Category Archives: Currencies

Satyajit Das: Extortionate Privilege – America’s FMD

Yves here. I’m putting myself in the rather peculiar position of taking exception to a guest post. One might argue as to why I’m featuring it. Das gives an articulate but nevertheless fairly conventional reading of views of market professionals about the US debt levels. For instance as you’ll see, it conflates state government deficits (which do need to be funded in now skeptical markets) with the Federal deficit. And this sort of thinking, due to fear of the Bond Gods, is driving policy right now.

In addition, he posits that depreciation of the US dollar continues apace. I’m always leery of what amount to trend projections. Complex systems often have unexpected feedback loops. There is an interesting question of whether markets have over-anticipated QE3. In addition, the dollar has fallen to the point where it is becoming attractive for manufacturers to repatriate activities. But given the loss of managerial “talent” (and here I mean people who know how to run operations, not executives) and infrastructure, there will be a marked lag before the weakened dollar produces the next leg up of domestic production.

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

Extortionate Privilege…

Given the magnitude of the US debt problem and the lack of political will, the most likely policy is FMD – “fudging”, “monetisation” and “devaluation”.

Mosler/Pilkington: A Credible Eurozone Exit Plan

By Warren Mosler, an investment manager and creator of the mortgage swap and the current Eurofutures swap contract and Philip Pilkington, a journalist and writer based in Dublin, Ireland

The Eurozone has certainly seen better days. The mess – to paraphrase a dodgy Irish politician – is only getting messier.

This is all avoidable, of course, and if the European authorities decided to take action and have the ECB backstop the sovereign debt of the periphery the whole crisis would come to an end. But the European authorities, for a variety of reasons, do not seem to want to do this. And even if they did there would be the issue of austerity: would they continue to force ridiculous austerity programs down the throats of the periphery governments? And if so, then for how long? Leaked documents from within the Troika show the austerity programs to be an abject failure and yet European officials continue to consider them the only game in town. So, we can only conclude at this stage that, given that European officials know that austerity programs do not work, they are pursuing them for political rather than economic reasons.

So, we contend that the periphery governments should have a credible exit strategy on hand and it is to this that we now turn.

Satyajit Das: In the Matter of Lehman Brothers – Part 1: Breaking Up is Hard To Do

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

In this two part paper, the issues regarding settlement of complex derivatives arrangement revealed by the failure of Lehman Brothers is outlined. Many of the failures affect new regulatory proposals such as the rapid resolution regimes under consideration. The First Part deals with terminating and settling derivative contracts.

A generation was once measured by where they were when an American President was assassinated in Dallas. A newer financial generation measure themselves by where they were when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008.

The controversial failure of Lehman has become a pivotal point in ideological debates about markets, finance and the role of government. At a more mundane level, Lehman’s bankruptcy points to deeper problems in the “plumbing” of the financial system. The policy debate so far has largely ignored these unfashionable issues.

EFSF Fail: Forced to Buy Some of Its Own Bonds in Auction

Pretty much everyone who is not part of the problem has seen the EFSF as unlikely to work very well, and has regarded the idea of a levered EFSF with the sort of amusement and disdain reserved for bad taxidermy.

Marshall Auerback: The Road to Serfdom

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By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist and hedge fund manager. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives.

The markets are again in free-fall and, once again, a lazy Mediterranean profligate is to blame. This time, it’s an Italian, rather than a Greek. No, not Silvio Berlusconi, but his fellow countryman, Mario Draghi, the new head of the increasingly spineless European Central Bank.

At least the Alice in Wonderland quality of the markets has finally dissipated. It was extraordinary to observe the euphoric reaction to the formation of the European Financial Stability Forum a few weeks ago, along with the “voluntary” 50% haircut on Greek debt (which has turned out to be as ‘voluntary’ as a bank teller opening up a vault and surrendering money to someone sticking a gun in his/her face).

Is Greece About to Derail the Bailout Yet Again?

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Germany found it hard to conquer and control Greece in World War II. History seems to be repeating itself.

EU Leaders Threaten Greece With Expulsion From the Eurozone

If you had any doubts about the intent of the Eurobailouts, the latest news should settle them. The game plan was to severely limit Greek sovereignity and assert the primacy of creditor rights, even if they came at the expense of democracy. Greece, as we described in a post earlier today, threatened to blow up the bailout by having a referendum. That measure, even if it took place before year end, would create massive uncertainty and wreak havoc with other efforts (for instance, getting China to contribute cash to the levered EFSF, the bailout funding vehicle. As we’ve detailed in earlier posts, it is unworkable in the absence either of ECB backing or substantial outside funding).

The Eurocrats have decided to try to push Greece into line, threatening expulsion from the Euro (note, not the EU) if Greece does not back down.

Is the Eurobankster “We’ll Shrink Our Balance Sheets” Threat Largely Empty?

Even though the Greek move to blow up the latest Eurorescue plan caught the world’s attention, another pushback is underway, this via the blue chip lobbying group, The International Institute for Finance.

