..................................................................................................................................................................................... .....................................................................................................................................................................................
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 7, 2008

Money Goes Geopolitical: Iceland Seeking Rescue From Russia

Not only does politics make for strange bedfellows, but so does desperation. Iceland is looking to borrow over $5 billion from Russia to shore up its banks. Um, Iceland is a member of NATO, or at least is now. As reader Jørgen commented,
Russia backstopping Iceland? What is the pay-back? Keflavik?

I guess this resembles blackmail of EU: If you don’t rescue us, Putin will.

Reading the Reuters story on this surprising turn of events, it appears that Iceland is not willing to seek assistance from the IMF, since in the Asian crisis, it imposed reforms that were seen as draconian (and many believe contained counterproductive elements).

Update 7:15 PM. I thought Jørgen was kidding. Even if he was, he was spot on. The Spectator confirms the idea (hat tip reader RB):
But what price will the Russians demand for their bailout? A highly-placed source in Reykjavik tells Coffee House that Iceland might look kindly on requests from Russia's military to use America's former military base in Iceland. America closed its Naval Air Station at Keflavik Airport two years ago, handing back the Nato facility to the Icelandic government.

From Reuters:
Iceland took over its second largest bank, propped up a battered currency and sought on Tuesday a 4 billion euro ($5.44 billion) loan from Russia to help tackle a crisis threatening to overwhelm the island nation.

Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said Moscow viewed positively the request from Iceland, whose premier said it had faced a risk of "national bankruptcy."

"The result will be announced after negotiations," Kudrin said.

Prime Minister Geir Haarde said Icelandic officials would travel to Moscow on Tuesday or Wednesday to discuss terms for the loan to bolster the country's foreign reserves.

"With this, like everything else, nothing is certain until it's certain," Haarde told a news conference.

He said Iceland would not default on its sovereign debt.....

Yves here. If you believe that, I have a bridge I'd like to sell you.
So volatile was the currency that Iceland's central bank was forced to introduce a currency peg at a value of 131 per euro. It was last trading around 150.

An International Monetary Fund spokesman said an IMF staff team was in Iceland and Norway said it was ready to discuss help but had heard nothing from Reykjavik.

Its reluctance to ask for IMF help was also noted when G7 deputy finance ministers discussed its situation during a conference call on Monday evening, according to a government official from one of the Group of Seven industrial nations.

"Japan proposed using an IMF facility to help Iceland, but Iceland did not want to ask the IMF for money," the official, who was familiar with the content of the phone consultations, told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity.

"Iceland does not want to be singled out as a country that needs IMF help. Even last summer, Iceland preferred to ask the central banks of some Nordic countries for help rather than go to the IMF for money."....

The central bank said a Russian loan would substantially strengthen Iceland's foreign reserves and support the crown, which Haarde predicted would should strengthen significantly when more normal trading conditions resumed.

"Four billion euros would be more or less what Iceland needs to cover the whole banking system assets with their reserves," said Elisabeth Gruie, currency strategist at BNP Paribas.

SEC's Cox Censors Report on Bear Collapse

The public got a bglimpse of an unedited report on Bear Stearns failure because Senator Charles Grassley put the full version on the Internet briefly. The official version had significant deletions. From Bloomberg (hat tip reader Alex):
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox's regulators stood by as shrinking capital ratios and growing subprime holdings led to the collapse of Bear Stearns Cos., according to an unedited version of a study by the agency's inspector general.

The report, by Inspector General H. David Kotz, was requested by Senator Charles Grassley to examine the role of regulators prior to the firm's collapse in March. Before it was released to the public on Sept. 26, Kotz deleted 136 references, many detailing SEC memos, meetings or comments, at the request of the agency's Division of Trading and Markets that oversees investment banks.

``People can judge for themselves, but it sure looks like the SEC didn't want the public to know about the red flags it apparently ignored in allowing Bear Stearns and other investment banks to engage in excessively risky behavior,'' the Iowa Republican said in an e-mailed statement.
The report, by Inspector General H. David Kotz, was requested by Senator Charles Grassley to examine the role of regulators prior to the firm's collapse in March. Before it was released to the public on Sept. 26, Kotz deleted 136 references, many detailing SEC memos, meetings or comments, at the request of the agency's Division of Trading and Markets that oversees investment banks....

``People can judge for themselves, but it sure looks like the SEC didn't want the public to know about the red flags it apparently ignored in allowing Bear Stearns and other investment banks to engage in excessively risky behavior,'' the Iowa Republican said in an e-mailed statement....

The SEC, which governed the firm along with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, ``failed to carry out its mission in the oversight of Bear Stearns,'' the agency said in both versions of the report.

AIG: Hearings Present Evidence That Management Disguised Losses

From coverage of Congressional hearings in the New York Times (hat tip reader Tom):
[Former AIG CEO Maurice} Sullivan also came under fire for reassuring shareholders about the health of the company last December, just days after its auditor, Pricewaterhouse Cooper, warned of him that AIG was displaying ''material weakness'' in its huge exposure to potential losses from insuring mortgage-related securities....

Waxman unveiled documents showing AIG executives hid the full extent of the firm's risky financial products from auditors, both outside and inside the firm, as losses mounted.

For instance, Federal regulators at the Office of Thrift Supervision warned in March that ''corporate oversight of AIG Financial Products ... lack critical elements of independence.''

At the same time, Pricewaterhouse Cooper confidentially warned the company that the ''root cause'' of its mounting problems was denying internal overseers in charge of limiting AIG's exposure access to what was going on in its highly leveraged financial products branch.

[House Oversight Committee Chairman Henry] Waxman also released testimony from former AIG auditor Joseph St. Denis, who resigned after being blocked from giving his input on how the firm estimated its liabilities.

A Glimpse Into the Abyss

I must confess a certain fondness for the apocalyptic sort of financial writer, provided they don't lose anchoring with reality and fall into the tinfoil hat category. Nouriel Roubini is the case example of an economist who favors a baroque, melodramatic style, and despite sounding more than a tad unhinged at points, he has proven to be the most accurate seer of our unfolding financial mess.

Another writer who almost seems to relish describing how bad things can get is Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of the Telegraph. Pritchard has been proven correct, despite catcalls on this blog, in his assessment that the oil price runup was overdone and his early recognition that deflation, the product of deleveraging, and not inflation, was the pressing economic risk.

