A MarketWatch story on Warren Buffet’s borderline extortionate offer to struggling monoline insurers suggested it could provide a format for a rescue New York insurance superintendent Eric Dinallo. A story by the New York Times alluded to the same notion.
While I may be missing something, I don’t see how this could possibly work.
First, let’s start with the rumor. From MarketWatch:
If Warren Buffett’s $800 billion reinsurance plan is rejected by bond insurers, a leading industry regulator may end up pushing a similar solution, a person familiar with the situation said on Tuesday.But Buffett said on Tuesday that one of the insurers has already rejected the offer and Ambac said later in the day that the plan isn’t in the interests of all its policyholders.
However, if the situation gets worse, bond insurers may have no choice.
If current efforts by the New York State Insurance Department to stabilize the $2.4 trillion industry fail, the regulator may propose a similar plan to Buffett’s, in which bond insurers’ steadier muni businesses are separated from their more troubled structured-finance business, the person said, on condition of anonymity.
There are two problems with this concept: first, that it solves no problem, and second, that it probably represents regulatory overreach if the insurers don’t go along (likely).
To the first issue, that this approach does not address the underlying issues. While Buffett has every reason to want to get the best risks out of the monolines on the cheap, that doesn’t mean it is a good deal for anyone other than Buffet, and perhaps parties in the municipal bond market. There has been quite a lot of disruption of new fundings, which means that despite the considerable press of late on how muni insurance is basically a waste of money (the rating agencies rate munis much tougher than corporate credits), municipalities are facing considerably higher costs to raise funding without the insurance wrap.
One would think that Buffett’s entry into the business would have solved that problem, but so far, he has done very few deals. And even if he entered into his proposed arrangement with MBIA and Ambac, all that does is shore up their existing portfolio of risks, that is, it helps secondary market investors but not the municipalities under stress.
What happens in this plan to the bond guarantors’ muni underwriting operations? There was no suggestion that these would go over to Buffett. Do the keep originating and then get them reinsured by Buffett? I doubt that Buffett will help a direct competitor except at worse terms than for his own operations. So unless some crucial bit has failed to be disclosed, I don’t see how this move would help municipalities.
And as the market realized as the day went on, this arrangement would be lousy for the remaining book of risks. It leaves the remaining guarantees with even less coverage. The New York Times clarified Buffett’s proposal:
In a letter dated Feb. 6 to Lazard, the investment bank that is advising MBIA, Ajit B. Jain, president of reinsurance for Berkshire Hathaway, proposed that MBIA pay Mr. Buffett’s company 150 percent of the premium it earns for insuring its municipal bond portfolio. Typically, insurers cede a share of their premiums, not more than they earn…..He noted that in recent months, Berkshire had been able to set premiums at twice as much as MBIA used to charge, or more. Mr. Jain estimated that the reinsurance premiums paid by MBIA and Ambac would total about $9 billion.
In other words, the bond guarantors have to pay out hard cash at a time when they are desperate to raise more equity in order to cede the best part of their business to Berkshire Hathaway.
I am no expert, but I do not see the legal basis for favoring one type of policyholder over another. While debt instruments set clear priority in payment, I am not aware that any priority in payment exists among insurance policyholders. Unless the muni bond guarantees have a preferred standing relative to the other guarantees, this approach would seem to be a magnet for litigation.
Now if this approach seems only to benefit Buffett, why would Dinallo be pushing it (if that is the case)? There is some speculation that he is using the Berkshire offer to bring reluctant banks to heel, but for that to work, he has to have a viable threat. I don’t see one here. This seems to be a misguided application of the “good bank-bad bank” approach used in the saving & loan workouts.
But consider the differences: the dead S&L’s landed in the FDIC’s lap. They had to figure out what to do with them, and they wanted to make a recovery on the payments they made in deposit insurance. So the Resolution Trust Corporation was set up. Note that a big issue was that the Federal government had to continue to fund the S&L’s working capital and also pay to keep some staffing going. That cost was considerable and controversial, and led the RTC to sell assets faster than it would have if it had wanted to maximize value.
The reason for segregating assets was simple: there were two different types of investors who might want to acquire them: banks that hadn’t been too badly damaged were interested in the “good bank” assets; distressed players and wealthy individuals went after the “bad bank” assets. The bad bank assets were going sufficiently on the cheap that even parties that had never dabbled in that sort of deal like Ron Perlman made acquisitions and did very well.
