naked capitalism

This tidbit, from a report on impressions of conditions in China, via a steel buyer who has been making the rounds in Asia (hat tip reader Michael) is more significant than it appears. High inflation levels in China (and the powers that be seem to get worried when it goes over 11%-12%) is consistent with the authorities having started to ease up on stimulus, particularly pushing banks to lend.

And high interest rates feed stock market speculation. Interest rates on deposits are low, so the routes for investors to preserve cash are stockpiling commodities (we’ve read various reports of both businesses and speculators going this route) and the stock market. But stocks often backfire as a store of value when too many people latch on to the same strategy.

I was at presentation a couple of years ago at the Asia Society on China, and one of the panelists observed that if you wanted to design a system guaranteed to produce hyperinflation, it would be hard to do a better job. The global financial crisis has provided a wee bit of a respite on that front for China; we’ll see, when world growth resumes, if this view proves correct.

From Steel Market Update:

Construction appears to be booming around Shanghai. A world expo will be held here in May 2010 and there is much construction ahead of the Expo. Funny thing is you see tons of cranes but very little actual work except on the government projects. A high speed train is being built between Shanghai and Beijing. Everything appears very prosperous and the traffic is almost as bad as India….Mill yesterday said that pricing within China has bottomed and is beginning to rebound. Judging by Shanghai this is believable but I don’t know how far this extends.

I have been told that times are really tough in Taiwan….

I have been to some rerollers and have not seen what I would consider excess inventory and the lines have been running. However, there seems to me that there is a similar feeling as the summer of 2008 – everyone feeling that the good times would last forever.

As usual the drivers are the best source of information. The average person in Shanghai area earns equivalent of $500 US per month. The average high rise apt (400 sq ft) is US $100K. So where does the average person live?

There has been a lot in local papers about the govt pulling back from stimulation because of concern about a too hot economy. I am told actual inflation is at 15%. The economy is not exporting.

Submitted by Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns.

Earlier today I wrote a post featuring comments by Marc Faber as I like to do from time to time.  In this particular case Dr. Faber was waxing prosaically about an eventual bankruptcy of the U.S. government.  His money quote was:

“Next station is when the U.S. government goes bust.”

I love this guy. Quite frankly, the man is a quote machine.  He makes a lot of outrageous statements that get him noticed.  Here are a few that I have featured in the past:

• Oct 2009 – “Monetary policy in the United States will stay expansionary”
• Sep 2009 – “The future will be a total disaster, with a collapse of our capitalistic system as we know it today, wars, massive government debt defaults and the impoverishment of large segments of Western society.”
• May 2009 – “I am 100% sure that the U.S. will go into hyperinflation”
• Mar 2009 – “The feds poured the gasoline and lit the match. Now they’ve joined the fire department”
• Nov 2008 – “I advise every American to hold his gold outside of the United States“
• Mar 2009 – “Don’t underestimate the power of printing money.”

The last one is my all-time favorite.  And there are many more available at Credit Writedowns and elsewhere.  Dr. Doom is very entertaining indeed – which is why I quote him so often.  But, is he right?

That’s a good question – one I will take up indirectly by introducing the latest piece by Martin Wolf, another author I have featured at Credit Writedowns from time to time. You may have seen me tweet this earlier today. I had intended to add it to the links for tomorrow, but Niels Jensen, who I also feature often, convinced me to write it up as an ‘antidote’ to Faber.

Here’s how Wolf begins his article:

It is the season of dollar panic. These panic-mongers are varied: gold bugs, fiscal hawks and many others agree that the dollar, the dominant currency since the first world war, is on its death bed. Hyperinflationary collapse is in store. Does this make sense? No. All the same, the dollar-based global monetary system is defective. It would be good to start building alternative arrangements.

This is exactly what the Chinese are doing. They are preparing themselves for a non-dollar future. This is why the Chinese are buying gold. This is why the Chinese are settling trade in Yuan. And this also why the Chinese are getting a bunch of other countries onside.  But they are not looking for a dollar crash as I indicated last week.

Then, there is the part about Dollar weakness being a sign of inflation. Here’s what Wolf has to say about this idea:

The dollar’s correction is not just natural; it is helpful. It will lower the risk of deflation in the US and facilitate the correction of the global “imbalances” that helped cause the crisis. I agree with a forthcoming article by Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics that “huge inflows of foreign capital to the US facilitated the over-leveraging and underpricing of risk”.* Even those who are sceptical of this agree that the US needs export-led growth.

I hope this argument sounds familiar because it is one I made when I asked is the Fed just jawboning? The U.S. wants – it needs a lower dollar to avoid deflation. Quantitative easing is not solving the deflation question. The U.S. government wants a strong dollar? Well, policymakers say one thing and wish for another. The U.S. insistence on focusing on global imbalances at the G-20 should tell you what policy makers really want. This is why the dollar is falling.

The problem of course is that the dollar’s recent rout is not necessarily helping the U.S. because the dollar is overvalued vis-a-vis a host of pegged currencies. And while those currencies are under pressure to drop the peg, they are resisting because they do not want to move toward a more re-balanced global growth paradigm unless forced to do so.  Unless these countries (read China) do something on the currency front, expect more of this, this and this – protectionism.

Then, the question arises, if everyone hates the dollar, what are they moving to? Wolf says:

Finally, what can replace the dollar? Unless and until China removes exchange controls and develops deep and liquid financial markets – probably a generation away – the euro is the dollar’s only serious competitor. At present, 65 per cent of the world’s reserves are in dollars and 25 per cent in euros. Yes, there could be some shift. But it is likely to be slow. The eurozone also has high fiscal deficits and debts. The dollar will exist 30 years from now; the euro’s fate is less certain.

This view may be too complacent. The danger of a collapse of the dollar is small and of its replacement by another currency still smaller. But a global monetary system that rests on the currency of a single country is problematic, for both issuer and users. The risks are also growing, particularly since the emergence of “Bretton Woods II” – the practice of managing exchange rates against the dollar.

I liken this argument to George Soros’ comments on dollar weakness: “The dollar is a very weak currency except all the others.” Right now, there is no alternative to the dollar.  Some people are fleeing U.S. assets if they can. But the alternatives are limited and this limits how far the dollar will fall. And this is unfortunate because the monetary system now in place is in need of change.  Without it, we are likely to see nationalistic policy responses to economic weakness, which will induce conflict.