Evans-Pritchard put up two articles this week, the first "Germany takes hot seat as Europe falls into the abyss" and "Russia and Brazil crumble as commodity prices crash." Both are suitably bone chilling, First, excerpts from the EU piece:
During the past week, we have tipped over the edge, into the middle of the abyss. Systemic collapse is in full train. The Netherlands has just rushed through a second, more sweeping nationalisation of Fortis. Ireland and Greece have had to rescue all their banks. Iceland is facing an Argentine denouement.

The US commercial paper market is closed... The interbank lending market has seized up..... Healthy companies cannot roll over debt....

As the unflappable Warren Buffett puts it, the credit freeze is “sucking blood” out of the economy. “In my adult lifetime, I don’t think I’ve ever seen people as fearful,” he said.

We are fast approaching the point of no return. The only way out of this calamitous descent is “shock and awe” on a global scale, and even that may not be enough....

Yves here. That turn of phrase is not off target. Paul Krugman has said that interventions in large liquid markets are too small to force a change in valuation by virtue of the sheer weight of buying. They instead serve as a slap in the face, to (hopefully) make investors realize that they are caught in a funk. But Krugman also acknowledged that in this case, the markets may not be irrational.
The lesson of the 1930s is that any country trying to reflate in isolation will be punished. The crisis will ricochet from one economy to another until every one is crippled. We are seeing it play again in this drama as our leaders fail to rise above their narrow, parochial agendas.

The European Central Bank – which raised rates into the teeth of the crisis in July – has played a shockingly destructive role in this enveloping slump. Its growth predictions this year have been, and still are, delusional. Neglecting its global role, it has vastly complicated the fire-fighting efforts of Washington.

It could have offered “cover” to the US Federal Reserve this spring when Ben Bernanke was forced by events to slash rates to 2pc. It could at least have signalled an end to monetary tightening. That is how an ally ought to behave.

Instead, it stuck maniacally to its Gothic script, with equally unhappy consequences for both sides of the Atlantic, as well as for China, Japan, and India. The euro rocketed yet further, which it turn set off an oil shock as crude metamorphosed into an anti-dollar with leverage.

The ECB policy was self-defeating, even on its own terms. It merely drove headline inflation even higher, while deeper forces of underlying debt deflation pulled the real economies of Germany, Italy, France, and Spain into a recessionary vortex.

Far from offering reassurance, the weekend mini-summit of EU leaders served only to highlight that nobody is in charge of this runaway train. There is still no lender of last resort in euroland. The £12bn stimulus package is risible.

Angela Merkel has revealed her deep limitations. It was she who vetoed French efforts to launch a pan-EU rescue package, suspecting that any lifeboat fund would prove to be Trojan Horse – a way of co-opting German taxpayers into colossal transfers of wealth to Latin Europe.

In that she is right, but it is too late now for dysfunctional EU political games. By demanding that those who caused the damage should pay for it, she crossed the line into caricature, or worse.

Her comments echo word for word the “we’re alright Jack” attitudes of Euro-pols during the first US banking crises in 1930-1931, until the storm hit Europe and the entire cast was swept away by furious electorates, or simply shot. Thankfully, this EU stupidity is at last drawing serious criticism....

As for the US itself, it has not yet exhausted its policy arsenal. It can escalate further up the nuclear ladder. The Fed can cut interest rates from 2pc to zero. If that fails, it can let rip with the mass purchase of US debt.

“The US government has a technology, called a printing press,” said Fed chief Ben Bernanke in November 2002. (His helicopter speech).

In extremis, the Treasury/Fed can swoop into any market to shore up asset prices. They can buy Florida property. They can even buy SUV guzzlers from the car lots in Detroit, and mangle them in scrap yards. As Bernanke put it, the Fed can “expand the menu of assets that it buys.”

There is a devilish catch to this ploy, of course. It assumes that foreign creditors will tolerate such action.
Japan entered its Lost Decade as the world’s top creditor, with a vast pool of household savings to cushion the slump. America starts its purge with net external liabilities of $3 trillion, and a savings rate near zero. Foreigners own over half the US Treasury debt, and two thirds of all Fannie, Freddie, and other US agency bonds.

But the risk of a dollar collapse is one for the distant future. Right now the world faces the opposite problem. There is a wild scramble for dollars as a $10 trillion pyramid of global lending based on dollar balance sheets “delevers” with a vengeance.

This is a key point missed in many analyses.
This is a “short squeeze” on those who have used the dollar for a vast global carry trade. International banks are facing margin calls on their dollar leverage. It is why the Fed is having to provide $1.25 trillion in dollar liquidity for the entire global system, according to estimates by Brad Setser from the Center for Geoeconomic Studies.

The crisis engulfing Europe, Asia and emerging markets, makes life easier for Washington. The United States is becoming a safe-haven again.

The Fed can now hope to pursue monetary stimulus “a l’outrance” without being slapped down by the currency, debt, and commodity markets. Take comfort where you can.

And now to key bits from the commodities article:
Oil, grains, and industrial metals all crumbled as the week began despite the passage of the Paulson bail-out plan in Washington and dramatic moves by European governments to shore up their banking systems, compounding the steepest commodity crash in over half a century.

The big exception yesterday was gold, which surged $34 to $864 an ounce on safe-haven buying as the markets came face to face with the unsettling reality that the euro is no healthier than the dollar, and perhaps sicker...

Hans Redeker, currency chief at BNP Paribas, said investors fear that no one is in charge of Europe’s monetary union. “Who is Mr Europe? What is his telephone number? There is no such thing. We have a cancer eating at the system because even healthy companies cannot roll over their debts, yet the politicians still don’t understand the risk,” he said.

The sudden shift in commodity sentiment has led to a massive withdrawal of funds from frontier markets, triggering stock market routs across Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. The MSCI index of emerging markets fell 11pc yesterday in its worst day ever.

Russia suspended trading after Moscow’s Micex index crashed 19pc in its biggest one-day drop since the 1998 default...Brazil shut the Sao Paulo exchange after the Bovespa index crashed 15pc in panic trading...Mexico’s Bolsa was off 7pc; India’s Sensex was off 6pc.

The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index has tumbled a third since May. Chartists say it is now perched precariously on its seven-year line, threatening to challenge the “supercycle” thesis that became so fashionable at the top of the bubble.

