into this picture?
More generally, what do you see as the strengths and limitations of Tainter’s theory?








First of all, cultural achievement (having a really big colorful feathered tail) is something entirely different from promoting cultural cohesion through building in redundancy (having 2 kidneys), so his argument that cultural complexity counts for nothing definitely mistakes the content for the form.
Also, a BBC documentary (“The Trap”) argued (moderately persuasively) that we should understand the rise of Nash’s game theoretical thinking as something following from his paranoia merging with worries caused by the cold war, which was then “recognized” to beautifully fit the centuries-old notions of homo economicus. Broad adoption of this kind of thinking only really began during Milton Friedman’s years, and was broadly adopted under Reagan — hardly a period without economic problems — in which our communicative abilities allowed us to explain these problems away as not being caused by our mode of societal organization (which was “rational”). So yes, ideology and communication do strongly affect how we prepare for the future and look at the problems existing in the present, and — in times of prosperity — this allow a society to very quickly and effectively force the whole of society to stop investing in and maintaining redundancies, even though this will be costly once a problem period starts (especially a quickly developing one due to a long period of overspecialization or over-exploitation).
I haven’t read his book, though I am somewhat familiar with the complex systems thinking of the SFI, but from what you quote here I’m not really enthused about his idea of “increasing marginal returns” (point 4). It is true that some of the increased costs of maintaining a society come from the creation of new systems that are supposed to promote redundancy (medical research etc.); but the problem is that these are then able to claim far more of the resources than is wise (due to perceived status differences), without really contributing to overall stability. This does not really seem to be a function of complexity so much, (3) as one of unequal distribution of the current resources that is being allowed by the other members of society because they feel it is a. a defensible use of resources that would or could not otherwise be used more usefully (even though this will affect future security, but this isn’t thought of in good years, in which ‘exploit’ seems the best strategy), or b. because it is /thought/ ‘important’ to stability, or because these systems enjoy high social status. Most of today’s instability has come from feedback loops creating ever more inequality because these high status individuals wanted ever more of the available resources, while the fact that the past decades were “good years” was at the same time used to argue for cutting back on investments in redundancy (via cutting welfare, not investing in pension funds, etc.). And now, of course, even fewer resources are allocated to ‘upkeep’ and redundancy because “these are lean times”, even though the leanness is in large part a feature of the inequalities that exist in distribution, rather than due to actual resource shortage. The two big problems for this discussion are probably how to understand the role money plays in all of this, because it seems hard to capture in this paradigm, and to understand how communication affects which strategies we take and how we distribute resources.
Lastly, human societies are not problem solving organizations, they’re a solution that is given to the problem of how to organize — which creates constant conflicts because of the status differences that the members think exist and are relevant to the question of how to distribute the goods. The locus of problem solving is primarily at the individual level, where people worry about “how to improve my own security”. This is then answered either by “ok, let’s work with and try to support the system we have” or (Friedman, neoclassicism) “let’s just be parasitical on the system and not care about whether it might break because I really deserve as much of the resource pie as I can get”.