This blog from time to time has commented on deteriorating economic conditions in China, and expressed the view that the slowdown is likely to be worse than most mainstream forecasters have anticipated (although the projections are now being revised downward). That sort of post has often lead to reader comments that a lower level of Chinese exports means a sharp falloff in the purchase of Treasuries, perhaps even a reversal, and therefore the Treasury bond market is set for a nasty reversal soon.
We don’t give investment advice, and note the Treasury market could go into a downdraft for a host of reasons. However, an economic unwind in China is unlikely to be the cause. Brad Setser explains why in, “Worry about a fall in China’s demand for the world’s goods, not a fall in China’s demand for Treasuries.”
Earlier this month, the Wall Street Journal reported that even though China’s exports in December fell sharply, imports fell much further. Now as import prices stabilize (commodities will bottom at some point), imports will cease dropping so quickly, but a general point holds: China is very likely to continue to run trade surpluses even with global trade at depressed levels.
That means China (which is still running monster surpluses) will, absent other factors, continue to buy foreign assets. Now they could shift the mix away from dollars, but the weakening trade market alone is not sufficient reason to expect the Chinese to quit buying Treasuries. (I am of the Herb Stein school, which is that that which is unsustainable will not be sustained, but have seen way too many times things that looked like they ought to collapse under their own weight, like the dot-com bubble, go much longer than any skeptic would have imagined. And if, contrary to conventional economic wisdom, the Fed fails to whip deflation, those Treasury yields would not be crazy).
There are reasons to be skeptical of Treasury bonds, namely the big increase in the fiscal deficit and the number of contingent liabilities the US government has assumed. But the slowdown in China is having a much greater impact on commodities than it has on Treasuries, and that pattern appears likely to persist.
There is another way to look at Setser’s reading. Keynes had taken note of the role of persistent trade imbalances as a cause of financial instability. He further noted there was no disincentive for the trade surplus nation to continue to rack up disruptive surpluses. Keynes did come up with a remedy which was never implemented, and the current vogue for Keynes appears to have left out this important part of his prescription. If Keynes is correct, we may go from emergency to emergency until a better fix is put into place.
From Brad Setser:
Suppose China’s economy slows sharply — a not-impossible development given the rather starling fall in the OECD’s leading indicators for China. How would that impact China’s balance of payments?
The first impact is rather obvious. China would import less. It would buy less. And since the rise in Chinese demand helped push the price of various commodities up, it stands to reason that a fall in Chinese demand would push prices down. It probably already has. That implies a big fall in China’s import bill, and a larger trade surplus. A slowing global economy would hurt China’s exports, but in this scenario China would slow more than the world. That means China’s imports would fall more than its exports. China’s trade surplus would rise.
But, you might say, the current account surplus is determined by the gap between savings and investment. Why would that change in a slowdown? Simple. China’s slowdown reflects a fall in investment (especially in new buildings and the like). Less investment and the same level of savings means a bigger current account surplus. In practice, though, savings would also likely fall a bit — as a slowdown would cut into business profits and thus business savings. It possible that China’s households would reduce their saving rate to keep consumption up as their income fell. But it is also possible that Chinese households might worry more about the future and save more. My best guess though is that the fall in investment would exceed the fall in savings, freeing up more of China’s savings to lend to the world. That surplus savings has gone into Treasuries and Agencies in the past….
Setser then turns to the complicating factor of a recent, large exodus of hot money:
Since reserve growth is a function of both the current account balance and capital outflows, it is possible that the rise in capital outflows could overwhelm the rise in the current account surplus. That seems to be what happened in q4.
In the absence of such outflows, though, the rise in China’s current account surplus would imply that China almost certainly would continue to add to its Treasury holdings. And even if there are large outflows — so large that the outflows exceed China’s current account surplus and China’s government has to dip into its reserves to meet the surge in Chinese demand for dollars — China would still be financing the rest of the world. The accumulation of foreign assets by private Chinese savers would substitute for the accumulation of foreign assets by the central bank, but money would still be flowing out of China. And some of that outflow likely would still make its way into Treasuries.
The full post, which has considerably more detail, can be found here.
39 comments
Comments are closed.
Setzer’s Chinese trade surplus is like Larry Kudlow’s American consumer: both only BENEFIT from deflation (in the form of lower prices).
