Category Archives: Currencies

Is the Eurobankster “We’ll Shrink Our Balance Sheets” Threat Largely Empty?

Even though the Greek move to blow up the latest Eurorescue plan caught the world’s attention, another pushback is underway, this via the blue chip lobbying group, The International Institute for Finance.

The threat, which has surfaced before and is picked up in an article by Bloomberg, is that raising capital levels as mandated under the latest version of the Eurorescue plan, won’t take place by selling equity, retaining earnings (which would almost certainly mean constraining pay levels) or accepting government equity injections (which will come with nasty strings attached). Instead, banks will just shrink to meet the targets by selling risky assets. (Note that the targets, which are being met with howls by the industry, are for them to write down sovereign and reach a core capital level of 9% by June 30, 2012).

This is meant to be a threat. “Shrinking assets” implies less lending. Less lending would put a downward pressure on economic growth. Recessionary or near recession conditions tend to lead voters to throw elected officials out. So this sabre rattling is clearly meant to get the officialdom back in line.

How seriously should we take this?

Greece: The Debtor that Roared

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou has managed to put the European crisis game of financial fakery into turmoil. Pretty much no informed commentator expected the latest gimmick-larded rescue package to work; there were simply too many points of failure. And even if this program had miraculously come to fruition, a later train wreck was still inevitable, since Germany was persisting in wanting two contradictory outcomes: running trade surpluses in Europe, and not lending more to its trade parters.

But no one anticipated that a long suffering debtor would revolt, which is what Papandreou’s announcement of a referendum on the punitive bailout amounts to.

Europe’s Plan To End the Debt Crisis – Putting The “Con” in “Confidence” Part 2

Yves here. Das’ understated comment on the latest Eurorescue scheme, “Implementation of the plan faces significant risks,” has been proven true by the events of the day, namely, the proposal by Greek prime minister George Papandreou for a referendum on the proposed rescue plan. Even though he secured unanimous approval of his cabinet, two members of his coalition, which has a thin hold on government, defected, and he faces a vote of no confidence on Friday. Mr. Market was not happy with this news. While the fall in equity markets was what got the headline, the enthusiasm there had been considerably overdone. Far more serious was the action in the debt markets. The spread between German bunds and Italian government debt hit 450 basis points. That put Italian borrowing rates at over 6%, which is an intolerable level relative to the country’s growth prospects.

We have more detail in a related post.

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

Without Wings, Sans Prayers…

The initial market response to the EU proposal was positive, with major stock markets and bank shares rising sharply. Unlike equity markets, debt traders were cautious. On Friday 29 October, an Italian debt auction met with lack lustre demand falling short of the full amount offered for sale. The debt markets registered their doubts by pushing up 10 year interest rates on the bonds of both Italy (up 0.14% per annum to 6.01% per annum) and Spain (up 0.18% per cent to 5.49%). Greek rates remained high at 22.35% for 10 years while comparable Portuguese rates were 11.48% and Irish rates were 7.98%.

Implementation of the plan faces significant risks.

Satyajit Das – Europe’s Plan To End the Debt Crisis – Putting The “Con” in “Confidence” Part 1

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

The most recent summit failed to meet even the lowest expectations.

Europe’s Economy is Falling Apart

Yves here. Note the comment at the end, that Sarkozy’s sales pitch to China on the levered up EFSF did not go so well. If the Chinese don’t relent, this greatly reduces of this scheme working, even in the short term. And further note that the flagging European growth is the result of the austerity hairshirt being imposed on highly indebted economies. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has a pointed article on the consequences of the beggar-thy-neighbor German stance.

By Delusional Economics, who is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint. Cross posted from MacroBusiness

Angela Merkel has been warning for quite some time that Europe’s economic woes will take up to a decade to fix and that it is time for Europe to rethink its economic strategy after years of living “beyond its means”. It seems fairly obvious from those statements that the rest of the world is going to have to get use to Europe moving into a slow growth phase while it attempts to adjust away from what it considers to be unsustainable debt.

In an attempt support the transition while keeping Europe together the European leaders have put together 3 part package to save Greece, re-capitalise the banks and provide a stability mechanism for countries that run into trouble. The problem is that once you understand the technicalities behind what they have come up with you come to realise that real economic growth is the only thing that actually matters. The latest news out of Europe for many of the 17 member nations is not good at all in that regard.

German Finance Minister Schäuble Calls for a Eurozone Tobin Tax

A key German finance leader is talking tough about financial reform. But will his peers follow?

Gene Frieda: Europe’s Dying Bank Model

Yves here. Frieda makes a very important point in this Project Syndicate column, that of the role of the banking system in the European debt crisis. On one level, it may seem trivial to say that the sovereign debt crisis is the result of financial crisis. But the Eurozone leadership has not drilled into the next layer: how did this come about? The superficial explanation, that they all ate too much US subprime debt and got really sick, is superficial and shifts attention away from the real issues. European banks have huge balance sheets with a lot of low-return investments. I did some consulting work for some European banks over a decade ago (one of the remarkable things about banking is how little things change over time) and they tended to target commodity areas of banking in the US, not simply because that was where they could break in, but also because the returns were tolerable (although they did hope to move up the food chain into more lucrative business).

Frieda argues that merely having banks raise capital ratios to the 9% level stipulated in the current version of the Eurozone rescue is inadequate. Absent more aggressive measures, “no amount of capital will restore investors’ faith in eurozone banks.”

By Gene Frieda, a global strategist for Moore Europe Capital Management. Cross posted with author permission from Project Syndicate.