Wolf says:

I arrive, by a somewhat different route, at the same conclusion as Mr Bergsten: the global role of the dollar is not in the interests of the US. The case for moving to a different system is very strong. This is not because the dollar’s role is now endangered. It is rather because it impairs domestic and global stability. The time for alternatives is now.

Apropos alternative monetary systems, we might start with Paul Davidson’s ideas, which I first highlighted in November.  So there is no hyperinflation, no U.S. national bankruptcy, and  no dollar crash coming. But, the financial crisis demonstrates we are living on borrowed time and need a new monetary system. The time is now.

Source

The rumours of the dollar’s death are much exaggerated – Martin Wolf

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

You know all about the subprime, alt-a, option arm, and commercial real estate crises.

You’re well-aware of the house of cards built with credit default swaps, securitized assets and other exotic investments.

You’ve heard about the massive debt overhang threatening individuals, companies and the country as a whole, and the massive de-leveraging which is still to occur.

You’re aware of the soaring unemployment rate, the tapped out consumer, and many other economic problems.

But do you know about the demographic crisis?

What Demographic Crisis?

Franco Modigliani won the Nobel Prize in Economics 1985, partly for his “life cycle hypothesis“, which states that spending and savings patterns are predictable and largely a function of age demographics. In other words, Modigliani’s hypothesis is basically that age demographics largely determine the health and robustness of an economy.

Harry Dent and other financial advisors who have examined American demographics say that we’re in big trouble.

Specifically, they say that the basic health of any country’s economy is largely driven by the number of its citizens who are in their peak spending years.

For example, the peak Japanese spending range has been estimated to be comprised of 39-43 year olds. The more 39-43 year olds Japan has at any given time, the more consumer spending there will be, as these are the folks who are the big spenders in Japan. Dent argues that the Japanese economy will tend to grow when the number of 39-43 year olds grows, and to shrink when it shrinks.

Dent says that this principle applies to all countries, although the peak spending years might vary slightly from country to country.

In the U.S., Dent says, 46-50 year olds are the biggest spenders, because that is when – on average – they are paying for their kids’ college, paying mortgage on the biggest house they will own during their life, and making other big-ticket purchases.

Claus Vogt agrees, saying that – all other things being equal – the country with the youngest population will experience the biggest growth in the future, as it will have the highest percentage of productive people in the days ahead (Modigliani’s age categories are somewhat different from Dent’s and Vogt’s, but – in general – people are having children later than they were in 1985).

Whether or not you believe Modigliani , Dent and Vogt, it should be obvious that countries with a large percentage of elderly people and a small proportion of productive workers will have less productive output and a larger demand for social services than those with a higher percentage of workers. It should also be obvious that this will tend to drag down the economy.

Which Countries Have the Most Favorable Demographics?

Which countries have the best demographics?

Let’s start by looking at the “age pyramid” for the United States. The following 2 charts from the National Institutes of Health shows that the population is aging:

This graphic (courtesy of Ed Stephan) shows the U.S. age pyramid from from 1950 through 2050:

male	female
Population of the United States, by Age and Sex, 1950-2050 (millions)
information source: International Data Base, U.S. Census Bureau; supplied pyramids were modified using Canvas, GraphicConverter and GIFBuilder.

[If you can't see the dates at the bottom of the pyramid, click here].

As NIH notes:

The first of the postwar baby boom cohort, born 1946–1964, will turn 55 years in 2001. In just three decades, an extraordinary change in the age structure of the United States is anticipated. By 2030, one in five persons (20% of the U.S. population) will be aged 65 or older, increasing from the present ratio of one in nine persons (12.8%). The number of persons in the 65 and older age group will more than double, increasing from the current 34 million persons to 70 million persons. Moreover, within the older segment of the population, because of longer life expectancy and additional persons reaching older ages, there will be age shifts resulting in the 85 and older population more than doubling in size from 4.3 million persons to approximately 8.9 million persons.

An aging U.S. population means less productive workers, less big-spending consumers, and more dependent elders.

Here’s China:

Brazil has a much younger age demographic.

And India’s is even younger than Brazil’s.

The following chart shows that Japan has the worst demographics of all, with a staggering percentage of elderly who need to be taken care of by the young:

Chart 2: Old Age Dependency Ratios for Selected Countries

Source: http://data.un.org/

And this chart shows that – as a whole – emerging markets have a higher percentage of working age population:

Chart 3: Working-Age Population as % of Total Population

Source: http://data.un.org/

You can find some interesting charts showing age pyramids for multi-country regions here. You can search for other countries or regions, as well.

What Does It Mean?

What does all this mean?

Well, initially, it means that – in addition to everything else they have going for them – 2 of the BRIC countries (Brazil and India) have much more favorable demographics than the United States. So they are at a competitive advantage to America for demographic reasons in addition to the other reasons that people write about.

Indeed, as Richard Jackson told the White House Conference on Aging in 2005:

If demography is destiny, global leadership may pass to the “Third” world…

Countries with slowly growing workforces may have slowly growing economies…

We live in an era defined by many challenges, from global warming to global terrorism.

None is as certain as global aging.

And none is likely to have such a large and enduring effect on the shape of national economies and the world order.

Moreover, Dent and another of the main writers focusing on the economic effect of age demographers – Daniel Arnold – say that America’s aging demographics point to a major depression.

As Arnold writes:

I hope that he’s wrong.

See also this and this.

Note: Of course, different levels of development and technology also substantially affect the economy.

Whoops, that was the old brand, and it was to be led by Japan. The results were less than happy since Japan was not prepared to take “no” for an answer.

But this time around, necessity as well as opportunity are leading China, Japan, and Korea to discuss moving forward on closer economic ties. In fact, the driver for talks appears to be more than a tad of desperation of the Japanese.

The US has been opposed to anything more than symbolic movements on this front. For instance, in the 1997 Asian crisis, Japan wanted countries in the region to lead rescue efforts. That idea was opposed, forcefully, by Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, and Timothy Geithner, who was then at the IMF but slotted to join the Treasury. And we know how that movie ended. The IMF “reforms” were the same template they had used for Mexico, and was inappropriate in key respects for high-savings Asian countries. The Asian tigers’ resentment of punitive and painful programs led them to institute currency pegs at artificially low rates so they could build up their reserves. China held its peg during the crisis at US request, reinforcing its use of pegs (and one can further argue that the low rates implemented in the crisis countries gave China plenty of cover to maintain its peg even as its currency became increasingly undervalued).