In reality, of course, deflation cuts both ways: it hurts incomes as well as prices.
For China, deflation means reduced employment. Michael Pettis has argued that the true Depression-style employment adjustment must come from countries that overproduce — mainly China.
Higher unemployment leads to spending of savings. The Chinese savings rate will fall, just as the U.S. savings rate did in the early 30’s. Part of the savings adjustment will also come through Chinese fiscal spending.
Meanwhile our savings rate will doubtless rise.
This dynamic, not static, process of adjustment will yield less financing for Treasuries.
And even if it didn’t, Setzer himself admits that Chinese reserve growth next year will be a paltry $300b — compare that to the over $2tr needed by the U.S. federal government (in the form of T-bond, Agency, and FDIC-guaranteed debt issuance). In a sense, Setzer asks the wrong question. What matters is not how much China will lend, its how much we need to borrow.
All of this implies that the Chinese are actually saving. While I have no direct evidence to the contra of that it fails the sniff test. Simply put that enough chinese have enough wealth to do more than open a simple bank account and that those peoples money is enough to effect China’s reserves.
Its far more likely the Chinese are just printing to sterilize our debt, no savings required.
barnaby,
It is very well documented that the Chinese do have high savings rates, due primarily to the lack of social safety nets and the one child policy. In emerging economies, having lots of children is the usual way to assure one will be taken care of in old age. With only one child, that is a very risky bet in China.
Similarly, if you are sick in China and run out of money while in the hospital, you get thrown out on the street. That also produces a high incentive to save.
David,
I agree with your general point but the Fed and Treasury do not see themselves as in borrowing mode but in printing mode, as in creating dollars to counter the contraction in borrowing and spending. And as long as deflationary forces are operative, they may well just be making up for the contraction of other forms of money, like the old M3.
But as many have noted, they won’t be able to tell soon enough when deflation has been whipped, they will be afraid of repeating the mistake of 1937 (and Japan in 1995) of tightening too early, plus given the dreck on the Feds’ balance sheet, it would be hard for them to mop up liquidity even if they wanted to (ie, they would take losses on the sale of assets, and having the Treasury recapitalize the Fed would be very unpopular). So that almost certain-to-happen creation of too much inflation (or the anticipation of that scenario) should lead to much higher Treasury bond yields if nothing else does.
a query
what is meant by “hot money”?
Yves,
By the same token, if the Fed (rather than higher private savings) finances our deficit, then what will be the impact on Setzer's beneficially-low oil prices?
In effect, Setzer assumes no impact from Fed money printing. This assumption is critical to his analysis of Chinese reserve growth.
If the Fed succeeds in creating inflation, China will again suffer from having a dollar peg. Its terms of trade will deteriorate as its import prices rise and its export volumes fall.
So either the U.S. savings rate goes up to finance the deficit (in which case China's current account surplus falls); or the Fed finances it and hurts China's terms of trade.
BTW, the BEA has stats for our savings rate in the early 30's. If Pettis is right, China's savings rate will plummet. Here's the U.S. series for the net savings rate:
1929 9.6%
1930 6.3
1931 -.3
1932 -7.2
Source: http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=120&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=1929&LastYear=1946&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid
David,
I do not know how the loss of savings at failed banks factors into those figures. My grandparents had accounts at three different banks and still lost 97% of their savings (and it was something like a decade before they got the 3% back).
Inflation will not kick in quickly in the US. I don’t see us cleaning up the banking mess remotely quickly enough, and as long as consumer credit is scarce and the job outlook is lousy, we are not going to see a lot of spending. Money will pile up as reserves at the Fed for a while. But at some point, the bond markets will start discounting inflation. Things will get interesting, and not at all in a good way.
“China would still be financing the rest of the world. The accumulation of foreign assets by private Chinese savers would substitute for the accumulation of foreign assets by the central bank”
True, but there are a lot of asset classes other than US Treasuries that Chinese businesses and individuals could put their money into. How about gold, or resources, like mines in Australia, oil reserves, etc.
What Setser shows is that there may well be a scenario where China keeps accumulating Treasuries. But what he fails to do is make a convincing case that this is the only scenario, or even the most likely one.
