Collateral damage – more than Paul Jackson’s reputation at risk

Events during this financial crisis have repeatedly displayed a degree of disrespect for various pundits’ authority; every so often another pulpit is toppled. So spare a thought for the pundits, the most unmourned of crisis casualties. One skips through the roll of slight miscues (“Lehman repo looks solid”, April ’08), shame (“believe Fuld, Lehman bears are liars”, July ’08), survivable embarrassment (“this is the bottom in banks’ equity!” July ’08), and more shame (“Ireland is a great example of free markets in action, wait, no, a terrible example of government interference”, 2006-2010) in bemusement.  At least Tom Brown’s stock tip is a wee bit higher than it was when he tipped it.

Why do they set themselves up for a fall like that, I wonder? Volunteering to be part of the collateral damage seems to be compulsive. The latest to stick his neck out is the respected Housing Wire commentator, Paul Jackson.

Hang it, don’t spare a thought for him at all. He should know better than to combine a shoddy defense of document forgers with a drive by shooting of servicer critics.

The starting point of the piece is the celebrated DocX document fabrication price sheet, which, having debuted in the blogosphere in early October, made it onto TV the week before last, brandished in the mitt of Rep. Maxine Walters. This is why it matters (from the class action against LPS):

Docx is a wholly owned subsidiary of LPS. Docx is the largest lien release and assignment processing firm in the U.S., with more than 100 employees. Docx software is used by banks to track U.S. residential mortgages from the time they are originated until either the debt is satisfied or the borrower defaults. When the borrower defaults and the bank decides to foreclose, LPS assists the bank in preparing the paperwork that is filed with the court.

But the price sheet is old news, says Paul Jackson, very old news. So old, in fact, that it means nothing:

Here’s the real bombshell about the now-infamous DocX pricing sheet: It is very much real, but it was in use more than a decade ago, and last seen years before LPS actually acquired Docx in late 2005. No wonder my sources couldn’t remember seeing it. Who would recall a 10-year-old pricing sheet from a then-much-smaller company in an obscure corner of the mortgage services world?

It mattered then; and, if DocX got big, and was still doing the same things, then it does matter now, too, Mr Jackson. Just asking a rhetorical question isn’t enough to rebut that point. Try harder.

It’s not just the grandstanding Maxine Walters, and other “congressional leaders” who are in Jackson’s sights, but also state attorneys general, “consumer groups”, “Carol Asbury, the Florida-based foreclosure defense attorney that first posted the DocX pricing sheet on her blog”, “consumer websites, including the Naked Capitalism blog” (I bet Yves likes that characterization), and, last but by no means least those dreadful “foreclosure defense attorneys” with their shoestring budgets and not-rich clients. A platoon of tiny assailants picking on the poor old multibillion dollar servicing industry. So unfair to the servicers! Be still, my beating heart, fer chrissake.

In short, Jackson’s shooting at pretty much anyone who thinks LPS, the not-too-happy owner of DocX, is full of it; but Jackson’s stance, devoid of evidence as it is, amounts to nothing more than a smear:

But the same level of scrutiny now applied to servicers ought to apply to both sides of this very heated debate, including those making the accusations. That those so aggressively accusing mortgage servicers of lying and fraud may themselves also be guilty of the same is a troubling trend.

Whoa, where did that come from? How did the ten-year-old DocX price sheet mutate into evidence of lying and fraud by the accusers of mortgage servicers? Well, you can catch Jackson’s weaselling in full view here: “may themselves also be guilty of the same is a troubling trend”. That’s all he’s got. A little semantic shift turns a baseless, indeed counterfactual speculation into “a troubling trend”, in the space of half a sentence. On he limps, immediately and artlessly exposing his own modus operandi:

Because it begs important questions: What other fact patterns have been twisted around? Who can we really trust to tell the truth here?