It is still not clear how serious this move is. There has been talk for some time of beefing up ASEAN (for instance, having it have its own development bank as an alternative to the World Bank). This initiative is outside ASEAN and is in the brave talk stage. The biggest potential obstacles is long-standing distrust among the principal actors. That may be compounded by China trying to assert a leadership role, which is understandable given its economic position, but diplomacy is not yet one of China’s strengths.

From the Telegraph :

The three countries, dismayed at falling levels of trade and investment from the US and Europe, met in Beijing to plan for more structured levels of co-operation.

The move came as HSBC warned there is likely to be a “shift in the world’s centre of economic gravity from West to East”. The bank has already decided to move its chief executive, Michael Geoghegan, from London to Hong Kong next February to prepare for Asia’s ascendancy.

Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, and his Japanese and South Korean counterparts, Yukio Hatoyama and Lee Myung-bak, said the three countries were “committed to the development of an East Asia community”, similar to the European Union.

The idea, which is being strongly pushed by Japan, could eventually lead to a free trade block and co-operation on public health, energy and the environment….

The proposals are in their early stages, and the three countries emphasised that it was a “long-term goal”. Liu Changli, a professor at China’s North East Finance University, said a free trade area could be in place “by 2020, on a best-case scenario”. He added: “Add another five to 10 years for an economic union and a further five to 10 years after that for a true economic, military, political and cultural union”.

The proposals come as Japan is struggling with the collapse of its export sector, a key motor of its economic growth. Since Mr Hatoyama was elected at the end of August, he has been searching for a way to kick-start the economy and alleviate the country’s debt, which currently stands at 283pc of GDP, the highest of any G20 nation….

South Korea’s ties with China have also weakened, with substantial Korean populations in Beijing and Shanghai returning home because of the downturn.

Both countries now see China’s booming economy, which is set to grow by at least 8pc this year, as a beacon of hope. China, for its part, has a long-term strategy of reducing its dependence on the West and building political and economic ties with Russia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia. It has already signed a bilateral free trade agreement with ASEAN, the coalition of South East Asian nations, which is due to come into full effect next year.

However, any attempts by the three nations at closer integration are likely to be opposed by the US, which is concerned about any waning of its influence in the Pacific.

Japan’s role in this is a clear statement of diminished US power. Japan is a military protectorate of the US. For at least the last three years, if not longer, Japan has been playing a very careful game between the US and China. It appears to have decided it has little to lose in seeking to throw its lot in with China.

An unannounced but evidently coordinated effort to arrest or at least slow the fall of the dollar is underway. The Financial Times indicated that Asian central banks were aggressive dollar buyers on Thursday, but the information came via currency traders rather than an official pronouncement. Thailand, Malaysia and Taiwan made substantial purchases; Hong Kong and Singapore also intervened today. The action may also have a secondary objective of rejiggering their currency values versus China’s, since China repegged the renminbi against the dollar.

However, these efforts were seen by traders as merely an attempt to control the fall in the dollar rather than halt it. And other markets responded to the dollar weakness. Oil prices rose nearly $3 today, gold hit a new high in dollar terms, and copper and tin spiked upward. The dollar is strengthening overnight on Bernanke’s empty promise that the central bank will raise rates when the economy recovers.

The dollar’s weakness exposes a series of dilemmas and a lack of obvious remedies. Normally, a country experiencing a financial crisis takes measures to depreciate its currency so it can use an export boom to help pull itself out of its economic mess. However, Paul Krugman, among others, have pointed out that trade has collapsed, so even if one were to break glass and trash currency, it isn’t as effective a solution as it would normally be. And even if that approach might work, with so many countries affected by the crisis, it’s too easy for currency depreciation to lead to beggar-thy-neighbor competitive devaulations.

Although the US keeps mouthing its “strong dollar” assurances, many observers believe that the Obama Administration is content to let the dollar slide because the resulting inflation will help erode the value of debt and more robust exports will help growth. But that seems a trifle optimistic. First, some economists, such as Jim Hamilton, argue that it was the commodity price runup of early 2008 that pushed over-indebted consumers over the edge. Commodities inflation, when it inures to the benefit of foreign producers, is not a boon to the US. Second, the US has ceded a lot of manufacturing industries. How long would the dollar have to stay weak for the US to repatriate significant amount of, say, furniture and shoe fabrication? These are two industries where some incumbents insist the US could remained competitive in high-end and even some mid-level manufacturing (offshoring was driven not just by cost savings but also by a desire to please Wall Street analysts). It takes time to establish operations and hire and train staff. No one is going to make investments like that unless they are confident the dollar will remain comparatively weak.

Third, rising inflation is not a panacea. While it reduces the value of debt currently outstanding, it also makes it costly to sell new debt (unless the borrower is convinced inflation will rise even higher). Even if the principal will be paid back in depreciating dollars, the cost of debt service rises with higher interest. And having lived through the inflation-ridden bond markets of the early 1980s, no one wanted to be borrowing then. Reasonable credit quality companies were facing 15+% coupons.

Even before we get to anything resembling that level of interest rate, the Fed and Treasury have a big bind. Higher domestic inflation means higher interest rates. Higher interest rates mean higher mortgage rates. That kills housing. Higher interest rates also means all those private equity owned companies that are stuffed up to their eyeballs in debt and need to refi between now and 2013 find it more costly. Many will not survive higher debt service. Big bankruptcies and related job losses are not too good for economic recovery. The Treasury has also gotten addicted to super low interest rates (and if my correspondents are correct and the average maturity of Treasury debt has shortened, the US is more exposed to interest rate increases than it might otherwise be). In other words, even a modest increase in rates could have a much nastier economic impact than conventional wisdom assumes.

And we have another possibility. At the G20, the US started to take up the “we want to be an exporter when we grow up” theme. Ahem, so who is going to be the net consumer if the US gives up that role? Now I will be the first to concede that having a world where more countries had robust consumer sectors and were less export dependent would be a much better arrangement, but getting there is at least a 10 year, probably more like a 20 year transition. Yet the powers that be here are acting as if the US can beef up its exports and get to a net neutral or a net exporter position much sooner. So was that unannounced Asian intervention benign, or was it a bit of a warning shot, that the rest of the world reluctantly accepts that the dollar probably needs to be cheaper, but will only let that go so far?