Frankly, I don’t think anyone has any idea how that will play out. Will China’s growth fall to 8%, 5%, 3% or possibly turn negative? Will Chinese businesses and individuals move wealth out of the country, augmenting a foreign hot money exodus?
The problem with his scenario is that it seems a little too simple, even facile.
I agree with Bob and David. Normally Brad Setzer is readable even to the lay person but I don’t follow his argument.
To me if a country is hard hit economically it will stop producing surpluses and start creating a deficit. To me saying Chinas terms of trade have improved along with the global recession makes no sense at all.
Surely like any other countries currency, except the US, the Yuan will fall as factories close, unemployment grows and profitability drops…?
Sion,
Like it or not, terms of trade HAVE improved. November was the biggest trade surplus month for China, ever, followed by December.
My only concern is what happens when China kicks in its infrastructure investment? Will it still buy Treasuries then? If not, hello inflation, which could be a good thing.
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12923831
http://www.spreadsoncredit.com
I guess complicated things like this should be plotted on a graph if they could be.
I mean as the recession worsens and the US gov spends more and more to try to halt the fall they will need people to buy treasuries and not sell the ones they’ve got.
At the same time although China’s terms of trade have improved due to the drop in commodities prices and the other things Brad mentioned total receipts will drop. They have to since fewer people are buying things.
At some point the reducing receipts for export will trump the improved terms of trade. Intuitively that would seem to be something that could happen quite easily if things continue to get worse at the rate they are. I mean look at the Baltic dry index and manufacturing forward orders theses things have crashed. No trade equals no surplus.
I read the entire post again and I think I’m getting the hang of it. Thanks to the university of Yves. I guess I should follow the Kenynes remedy link to become even better educated.
Sion.
The discussion above does not mean that things can’t change, but a lot of casual observers are acting/reacting as if China’s trade surplus has collapsed. China will peg the yuan where it has to in order to maintain some level of a trade surplus (or at least will until the threat of retaliation is imminent). But for the moment, the surplus and hence the demand for foreign assets is intact.
I don’t know. I still don’t understand what’s all the fuzz about china.
1. The idea that China won’t be able to pump up demand is UTTER nonsense. The entire asia was over consuming and borrowing too much during the 90’s. And they quickly flip/implementing new regulation. And they are back.
To most people in asia, current crisis is a bump, not a crash. 90’s was a giant crash.
I think China’s challange is this: their machine is geared toward producing crap fos westerners (eg. toys, clothing, ) Their industrial policy, supply chain, design are also too depended on western companies. So that’s their biggest problem that prevent them to quickly reroute production and geared toward different market, specially domestic.
next big china’s problem. they have too many state corporation. These corporation couldn’t care less about “consumer” level perception, nevermind product design or advertisement. They have near zero skill deploying modern “demand” creation tools. (TV, consumer survey, etc)
But all those are minor.
I really can’t understand why people going banana about asia, considering what happens in late 90’s was so much bigger and more difficult.
For asia is “slow down”, their biggest task is to organize chain supply and logistic channel to fill asean demand instead of US.
(trust me, people are thinking about this down there.)
Dave Levy,
China’s stimulus package is often overstated. A simple example is that 294B of the proposed 600B stimulus had already been allocated and mostly used for the transit system. I think the annoucement of the package was more psychological than anything else.
January 19, 2009
Investor puts pressure on HSBC to let US sub-prime unit go bankrupt
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5542969.ece
D
I find it facinating that discussions about China here are singularly lacking in a perspective on, and understanding of the “shadow” or “gray” or “under the table” transactions and economy in China.
The biggest problem that is about to face China is that whatever visible surpluses they earn for now will be pretty soon countered by very large capital outflows as Chinese get worried about the stability of China.
Look at the huge outflow of RMB into HKD this past few months which is a proxy for demand for USD.
Few people seem to get it.
China is about to start to drain their forex reserves to pay for this.
D
Who says that China will buy or not buy X amount of Treasuries in 2009 based on other than “economic” fundementals? I do.
Why would ANY foreign country lend America enough money so that it does not have to adjust their military budget downward?
At least if they love their children…..
D,
Setser has been writing about hot money inflows for quite some time and has parsed the figures (including, as has Michael Pettis, made estimates as to how the money has been “hidden” in categories like FDI, since some of the money came in via over-invoicing). If you read the full post and his earlier work, he is on top of the issue. You may disagree with his conclusions, but it is incorrect to charge him (and by extension this blog, since we have been reporting on it as well) of being unaware of the issue.