“The boom was fuelled by massive speculation,” said Charles Dumas, chief strategist at Lombard Street Research.

“Commodity derivatives in the spring had a face of $10 trillion, so it doesn’t take many bulls to sell and send prices crashing. Remember all those clever bankers saying this was the new investment medium, 'uncorrelated’ with either assets? Well, it’s correlated now – downwards,” he said.

The Australian dollar, the beacon of commodity sentiment, went into near-meltdown yesterday, dropping 9.7pc against the yen in the largest one-day drop on record as Japanese investors dumped their Uridashi bonds and scrambled to close bets on high-yield economies – known as the carry trade.....
Albert Edwards, global strategist at Société Generale, said China depends on exports to US and Europe for its lifeblood, and could face banking problems of its own.

“I think China is going into recession as well. This is going to catch investors off-guard.”

Yves here, Note most forecasters call for China's growth to slow from its recent pace of 12% to 8%. The idea that it could have a contraction is on just about no one's radar right now.
Stephen Jen, currency chief at Morgan Stanley, said the “glowing reputation” enjoyed by emerging markets during the global boom was a deception caused by the easy-money largesse of the credit bubble. Strip that away, and the picture looks very different.

“They are very vulnerable to a U-turn in capital flows,” he said....
There are fears that Russia could slip into a downward spiral if oil drops to $50 a barrel, which is now the lower end of Merrill Lynch’s forecast.

Moscow has become addicted to the oil bonanza, ratcheting up spending so quickly that it may now need prices to stay above $90 to fund spending plans. Veteran analysts say they have seen this movie before.

Monday, October 6, 2008

Wolfgang Munchau: Europe Needs a Bank Rescue Plan

Wolfgang Munchau, who writes for the Financial Times and the blog EuroIntelligence, argues that the fact that EU member nations managed to survive their first series of bank failures does not mean it can afford to take the risk of defaulting to continued improvisation. Munchau comes out squarely in favor of a coordinated, funded rescue program.

From the Financial Times:
This has been a week of self-congratulation in Europe. We have saved a handful of banks. We have, in effect, started to cut interest rates. We even had a summit of European leaders that produced warm words of solidarity. It looks as though the Europeans have reached substantive agreement that no systemically important bank should ever be allowed to fail....The rescue of Fortis and Dexia last week, two large, but not too large, cross-border European banks, should be seen as a sign that our emergency procedures are working. Look, they say, we met quickly and decided what needed to be decided. It was fast and unbureaucratic. We do not need a European rescue fund, let alone any new institutional set-up to deal with this, they say. We can do it ourselves.

I agree that the few ad hoc rescues have worked. But do not fool yourself. They worked because they were the first wave of rescues and because they involved banks such as Fortis – of just the right size, based in just the right small- to medium-sized country where political leaders are sufficiently rational not to hold each other to ransom as midnight approaches on Sunday.

But what if this had been a bank with a name of a large European country, or an acronym that refers to a large European city, banks that are simultaneously too big to fail and too big to save? I shudder to think what would happen when Silvio Berlusconi, Angela Merkel, Lech Kaczynski and the next Austrian leader have to meet to discuss the future of a large cross-border European bank.

What worked for banking rescues numbers one to five may not work for rescues number six to 50 – the estimated number of systemically important banks in Europe. And that number does not include some banks we have already rescued, which politicians judged to be important for their domestic banking system, like Germany’s IKB Bank, but with no European relevance whatsoever. We have been squandering money.

Nor does it include the likes of Hypo Real Estate, which is not even a bank at all,....

The Europeans are of course right in their overall ambition not to allow systemically important banks to fail. They are also right in their scepticism about their ability to distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency during an emergency. But I fear we are still well short of a strategy. We might be lucky, and scrape through what could well become the most dangerous month of the crisis so far. If, for example, the credit default swap market were to blow up in the next couple of weeks – a non-trivial probability – we have no plan.

Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, was therefore right when he appeared to back a €300bn rescue fund. Regular readers of this column will probably recall my somewhat constrained enthusiasm for his economic policies. But this had the makings of a good plan. He ended up distancing himself from it, when it became clear that Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, would not support it. But he was right and she was wrong. Of course, a European plan should not have been a copy of the bail-out that was finally adopted by Congress on Friday. The US plan failed to address the problem of an undercapitalised banking sector. That issue is even more important in Europe where many banks have an extremely weak capital base, with leverage ratios of 50 or more.

Europe does therefore not need any bail-out plan, but a plan that specifically addresses the capitalisation problem. Concretely, three things are needed: the first and most important is money. A sum of €300bn will not cover the EU in a worst-case scenario, but it is a sensible number to start with; secondly, you need a semi-permanent crisis committee empowered to take decisions; and finally you need a strategy to apply symmetrically and based on clear rules about when to recapitalise, and when not.

If you pursue a strategy of taking purely national decisions, you run the risk that at least one government will hit its own financial ceiling before this crisis is over, or that decisions have negative spillovers on the banking systems of other countries. Moreover, you end up with a beggar-thy-neighbour regulatory race, as we saw last week when Ireland and Greece unilaterally issued blanket guarantees for large parts of their banking sector. Last night, Germany was preparing a full deposit guarantee for its own banking system. Last but not least is the risk of violent political setback against a process that lacks transparency.

For Europe, this is more than just a banking crisis. Unlike in the US, it could develop into a monetary regime crisis. A systemic banking crisis is one of those few conceivable shocks with the potential to destroy Europe’s monetary union. The enthusiasm for creating a single currency was unfortunately never matched by an equal enthusiasm to provide the correspondingly effective institutions to handle financial crises. Most of the time, it does not matter. But it matters now. For that reason alone, the case for a European rescue plan is overwhelming.

Sunday, October 5, 2008

European Leaders Promise to Save Major Banks, But Fail to Adopt EU Plan

So far, the statement released this afternoon US time out of a Euro summit amounts to an attempt at reassuring hand-waving but in fact was merely a restatement of the status quo. The group of European leaders did agree on a set of principles, but it remains an open question whether they will be able to act quickly or boldly enough in the fact of the mounting financial crisis.

And one principle was troublesome: that each country is on its own as far as its banks are concerned. Some banks, such as Deutschebank and UBS, are too big for their countries to save should they founder. Hypo was brought down by an Irish acquisition. The statement may have been crafted in part to keep pressure on German banks to support the Hypo rescue, and may be a practical necessity right now, since the public at large does not yet recognize the depth and extent of the risk in the EU, but it seems unwise to take a hard position on such a central issue.