Many US commentators blithely asset that the US does not need to worry about the reserve currency status of the dollar, since there is allegedly no ready substitute. Yet those arguments ignore the fact that there has already been movement away from the greenback. The Globe and Mail in early 2008 noted:

A UBS Investment Research report says that while it would be wrong to write off the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency, its roughly 90-year iron grip on that position is loosening. “The use of the U.S. dollar as an international reserve currency is in decline,” said UBS economist Paul Donovan.

“The market share of the dollar in international transactions is likely to decline over the coming months and years, but only persistent policy error – or considerable fiscal strain – is likely to cause the dollar to lose reserve currency status entirely.”

The UBS report maintains that the gradual slide of the U.S. dollar is being driven not by the world’s central banks, but by the private sector, as individual companies increasingly abandon the greenback as their international currency of choice.

“The private sector’s use of reserves is more important than official, central bank reserves – anything up to 20 times the significance, depending on interpretation,” Mr. Donovan said. “There is evidence that the move away from the dollar as a private-sector reserve currency has been accelerating since 2000.”

Another chip away at the dollar’s standing is a effort underway by the Gulf States plus China, Russia, Japan and France to denominate oil sales not in dollars but a basket of currencies. Note this is not completely novel; Iran’s oil sales to Japan are quoted in yen.

From the Independent (hat tip reader John D):

In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.

Secret meetings have already been held by finance ministers and central bank governors in Russia, China, Japan and Brazil to work on the scheme, which will mean that oil will no longer be priced in dollars…

The Americans, who are aware the meetings have taken place – although they have not discovered the details – are sure to fight this international cabal which will include hitherto loyal allies Japan and the Gulf Arabs. Against the background to these currency meetings, Sun Bigan, China’s former special envoy to the Middle East, has warned there is a risk of deepening divisions between China and the US over influence and oil in the Middle East. “Bilateral quarrels and clashes are unavoidable,” he told the Asia and Africa Review. “We cannot lower vigilance against hostility in the Middle East over energy interests and security.”

Yves here. The explicit linking of security issues in the Middle East and the desire of a lot of countries to more away from the dollar as reserve currency is troubling, and the Independent also reads this as a thinly veiled threat:

This sounds like a dangerous prediction of a future economic war between the US and China over Middle East oil – yet again turning the region’s conflicts into a battle for great power supremacy…. The transitional currency in the move away from dollars, according to Chinese banking sources, may well be gold…

The decline of American economic power linked to the current global recession was implicitly acknowledged by the World Bank president Robert Zoellick. “One of the legacies of this crisis may be a recognition of changed economic power relations,” he said in Istanbul ahead of meetings this week of the IMF and World Bank. But it is China’s extraordinary new financial power – along with past anger among oil-producing and oil-consuming nations at America’s power to interfere in the international financial system – which has prompted the latest discussions involving the Gulf states.

Brazil has shown interest in collaborating in non-dollar oil payments, along with India. Indeed, China appears to be the most enthusiastic of all the financial powers involved, not least because of its enormous trade with the Middle East….

The Chinese believe, for example, that the Americans persuaded Britain to stay out of the euro in order to prevent an earlier move away from the dollar. But Chinese banking sources say their discussions have gone too far to be blocked now. “The Russians will eventually bring in the rouble to the basket of currencies,” a prominent Hong Kong broker told The Independent. “The Brits are stuck in the middle and will come into the euro. They have no choice because they won’t be able to use the US dollar.”

Chinese financial sources believe President Barack Obama is too busy fixing the US economy to concentrate on the extraordinary implications of the transition from the dollar in nine years’ time. The current deadline for the currency transition is 2018.

The US discussed the trend briefly at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh; the Chinese Central Bank governor and other officials have been worrying aloud about the dollar for years. Their problem is that much of their national wealth is tied up in dollar assets.

“These plans will change the face of international financial transactions,” one Chinese banker said. “America and Britain must be very worried. You will know how worried by the thunder of denials this news will generate.”

Iran announced late last month that its foreign currency reserves would henceforth be held in euros rather than dollars. Bankers remember, of course, what happened to the last Middle East oil producer to sell its oil in euros rather than dollars. A few months after Saddam Hussein trumpeted his decision, the Americans and British invaded Iraq.

It isn’t uncommon for a theme or a trend to dominate how investors and analysts view a particular sector. For instance, when barriers to interstate banking were lowered, then dropped, bank consolidation was all anyone seemed able to think about, even though there were other important developments in the industry. During that era, at McKinsey, a slide show made fun of typical presentations to banking clients. One had a cartoon of an a school of little fish fleeing an enormous fish with a wide open mouth and sharp teeth. Caption: “Citibank is about to enter your market.”

But while some banks were gobbled up by bigger ones, it was often because it served the executives to do so, rather than because it was a business imperative. Well-run small banks can do well; in fact, beyond a not-very-high threshold, banks do not show economies of scale (it may be that the diseconomies of scope outweigh the scale advantages within particular activities).

Similarly, in the dot com era, even stodgy industrial companies would feel compelled to show that they were somehow taking part of this (the seemingly) earth shaking change.

The rising influence of China is another sea change that investors and companies can nevertheless overdo. This tidbit comes from Andrew Kaplan, a hedge fund manager who focuses on the technology and alternative energy sectors:

From American Superconductor’s June quarterly earnings call, 7/30/09:

In 2008, China grew its installed base of wind turbines to about 12 gigawatts of power and early this year declared that it intended to add another 10 gigawatts or more in 2009…more recent reports state that China may exceed 150 gigawatts by 2020. To put all those numbers in perspective, one gigawatt is enough electricity to power…about 3,000,000 Chinese homes. It’s quite clear that the opportunity in China is tremendous and we are definitely taking advantage of the situation.

The 150 gw number by 2020, while it seems large, would be largely achieved if China kept its pace of wind installations flat with its 2009 number (10 gw).

China’s population is 1.3 billion. At current growth rate, population will be 1.4 billion in 2020.