But what does a segregation achieve here? No one but an AAA rated party would make sense as a buyer/reinsurer of the muni portfolio. Buffett already having decided to enter the business on a de novo basis means the only interest another insurer is likely to have is reinsurance. But per the discussion above, this is a huge market inefficiency; the insurance adds no value (but sadly appears to be necessary).
And who would buy the rest? The parties who best understand the CDO/CDS exposures and have reason to do a deal are already at the table. You aren’t going to have new parties appear out of the blue. Private equity investors like TPG and Bain Capital predictably said no thank you, we don’t understand this stuff. I’d be curious to know who might materialize.
So a simple runoff of the portfolios would make the most sense. Any other activity appears to be for the benefit of lawyers and Perella Weinberg, not the policyholders.
Now to regulatory matters. Ambac is at most immediate risk, by virtue of not having raised more equity and having a big CDO portfolio (those have a relatively short life). MBIA has proportionately less CDOs but has commercial real estate, below investment grade, HELOC and second mortgage guarantees, I can’t be certain, but their poisoned fruit might not be rotting quite as fast as Ambac’s.
But Ambac is in Wisconsin. Dinallo has no authority over them, and Sean Dilweg, the commissioner of insurance in Wisconsin, said on January 23:
Eric is looking at the overall issue, but I am pretty confident that we will work through Ambac’s specific issues. They are a stable and well-capitalized company but they have some choices to make.
That doesn’t exactly sound like someone who is eager to do a rescue.
So let’s consider the current state of play. Both the big bond insurers insist they are adequately capitalized; presumably the statutory accounts they will file will say the same thing. MarketWatch says that MBIA disputes Dinallo’s authority to impose a plan on them:
Still, it’s not clear whether the New York State Insurance Department could impose such a plan on bond insurers if the companies are against the idea.MBIA, which is regulated in New York, questioned a bailout like this during a conference call with analysts and investors on Jan. 31.
It also said that insurance regulators could only take control of the company if it is deemed to be insolvent under regulatory and statutory accounting standards.
“I can assure you that we will be showing a substantial, in the billions of dollars, amount of statutory capital beyond requirements for the New York State Insurance Department,” Gary Dunton, chief executive of MBIA, said, according to a transcript of the conference call.
However, later in the call, Greg Diamond, head of investor relations at MBIA, clarified Dunton’s comments. The New York State Insurance Department can take control of companies even if they’re not insolvent, he explained.
The regulator could take control if a company is found to have violated law or regulatory orders or if the department is concerned about the company’s ability to pay its claims, Diamond said, according to the transcript.
Here is the interesting dilemma: a crisis. or at least some disruption and uncertainty, will be triggered if either MBIA or Ambac are downgraded by Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. But there is a big difference between being less than AAA and being unable to pay claims (I don’t imagine Dinallo can charge them with violations; the big area of dispute would be their accounting, and my impression is that insurance accounting allows reporting entities a lot of latitude). MBIA has kept up an aggressive front. I don’t know that Dinallo can claim in all honesty that MBIA is at risk of not paying claims, at least for the next two years. I don’t know what recourse MBIA would have if it decided to fight Dinallo, but I would expect them to go to the mat.
Dinallo can achieve the same outcome, although it will take a bit longer, by forbidding the regulated insurance subs from upstreaming cash to the holding company. When the executives are forced to realize that they are on a sinking ship, they will become much more compliant.
Anonymous 
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A Trillion pardons here for this long post, but I began to wonder today what the actual resolution was for the LTCM “crisis” as it relates to this current “crisis”?
II feel the following summation is worth looking at. It is also worth noting that we seem to have a much larger group of collusive idiots involved this time around, and obviously the regulation-people failed 100% with LTCM and Enron and within just a few years after The Bogus Sarbanes-Oxley Act and The Patriot Act, we have more collusion and corruption!!
But First (Dont take my word for it): Fears of a global slowdown triggered by US housing market woes wiped $5.2 trillion (£2.7 trillion) off global stock markets in January, say analysts.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7239506.stm
According to ratings firm Standard and Poor’s, 50 out of 52 share indexes around the world ended the month lower.