From the Wall Street Journal:
European leaders pledged at a weekend summit to protect the continent's banks from the spiraling global financial crisis. Their resolve is already being put to the test as two European banks required fresh rescues.

At an emergency meeting in Paris on Saturday, the leaders of France, Germany, U.K. and Italy said that, unlike in the U.S. where Lehman Brothers was allowed to file for bankruptcy, European governments would stand in to prevent any bank from failing.....

Yet, so far, proposals for unified anti-crisis rules -- such as a mult-billion euro banking bailout fund -- have been abandoned for fear they would be impossible to govern. Instead of concrete decisions, therefore, the four EU leaders decided on Saturday to a list of principles. Among them: though the leaders agreed that each country will be responsible for handling problems within its own banking system -- including coming up with possible sanctions for the heads of any failed banks -- they promised to keep each other informed of their actions.

They said they would jointly consider ways to amend some accounting standards -- such as the mark-to-market rule -- that have pushed several banks into uncontrolled, downward spirals.

From Bloomberg:
European leaders pledged to bail out their own nations' banks while stopping short of a regional rescue effort to deal with the global credit crisis.

At a summit in Paris yesterday, leaders of France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, the European Central Bank and the European Commission agreed to ease accounting rules, seek tougher financial regulations and weaken enforcement of competition and budget laws.

``Each government will act according to its own methods and its own means but in a coordinated manner with the other European states,'' French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who called the meeting, told reporters....

Europe ``is still a dwarf compared to the U.S.'' in terms of willingness to spend, said Laurence Boone, an economist at Barclays Capital in Paris. The statement on supporting banks ``is not a progress. It's the same as before the summit.''

Germany appears to be the stumbling block. Again from Bloomberg:
Hours before the summit, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, met Sarkozy to press the need for agreement. ``Collective action is even more necessary in Europe than in the U.S. because Europe is more complex than the U.S.,'' he told reporters. ``Action must be taken quickly and in a concerted manner.''

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's opposition underscored the hurdles to forging a unified front. ``Each country must take its responsibilities at a national level,'' she told a joint press conference after the summit.

The group agreed on coordinated policies on deposit guarantees and on having another summit soon to hash out fundamental reform. Bloomberg again:
Sarkozy said that ``all actors'' must be supervised, including rating firms and hedge funds. Executive-pay systems must also be reviewed, he said.

``We want a new world to come out of this,'' Sarkozy said. ``We want to set up the basis for a capitalism of entrepreneurs, not speculators.''

Anticipating increased spending, declining tax revenue, and government bank takeovers, they called for ``greater flexibility'' in the application of European Union competition and budget rules.

The last statement is an admission that the Stabilization Pact, which limits borrowings and fiscal deficits by EU members, is kaput.

Saturday, October 4, 2008

Hypo Bank Rescue Fails, Threatening Lehman Scale Bankruptcy, Future of Euro

Hypo Real Estate, Germany's second largest real estate lender, teeters on the verge of collapse. The bank has a €400 billion balance sheet, which would make for a failure of a similar scale to Lehman's (Hypo's footings are roughly $550 billion, while Lehman's were $660 billion as of its last balance sheet date).

Even though Hypo it technically a bank, it is not a depositary institution, so rescuing it poses similar difficulties (procedural and political) to the authorities as Bear and Lehman did in the US. The financial system cannot take another body blow of this magnitude. The authorities had better patch this one up over the weekend, or we face even more credit market panic on Monday.

And if that weren't an ugly enough picture, the failure to salvage Hypo has even broader ramifications. From Marshall Auerbach, independent global strategist who does consultancy for a number of funds, and sometimes financial commentator, via e-mail:
The euro is in serious trouble with this Hypo Real Estate collapse. Germans remain completely in denial. The French get it, largely because their clever finance minister, Christine LaGarde, was educated at the University of Chicago and consequently understands something about markets. Sarkozy, to his credit, appears to be listening to her. The Germans are about to destroy EMU with their pigheadedness, and this will be the stuff of revolution, given that the German people were never consulted on abandoning the DM (if there had been a referendum, the euro would have never been accepted in Germany) and were forced to get rid of arguably the most successful post-war monetary institution, the Bundesbank.

The sop thrown their way was the stupid Stability and Growth Pact, designed by former German Finance Minister, Theo Waigel. So he has hoisted the Germans and the euro zone on a German petard. And that's made things worse! No EU wide guarantee of deposits, no EU-wide prospect of a major fiscal stimulus and bye bye euro.

Ed Harrison of Credit Writedowns provided a translation from Der Spiegel. Key sections:
HRE spokesman Obermeier did not want to comment Spiegel Online as to reports that the liquidity Gap of the bank could reach 70 to 100 billion euros by the end of 2009. He could only confirm that the consortium's original aid pledge had been withdrawn. "Why, we do not know," Obermeier said. He said there were clear signals from the shareholders and Government, that they wanted to cooperate to find a solution to the problem....

Sources close to [Finance] Minister Steinbrueck said that the Finance Ministry had not been informed of the changed situation in advance by either Hypo Real Estate or the consortium of banks. The government was informed only through ad hoc communication with HRE that the rescue package had collapsed. "We will now try to pick up the pieces on Sunday," the Ministry of Finance said. The aid plan, agreed to one week ago, foresaw a short-term loan of 15 billion euros and a long-term refinancing of up to 35 billion euros in the second half of 2009.

"Die Welt am Sonntag" had previously reported that Deutsche Bank had found in a study that HRE already clearly needed more money in the short-term. According to the Deutsche Bank report, the company would lack up to 50 billion euros by the end of the year and even as high as 70 to 100 billion euros by the end of 2009....

"If there is no solution when stock markets open on Monday morning, the company won't make it two more days," said a banker.

This week, the Bundesbank and the BaFin had labeled the rescue operation which is now collapsing as vital to avoid "severe disruptions to the financial markets". In a letter from the Bundesbank and BaFin to Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck it was said that otherwise the German financial and economic system would be threatened by "similar unforeseeable consequences" as after the collapse of the U.S. financial group Lehman Brothers.