Average household size in China (blended avg of urban + rural) is 4.0.

So in 2020 there will be 350 million Chinese households.

Given that 1 gw of wind can power 3,000,000 Chinese homes, 150 gw of wind will be able to power 450 million Chinese homes.

So in 2020 wind will account for 129% of Chinese household electricity use.

That’s all. You may now return to regularly scheduled programming. (and, yes, I know that households are not the only consumers of electricity. But, believe it or not, wind is not the only source of electricity in China).

By George Washington of Washington’s Blog.

(Rest assured that once Yves is done writing her book, and back posting,  or other guest posters write more, I will post less often! )

This essay rounds up arguments for gold as a reasonable investment.

China

Commentators such as Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Byron King argue that China’s hunger for gold will put a floor on gold prices.

Specifically, they argue that China will “buy the dips” in gold prices, effectively putting a minimum on how low gold prices can go.

Inflation

It is conventional wisdom that gold is a hedge against inflation.

For example, noted inflationist John Williams advises buying gold.

Axel Merk argues that gold is a better buy than TIPS as an inflation bet.

And Taleb advised buying gold in May, since currencies including the dollar and euro face pressures.

Deflation

If gold does well during times of inflation, it makes sense that it would perform poorly during deflationary periods.

But Examiner.com points out that such an assumption is probably untrue.

Specifically, as Examiner.com writes:

Eric Sprott – who manages $4.5 billion in assets, and correctly predicted in March of 2008 a “systemic financial meltdown” – says:

“I believe no matter what environment you’re in – deflation or inflation – people will run to gold,” Sprott said. “Gold is proving exactly what we all would have expected, that in almost any environment, it’s a go-to asset.”

And investment analyst and financial writer Yves Smith argues that gold does well during both periods of deflation and high inflation. She argues:

Historically, gold does well [in] hyperinflation and deflationary [periods]. Gold does poorly under more normal conditions, and gets hammered in disinflationary conditions, a falling but positive rate of inflation.

Analyst Adrian Ash argues that gold’s value actually increases during periods of deflation even if its price drops:

Does the price of gold rise or fall in a deflation?Hint: It’s a trick question, already tripping up plenty of would-be advisors…

Absent the money-supply limits which the gold standard imposed on the world, people rightly guess that double-digit inflation would prove rocket-fuel for the bull market in gold. Yet the purchasing power of gold nearly doubled during the Great Depression, and it’s risen four-fold during this decade’s low consumer-price inflation as well.Why? Because both those periods of low price-inflation saw the money-issuing authorities devalue the currency, first with explicit reference to gold but now without daring to name it. Roosevelt in the mid-30s slashed the dollar’s gold content by 40%; the Greenspan/Bernanke Fed devalued the Dollar again to sidestep a DotCom Depression, keeping real interest rates at less than zero, between 2002-2005.

The maestro’s apprentice applied the same trick in the back-half of 2008, but so far to no avail. And now even the European Central Bank is pumping out money – a near half-trillion euros today alone – in a bid to revive bank lending, swamp the currency markets, and pull Germany out of its first flirt with deflation since the 1930s.

Just such a devaluation – and again, absent any stated reference to gold – was attempted by the Bank of Japan a little less than a decade ago.

Indeed, Japan is the only developed nation since the end of the gold standard to have suffered an extended deflation in prices. So far, at least. Germany and Switzerland look set to try for a re-wind, and unless the dollar can outpace the euro’s descent, we might yet see truly sub-zero inflation in the United States, too.

But whatever that should mean for gold prices, all other things being equal, just doesn’t matter. Because the gold price will not get a chance. All other things are not equal, and the policy solution – rank devaluation – can only make gold more appealing to investors and savers, whether the “monetarist experiment” of TARP, quantitative easing or a half-trillion euros proves successful or not.

Japan’s slump into deflation coincided with the Bank of Japan’s “zero interest rate policy” (ZIRP) at the start of this decade. It also saw the gold price worldwide hit rock-bottom and turn higher, a move that analysts (including us) have typically linked to US monetary moves and investment cash looking for safety as the Dotcom Bubble exploded.

But zero-rate money from the world’s second-largest economy shouldn’t be ignored. And today, zero-rate money is all the developed world has to offer – a trick that might not beat deflation, but might just spur a whole new rush into gold.

In other words, Ash argues that you can’t take inflation or deflation in a vacuum. During deflationary periods – like we have now – governments always increase the money supply with a flood of new dollars, which is bullish for gold.

And PhD economist Marc Faber wrote in October 2007 that gold will do well even in a deflation:

How would gold perform in a deflationary global recession? Initially gold could come under some pressure as well but once the realization sinks in how messy deflation would be for over-indebted countries and households, its price would likely soar.

Therefore, under both scenarios – stagflation or deflationary recession – gold, gold equities and other precious metals should continue to perform better than financial assets.

Looking At the Charts

Is Faber right?

Well, take a look at the following charts showing gold’s performance as compared to the yen during Japan’s “lost decade” of deflation:

Japan’s deflation didn’t definitively end until 2007 or 2008.

This provides some evidence that gold may tend to hold or increase its value at least in the later part of the deflationary period as compared with the relevant national currency.

Moreover – approximately half the time – gold has risen during recessions in the United States:

(The grey vertical bars show periods of recession; the chart gives gold prices in monthly averages; click here for larger image).

If you study the above chart, you will see that gold seems to often fall during the beginning stages of a recession, then rise in the later stages of the recession (before 1971, the dollar was still backed by gold at a fixed price, and so gold did not fluctuate).

But what about Ash’s theory?

The American Enterprises Institute notes:

After five years in a deflationary economic wilderness, the Bank of Japan switched during the spring of 2001 to a policy of quantitative easing–targeting the growth of the money supply instead of nominal interest rates–in order to engineer a rebound in demand growth.

Look again at the first gold chart for Japan, above. Gold appears to start increasing against the Yen in 2001.

This may provide some evidence for Ash’s thesis that it is an expansion of the money supply which pushes the price of gold up in the later stages of deflationary periods.

Uncertainty

Finally, Chris Martenson argues that – in prolonged periods of deflation – we usually see failures of large and significant banks, institutions, and perhaps even states and countries. Because gold traditionally does well during periods of uncertainty, Martenson likes gold during periods of deflation.