The threat, which has surfaced before and is picked up in an article by Bloomberg, is that raising capital levels as mandated under the latest version of the Eurorescue plan, won’t take place by selling equity, retaining earnings (which would almost certainly mean constraining pay levels) or accepting government equity injections (which will come with nasty strings attached). Instead, banks will just shrink to meet the targets by selling risky assets. (Note that the targets, which are being met with howls by the industry, are for them to write down sovereign and reach a core capital level of 9% by June 30, 2012).

This is meant to be a threat. “Shrinking assets” implies less lending. Less lending would put a downward pressure on economic growth. Recessionary or near recession conditions tend to lead voters to throw elected officials out. So this sabre rattling is clearly meant to get the officialdom back in line.

How seriously should we take this?

Greece: The Debtor that Roared

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou has managed to put the European crisis game of financial fakery into turmoil. Pretty much no informed commentator expected the latest gimmick-larded rescue package to work; there were simply too many points of failure. And even if this program had miraculously come to fruition, a later train wreck was still inevitable, since Germany was persisting in wanting two contradictory outcomes: running trade surpluses in Europe, and not lending more to its trade parters.

But no one anticipated that a long suffering debtor would revolt, which is what Papandreou’s announcement of a referendum on the punitive bailout amounts to.

Europe’s Plan To End the Debt Crisis – Putting The “Con” in “Confidence” Part 2

Yves here. Das’ understated comment on the latest Eurorescue scheme, “Implementation of the plan faces significant risks,” has been proven true by the events of the day, namely, the proposal by Greek prime minister George Papandreou for a referendum on the proposed rescue plan. Even though he secured unanimous approval of his cabinet, two members of his coalition, which has a thin hold on government, defected, and he faces a vote of no confidence on Friday. Mr. Market was not happy with this news. While the fall in equity markets was what got the headline, the enthusiasm there had been considerably overdone. Far more serious was the action in the debt markets. The spread between German bunds and Italian government debt hit 450 basis points. That put Italian borrowing rates at over 6%, which is an intolerable level relative to the country’s growth prospects.

We have more detail in a related post.

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

Without Wings, Sans Prayers…

The initial market response to the EU proposal was positive, with major stock markets and bank shares rising sharply. Unlike equity markets, debt traders were cautious. On Friday 29 October, an Italian debt auction met with lack lustre demand falling short of the full amount offered for sale. The debt markets registered their doubts by pushing up 10 year interest rates on the bonds of both Italy (up 0.14% per annum to 6.01% per annum) and Spain (up 0.18% per cent to 5.49%). Greek rates remained high at 22.35% for 10 years while comparable Portuguese rates were 11.48% and Irish rates were 7.98%.

Implementation of the plan faces significant risks.

Satyajit Das – Europe’s Plan To End the Debt Crisis – Putting The “Con” in “Confidence” Part 1

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

The most recent summit failed to meet even the lowest expectations.

Europe’s Economy is Falling Apart

Yves here. Note the comment at the end, that Sarkozy’s sales pitch to China on the levered up EFSF did not go so well. If the Chinese don’t relent, this greatly reduces of this scheme working, even in the short term. And further note that the flagging European growth is the result of the austerity hairshirt being imposed on highly indebted economies. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has a pointed article on the consequences of the beggar-thy-neighbor German stance.

By Delusional Economics, who is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint. Cross posted from MacroBusiness

Angela Merkel has been warning for quite some time that Europe’s economic woes will take up to a decade to fix and that it is time for Europe to rethink its economic strategy after years of living “beyond its means”. It seems fairly obvious from those statements that the rest of the world is going to have to get use to Europe moving into a slow growth phase while it attempts to adjust away from what it considers to be unsustainable debt.

In an attempt support the transition while keeping Europe together the European leaders have put together 3 part package to save Greece, re-capitalise the banks and provide a stability mechanism for countries that run into trouble. The problem is that once you understand the technicalities behind what they have come up with you come to realise that real economic growth is the only thing that actually matters. The latest news out of Europe for many of the 17 member nations is not good at all in that regard.

German Finance Minister Schäuble Calls for a Eurozone Tobin Tax

A key German finance leader is talking tough about financial reform. But will his peers follow?

Gene Frieda: Europe’s Dying Bank Model

Yves here. Frieda makes a very important point in this Project Syndicate column, that of the role of the banking system in the European debt crisis. On one level, it may seem trivial to say that the sovereign debt crisis is the result of financial crisis. But the Eurozone leadership has not drilled into the next layer: how did this come about? The superficial explanation, that they all ate too much US subprime debt and got really sick, is superficial and shifts attention away from the real issues. European banks have huge balance sheets with a lot of low-return investments. I did some consulting work for some European banks over a decade ago (one of the remarkable things about banking is how little things change over time) and they tended to target commodity areas of banking in the US, not simply because that was where they could break in, but also because the returns were tolerable (although they did hope to move up the food chain into more lucrative business).

Frieda argues that merely having banks raise capital ratios to the 9% level stipulated in the current version of the Eurozone rescue is inadequate. Absent more aggressive measures, “no amount of capital will restore investors’ faith in eurozone banks.”

By Gene Frieda, a global strategist for Moore Europe Capital Management. Cross posted with author permission from Project Syndicate.