Bloomberg reports more clearly than Der Spiegel did that the bailout package may have been inadequate even over the coming weeks:
Hypo Real Estate's financing needs exceeded the bailout plan guarantee, Germany's Die Welt reported yesterday, citing unnamed people in the finance industry. It will need 20 billion euros by the end of next week and 50 billion euros by the end of the year, according to the newspaper. As much as 100 billion euros may be needed to shore up the bank's finances by the end of 2009, Die Welt said. Obermeier declined to comment.

The European Central Bank and the Bundesbank planned to contribute jointly 20 billion euros, and a group of unidentified banks another 15 billion euros. The plan called for Hypo Real Estate to use 42 billion euros in assets, mostly debt owed by government borrowers, as collateral.

Further detail from Reuters:
Property lender Hypo Real Estate fought for its life on Saturday after German banks and insurers pulled out of a state-led 35 billion euro ($48.5 billion) rescue program stitched together only days ago.

The news is a fresh blow for the global financial system struggling to master an unprecedented crisis of confidence and poses a political challenge for the Berlin government, which has been fighting efforts to arrange a pan-European bank bailout.

"The 35 billion euro rescue package promised to the Hypo Real Estate Group and extending into 2009 announced last week is currently withdrawn," the Munich-based real estate and public-sector lender said in a brief statement.

"The intended rescue package involved a liquidity line to be provided by a consortium of several financial institutions. The consortium has now declined to provide the line."

And Times Online:
The breakdown of the rescue of Hypo Real Estate will send fresh alarm through the markets that a raft of emergency measures enacted by European governments as well as the approval of the historic $700 billion (£396 billion) bailout by the American government in the last week have done little to keep the crisis from deepening.

Under the Hypo deal, which had been brokered by Berlin last week, a consortium of German banks had agreed to put up about €8.5 billion of a €35 billion emergency credit injection to keep the company afloat. The German taxpayer would have footed the rest of the bill.

Friday, October 3, 2008

Bailout Bill Passed by House

From the Wall Street Journal:
U.S. House of Representatives lawmakers wary of growing signs of the nation's economic distress voted in favor of a $700 billion Wall Street rescue package on Friday, sending the biggest government intervention in the financial markets since the Great Depression to President George W. Bush for his signature.

The vote was 263 to 171.

Update: the Dow, which had been up over 200 points before the bill's passage, has retreated to a mere plus 34. Buy on rumor, sell on fact?

Greece Scuttles €300 Billion Rescue Plan, Guarantees Bank Deposits

Yet another subject of worry is whether the global financial crisis will fracture the EU fatally. While the ECB coordinated rescue of Fortis was a positive sign, Ireland's move to guarantee all bank deposits was a blow, since it is drawing funds from EU institutions to Irish ones. French president Sarkozy had proposed a 300 billion euro rescue program (an idea that seemed to elicit more surprise than enthusiasm), but that idea was effectively deep-sixed by Greece's announcement today that, following Ireland, it too was providing a blanket deposit guarantee.

From the Times Online. I've left much of the detail in because it shows how hard it is for governments to respond in market time:
Plans for a pan-European response to the global financial crisis lay in tatters last night as Greece followed Ireland in unilaterally guaranteeing all bank deposits.

Amid reports that Greek depositors were rushing to withdraw their savings, Greece's Cabinet agreed to protect all deposits whatever their size. Previously the maximum guaranteed was €20,000 (£15,600).

A proposal by President Sarkozy of France to create a European €300 billion bailout fund also collapsed, leaving attempts on this side of the Atlantic to calm investor panic and lubricate the money markets in chaos.....

The latest chapter in the story of this piecemeal approach to stabilising the banking system began on Monday evening, when a group of Ireland's most senior bankers trooped into Government Buildings in Dublin.

It had been a terrible day in markets worldwide and a catastrophic one locally....Thus began the hatching of the explosive plan for a guarantee of all Irish bank deposits. Irish officials worked through the night to cobble together a credible plan.

There was no time to consult other governments, the European Commission or even the European Central Bank. A guarantee had to be in place before ordinary bank branches opened on Tuesday. At 4.15am the plan was completed. The promise would apply to six home-grown banks, and to no one else....

Dublin's move was having awkward consequences. Depositors on both sides of the Irish Sea were beginning to vote with their feet. Allied Irish Bank reported a surge in new deposits, as did Bank of Ireland, as anxious savers rushed to pull their money from British-owned banks and put it in the six favoured institutions with a rock-solid guarantee.

British bank leaders were furious. Dublin's move might be good for Irish banks but it was bad for British ones, for whom deposits were lifeblood in such difficult conditions. By Tuesday evening, several banking leaders were putting their concerns directly to Mr Brown, Mr Darling and Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, in a conference call....

By Wednesday, the fury over Ireland's unilateral guarantee was hardening in the City and across Europe. British banks were incandescent with their Irish counterparts, whom they accused of having deliberately exploited the situation to ring up corporate depositors and urge them to defect to “safer” Irish banks.

The case for an ambitious, co-ordinated response across Europe seemed stronger than ever to some on the Continent. That evening one European government source disclosed that France wanted Britain, Germany and Italy to back a €300 billion bank rescue fund at Mr Sarkozy's planned summit this weekend.

Within minutes, however, a German government spokesman bluntly rejected the idea in comments echoed by Angela Merkel. Confusion set in as French officials accused Germany of leaking the scheme to kill it off.

By late Wednesday evening French officials were changing tack to describe the €300billion fund as a Dutch idea, which they had always rejected. The Hague said it had no idea what France was talking about

The Élysée announced that a meeting between Mr Sarkozy and Mr Balkenende, due that evening, had been postponed for a day because the Dutch Prime Minister “has a problem with his airplane”.

By yesterday lunchtime, Hendrieneke Bolhaar, a Dutch finance ministry spokesman, said that the idea for a bank rescue fund had come from The Hague after all.

But farce then took over as Mr Balkenende emerged from his meeting with Mr Sarkozy - held after his aircraft started working again - to slap down the spokesman. There has “never been any question of a European fund”. It is all a “misunderstanding”, he said.

Instead, taking up a concept first mooted by Mr Balkenende, Mr Sarkozy is expected to float the idea that each EU country demonstrate that it has at least 3 per cent of its GDP at its disposal to help out in a financial crisis.

One EU diplomat told The Times that early French thinking on co-ordinated national funds had probably been mistakenly conflated into the idea of an EU fund, given that 3 per cent of EU GDP amounts to around €300 billion.