Another semantic shift: now the “fact patterns” have definitely been “twisted around”. Two sentences of low grade rhetoric, and you have a case! If only it were that easy. My tip to Mr Jackson: don’t mistake rhetoric and conviction, nor your own obliviousness to recent court cases,  for evidence; your readers certainly won’t; and on the Internet, everyone can see what you’ve been up to, for ever.

But yes, the question is indeed begged. Let’s see if we can get an idea of who might be twisting what facts.

First, Jackson’s bombshell is a dud. The very age of the price sheet, centrepiece of his argument is, um, old news. LPS pointed that out in its October 6 conference call.. The helpful Skeptic99 makes Jackson’s point six weeks earlier than Jackson, in a comment to Yves’s first post in this subject. We should note that Skeptic99 comment is dated October the 18th, rather a long time after the post itself (5th October). That, of course, is not the typical NC commenter pattern: they put their stuff up within a day or two at the most of the initial post. Not that I’m certain, but if you are a dopey corporation getting a news management campaign together, it might indeed take a couple of weeks to realize what a disaster the initial news (and accompanying bear raid) represents, get lawyered up and sort a line out, hold an investor conference, plan the PR campaign, and trot through the hostile links you have assembled, making challenging comments, anonymously. But as we will see, if Skeptic99 is a sockpuppet aligned with LPS, his comments verge on counterproductive (again not implausible; one investor told Yves that LPS’ crisis response was the worst he had even seen).

Note the similarity between Jackson’s main claim and Skeptic99’s talking points, which are in turn pasted from a transcript of the LPS conference call:

So when we see information coming out of these blogs that are not fact based we’re not going to be able to respond to every nonfactual blog item that comes out. When you look at this particular blog that introduced this price sheet under DOCX, this is the price sheet that relates back to early 2000, we think 2001, 4 years before we owned the entity.

Now it appears that Jackson simply made his own investigation, well after the fact, came across the LPS conference call discussion, and took it at face value. Not insanely great beat journalism, that, but there’s nothing unethical about it. I am impugning Mr Jackson’s journalistic competence, not his ethics, for the moment. Tip to Mr Jackson: do try to keep up with the stories.

Second, the age of the price sheet is perfectly irrelevant. From the conference call transcript:

What the service was and again this is not underneath us, what the service was, was basically you are talking about a very manual environment and throughout the mortgage process documents are required not just in foreclosure. And so what we did, because it was a very manual process to get records from counties and because there were a lot of records needed in the various transactions that occur in servicing a mortgage, we established a network or DOCX established a network of what we call runners. Employees or contractors in each significant locale that if a customer had a loan that was missing information they could call us, we would call our runner in that area, take a run down to the courthouse, then find this piece of documentation related to this loan that this lender doesn’t have in their files.

So, under the spotlight of a falling stock and unfavorable press, note that there is no denial by LPS. Nowhere do they say that the price sheet listed services that the company ceased offering long ago. Yet that is precisely the conclusion Jackson tries to make us jump to, despite the absence of any evidence to support his assertion.

You’d expect a flat denial if the truth was on the company’s side. Instead, the conference call features an  unilluminating discussion of how its services were to contend with a heavily “manual” environment, and seeks to imply that what DocX did was always based on getting information from public records, and therefore valid and not at all suspect. There is not a hint of suggestion that the service offerings changed, irrespective of whether it’s 2000, when the price sheet was knocked up, or 2005, when LPS took over DocX, with the securitization bonanza in full swing, or April 2010, when they shut DocX down. Well, LPS say they shut it down, but then, so does the Florida AG; so someone’s lying about that, too. Whatever the year, it’s the same legal framework, the same paper-heavy process, the same need for the same document set priced up in 2000. DocX either had the 2000 pricing model and prices, or they changed the pricing model and the prices between then and now.

It makes no difference. DocX were getting paid for doing something, and LPS, even when under the interrogation lights, offers no reason to think it wasn’t the same sorts of things all along. Tip to Mr Jackson: when constructing your story, try to keep the big picture in mind, and monitor your assumptions for plausibility.