Anon of 12;20 AM,
China has made it a priority to maintain a trade surplus. In a system of freely floating currencies, a country with a persistent trade surplus should see the currency appreciate and the surplus fall. Except in those times when investment outflows naturally depress the RMB, China must keep buying foreign currencies to keep the RMB cheap and defend its surplus.
Yves,
China can see the writing on the wall as well as the next and will change their priorities, both short and long term, to accomodate this evolving crisis.
Having much, if an of a trade surplus is not in the cards in 2009 for China, IMO. As was noted earlier, this is a non-issue because, regardless, there is not going to be enough demand for the coming US requirements……that is when the buck becomes a duck and starts quacking.
Where are the investors going to come from to buy 2009 US debt and on the flip side, how much will we run the printing presses to cover the shortfall? I think this is the question to ask.
Yves,
I agree on inflation being more of a medium-term problem.
However, that’s not to say that we won’t see inflation until the “output gap” is closed. Too many (smart) economists, like David Rosenberg, make this assumption.
The main driver of inflation in countries like Argentina or Brazil is not the output gap. Its the perception by the markets that government deficits are unsustainable, and that without sufficient domestic private savings, the structural deficit will end up being monetized by the Central Bank. The resulting capital flight is what causes inflation — essentially a velocity, not supply, phenomenon.
The discounting of deficit monetization does not occur in one fell swoop. It happens over time, and it makes inflation tick up before it gallops. No one believes the U.S. can experience this “emerging market” dynamic. I’m not so sure. We have one thing in common with the Latins:
No savings.
setser has phd in economics, but accounting is the achilles heel of his education. his analysis shows no understanding of profit margin or fixed investments and the impact on company profitability which is the main driver of fx reserve accumulation. furthermore, he fancies china as one big enterprise where all inputs are variable and the profit(aka trade surplus) grows as long as the inputs are depreciating faster than the outputs.
no brad, this is a country, not an enterprise. the revenue of a country comes from taxation, as opposed to a company whose revenue comes from trade. your failure to understand this has lost me as a reader.
many businesses in china run on very thin profit margins, they need huge volume to turn a profit and decreasing volume is ruinous to them.
on top of that, 40% of gdp is fixed investment + capex. fixed investments generate tax revenue as long as the companies are profitable, but with the onging real estate slowdown profits disappear and with them government tax revenue. capex is acting as a deadweight now for businesses: cutting deeper into the profitability after decreased operating profit margins. this means the biggest gdp generator is stalling in china, and growing gdp means growing tax revenues.
and the biggest fallacy of his analysis: considering the trade surplus to be something that belongs to the country and readily disposable for treasury purchases. the trade surplus is the sum of all company trade activity. the treasuries are being purchased not by companies but by the government. the government could only recycle into treasuries currency from the profit of companies plus salaries, the rest goes to debt servicing and imports of resources. in times of economic slowdown profits and salaries shrink and thus the available currency for treasury purchases and government revenue in general. the debt servicing share of company expenses grows by the day: this is what sucks in most of the excess trade surplus. look at the last quarter and you will see that the fx reserves growth has stopped. i would not attribute much to hot money that you Yves have estimated to be around 100bn (3% of chinese gdp) in Q3 2008. you certainly have better idea how much more idling money there is, but i doubt outflows could have lasting impact on the fx reserves: if it is hot it moves quick. to me most depleting to fx reserves are decreasing operating margins and salaries and thus decreasing government tax revenue.
So SAFE adjusted its reserve portfolio, and China continues to buy Treasuries from Uncle Sam. So what?
For the hottest news circulating on Chinese internet forum regarding Sino-US trade, check this out:
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMediaTelecomNews/idUSN1337694320090113
Yves,
Nice link to Keynes call for a global bank to clear trade imbalances annually. I will have to read it more closely manana, Mr. Sandman’s “Peaches and Cream” production is about to begin.. g’night
David Pearson,
Your scenario for US showing similar macro dynamics to latin america – turkey in previous three decades is spot on. Most pundits are under illusion of US exceptionalism.