With the fund off the agenda, Mr Sarkozy finally persuaded Mr Brown and Mrs Merkel to meet him, Silvio Berlusconi, Mr Juncker, José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission chairman, and Jean-Louis Trichet, the chairman of the European Central Bank, in Paris on Saturday afternoon.

The official aim is merely to agree on a European plan for tighter investment bank regulation to put to the next G8 summit. Unoffically, Mr Sarkozy would also like a decision on a EU response to the crisis and at the very least an agreement not to follow Ireland's - and now Greece's - go-it-alone example.

But there has been little this week by the way of co-ordination to suggest that the plan has a chance.

Thursday, October 2, 2008

Will Euro Bank Woes Take Down the EU?

We have been asserting for many moons that despite having lower incidence of US style, "another quarter, another writedown" behavior, European banks are actually in weaker condition than their US counterparts. That's based on the view of a buddy who has top level regulatory connections here and in Europe, and it seems plausible given the fact that European regulators let their bank operate with lower equity levels than US banks can.

Not only have events started confirming this view, but, with a banking crisis starting to take hold in the EU, the stakes are high. The EU lacks a mechanism for rescuing banks; the responsibility falls to national central banks. The rescue over last weekend of Fortis demonstrated that several central banks, shepherded by the EU, can make a coordinated rescue. But will this prove to be a one-off or a model? The biggest banks in Europe, starting with Deutschebank and UBS, are similarly too big for their home country central bank to salvage in case of a meltdown.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, who admittedly has an appetite for drama, contends that the survival of the monetary union itself is in play.

From the Telegraph:
It took a weekend to shatter the complacency of German finance minister Peer Steinbrück. Last Thursday he told us that the financial crisis was an "American problem", the fruit of Anglo-Saxon greed and inept regulation that would cost the United States its "superpower status". Pleas from US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson for a joint US-European rescue plan to halt the downward spiral were rebuffed as unnecessary.

By Monday, Mr Steinbrück was having to orchestrate Germany's biggest bank bail-out, putting together a €35 billion loan package to save Hypo Real Estate. By then Europe was "staring into the abyss," he admitted. Belgium faced worse. It had to nationalise Fortis (with Dutch help), a 300-year-old bastion of Flemish finance, followed a day later by a bail-out for Dexia (with French help).

Within hours they were all trumped by Dublin. The Irish government issued a blanket guarantee of the deposits and debts of its six largest lenders in the most radical bank bail-out since the Scandinavian rescues in the early 1990s. Then France upped the ante with a €300 billion pan-European lifeboat for the banks. The drama has exposed Europe's dark secret for all to see. EU banks took on even more debt leverage than their US counterparts, despite the tirades against ''le capitalisme sauvage'' of the Anglo-Saxons.

We now know that it was French finance minister Christine Lagarde who begged Mr Paulson to save the US insurer AIG last week. AIG had written $300 billion in credit protection for European banks, admitting that it was for "regulatory capital relief rather than risk mitigation". In other words, it was underpinning a disguised extension of credit leverage. Its collapse would have set off a lending crunch across Europe as banking capital sank below water level.

It turns out that European regulators have allowed even greater use of "off-books" chicanery than the Americans. Mr Paulson may have saved Europe.

Most eyes are still on Washington, but the core danger is shifting across the Atlantic. Germany and Italy have been contracting since the spring, with France close behind. They are sliding into a deeper downturn than the US.

The interest spreads on Italian 10-year bonds have jumped to 92 points above German Bunds, a post-EMU high. These spreads are the most closely watched stress barometer for Europe's monetary union. Traders are starting to "price in" an appreciable risk that EMU will break apart.

The European Commission's top economists warned the politicians in the 1990s that the euro might not survive a crisis, at least in its current form. There is no EU treasury or debt union to back it up. The one-size-fits-all regime of interest rates caters badly to the different needs of Club Med and the German bloc.

The euro fathers did not dispute this. But they saw EMU as an instrument to force the pace of political union. They welcomed the idea of a "beneficial crisis". As ex-Commission chief Romano Prodi remarked, it would allow Brussels to break taboos and accelerate the move to a full-fledged EU economic government.

As events now unfold with vertiginous speed, we may find that it destroys the European Union instead. Spain is on the cusp of depression (I use the word to mean a systemic rupture). Unemployment has risen from 8.3 to 11.3 per cent in a year as the property market implodes. Yet the cost of borrowing (Euribor) is going up. You can imagine how the Spanish felt when German-led hawks pushed the European Central Bank into raising interest rates in July.

This may go down as the greatest monetary error of the post-war era. The ECB responded to the external shock of an oil and food spike with anti-inflation overkill, compounding the onset of an accelerating debt deflation that poses a greater danger. Has it committed the classic mistake of central banks, fighting the last war (1970s) instead of the last war but one (1930s)?
After years of acquiescence, the markets have started to ask whether the euro zone has the machinery to launch a Paulson-style rescue in a fast-moving crisis. Who has the authority to take charge? The ECB is not allowed to bail out countries under EU treaty law. The Stability Pact bans the sort of fiscal blitz that has kept America afloat. Yes, treaties can be ignored. But as we are learning, a banking system can implode in less time than it would take for EU ministers to congregate from the far corners of euroland.

France's Christine Lagarde called yesterday for an EU emergency fund. "What happens if a smaller EU country faces the threat of a bank going bankrupt? Perhaps the country doesn't have the means to save the institution. The question of a European safety net arises," she said.

The storyline is evolving much as eurosceptics predicted, yet the final chapter could end either way as the recriminations fly. Germany has already shot down the French idea. The nationalists are digging in their heels in Berlin and Madrid. We are fast approaching the moment when events decide whether Europe will bind together to save monetary union, or fracture into angry camps. Will the Teutons bail out Club Med? If not, check those serial numbers on your euro notes for the country of issue. It may start to matter.

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Bailout Bill To Make Money Market Liquidity Crunch Worse?

Boy, I wish I had thought of this, and why no one else save some smart readers have focused on the mechanics of the Paulson plan operations is beyond me. This bill is moving ahead like the Titanic.....with high odds of similar outcomes.