Examiner.com notes in a subsequent article:

Merrill Lynch agrees.

Specifically, PhD economist Nouriel Roubini paraphrases a report from Merill Lynch (not available online) as follows:

Short-term rates of 0% are bullish for gold, which serves as a store of value but is a useful hedge against deflation as well, since deflation is inherently destabilizing for financial assets. In the 2001-03 deflationary period, gold rose more than 30%, not to mention the prospect of a return to a dollar bear market. “Gold is inversely correlated to global short-term interest rates and there is a race right now towards 0%. Production is down 4.0% y/y while fiat currencies globally are being created at a double digit rate by the world’s central banks….As for all the talk of a ‘gold bubble,’ it would take a nearly 625% surge in gold to over US$6,000/oz and a flat stock market to actually get the ratio of the two asset classes back to where it was three decades ago when bullion was in an unsustainable bubble phase.”

Gold tends to be less sensitive to global economic slowdown than industrial metals or energy and works better as a hedge against crisis than inflation.

Global Short Term Interest Rates Are Low

The above-quoted Merrill article states:

Gold is inversely correlated to global short-term interest rates and there is a race right now towards 0%.

This argues for gold.

Polls Show Distrust in Government

Time Magazine writes:

Traditionally, gold has been a store of value when citizens do not trust their government politically or economically.

Given the enormous levels of distrust in the government politically and/or economically (and the fact that some have warned of recession-induced violence), gold might do well.

Greenspan and Exeter

Professor Emeritus of Mathematics Antal Fekete has argued for years that gold is the ultimate – and only – safe haven when things really hit the fan.

For example, in 2007 Fekete wrote:

The grand old man of the New York Federal Reserve bank’s gold department, the last Mohican, John Exter explained the devolution of money (not his term) using the model of an inverted pyramid, delicately balanced on its apex at the bottom consisting of pure gold. The pyramid has many other layers of asset classes graded according to safety, from the safest and least prolific at bottom to the least safe and most prolific asset layer, electronic dollar credits on top. (When Exter developed his model, electronic dollars had not yet existed; he talked about FR deposits.) In between you find, in decreasing order of safety, as you pass from the lower to the higher layer: silver, FR notes, T-bills, T-bonds, agency paper, other loans and liabilities denominated in dollars. In times of financial crisis people scramble downwards in the pyramid trying to get to the next and nearest safer and less prolific layer underneath. But down there the pyramid gets narrower. There is not enough of the safer and less prolific kind of assets to accommodate all who want to “devolve”. Devolution is also called “flight to
safety”.

Darryl Schoon makes the same argument.

Here’s a visual depiction Exeter’s inverted pyramid, courtesy of FOFOA:

(Click here for full image; I am not certain every level of the pyramid is accurately ranked)

Alan Greenspan has just lent some support to the theory. Specifically:

Gold prices that jumped above $1,000 an ounce this week are signaling that investors are buying metals to hedge against declines in currencies, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said.

The gains are “strictly a monetary phenomenon,” Greenspan said today at an investment conference in New York. Rising prices of precious metals and other commodities are “an indication of a very early stage of an endeavor to move away from paper currencies,” he said…

“What is fascinating is the extent to which gold still holds reign over the financial system as the ultimate source of payment,” Greenspan said.

In other words, Greenspan is saying that investors are moving out of the second-to-lowest step on the pyramid (currencies and government bonds) and into the lowest step (gold).

Greenspan is also verifying what goldbugs like Exeter, Fekete and Schoon have been claiming: that “the barbarous relic” still holds an important place in the modern investor’s psyche.

Are Exeter, Fekete and Schoon right? I don’t know. And Greenspan might be wrong, or trying to excuse weakness in the dollar (as opposed to all paper currencies).

Note 1: Zero Hedge alleges that newly-declassified federal documents prove that gold prices have been manipulated for decades. If these documents are authentic (I have no reason to doubt their authenticity, but have no inside knowledge), if the claims of artificial price suppression are true, if this is widely publicized, if such publicity causes someone like Congressmen Alan Grayson, Brad Sherman, Ron Paul, or Dennis Kucinich to raise a ruckus in Congress, and if Congress as a whole votes to ban such a practice, then the price of gold would presumably rise. That’s a lot of ifs.

Note 2: Some of the best recent arguments I’ve heard against gold are written by Vitaliy Katsenelson. Read this, this, this and this.

Note 3: I am not an investment advisor and this should not be taken as investment advice.

Submitted by Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

I have to admit to hyping the debate now swirling about protectionism. I believe that tariffs are not a very good solution to a trade problem as they are likely to result in retaliation and/or escalation. Moreover, they end up protecting small groups at the expense of higher prices for everyone else.  That is why I wrote the provocatively-titled “Murder-Suicide in Chimerica.”

But taking a step back from the rhetoric for a second, I want to highlight two recent articles and make a few comments.

Is the protectionist bogeyman really coming?

First, while a protectionist backlash is a distinct possibility which I see as the main threat to sustained recovery, I recognize that countries like China and the United States are co-dependent and loath to permanently altering the status quo unilaterally. So while I condemn the recent tariffs imposed on Chinese tires, I recognize that the tariffs were imposed in the calculus that this issue would not or could not escalate.

This is what James fallows argues in a post yesterday:

I keep putting this off, so before it finally disappears into the mists of time, here is a bullet-point summary of what I would have said at greater length when the Chinese tire tariff first arose.

1) There is not now, and there never was, a serious possibility that this would escalate into some sweeping, self-intensifying, global-recovery-threatening “trade war.”  The many publications and commentators who raised their hands in “Oh no! It’s Smoot Hawley again!” horror need to calm down — and to have their tendency toward over-reaction noted for the record. Yes, I’m talking about you, Economist magazine cover-designers (last week’s cover image, below), but you had tons of company.

There is too much going on, on too many other fronts, involving affairs of incomparably greater consequence between China and America, for this to have been more than a contained, specific dispute — contained in both duration and sweep. This was clear at the time and should have buffered the shock-horror tone of the stories. Why this matters: because of the  boy-who-cried-wolf principle. There are issues between China and the outside world in which a small disagreement could spiral into a very dangerous confrontation. Many of these involve Taiwan, for reasons to be spelled out another time. But tire tariffs, agree with them or not, were never going to set off a global economic confrontation.