US will get inflation after exhaustion of deleveraging with a big output gap. Capital flight may take different forms like commodity hoarding etc but UberKeynesian zealots will get their Armageddon.
Quietly appearing in the Australians financial section was this little ditty;
“China orders banks to lift provisions”
———————————-
CHINA’S banking regulator has ordered banks to set aside more provisions to cover potential loan losses, warning the global financial crisis is far from over.
Local banks must set aside provisions equivalent to at least 130 per cent of loans that were likely to turn sour, Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), said in a statement posted on a Government website.
———————————–
Not to state the obvious but this really doesn’t look good but an opinion from a more enlightened source wouldn’t go astray.
PS: My word verification was ‘chinlic’ – China licked?
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,28124,24931578-20501,00.html
Not sure about the late 90’s, but this crisis is a big deal in Asia, as 4th quarter GDP will show. Singapore already came in at -12% 4th quarter GDP. Japan’s could be equally bad.
Yves writes: “But as many have noted, they won’t be able to tell soon enough when deflation has been whipped, they will be afraid of repeating the mistake of 1937 (and Japan in 1995) of tightening too early…”
To just briefly point it out, if strong inflation manifests itself, the Fed will then have to slam on the brakes in brutal Volcker-like fashion and create another powerful 1981-2 like recession following directly on top of the economic carnage of the next few years. Unless they get everything right. Kick the can down the road.
jult52
Brad’s article is very convincing and looking at the current situation you would have to agree with him. He has however made a few assumptions in his outlook. The first assumption is that commodity prices will not be rising, and while this is a reasonable assumption for next year, it probably is not for the following year. Production destruction due to current low demand will eventually force a turn around in commodity prices which it would be sensible not to ignore. The second assumption is that there is no very short term element to the downturn in import flows. Running down commodity inventories even as exports pile up in the warehouse seems an obvious thing for businesses to do.
The biggest assumption is that exports will not implode as Sam at FT Alphaville suggested. Since imports are generally partly for internal consumption and partly as the base for exports, import flows even if priced lower tend not to stop. If as forecast exports drop off some 30 percent then most likely Brad is right, if however exports implode and drop 95 percent then Sam would tend to be right. China has 3 big markets for their produce and I guess about a third of their goods end up in the US which has probably seen a decline of some 10 percent or more. Another third of their goods go to Europe and since the Euro has dropped significantly against the dollar and hence Chinese currency this has probably seen a trade flow drop above 50 percent. If you look at China’s trade flow to India and Japan it’s other big markets, things are even worse.
For the moment commodity price declines and export declines look finely balanced, much more so than perhaps Brad suggests. An inverse J Curve comes to mind as the Chinese currency appreciates against the Euro and against all currencies except the yen and dollar. Short term I think Brad is right, longer term especially when commodity demand picks up due to Chinese stimulus packages then I think things may be different.
So here is an interesting piece that comments on the newly increasing US savings rate and the implication for US Treasury financing and for China
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090116.wcokedrosky16/BNStory/Business/
Money Quote (IMHO)
“To put it in context, a U.S. savings rate of minus 1 per cent meant roughly $2-million a minute was flowing out of U.S. consumer savings into other things, mostly consumption, like TVs and home renovations, and so on. Or, on an annual basis, that worked out to almost $1.3-trillion exiting the U.S. banking system for other places.
Turn that around, however, and things get very different, very quickly. At a 3-per-cent savings rate, the United States will see $3.8-trillion showing up next year in the banking system just from domestic savers. At 7 per cent, almost $9-trillion will come rushing in as part of the savings tsunami. It is a fire hose of money pointed at the banks, and it’s just beginning.
These are ear-popping figures. Three per cent, for example, produces almost five times as much in one-year U.S. capital inflows as the entirety of China’s current Treasury holdings. It is four times as much as the proposed Obama stimulus plan. In short, at even relatively small changes, at least in percentage terms, the United States will rapidly transform its banking system and its capital markets.”
There is more about implications for global consumption and trade. But without endorsing the position it raises some interesting possibilities. Perhaps the US isnt so hamstrung as some believe, or hope, and that by being responsible the US can right itself again.
The critical stage now becomes not this phase, the restarting of the economy, which it appears the US govt might be able to finance internally, but the step after that. Does he govenment pul back on its spending and decrease its borrowing requirements?
