Category Archives: Moral hazard

Lawyers Threatened With Sanctions for Talking About Foreclosure Abuses

So much for the idea that the legal profession cares about integrity. While there are no doubt many upstanding attorneys, state bar associations seem vastly more concerned about trying protect the industry’s meal ticket than policing questionable conduct. It’s well known in the profession that to the extent lawyers are ever sanctioned, it’s almost without exception small firm operators. The big boys pay a lot in dues and often have partners in their firms that hold offices in the state bar organization.

One damning illustration: even though Florida has been a virtual cesspool of legal malfeasance, with its biggest foreclosure mill having shuttered its doors and impermissibly not passed open cases on to other lawyers and all of the other big players on the ropes, not a single lawyer has been sanctioned. Yet two lawyers in the state were threatened because they’ve dared to say a candid word or two about the mortgage mess.

Doug Smith: Shock Therapy For Economics, Part 1

By Douglas K. Smith, author of On Value and Values: Thinking Differently About We In An Age Of Me

In “Economics In Crisis”, professor Brad DeLong notes:

The most interesting moment at a recent conference held in Bretton Woods … came when Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (asked) Larry Summers, “[Doesn’t] what has happened in the past few years simply suggest that [academic] economists did not understand what was going on?”

DeLong agreed with Summers’ response: “the problem is that there is so much that is “distracting, confusing, and problem-denying in…the first year course in most PhD programs.” As a result, even though “economics knows a fair amount,” it “has forgotten a fair amount that is relevant, and it has been distracted by an enormous amount.” DeLong then goes on to call for serious change in what economics departments do and teach.

In Part 2 of this post, I’m going to address the realities of ‘serious change’; and, in that context, what is troubling for INET about Summers’ presence at the recent Bretton Woods gathering. I’ll do this from my experience in leading and guiding real change as well as by contrasting INET with another, smaller, and more nascent effort called Econ4.

For now, though, let’s put aside the serious lack of self-respect in paying any attention at all to a world historical failure like Summers (Why is this arrogant sophist even on anyone’s C list, let alone A list? Why isn’t Summers wearing sack cloth and rolling in ashes?). Instead, let’s respond to DeLong’s ‘fessing up to the crisis in economics:

Geithner Blocked IMF Deal to Haircut Irish Debt

Was the US Treasury Secretary’s deep sixing of a plan by the seldom-charitable IMF to give the Irish some debt relief Versailles redux? By that I mean the Treaty of Versailles, the agreement at the end of World War I devised by the victors to dismember the German economy. Bear with me as I tease out this conceit.

Guest Post: Overruled

Cross posted from MacroBusiness

Ok, we all know that anyone who says “this time it is different” is to be treated at best as misinformed, at worst as a fool. “They are the five most dangerous words in the English language” etc. etc. But, to repeat my question: “Are things always the same?” Mostly, yes. Modern housing bubbles are not unlike 17th century Holland’s Tulipmania, government debt crises have not changed all that much since Henry VIII reduced the gold in coinage, greed, profligacy, irresponsible plutocracies are always with us.

But in global finance there are some things happening that are genuinely different. Dangerously so.

Earth to Libertarians: Private Parties Have Coercive Power Too

I’m sick of the free pass given the libertarian blather, “The state is the only source of coercive power.” I doubt that many non-libertarians buy that assetion, but they too often remain silent because most libertarians are rabid on that issue and arguing with them is like talking to a wall. But since that bogus assertion has been showing up increasingly in comments here as right-wing plants are becoming more common, I might as well do a quick shred, since it does not take much effort to show this claim is nonsense.

Let’s look at some simple empirical examples of why this pet argument just ain’t so.

On Economics of Contempt’s Reliance on His Own Brand Fumes

Economics of Contempt is aptly named. While his stand alone pieces on various aspects of regulation are informative, if too often skewed towards officialdom cheerleading (he too often comes off as an unpaid PR service for Geithner), his manner of engaging with third parties leaves a lot be desired. He often resorts to the blogosphere version of a withering look rather than dealing with an argument in a fair minded manner. This then puts the target in a funny position: do you deal with these drive-by shootings which have either not engaged or misrepresented your argument, by cherry picking and selective omission? If you do, you can look overly zealous or argumentative. But if you do nothing, particularly if it’s in an important area of regulatory debate, you’ve let disinformation, at the expense of your reputation, stand.