Hoisted from comments, we turn the mike over to reader Don:
The bailout, I mean rescue plan, can be seen as nothing less than a new Ponzi scheme. It works like this:
Fed as only lender, in an attempt to keep the financial system from imploding;

TARP needed to keep Fed balance sheet intact so that it can continue as only lender;

Treasury will need to significantly increase the amount of Ts (public money) auctioned to fund TARP;

Panic serves to encourage T. buyers, especially for bills;

This represents a liquidity trap: TARP recipients of Ts will hoard cash to buy Ts: rinse and repeat.

This results in drying up of lending to corporations/crowding out private capital - no new credit lines;

The Fed becomes a holder of private capital, the later of which is now frozen to protect that capital from deteriorating, The rollover scheme will restrict even more lending in the private sphere for purposes of keeping the financial sphere on life support, but with the consequence of furthering the deterioration of the 'real' economy.

The counterargument is that the TARP will end the fear, breaking the Treasury-hoarding. But with banks (presumably) able to use the new phony prices paid by the TARP as marks for asset valuation purposes (whether they sold to the TARP or not), you get less transparency and hence less faith in bank balance sheets.

Further remarks from reader FairEconomist:
My thoughts exactly, Don. Plus the durations target the drawdown precisely on the capital we need most. We're desperately short of 3 month working capital, and here comes Paulson to take $700 BB of what we've got left away and dump it in the mortgage industry. I don't think you could devise a worse plan. We might be better of if he *did* steal it.

Informed reader comment very much appreciated.

More on the Oinking Bailout Bill

More detail on all the lovely goodies larded in via Karim Bardeesy at The Big Money (both someone at TBM and reader Jennifer pointed out the piece). Note that this is a partial list:
DIVISION C-TAX EXTENDERS AND ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF

SEC. 308. INCREASE IN LIMIT ON COVER OVER OF RUM EXCISE TAX TO PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Paragraph (1) of section 7652(f) is amended by striking ‘‘January 1, 2008'' and inserting ‘‘January 1, 2010''.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by this section shall apply to distilled spirits brought into the United States after December 31, 2007.

SEC. 309. EXTENSION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CREDIT FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.

Subsection (d) of section 119 of division A of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 is amended-

(1) by striking ‘‘first two taxable years'' and inserting ‘‘first 4 taxable years"

SEC. 317. SEVEN-YEAR COST RECOVERY PERIOD FOR MOTORSPORTS RACING TRACK FACILITY.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.-Subparagraph (D) of section 168(i)(15) (relating to termination) is amended by striking ‘‘December 31, 2007'' and inserting "December 31, 2009''.

SEC. 325. EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION OF DUTY SUSPENSION ON WOOL PRODUCTS; WOOL RESEARCH FUND; WOOL DUTY REFUNDS.

(a) EXTENSION OF TEMPORARY DUTY REDUCTIONS.-Each of the following headings of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by striking the date in the effective period column and inserting ‘‘12/31/2014'':

(1) Heading 9902.51.11 (relating to fabrics of worsted wool).

(2) Heading 9902.51.13 (relating to yarn of combed wool).

(3) Heading 9902.51.14 (relating to wool fiber, waste, garnetted stock, combed wool, or wool top).

(4) Heading 9902.51.15 (relating to fabrics of combed wool).

(5) Heading 9902.51.16 (relating to fabrics of combed wool).

SEC. 503. EXEMPTION FROM EXCISE TAX FOR CERTAIN WOODEN ARROWS DESIGNED FOR USE BY CHILDREN.

‘(B) EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN WOODEN ARROW SHAFTS.-Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any shaft consisting of all natural wood with no laminations or artificial means of enhancing the spine of such shaft (whether sold separately or incorporated as part of a finished or unfinished product) of a type used in the manufacture of any arrow which after its assembly- ‘‘(i) measures 5⁄16 of an inch or less in diameter, and ‘‘(ii) is not suitable for use with a bow described in paragraph (1)(A).''.

We Chat on Bloggingheads with Megan McArdle on the Credit Crisis

Here's a clip:



Boy, do I need to get better at looking at the lens. FWIW, this is all done with a computer camera (unlike videotaping or TV) so you only have a teeny light to look at, and you clearly need to keep your eyes locked on it not to look peculiar. Better luck next time, but I hope you enjoy the substance. I had fun chatting with Megan.

Here it the full session.

Takes on the New, Porked-Up Bailout Bill

This comes from an e-mail titled, "It's worse than I thought," from a reader with a good deal of inside-the-Beltway experience:
It's Christmas…This has NOTHING TO DO WITH THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT. In fact very little has really been changed with respect to the original Paulson plan…The new PIG has everything to do with Senate Finance. There are 300 pages of tax breaks.

McCain and Obama are out on the campaign trail…What are they saying???

Washington back the bill!

Yet this thing is nothing but “earmarks,” which McCain said he would veto…and “business as ususal” which is the entire basis of Obama’s Change campaign.

And I’ve been watching CNBC all day…the finance talking heads can’t even begin to understand what’s happened here. This is a stunning power grab by a small group of US Senators…one assumes with the backing of Bush.

Pelosi had her chance…Paulson got down on one knee. When she couldn’t deliver, it became a Senate issue and they have overwhelmed everyone…

Incredible...hey added hundreds of billions to this with all the crap…..

And from another reader from his (no doubt in vain) communiques to elected officials:
Overall during the 1990s, Japan tried 10 fiscal stimulus packages totaling more than 100 trillion yen, and each failed to cure the recession. What the spending programs have done, however, is put Japan's government in poor fiscal shape. The "on-budget" government spending has caused public debt to exceed 100 percent of GDP (highest in the G7), and even more debt is apparent when the "off-budget" sector is included. Japan tried changing the rules, they took assets, they tried to prevent them from going down.

Look at the Japan Stock market ever since. Despite all that money the market continued to go down, as will ours. The scare tactic being used in washington would lead you to believe otherwise.

Of course Jean Claude Trichet wants you to approve this. Deutche Bank, UBS, etc.. are all knee-deep in these credit derivatives...He wants us to bail out them, meanwhile he refused to cut interest rates this entire time which would have been favorable to the dollar. Now we are facing a real threat of hyperinflation if congress allows this plan to proceed. No amount of jiggering this bill is going to make it right.

However, Doing Something is clearly taking precedence over Doing Something That Might Actually Work.

McDonalds now has less of a chance of defaulting on his debt than the United States. That's correct, we are now facing the very real possibility of having our own national debt downgraded.