While I’m at it, I’d better answer Sceptic99’s concluding question:

There are few possibilities as I see it: 1)the CEO of LPS doesn’t understand his own business and is simply clueless, 2) he is lying about committing fraud and is therefore committing fraud again by misleading analysts and shareholders on a public call, or 3) DOCX was actually performing a legitimate and legal service and you have misinterpreted the terms on this pricing sheet.

I would appreciate your thoughts on this matter. Thanks.

Well, you can rule out 3), I should think. Eventually, we might get an adjudication on whether 1) or 2) applies, and how much of each. For what it’s worth, LPS’s shareholders’ lawyers may agree with me: a class action against LPS kicked off at pretty much the same time as this stuff went public (and I doubt if that’s a big coincidence). So those are my thoughts, Sceptic99; I hope you like them. Back to Jackson.

Third, there is evidence supporting the notion that DocX continued offering document fabrication services into more recent times. Nick Wooten, an Alabama lawyer who has been heavily involved in foreclosure defense, recognized the service codes on the DocX price list, as did other attorneys in his circle (Wooten is involved both in the group of foreclosure defense attorneys around Max Gardner, as well as in contact with colleagues in the Southeast). Per Nick:

We’ve been seeing these codes on the documents produced by the foreclosure mills in court for years, and wondered what they meant. The light bulb went off when I saw the DocX list. It’s their codes.

So the supposedly dated price list turns out to be very much current. The service codes were in use well after 2001; attorneys like Wooten are involved almost entirely with loans originated in the 2004-2007 time frame.

Similarly, a Florida attorney general’s investigation, was also on the trail of DocX abuses in 2010, again indicating that the questionable practices were of recent vintage. It might behoove Jackson to check his own archives, since this report comes from HousingWire in June of this year:

The Florida Attorney General’s office is investigating Fidelity National Financial (FNF: 13.88 +0.73%), its former subsidiary Lender Processing Services (LPS: 31.12 -0.03%) and LPS subsidiary Docx, alleging the companies used false documents to foreclose on Florida homeowners….

The civil investigation revolves around allegations that FNF and LPS may have engaged in creating and manufacturing “bogus assignments” of mortgage ownership in order to perform foreclosures quicker, the Florida AG’s office said on its website.

The documents in question appear to be forged, incorrectly and illegally executed, false and misleading, the AG’s office claims, adding the documents were used in court cases as “real” documents of assignment, used to expedite foreclosure proceedings in the state.

Tip to Jackson: get better sources; do background research.

Fourth, I said “document fabrication “, and I meant it. Says Jackson, rather pompously:

I wouldn’t claim to truly know what “recreate entire collateral file” ultimately means, for example, although consumer attorneys suggest it means forging documents from whole cloth. (I’ve of course been told otherwise by title industry experts.)

Aww Paul, those sources. If they don’t have a clue, and you don’t have a clue, and then they tell you something, you still won’t have a clue. That is how it works. Tip: cultivate a critical attitude to your sources: are their claims consistent with the other info that you have?

That’s assuming you have any other info, of course. Robosigning, for instance, is the sort of other evidence one might take into account. Or multiple attempts by different banks to foreclose on the same property. Or affidavits that the signer later repudiates in court. That type of thing. You might wish to consult (try the real estate tag), or, or, or, to get an idea of what’s been going wrong, squarely in the middle of Housing Wire’s patch, possibly for up to a decade.

The notion that “recreate entire collateral file” has some sort of innocuous explanation is bogus. Tom Adams, an attorney and mortgage industry lifer, explains the role it serves:

The collateral file is the collection of documents which represent the ownership interest in the mortgage loans.

The collateral file is intended to be the documents which give the trust rights of enforcement or potential rights of collection. It is distinguished from origination documents – such as the mortgage application and documents required in the origination process, such as appraisal, letters from employer, bank statements, tax returns, etc. It is also distinguished from the “servicing file” which includes documents that are created, electronically or otherwise, during the life of the loan, such as letters to the borrower or notes from collectors. All of these may be kept by the servicer.