>>>>Now On To The Lesson:
LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF HEDGE FUND, LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
By David Shirreff
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/craine/e137_f03/137lessons.pdf
In the first two weeks after the bail-out, LTCM continued to lose value,
particularly on its dollar/yen trades, according to press reports which put the loss at
$200 million to $300 million. There were more attempts to sell the portfolio to a
single buyer. According to press reports the new LTCM shareholders had further talks
with Buffett, and with Saudi prince Alwaleed bin talal bin Abdelaziz. But there was
no sale. By mid-December, 1998 the fund was reporting a profit of $400 million, net
of fees to LTCM partners and staff.
In early February, 1999 there were press reports of divisions between banks in
the bailout consortium, some wishing to get their money out by the end of the year,
others happy to “stay for the ride” of at least three years. There was also a dispute
about how much Chase was charging for a funding facility to LTCM. Within six
months there were reports that Meriwether and some of his team wanted to buy out
the banks, with a little help from their friend Jon Corzine, who was due to leave
Goldman Sachs after its flotation in May, 1999.
By June 30, 1999 the fund was up 14.1%, net of fees, from last September.
Meriwether’s plan approved by the consortium, was apparently to redeem the fund,
now valued at around $4.7 billion, and to start another fund concentrating on buyouts
and mortgages. On July 6, 1999, LTCM repaid $300 million to its original investors
who had a residual stake in the fund of around 9%. It also paid out $1 billion to the 14
consortium members. It seemed Meriwether was bouncing back.
Despite the presence of Nobel laureates closely identified with option theory it
seems LTCM relied too much on theoretical market-risk models and not enough on
stress-testing, gap risk and liquidity risk. There was an assumption that the portfolio
was sufficiently diversified across world markets to produce low correlation. But in
most markets LTCM was replicating basically the same credit spread trade. In August
and September 1998 credit spreads widened in practically every market at the same
time.
A working group on highly leveraged institutions set up by the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision reported its findings in January, 1999 drawing
many lessons from the LTCM case. It criticized the banks for building up such
exposures to such an opaque institution.
Supervisors themselves showed a certain blinkered view when it came to
banks’ and securities firms’ relationships with hedge funds, and a huge fund like
LTCM in particular. The US Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) appears to
assess the risk run by individual broker dealers, without having enough regard for
what is happening in the sector as a whole, or in the firms’ unregulated subsidiaries.
The sad truth revealed by this testimony is that the SEC and the NYSE were
concerned only with the risk ratios of their registered firms and were ignorant and
unconcerned, as were the firms themselves, about the market’s aggregate exposure to
LTCM
t is possible to argue that a market solution was found. Fourteen banks put up
their own money, regarding it as a medium-term investment from which they
expected to make a profit. From a value-preservation point of view it was an
enlightened solution, even if it did seem to reward those whose recklessness had
created the problem.
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan defended the Fed’s action at the
October 1 hearing in the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services as
follows: “This agreement [by the rescuing banks] was not a government bailout, in
that Federal Reserve funds were neither provided nor ever even suggested.
Agreements were not forced upon unwilling market participants. Credits and
counterparties calculated that LTCM and, accordingly, their claims, would be worth
more over time if the liquidation of LTCM’s portfolio was orderly as opposed to being
subject to a fire sale. And with markets currently volatile and investors skittish,
putting a special premium on the timely resoluton of LTCM’s problems seemed
entirely appropriate as a matter of public policy.”
The true test of moral hazard is whether the Fed would be expected to
intervene in the same way next time. Greenspan pointed to a unique set of
circumstances which made an LTCM solution particularly pressing. It seems
questionable whether the Fed would act as broker for another fund bailout unless
there were also such wide systemic uncertainties.
Bruce Jacobs, who has followed the systemic implications of
the 1929, 1987 and subsequent mini-crashes, fearful of the dangers of globally traded
derivatives, writes in a new book: “Had LTC not been bailed out, the immediate
liquidation of its highly leveraged bond, equity, and derivatives positions may have
had effects, particularly on the bond market, rivaling the effects on the equity market
of the forced liquidations of insured stocks in 1987 and margined stocks in 1929.
Given the links between LTC and investment and commercial banks, and between its
positions in different asset markets and different countries’ markets, the systemic risk
much talked about in connection with the growth of derivatives markets may have
become a reality.”