If you had any doubts about whose side the Administration is on, this story should settle all doubts. From the Nation:
Consider this: the recent Fed audit revealed over $3.3 trillion in emergency assistance to the banks and other corporate behemoths during the financial crisis–no strings attached….
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n theory, I’m a wee bit late to the item at hand, a suit by failed mortgage bond insurer MBIA against Morgan Stanley on a second mortgage deal. But in practice, I’ve not seen any commentary on it and the suit has some interesting wrinkles.
Before we get to the details, however, a general issue: looking at this case is like deciding which of Cinderella’s bad sisters is less ugly. While mortgage bond originators and sponsors did not cover themselves in glory in the later years of the subprime business, MBIA is no prize. Of all the monolines, MBIA was the most dubious. In addition to the general, and now well known problem with the industry business model, that they were running at such high leverage levels that they could not take on any real risks, MBIA has its own special cause for concern, namely a less-than-arms-length reinsurance operation. And management has major ‘tude. I’ve never read investor reports that were as haughty and obviously truth-stretching as MBIA, and thus any claims it makes about the merits of pending litigation need to be taken with a fistful of salt.
Read more...I hope readers will give their comments and ideas on the inquiry underway by the attorneys general of all 50 states into foreclosure “improprieties”, to use the term of art, and other mortgage market abuses. Given that real estate is a state law matter, and some state governments are less captured that Washington DC, this […]
Read more...Before we get the usual objections to mortgage modifications, I need to remind readers that in the old fashioned days of banking, when bank kept the loans they made, it would be unthinkable NOT to modify a mortgage or any other loan when a borrower got in trouble, assuming the borrower was viable. “Viable” means that the borrower still has enough income to pay enough that the bank still comes out ahead by modifying the loan rather than other recovery strategies, which for a mortgage loan means foreclosure.
This isn’t charity, it’s good business sense.
Many commentators have pointed out that mortgage servicers are the big reason mods aren’t happening.
Read more...When you thought you’d seen every possible stuff-up in mortgage land, a new one comes to light.
When the housing market correction started, most savvy observers pointed out that prices needed to revert to long-term relationships with rentals and income levels. And many have also pointed out that it is reasonable to expect prices to overshoot on the downside.
Evidence of the latest self-inflicted wound comes via e-mail from Lisa Epstein of ForeclosureHamlet.org…
Read more...Readers may recall that this site broke the story of litigation against Lender Processing Services, the biggest player in foreclosure management on behalf of mortgage servicers. These cases, launched earlier in the fall, accused the company of taking impermissible legal fees. These class action lawsuits were joined by the US bankruptcy trustee for the Northern District of Mississippi, both for herself and on behalf of all US bankruptcy fees, which meant she felt the issues set forth in the case had merit and were serious. In November, an additional class action case was filed against LPS, this time securities litigation, charging the company with making false and misleading statements to investors from July 29, 2009 to October 4, 2010, including “deceptive and improper document execution and preparation related to foreclosure proceedings.”
Subsequently, as our Richard Smith detailed earlier today, Housing Wire’s Paul Jackson attacked critics of LPS, including this blogger, of going off half baked in accusing the company of engaging in document fabrication. A Reuters investigation published today supports the critics’s case, revealing that document creation was far more extensive that the company has suggested.
Read more...Events during this financial crisis have repeatedly displayed a degree of disrespect for various pundits’ authority; every so often another pulpit is toppled. So spare a thought for the pundits, the most unmourned of crisis casualties. One skips through the roll of slight miscues (“Lehman repo looks solid”, April ’08), shame (“believe Fuld, Lehman bears […]
Read more...We are on Harry Shearer’s Le Show, a full hour interview on the mortgage mess. Harry really did his homework, so I think readers will enjoy the conversation. It’s “live” at 1 PM EST, then runs throughout the day at various times on public radio stations around the country, including 7 PM on WNYC-AM in […]
Read more...It isn’t clear why the American Securitization Forum decided to walk into a buzzsaw, but the carnage is proving to be an amusing spectacle. For readers who have not followed this wee saga, mortgage securitization abuses are increasingly looking to be a mess of Titanic proportions. The securitization industry created complex and specific procedures for […]
Read more...If you thought robo signing was bad, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet. The website 4ClosureFraud presents the gory details of a potential major new front in the foreclosure mess. A Pennsylvania foreclosure mill, Goldbeck McCafferty & McKeever, is accused by Patrick Loughren of allowing non-attorneys to file and prosecute foreclosures. A DailyFinance story gives the […]
Read more...Maybe the American Securitization Forum ought to do its homework before making emphatic and not very well founded claims. Right before Thanksgiving, the ASF released its long-awaited white paper, which argued, basically, that industry standard practices for conveying notes (the borrower IOUs) to securitization trusts were sound. Curious readers new to this can read the […]
Read more...Well, I suppose one can defend the lies testimony offered by American Securitization Forum executive director Tom Deutsch before the Senate Banking Committee yesterday if one subscribes to the Through the Looking Glass theory of usage: ` When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, `it means just what I […]
Read more...We’ve had a series of posts (see here, here, and here) on the judge’s decision in a case called Kemp c. Countrywide, which provided what appeared to be the first official confirmation of what we’ve long suspected and described on this blog: that as of a certain point in time post 2002, mortgage originators and […]
Read more...As much as I’ve seen a lot of financial services industry misconduct at close range, sometimes even a cynic like me is not prepared for how bad things can be. And mortgage abuse is turning out to be one of those areas. I’ve been in contact for over the last six months with attorneys involved […]
Read more...Bloomberg provided a useful update on the 50 state attorney generals’ investigation into mortgage abuses. One key development is that the AGs are treating investors as parties whose interests need to be considered. This appears to be at odds with the approach taken by Federal regulators, who are devising and implementing exams of various sorts […]
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