Lastly, PLEASE do yourself a favor and look at your own economic data. Personal Savings Rate, Household Debut and Foregin ownership of our debt: Just look at these 3 graphs then ask yourself a few questions about this bailout

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PSAVERT
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CMDEBT
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FDHBFI

Like the monolines, the US will be seen as a less than stellar credit long before any debt downgrade were to occur. Japan's yen debt rating was single A before recent upgrades.

And from another reader who worked in the financial markets and now has a ringside seat:
The main concern is keeping the Fed autonomous, independent and the " lender of last resort". It is not the money, it is the administration of the money. The Treasury's rescue, to take from legal custody by force, is wrong. The Treasury's choices with whom they will do business is telling. Carlyle executives moving into powerful positions at Freddie Mac, Wachovia and on and on. This does not bode well...

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

Calls to Congressmen Running in Favor of Bailout Bill

Despite the hue and cry among the officialdom in favor of the bailout bill, the reading we have gotten from professional investors, some of them with very high level connections, and economists among our readership and personal network is strongly negative. Nevertheless, by making the bill a de facto ultimatum ("do this or we do nothing") when there were other options for addressing the credit crisis, the Treasury assured a strongly negative market reaction when the bill looked to be in jeopardy (and in fact the Fed has pulled out the stops, but the popular media pay little heed). The specter of the stock market plunging has created panic, and the electorate is responding accordingly.

Sadly, the odds of getting a better bill were not high independent of the pushback. The House Republicans in most cases were opposed for ideological reasons, that the bill was too "socialistic" for their taste. The real issue is that the bill does little to nothing to address the acute aspects of the crisis, namely the seize up in the money, particularly the commercial paper, markers. There will be a brief psychological boost, then back to status quo ante.

From Bloomberg:
President George W. Bush and Senate leaders vowed today to revive a $700 billion financial rescue plan amid evidence voters and lawmakers regretted yesterday's U.S. House vote to kill the bailout.

Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky predicted lawmakers would wrap up work on the plan by the end of this week. A plunge in U.S. markets, partially erased today, makes it clear Congress must act, he said....

Voters flooded Capitol Hill offices today, decrying the defeat of the rescue package, a House Republican leadership aide said. Prior to yesterday's tally, lawmakers said sentiment was running about 100-1 against the plan.

An Assessment of Bailout Bill Options from a Former Congressional Staffer

Our reader and sometimes contributor Lune worked on the Hill and was so kind as to send us his take on the choices facing the Senate and House leadership on the bailout bill, His position on it is rather clear:
While many of you may be popping champagne bottles tonight in honor of the bailout plan that never was, we need to realize that this is only one step. The bailout is by no means dead. Having dealt with the legislative process before, here is my speculation about what may happen in the coming days, and the options that Congress has before it:

1) The House schedules a re-vote on the same bill.
Keep in mind that victory today was a very narrow one. The final vote was 228-205. That means a switch by 12 congresspeople would make all the difference. All the leadership has to do is put 12 Bridges to Nowhere-type earmarks buried in the fine print of some appropriations bill, and those 12 votes can magically appear. Or promising to give/withhold campaign funds or plum committee assignments. The list of carrots and sticks available to the leadership is endless. In many ways, the vote turning out the way it did had nothing to with the bill per se, but rather represents a colossal failure of the leadership's whipping process. You don't walk into a critical vote like this without knowing how many votes you have beforehand. Indeed, a report in The Hill suggest that Roy Blunt, the Republican whip, miscalculated the votes in his pocket by 10, which was a huge mistake and probably cost them the vote.

2) The House schedules a re-vote after some minor alterations.
The leadership is by no means out of options in the horse-trading that's likely occurring now. Some of the congresspeople voted no not because they disagreed with the gist of the bill, but because their pet issue (e.g. foreclosure assistance, tax cuts, regulatory changes, etc. etc.) wasn't included. Just like adding the meaningless bond insurance plan into the bill bought a few Republican votes, similar minor provisions can be added to convince a few more people.

3) The Senate votes first, and the House uses that to pressure members to fall in line.
While the Senate seems to have the votes for passage, all bets are off right now until they come to grips with the House defeat. Senators are now deciding whether they want to walk the plank for Wall Street and possibly lose their jobs for a bill that won't pass anyway.

4) The process starts again, with new proposals and plans debated.
While this is perhaps the ideal situation, the likelihood of such an orderly debate will depend greatly on how the markets do in the next few days. If chaos continues to reign, the pressure will grow to pass something. This is where all those economists need to come together and come up with an alternate plan fast. While the University of Chicago writing a letter condemning the current plan was nice, it would have been better if they proposed an alternative. Remember that when a house is burning down, and someone proposes doing something, and another proposes doing nothing, chances are that something will win out, no matter how bad it is, simply because doing nothing is not an option.

Economists with ties to the Hill, or with journalists that could publicize such a plan, need to come together to propose a reasonable alternative. Throw enough academic credentials behind it, and they have a fighting chance of being more trustworthy than Bernanke and Paulson. We'll see if the academic community which has been so vociferous in its criticisms can also make constructive proposals (It doesn't have to have all the details in place, just remember 3 goals that can be reduced to soundbites for public consumption: save the financial system, punish Wall St., and cost less than $700 bil).

5) Congress is paralyzed and adjourns before passing anything.
This may not be as far-fetched as it sounds. Right now, many congresspeople are desperate to get home and campaign. Plenty of people are locked in tight elections, and every day they spend in Washington is one less day spent rounding up votes. The number one priority of most congresspeople is getting re-elected. If that means leaving DC and leaving the economy in a tailspin, so be it. This will likely depend on how badly the markets are doing, and how far off from getting enough votes the leadership perceives themselves to be.

6) The executive branch (Treasury and the Fed) finds new executive powers that allow them to substantially implement the bailout without Congressional approval.
This has happened plenty of times during this current Administration. No reason to suspect they're going to stop now.

Those are the possible scenarios that I see possibly playing out in the next few days. The bottom line is that today's defeat of the bailout was a tactical victory, not a strategic one. There are still plenty of ways that we can end up with a bad plan, and we need to remain vigilant.

Per Lune's final point: there is plenty the Administration could do on a stop-gap basis. One correspondent pointed out that the Administration could use the Exchange Stablization Fun