In effect, Fallows is saying that it undermines ones argument to scream, “Smoot-Hawley, Smoot-Hawley” every time there is some issue that deviates from the idealized world of free trade. Eventually people will block this out, especially in an environment like this, in which populist sentiment is running high. Fair enough.

Protectionism is more than just tariffs

So with those thoughts in mind, I read Edmund Conway’s article “We are entering a new age of protectionism” in the Telegraph. Conway says:

Some are “traditional” measures, familiar from the Depression and elsewhere – subsidies for domestic producers or tariffs on imports, President Obama’s move to slap a 35 per cent charge on Chinese tyres being a prime example. Such measures are provoking fury, and with good reason: the protectionist spiral into which the world plunged in the 1930s almost certainly contributed to the war at the end of the decade.

However, such visible signs of protectionism tell a fraction of the story. For the shocking truth is this: over the past year, the costs and obstacles faced by exporters have, according to a study by economists David Jacks, Christopher Meissner and Dennis Novy, increased by almost the same scale as in the early 1930s when the US and others were imposing a range of protectionist laws, including the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act.

Partly this is one of the perverse consequences of the financial crisis, which crippled the system of trade credit that underpinned the international flow of goods, making it impossible for some companies to ship products from one part of the world to another. But, far more worryingly, it is also a product of explicitly protectionist measures imposed by countries such as the UK in an effort to save their domestic banking systems from collapse. Most egregiously, these included so-called financial mercantilism, whereby governments, having rescued a bank, insisted that it had to lend far more to domestic customers than business or individuals overseas businesses.

This new protectionism is a different beast from that of the early 20th century, but the result is the same. According to the Bank for International Settlements, the amount of money flowing across national borders has collapsed in a way never before witnessed. Put simply, financial globalisation, which helped power economic growth in recent years, has gone into reverse over the past year. All the more worrying is that it has done so without people noticing.

If I read Conway correctly, he is rightly pointing out that all the bailouts and subsidies we have seen – especially in the financial sector – are the economic equivalent of tariffs.  Protectionism is not just about tariffs. We are moving to a world in which domestic jobs are ‘protected’ via non-tariff remedies.

Extending Conway’s argument to the auto industry, it should be patently clear that this is what is happening. Here are a few posts I wrote on the issue.  The titles should give you the gist.

• Volkswagen: if the American carmakers can get bailout funds, so can we – Dec 208
• Sweden: competitive auto bailouts begin with Saab and Volvo – Dec 2008
• Germans reject Chinese offer for Opel – Jul 2009
• Cash for Clunkers will put GDP over the top in Q3 – Aug 2009

Every car company has its hands out for a subsidy or bail out and most of them are receiving it. Certainly, the U.S. has led the way, but the Germans have been as bad as anyone here.  The deal that the German government struck to save Opel with Magna, a Canadian-Austrian auto parts manufacturer, is widely perceived as having been slanted in favor of German jobs over Spanish, Belgian or British.  All of these countries are complaining bitterly to the EU that the deal represents a subsidy and is anti-competitive.

This is why you see the Germans talking up regulatory reform in finance and the Americans and the British are talking up re-balancing:  The U.S. and the U.K. have strong financial services industries and Germany has a strong export sector. Of course the Americans are opposed to financial reform.  Of course the Germans don’t want global rebalancing.

Politics is domestic

In a prior life I was a foreign policy guy.  In my time living and breathing foreign policy it became evident to me that politics is always domestic first.  If you want to know why a foreign leader is acting a certain way or taking a specific position, take a look at the domestic political environment.

Do you think the Chinese cared what Americans think, when they threatened to retaliate to the tire tariffs? Do you think Angela Merkel cares what happens to workers at Vauxhall plants in the U.K. when she arranged the Magna deal? Do you think the Americans care about what happens to Frankfurt as a financial center when they bailed out BofA and Citgroup? Of course not.

What matters is placating domestic concerns and consolidating power domestically. So while I talk about the “cozy” relationship between China and the U.S. as a marriage, I am under no illusion that this is anything more than a business relationship. When push comes to shove domestic concerns will win out. And if that means placating rioting workers in fear of losing jobs, so be it.

Expect more, not less protectionism

So I am not optimistic this protectionist wave is going to go away. My baseline sees more not less protectionism.  What would be wonderful is if the recovery taking hold were robust enough so that nations came together and worked out a workable forward-looking global solution to some of the more intractable macro problems. However, for the time being most people are retreating to their corners, making protectionism a continued threat.

Submitted by Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

In 2002, the global economy was weak and equity markets around the world were at multi-year lows following the greatest equity bubble and bust in world history. Many policy makers including Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, feared a deflationary spiral of Great Depression proportions resulting from the stock market collapse.

To prevent such an outcome, the United States embarked on an historic monetary experiment to reflate a post-bubble economy by lowering interest rates to 1%, the lowest in 50 years. The result was a huge global economic boom which benefitted nearly every economy and every asset class on the planet. But the boom has turned to bust. In its wake, the cozy relationship between China and the United States that developed during boom time is unravelling.

Just Friday, Barack Obama slapped Chinese tire imports into the United States with tariffs of up to thirty-five percent. China was outraged and immediately threatened to retaliate. I now see a trade war between China and the United States as the biggest threat to global economic recovery.

With this trade war looming, one must wonder if Chimerica, the marriage of China and America as one economic entity, will end in murder-suicide, taking the global economy down with it.

Chimerica’s origins

Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick invented the term “Chimerica” in 2006 to describe the underpinnings of the 2000s boom. In their view, this economic upswing resulted from an America and China joined at the hip in a state of economic interdependence. Americans were the spenders and the Chinese were the savers and producers. The United States spent far in excess of what it saved. Meanwhile China ran a huge current account surplus, accumulating a $2 trillion stash of largely U.S. dollar-denominated international reserves, effectively funnelling America’s borrowed money back into the U.S. economy.

This state of affairs was always unsustainable – more so after the collapse of the associated credit and asset bubble exposed fissures in the global financial system in 2007. However, the flashpoint came in 2008 when the U.S. dollar plummeted to record or multi-decade lows against a host of other major currencies, leaving China’s reserves diminished in value. For the months since, the Chinese have expressed growing concern that they could get the short end of the stick if the marriage which created Chimerica dissolves.