The collateral file is defined in each PSA (often identified as the “mortgage file”). These documents are clearly required to be held by the trustee to announce and require that the trust holds the things which create the “collateral” for the trust.

Now why is the idea of recreating a collateral file suspect? The most important document in the collateral file is the note, the borrower IOU. This is a negotiable instrument, and it is exempt from laws permitting electronic signatures. In judicial states, the party foreclosing must present the note, and evidentiary rules require it to be an original, with so-called wet ink signatures. Recreating an entire collateral file thus inevitably entails recreating the note, which in turn means forging the borrower’s signature on a commitment usually worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. We don’t tolerate even minor forgeries of checks, another type of negotiable instrument, but Jackson would have us believe, based on the assurances of his apparently know-nothing title insurance industry source, that creating bogus negotiable instruments and forging signatures is completely acceptable behavior.

Another service on the DocX price sheet, and just as dubious, is “create note allonge”. This should be an impossibility, at least for a party concerned with observing the law. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, an allonge is to be so firmly attached to the note as to not be able to travel separately. It is used to allow parties to provide additional endorsements. Those endorsement again need to be wet ink signatures, by authorized parties. Thus the only legitimate allonge that DocX could create is a blank sheet of paper; the parts that have any legal meaning are a signature, name, and title of an authorized individual of the entity that owns the note. And since allonges are generally used (and abused) as a way of appearing to convey notes through specified parties, “create allonge” is almost certain to mean “create one with multiple signatures”: which means electronic forgeries. And this sort of document appears with impressive frequency in court cases, with pixellated signatures (that is, they are electronic, not actual signatures), and often visibly Photoshopped to fit the signature line.

This snapshot from a 2003 DocX archived webpage (hat tip Lisa Epstein of supports our interpretation (click to enlarge; DocX web pages became much less forthcoming over time):

Screen shot 2010-12-06 at 2.30.20 AM

Note the “preparation of note allonges in lieu of note endorsements”. That’s an admission of fabrication of signatures.

For my part, I think the consumer attorneys have it right. The rubric “recreate entire collateral file” most probably means “recreate entire collateral file”. Tip to Mr Jackson: if you’ve got a source who offers an alternative theory, make sure you understand what it is, and why he might be offering it, before you treat it as authoritative; and if (if) you actually think there’s something in it, you might consider disclosing that theory to your readers’ scrutiny, too.

Fifth, I should point out that not everything Jackson writes on this subject is utter garbage. Though he has no clue about how things got so screwed up, he is properly outraged about the back-office mess that spawned the riot of fraud that we now see. Yet, puzzlingly, he doesn’t join the dots: once you have a big paperwork mess, the only way to keep the slowly disintegrating show on the road is to forge documents. Denying this is futile, but he tries, anyway. Why?

Finally, there is a last piece of  Jacksonian windbaggery:

…in the dispute over foreclosures, as with nearly every other dispute in life, reality ultimately lies somewhere in between two extremes.

…and then a piece of his sky falls in. In an unfortunate piece of timing, for Mr Jackson anyway, some other dodgy document chains surfaced on Friday, along with a bunch of non-lawyers pretending to be lawyers. Check out the attorney signatures here (the second Scribd panel down), or the gloss from Yves. Even Jackson can tell this is a no-no; an agonized tweet from @pjackson may capture his response to this news:

I just read something tonight that has utterly blown my mind. If true, the corruption involved is beyond pale. All I’ll say for now.

Voila. Indeed, best to pause for thought, right there, Mr Jackson. Wouldn’t want to risk your reputation defending that one, too, would you? You’re in quite deep as it is; time to rummage around for that reverse gear, if you have one, on your pulpit.

