The spectacle of Senators in Tuesday’s banking committee hearings on the mortgage largely siding with articulate, fact-driven critics of the mortgage securitization is a sign that financial services industry misdirection and lame excuses are wearing thin. But far more devastating is the contrast between the long-promised American Securitization Forum paper on mortgage transfers, versus the […]
Read more...It’s become conventional wisdom to denounce Congressmen as know-nothings who routinely harass businessmen by hauling them before investigations and asking them uninformed questions. Tuesday, we saw a refreshing and badly needed contrast to that stereotype in the form of a comparatively short (less than three hour) hearing by the Senate Banking Committee on the foreclosure/securitization […]
Read more...It’s more than a bit puzzling when readers get upset when once in a great while, we point out how the case against banks on a particular issue is overstated. The reaction seems to be that we’ve suddenly gone soft on financial firm miscreants, which is about as wide of the mark as you can […]
Read more...Two media outlets tonight, Reuters and a Washington Post blog post, discussed the idea of a relatively quick settlement of the probe by 50 state attorneys general into robo signing and other foreclosure-related abuses. What is interesting is the timing of these sightings, which came the same day of the release of the Congressional Oversight […]
Read more...On the eve of Senate Banking Committee hearings into mortgage securitizations and the release of a Congressional Oversight Panel report covering the same terrain, the mortgage securitization industry has a full bore pushback underway. A story in the New York Times bears all the hallmarks of being a PR plant. Remember the sympathetic New York […]
Read more...We’ve described in various posts how evidence is growing that the participants in mortgage securitizations sometime early in this century appear to have ignored the requirements of a variety of laws and their own contracts. We believe the most serious and difficult to remedy problem results when the parties involved in the creation of a […]
Read more...We’re a little puzzled at the attention a Florida robo-signing case has garnered. A plaintiff tried arguing that robo signing alone constituted a reason to dismiss a foreclosure. That’s such a stretch that it is no wonder a judge decided against the borrower argument. Mind you, we think robo signing is serious because it is […]
Read more...Banks are going to qiuite some lengths to avoid doing principal mods. I’d love to know how Bank of America will book this loan versus the it one currently has. Lawyers for borrowers have been pushing principal mods when the bank is having trouble proving standing and is suddenly very willing to negotiate. But deals […]
Read more...If you were to believe the banks, the concern over foreclosure “improprieties” is way overdone. They claim that the robo signers really weren’t doing anything seriously wrong, the banks just need to redo some paperwork, and everything else about foreclosures is just fine. Yet Bank of America, having made the implausible claim that it had […]
Read more...Tom Adams pointed to an article in American Banker by Kate Berry which discusses how mortgage securitization trustees are increasingly coming under scrutiny in the foreclosure crisis. By way of background, the trustee is the party responsible for securing the assets (the borrower promissory IOUs, liens, and various other documents related to the securitization). The […]
Read more...Yves here. This post by Linda Beale, who was involved in the tax angles of securitizations in her prior life on Wall Street, first appeared on Angry Bear and on her blog, A Taxing Matter. It’s a very helpful addition to the discussion of the foreclosure crisis. Because it is also a bit technical at […]
Read more...We’ve been astonished at the continued poor reporting on the overhyped mortgage putback possible future action by Pimco, the Fed, Blackrock and others against Bank of America. Everyone seems so mesmerized by the names and the incorrect dollar size attached (the possible action relates to $47 billion of bonds, but the potential liability is much […]
Read more...We’ve noted that title insurers have been refusing to eat the risk in foreclosure sales when they can’t verify the chain of title from local records. Of course, the idea that title insurance was ever really intended to be insurance in the first place is questionable: the title insurers only step up when they can […]
Read more...ProPublica reports that the SEC has taken interest in Magnetar’s role in a JP Morgan underwritten CDO. We discussed Magntar at length in our book ECONNED, which broke that story six weeks before ProPublica launched its report, and remains the definitive account of how those transactions were structured. (Our continuing beef with the ProPublica account […]
Read more...An article in the Wall Street Journal about Bank of America’s says a great deal about the woes afflicting Bank of America, thanks to its enthusiastic embrace of Countrywide, both the biggest subprime lender and the biggest subprime servicer. The irony is that one of the reasons BofA coveted a criminal enterprise like Countrywide (they […]
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