Category Archives: Risk and risk management

Khuzami Deathwatch: SEC Ignores Tips About $12 Billion of Hidden Losses at Deutsche Bank

Two days ago, we said it was time to fire the SEC’s chief of enforcement Robert Khuzami, who has not provided the tough policing warranted by the biggest financial crisis in the agency’s history. We didn’t anticipate that the story of Khuzami’s negligence would blow so big so quickly. Today, the Financial Times reported that three separate whistleblowers charged that Deutsche Bank had mismarked up to $12 billion in exposures to make it look healthier in 2008 and 2009 than it was, yet the agency had not acted on these allegations. And had Deutsche carried its positions at the levels these former employees suggest was more accurate, Germany’s biggest bank may well have needed a bailout.

Mirabile Dictu! Regulators Using Trading Scandals to Push for Tougher Capital Requirements

Most news reports on financial regulatory reform hew to a few storylines: banks pushing back in private and winning on diluting regulatory reform; banks attributing lousy profits to new regulations (with a notable lack of proof of this convenient blame-shifting); bank regulators demonstrating capture, corruption and incompetence (which even though true to a fair degree is played up by industry incumbents to support the notion that regulation is futile).

So it’s refreshing to see a contrasting storyline….

Quelle Surprise! New York Fed Chair Dudley Confirms that TBTF Lives, Big Firms Still Can’t Be Resolved

The New York Fed’s William Dudley gave a surprisingly candid, meaning not positive, assessment of the state of the Too Big to Fail problem in a speech yesterday at the Clearing House’s Second Annual Business Meeting and Conference. From the text of his speech (hat tip Richard Smith):

High Risk Investing – The New Trend in Energy

Yves here. I’m giving this interview from OilPrice more of an intro than usual because I find it surreal.

Continuing Sandy Aftermath, New Nor’Easter Underscore Complex System Fragility

Here we are, a mere nine days after Sandy, and what would ordinarily be a mere “sorta bad” winter storm is doing disproportionate harm by virtue of coming so close on the heels of the hurricane.

How Botched Derivatives Risk Taming Regulations are Again Going to Leave Taxpayers Holding the Bag

An important piece in the Financial Times by Manmohan Singh, a senior economist at the International Monetary Fund, describes persuasively how one of the central vehicles for reducing derivatives risk, that of having a central counterparty (CCP) and requiring dealers to trade with it rather than have a web of bi-lateral exposures, or rely on banks to act as clearers (making them too big to fail) has gone pear shaped. While the immediate reason for this outcome is the unwillingness of national banking regulators to cede powers to an international clearinghouse, Singh fingers an equally important cause: the reluctance to recognize that the underlying problem was and remains undercollateralized derivatives positions. His introduction to the mess:

More JP Morgan Whitewash

Via e-mail, some updates from Michael Crimmins, a bank compliance expert and member of Occupy the SEC, on the continuing failure of the media to portray the real significance of the JP Morgan London Whale losses: that it revealed glaring deficiencies in internal controls that warrant prosecution of Jamie Dimon under Sarbanes Oxley.

New York Times Profile of London Whale Boss, Ina Drew, Camouflages Dimon’s Risk Management Failures

A New York Times profile of Ina Drew, the former head of the JP Morgan Chief Investment Office, almost certainly produced high fives in the bank’s corporate communications office. This piece is the best sort of PR you can get: it treats the trading losses as yesterday’s news, of interest only as point of entre into the downfall of a heretofore unknown but once hugely successful and personally appealing trading manager.

Robert Jenkins: Puncturing Bankers’ Myths

In this speech,Robert Jenkins of the Bank of England blows apart the self-serving myths that ‘old guard’ bankers and their lobbyists have been peddling since the financial crisis ripped apart the global financial system in 2007.

On FICO’s Dubious Explanation of Why it Treats Short Sales the Same as Foreclosures

April Charney sent me a link to a post which had a condescending explanation of a recent piece by FICO that warrants further discussion. The FICO article attempted to justify its position that someone who enters into a short sale gets his credit score dinged as badly as for a foreclosure. Yes, you read that correctly. One of the reasons many borrowers go to the effort to arrange a short sale, as opposed to the faster and easier process of “jingle mail” is that they assume that the damage to their credit score will be lower.

Here is the rationale….

Quelle Surprise! Regulatory Measures to Reduce Systemic Risk Are Proving to Be Ineffective, Possibly Counterproductive

In an perverse case of synchronicity, one headline last night touted regulatory efforts to address systemic risk as another highlighted bank efforts to increase it. And the ongoing efforts of banks to expand risk creation is no accident.

Fear Gauge Loses Track

By Paul Amery. Cross posted from Index Universe

The US equity market’s main risk measure is back down to the levels we saw in 2007. But declines in volatility mask substantially different behaviour from stocks than pre-crisis.

Risk is Always With Us

By Sell on News, a global macro analyst. Cross posted from MacroBusiness

A question that has been asked, but not nearly often enough, is why did the complex risk defrayal methods fail so completely during the global financial crisis?

Defining Strategies and Tools for Reducing Systemic Risk

Yves here. Although this VoxEU is heavier on economese than may suit the tastes of most NC readers, it’s nevertheless worth your attention. It takes issue with a popular view among economists, that one of the ways to reduce systemic risk is to reduce cyclical swings in asset prices (or more accurately, to prevent banks from all following some great new lending fad and running off a cliff tout ensemble). The wee problem with that is economists were patting themselves on the back in 2007 that they had engineered a Great Moderation and the overwhelming majority were in denial about the existence of a global credit bubble. In fairness, many are thinking about how to create automatic counter-cyclical stabilizers, since as Ian MacFarlane, the former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia pointed out, an asset bubble looks like increased wealth to the community, so anyone who stands in its way is going to be extremely unpopular.

This VoxEU article offers an alternate line of thinking on how to to lower systemic risk.