In the end, Jackson’s piss-poor journalism, and his imperilled credibility as a pundit, do turn out to have a great big ethical implication. The people he is speaking up for, and the stand he is taking, are profoundly antisocial. Denying, and thus, tolerating, this fraud involves even more collateral damage than a blogger’s standing, more even than abused mortgage holders, clouded title and a stalled housing market. The ultimate destination would be capitalist society without contract law: impossible. Says Tom Adams:

To date, courts have consistently sided with servicers and trustees because of the power dynamics (big banks vs. borrowers in default).  With all of the recent news, I suspect many judges are reconsidering this, especially in light of the significant case law history which would be unsympathetic to the position of the servicers/trustees.  To consistently hold for the servicer/trustee with poorly documented or protected collateral rights would create a very problematic set of precedents for other types of notes and contracts.  This is why attorney generals and judges should be very considered about the current state of mortgage industry.  It is a disaster for the rest of the legal world and no judge wants a collection of precedents set in their state where they have to ignore the UCC, prior precedents and common sense, in order to find for the servicer/trustee.  It is truly a terrifying issue.

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  1. Another victim of a Housing Wire hatchet job

    If the past is any indication, after your rebuttal of the Housing Wire “news” article, it will be reclassified as an “opinion column”.

    Clearly, the change in classification is intended to relieve the reporter of the journalistic responsibilities you outlined above.

    I wonder what the owner/editor of Housing Wire thinks they gain from this reclassification. Do they think it makes their platform look like less of a shill for the banks?

    1. Billy Bob

      Quite a pickle we in the US are in. Shall we preserve the rule of law and destroy the world economy, or shall we preserve the world economy and destroy the rule of law? To me, the answer is the former – despite all of the political and legal difficulties accomplishing that will entail – but I have to admit, I feel some sympathy now for the officer in Vietnam who said that ‘we had to destroy the village in order to save it.’

      1. DownSouth

        Are you asserting that destroying the rule of law will preserve the world economy?

        That’s quite an assumption. On what evidence do you justify such a leap of faith?

        1. Billy Bob

          Yeah, I think kicking the can down the road with ex post facto laws legalizing fraud and more publicly-funded bailouts of powerful private interests can make things appear not too disastrous for a few more years – time enough for the politicians who enact them to retire and get their payback money. But, long term of course, it would be, among other things, the end of contract law and therefore of capitalism.

          That’s why, as I say, I would choose to preserve the rule of law. But we need to be clear that that course also will have disastrous consequences, and assumes we can get politicians and judges to resist some very powerful interests. As Senator Durbin said last year when there was still some hope of controlling these interests, “… the banks – hard to believe in a time when we’re facing a banking crisis that many of the banks created – are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place.”

          As I say, quite a pickle.

          1. DownSouth


            I think this cartoon pretty much captures the situation Durbin spoke of.

            (I certainly don’t march in lockstep with the ¿conservative? Catholic views of the Michael Journal, but it does publish some great cartoons. And I do find some areas of agreement with it. That’s more than I can say for the radical religious right in the U.S. and people like Pat Robertson and Ralph Reed.)

  2. Random Blowhard

    The rule of law is what separates Zimbabwe from Australia. If the rule of law is replaced by the rule of whim, the United States WILL BECOME a third world craphole very quickly.

    1. readerOfTeaLeaves

      Yes. Or, as Yves phrased it:

      The people he is speaking up for, and the stand he is taking, are profoundly antisocial. Denying, and thus, tolerating, this fraud involves even more collateral damage than a blogger’s standing, more even than abused mortgage holders, clouded title and a stalled housing market. The ultimate destination would be capitalist society without contract law: impossible.

      Disregarding the social relationships upon which contracts depend is anti-social. Here’s hoping the former pundit has an epiphany about that fact.

  3. weinerdog43

    Well, I’ll just add Paul Jackson as one of those news ‘sources’ that I’ll ignore going forward. Congratulations Mr. Jackson, you are now right up there with Faux News, the Washington Post and Times, and ABC ‘News’ as someone with zero journalist integrity.