Grand European Rescue Already Starting to Come Unglued?

This site has had plenty of company in expressing doubts about the latest episode in the continuing “save the banks, devil take the hindmost” Eurodrama. The same issues came up over and over: too small size of rescue fund, heavy reliance on smoke and gimmickry to get it even to that size, insufficient relief to the Greek economy (the haircuts will apply to only a portion of the bonds), no assurance that enough banks will go along with the “voluntary” rescue, and way way too many details left to be sorted out.

But it is a particularly bad sign to see disagreement within the officialdom about the just-annnounced deal.

Eurozone Leaders Agree a Few Rescue Details, Like 50% Haircut on Greek Bonds; Plan to Develop a Plan Gooses Markets

When failure is too painful to contemplate, any halting motion in something resembling the right direction will be hailed as success.

Eurozone leaders had a session well into the night and announced a sketchy deal that dealt with one major stumbling block, which was getting a deep enough “voluntary” haircut on Greek debt. Government officials regarded it as key that any debt restructuring be voluntary, since no one wanted to trigger payouts on credit default swaps written on Greek debt (a default or forced restructuring would be deemed a credit event and allow CDS holders to cash in their insurance policies, and that could trigger a bigger rout). The banks were unwilling to accept the 60% haircut sought by the Eurocrats, but agreed to a 50% reduction.

Europe Readies Its Rescue Bazooka

It’s one thing to fail to recall relevant events that are genuinely historical, quite another to refuse to learn from recent failed experiments.

Remember Hank Paulson’s bazooka? The Treasury secretary, in pitching Congress to give him authority to lend and provide equity to Fannie and Freddie, argued, “If you have a bazooka in your pocket and people know it, you probably won’t have to use it.”

but the Treasury’s new powers did not do the trick. Less than two months later, Treasury and OFHEO put the GSEs into conservatorship.

If the latest rumors prove to be accurate, the latest Eurozone machinations make Paulson look good.

Satyajit Das: Central Counter Party Politics

By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

This four part paper deals with a key element of derivative market reform – the CCP (Central Counter Party). The first part looked at the idea behind the CCP. This second part looks at the design of the CCP.

The key element of derivative market reform is a central clearinghouse, the central counter party (“CCP”). Under the proposal, standardised derivative transactions must be cleared through the CCP that will guarantee performance.

The design of the CCP provides an insight into the complex interests of different groups affected and the lobbying process shaping the regulations.

Marshall Auerback and Rob Parenteau: The Myth of Greek Profligacy & the Faith Based Economics of the ‘Troika’

By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist and hedge fund manager, and Rob Parenteau, CFA, sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge and a research associate of The Levy Economics Institute

Historically, Greeks have been very good at constructing myths. The rest of the world? Not so great, if the current burst of commentary on the country is anything to go by. Reading the press, one gets the impression of a bunch of lazy Mediterranean scroungers, enjoying one of the highest standards of living in Europe while making the frugal Germans pick up the tab. This is a nonsensical propaganda. As if Greece is the only country ever to cook its books in the European Union! Rather, the heart of the problem is in the antiquated revenue system that supports that state, which results in a budget shortfall consistently about 10% of GDP. The top 20% of the income distribution in Greece pay virtually no taxes at all, the product of a corrupt bargain reached during the days of the junta between the military and Greece’s wealthiest plutocrats. No wonder there is a fiscal crisis!

So it’s not a problem of Greek profligates, or an overly generous welfare state, both of which suggest that the standard IMF style remedies being proposed here are bound to fail, as they are doing right now. In fact, given the non-stop austerity being imposed on Athens (which simply has the effect of deflating the economy further and thereby reducing the ability of the Greeks to hit the fiscal targets imposed on them), the Greeks really are getting close to the point where they may well default and shift the problem back to those imposing the austerity.

The Verboten Story of Argentina’s Post-Default Economic Success

Even notice nothing is ever said in the mainstream media about Argentina’s economy, save that it had a big default? You’d never know the following about Argentina:

Eurozone Rescue Going Off the Rails

In the runup to the crisis, it was striking to read the undertone of worry in quite a few of the articles in the Financial Times, and I don’t mean only Gillian Tett’s fixation on collateralized debt obligations. It was palpable that a lot of writers were uncomfortable with how frothy the markets were, yet couldn’t say anything too much at odds with what their largely cheerleading sources were telling them.

Even though the overall mood at this juncture is far more downbeat, there is again a reporting gap between the pink paper and the two major US print business outlets, the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times on the expected crisis nexus, the Eurozone.

Eurozone Leaders Ready €80 Billion Band-Aid for Banking Industry Gunshot Wound

I must confess I don’t stay on top of the blow by blow of the ever-devolving Eurozone mess. The broad lines of the trajectory look all too predictable. The officialdom could patch up things for quite a while if the powers that be let the ECB monetize the debt (eventually, you could have an inflation problem, but with the EU and global economy so slack, “eventually” will take quite a while to show up).

However,everyone in positions of authority seems to believe in certain-to-fail-much-faster austerity instead. So the permissible short-to-medium term fixes involves lots of complicated programs, multi-party negotiations, and in some cases, political approvals. The timeline for the governmental maneuvering seems badly out of line with what Mr. Market requires. And to make matters worse, an earlier deal on a Greek funding, which involved bondholders taking a 21% haircut, is now deemed not to be punitive enough to banks. While that is narrowly true, having this deal come unglued could be the detonator that sets off a crisis chain reaction.

And from a wider vantage, none of these remedies address the real issue