Your Humble Blogger Asked Larry Summers a Question He Did Not Like

A funny thing happened at the INET conference. First, I got to ask Larry Summers a question because Martin Wolf, who was moderating the session, is a good sport. Normally, at this sort of event, only At Least Semi Big Names get to interact with Big Names. Yours truly is a minimum of a rank or two below At Least Semi Big Names.

You will find our question at 55:40.

Our Polarized and Money-Driven Congress: Created Over 25 Years By Republicans (and Quickly Imitated by Democrats)

Political scientist Tom Ferguson prepared a short but important paper for the INET conference last weekend on how Congress got to be as polarized as it is today. His answer: it was redesigned quite deliberately by conservative Republican followers of Newt Gingrich starting in the mid 1980s and their methods were copied by the Democrats. Their changes resulted in firmer control by leadership (ie, less autonomy of individual Congressmen) and much greater importance of fundraising (which increased the power of corporate interests).

The extent of corruption may surprise even jaundiced readers.

Conflicted JP Morgan Next up for a Reputation Hit

Louise Story at the NYT has this: In the summer of 2007, as the first tremors of the coming financial crisis were being felt on Wall Street, top executives of JPMorgan Chase were raising red flags about a troubled investment vehicle called Sigma, which was based in London. But the bank chose not to move […]

A suspicious sniff at CoCos

Contingent Convertible bonds (“CoCos”) are supposed to address this nonsensical phenomenon: During the financial crisis a number of distressed banks were rescued by the public sector injecting funds in the form of common equity and other forms of Tier 1 capital. While this had the effect of supporting depositors it also meant that Tier 2 capital […]

Rationalization of Biggest Foreign Bank Bailout Misses Regulatory Failure

Some aggressive spinning on the Fed data releases about its lending during the financial crisis has surfaced at Bloomberg (admittedly with some less favorable facts also included). The Friends of the Fed and other Recipients of Largesse are defending the central banks’ panicked and indiscriminate responses to the crisis. These efforts to rationalize emergency responses fail to acknowledge underlying regulatory failings that remain unaddressed.

The PR push surrounds the foreign bank that got the most support during the post-Lehman phase, namely, Dexia.

More Journalists Dignifying “TARP Was a Success” Propaganda

I hope NC readers don’t mind my belaboring the issue of the TARP’s phony success, but every time I see the Administration’s propaganda parroted I feel compelled to weigh in.

The trigger was an effort at a balanced assessment by Annie Lowrey at Slate, to which I have some objections, followed by some shameless and misguided cheerleading by Andrew Sullivan:

But two years ago, I sure didn’t expect the government to make a profit from TARP. And I sure didn’t expect the auto bailouts to become such huge successes.

What’s surprising to me is how pallid is the Obama administration’s spin has been on this. I never hear them bragging about how they managed to pull us out of the economic nose-dive we were facing. I know why: the recession isn’t over, even if TARP was a success, no one wants to hear about it, etc. But it’s one of the strongest and least valued part of Obama’s record – along with the cost control innovations in health insurance reform.

At some point, you have to stand up and defend your record. No doubt Obama is biding his time on this. But count me as surprised as I am impressed.

Quelle Surprise! Fed and Treasury Keen to Find As Few Systemically Risky Firms as Possible

We seem to be going back to the world before the crisis in number of respects. The first is that the Financial Times is again running rings around the Wall Street Journal on markets and financial services industry coverage. The crisis forced the Journal to throw a lot of resources on those beats, with the result that it became pretty competitive.

The second is that the authorities seem to be engaged in a weird form of cognitive dissonance. They clearly can’t pretend the crisis didn’t occur; if nothing else, all the extra new studies and rulemaking imposed by Dodd Frank make that impossible. Yet in every manner imaginable, they behave as if no financial markets near death event took place.

The object lesson of the evening is a story in the Financial Times on a battle between the FDIC, which is responsible for resolution of systemically important firms under Dodd Frank versus the Fed and Treasury. The struggle is over how many non-banks are to put on the systemically important watchlist as required by Dodd Frank. No one wants to be on that roster; it leads to the potential to be subject to all sorts of proctological examinations.

David Apgar: Is That a Horse’s Head Under the Sheets or Are You Just Happy to Fleece Me?

By David Apgar, the Director of ApgarPartners LLC, a new business that applies assumption-based metrics to the performance evaluation problems of development organizations, individual corporate executives, and emerging-markets investors, and author of Risk Intelligence (Harvard Business School Press 2006) and Relevance: Hitting Your Goals by Knowing What Matters (Jossey-Bass 2008). He blogs at WhatMatters. The […]