Chimerica’s unravelling disturbs China

If one looks at any one incident involving China and the United States during the global economic crisis in isolation, it is easy to lose sight of the big picture. However, threading the events of 2008 and 2009 together makes a compelling case that the Chinese – U.S. marriage is coming apart.

The first indication of Chinese concern which I detailed came as the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac collapsed last August. The Chinese had put much of their reserve money into GSE debt, believing it as safe as U.S. government debt. It was evident that the GSEs were not a safe investment except through an implicit government guarantee (as I said in May 2008). But when the GSEs collapsed, the Chinese were caught out and warned they could dump dollar-denominated assets unless they were made whole.  Subsequently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were nationalized and creditors were made whole.

The next flashpoint was created by comments by incoming Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner at his confirmation hearings before Congress. Geithner charged China with ‘manipulating’ its currency in an environment in which many western policy makers were openly blaming Asia’s mercantilism for the economic crisis.  The Chinese retaliated, with Chairman Wen slamming the U.S. as a profligate nation in unusually stark terms that raised quite a few eyebrows.

At just about this time, the first hints of real American protectionism came into being in the form of the Buy America provision attached to the stimulus bill. There was quite an uproar from America’s major trading partners like Canada and China – and I saw this as a 21st Smoot-Hawley at the time, a view I still hold. (To make matters worse, the provision has had perverse consequences.)

By this point – early 2009, the Chinese were done. They had suffered the potential for massive losses through the dollar’s weakness and the failure of the GSEs. Now, they were being blamed for a crisis which began in the west.  It was at this time that I noticed a steady drumbeat of ditch-the-dollar talk coming out of China. By the G-20 meeting in April, the Chinese central bank head Zhou outright called for a new international reserve currency.

The drumbeat of anti-Dollar news coming from China got louder and louder during the spring. The Chinese started settling trade in Yuan (Apr. 9) instead of dollars. The Chinese were discovered to be stocking up on gold supplies (Apr. 24). The Chinese central bank attacked the policy of quantitative easing in its quarterly report (May 9). The Chinese positioned themselves as the champion of emerging market nations and assembled support from Russia, Brazil and India for reforms in the international reserve system (Jun. 12).

And then came the retaliation.

Protectionism rises

On June 16, I wrote a post “Beijing starts a ‘Buy China’ policy” which clearly demonstrated that the Chinese were incensed by the Buy America provision in America’s stimulus bill. The trade war was on.

The ‘Buy America” and the “Buy China” provisions were nationalistic and prevented goods from other countries being bought. However, they were merely passive protectionism i.e. legislative exclusion of foreign goods and services. No tariffs were assessed.

But when Barack Obama chose to slap 35% tariffs on Chinese tire imports, this was an unmistakable act of active protectionism. This was the proverbial serving of divorce papers. 

Expect prices to rise as a result:

Marguerite Trossevin, who represents a coalition of U.S. tire companies that import Chinese tires, said the tariff decision is "very disappointing." She predicted price increases for U.S. consumers and losses for U.S. tire importers.

The Chinese have now said they will look to retaliate on U.S. poultry and auto products:

China announced dumping and subsidy probes of chicken and auto products from the U.S., two days after President Barack Obama imposed tariffs on tires from the Asian nation.

Chinese industries complain that they’re being hurt by “unfair trade practices,” the nation’s Ministry of Commerce said on its Web site yesterday. The dumping investigation relates to poultry alone, a spokesman said in Beijing today. The ministry didn’t specify the value of imports of the products.

To be honest, the protectionism should not be a surprise.  Obama is no free-trader. And I certainly foresaw a rise in protectionism and indicated in December 2008 the United States was the likely first mover:

Tariffs, export subsidies and currency devaluations will roil the desire for free trade.  Initially, countries will seek relief at the WTO (World Trade Organization) but later they will begin to act unilaterally.  The U.S. will be the first to unilaterally retaliate.

Even the resistance to unwinding excess capacity and global rebalancing are all very predictable as nations retreat into nationalistic thinking when the chips are down. As far back as March 2008, I warned of a likely multi-cycle W-recession predicated on resistance to unwinding the status quo:

The global economy, now supported in the main only by the overextended U.S. consumer, finds itself at stall speed, susceptible to any number of potential exogenous shocks. Ultimately, the economic malaise created by this confluence of events will take years to unwind. A positive outcome to this process is dependent wholly on liquidation of excess credit and consumption.

This process will be extremely painful in the short term, but will lead to a healthy economy long-term. Unfortunately, experience shows that these painful steps will only be taken as a last resort. Moreover, geopolitical events become volatile in a world of economic insecurity, leading to political upheaval and protectionism. Protectionism is a natural outgrowth of nationalist economic policy as it transfers wealth from foreign producers to domestic producers by cutting off access to lower cost excess capacity in the goods in service sectors. However, this also serves to transfer wealth from domestic consumers to domestic producers by increasing the price of goods in the protected sectors, ultimately reducing consumption demand.

For these reasons, I am cautious about the long-term outlook for the global economy and the U.S. economy in particular. The likely outcome for the next decade is one of sub-par global growth with short business cycles punctuated by fits of recession.

Yes, trade and dumping are difficult issues. But, protectionism makes most everyone a loser. In June, I wondered should we expect a protectionist China. But I ended saying it was how the Obama administration responded to the green light given by the WTO to impose sanctions which would be most instructive. Obama has gone protectionist.

Chimerica marriage is ending in divorce

All need not be lost. Global re-balancing, where the American partner in this marriage does a little bit more of the saving and a little less of the spending and the Chinese partner does just the opposite, is what most economic counsellors suggest. This could save a strained relationship and put the partners on a sustainable path. This does seem to be happening.

Nevertheless, could this relationship between China and America be coming to an end?

I say emphatically yes. 100%. There is no going back now. Each partner in this marriage, China and the United States, has a bevy of domestic constituencies which are forcing a dissolution of the relationship. Hardliners in China want to move away from the dollar. And populists in America want to punish the Chinese for allegedly manipulating their currency and dumping goods below cost in America.

So, as surely as day turns to night, this arrangement between China and the United States will end.  This marriage is over. The question is whether it will end gradually and peacefully in divorce or violently in murder-suicide. Right now, it’s looking like the latter.