Just an interesting perspective
Just a couple of points as to why things are not as straight forward as Setser sees them:
First, China’s terms of trade improved in December, just as Setser and others predicted, and yet Treasury purchases fell.
Second, commodity price have fallen like rocks and many are now below at least come of the producers costs, mines are closing, etc. So the fall in commodity prices will slow markedly going forward, but the fall in China’s exports has so far been fairly modest. China’s trade surplus may well be peaking and could move in the other direction rather quickly, especially if China’s stimulus involves much spending on infrastructure.
my observations:
Things are too complicated to predict.
Chinese data is not to be trusted,neither U.S.A.’s intentions.
China may buy some treasuries but it cant continue forever.
U.S.A. can’t always throw its problems on outside world.The country has to become introspective.While it is not easy to punish someone from elite ruling class,USA can atleast PUNISH some bankers and politicians involved in crisis and keep them in very cushy jails,just for show.
Who has actually checked china’s surpluses?Hve you gone there physically and seen it?You are just trusting some communist officer’s figures(who is paid to lie like your bankers and politicians).
Stephen @ 8:56,
paul kerdosky can’t do math: his analysis suggests 126 trillion disposable income per year, which must be a subset of gdp, which is only 14.6 trillion.
At a 3-per-cent savings rate, the United States will see $3.8-trillion showing up next year in the banking system just from domestic savers. At 7 per cent, almost $9-trillion will come rushing in as part of the savings tsunami. It is a fire hose of money pointed at the banks, and it’s just beginning.
That’s not necessarily true, though, is it? Paying off already-incurred debt counts as “savings” in these calculations, doesn’t it? So an increase in savings won’t necessarily manifest itself as greater deposits but as further deleveraging.
bb,
One of my frustartions with articles like this is when they don’t “show their work”.
But conceptually this seems to be the right direction, since the complaint was that the US consumer wasnt saving enough. If his figures are correct, need to dig around more to see if this is accurate, then it would imply the US can dig itself out from its “foreign funding problem” much faster than it is given credit for.
Maybe it is a pipedream, just one of those things to keep an eye on. The US is incredibly wealthy with lots of “income”. It may be highly indebted but it is easier to work out your debts when you are wealthy and earning income. The worry is if the US slips into a sitaution where its income slips etc.
I guess I am looking for signs of spring that the Biden Bird said is coming. :-)
“At a 3-per-cent savings rate, the United States will see $3.8-trillion showing up next year in the banking system just from domestic savers. At 7 per cent, almost $9-trillion will come rushing in as part of the savings tsunami.”
3% would be closer to $300bb, not $3.8tr. There is a misplaced decimal place there, IMO.
jult52
@12:20AM
“Why would ANY foreign country lend America enough money so that it does not have to adjust their military budget downward?
At least if they love their children…..”
Sure. Let’s throw a military power vacuum into the mix on top of everything else. I’m sure that will improve the situation for children around the world.
Perhaps we can get China to act as policeman to the world instead. Sounds peachy.
I find it curious that most economic predictor pundits expect that the U.S. savings rate will increase during this financial debaucle. I find it even more curious as to how that exactly will happen when unemployment goes to 15%+++ and state deficits inspire a significant increase in taxes, hidden fees ad nauseum to go through the roof too, much less hidden federally inspired sleights of hand as well.
IMO all this talk of deflation because the consumer public is now saving so much more is bogus. What is really causing deflation is a deflation of wages, namely no wages at all, and the fear to spend on anything considered luxurious. Thus any increase in savings rates in this crisis should properly be identified as solely a temporary phenomenom as experienced by those fortunate few able to experience it and surely much more heavily counterbalanced by the extreme loss of jobs in general.
And one last wrinkle in all this: determining the true savings rate will prove a bit more difficult these days to quantify when many as in MANY will withdraw cash from their accounts and literally stick it in the proverbial mattress or convert it to guns, ammo, food, and sometimes even gold.
AM
@6;27
it seems you are making some mild assumption re commodity prices without trying to take account of their having been, to differing degrees, financialized, i.e. more and less beyond fundamentals.
sure the china story was used for years but for most part to ‘prove’ absense of a commodity price bubble no matter that funds, commodity desks, even cot data said the contrary as did a closer look at the ‘astounding’ global growth.