  4. MinnItMan

    I would not ignore Mr. Jackson or the HousingWire, but rather take his views as usually representative of the industry (although, I would give him good marks for avoiding Yun-ist sloganeering – most of the time), and industry that has worked mightily to nationalize operations (“go big or go home”). I mean “nationalize” in more than one way, but primarily my use is descriptive of attempting to have the largest possible geogrphical footprint.

    Many of the stories there are lender/sell side PR releases. They are what they are, but not exactly “news” or reporting. Or, just look at the ads – almost every one promotes the “go big or go home” message somehow.

  5. Sammy White

    There must be more then just LPS up to these shenanigans – wouldn’t bigger debt collectors move some of this stuff in-house?

  6. psychohistorian

    Folks comment like we still have Rule of Law but, if so, how come there are no FIRE perps in jail.

    It is more looking like America is Zimbabwe on a “grander” scale…..a banana republic with most of the worlds’ nukes and the worlds Reserve Currency to rule them all.

    Thanks for speaking truth to power, Richard.

  7. f247

    Nice post. I thought the Jackson column was bad when I read it, but that’s a real dissection. Fwiw, I did read it as “opinion” initially; was it really classified as “news”?

    On the LPS PR campaign, I particularly appreciate how they removed references to DocX from the company presentation this fall. Nothing to see here…

  8. Paul Tioxon

    A Pittsburgh attorney charges in a lawsuit that the Philadelphia law firm Goldbeck McCafferty & McKeever used non-lawyers to file mortgage foreclosures across the state and therefore fraudulently collected attorney’s fees in those cases. The lawsuit comes as a bankruptcy court judge, also in Pittsburgh, gave the same firm until the end of business Friday to self-report to the Supreme Court Disciplinary Board. The judge asserted one of the firm’s lawyers knowingly gave the court backdated documents in a foreclosure case.


  9. ScottS

    So to answer the question raised by Jackson’s mind-blowing twitter:

    “Foreclosure defense has become a cottage industry unto itself during these past three years, and for good reason, too: the number of borrowers defaulting has mushroomed. The result has been some pretty contentious courtroom cases. Consumer attorneys tow the line that they’re protecting the public interest and the public’s right to due process — which in many cases I believe they are, as the robo-signing scandal has clearly demonstrated. But it is equally true that nobody was really willing to protect this interest until it actually became profitable for an attorney to do so.” (—-and-growing)

    So, no. He’s still shilling for the servicers. Or, “servicing” the servicers.

    1. ScottS

      Scratch that, wrong article.

      Jackson’s fired back at Yves in his Monday article:

      “In case you missed it buried in the legal-speak above, let me pull out the relevant terms to make it clearer: “Upon discovery or receipt of notice … that a document is missing from the mortgage file … the trustee shall promptly notify the seller, the NIMS insurer and the master servicer of such … missing document … and request that the seller deliver such missing document … within 90 days from the date seller was notified of such missing document.””

      The PSA he quotes goes on to say that the buyer can force the seller to repurchase the missing loan 90 days after the complaint, but doesn’t say what happens if the buyer doesn’t receive the note and DOESN’T complain to the seller.

      So is he trying to say that the trust double-doesn’t have the note? Is this a double-negative or something?

      Then he tows the ASF party line:

      “It’s also beyond my own sense of logic as to why failing to physically transfer the notes to the trustee or its custodian, but instead keeping said notes safeguarded by an agent of the trustee — if indeed that is what occurred, as per the testimony in the Kemp case and allegations made elsewhere — represents prima facie a wholesale failure to convey assets into a trust.”

      Because if they don’t transfer the note, they can sell it to someone else, idiot. If I sell some junk to someone on eBay and don’t ever ship it, that doesn’t mean I “intended” to sell it, so I can keep the money and the stuff, then try to sell the stuff to someone else. Out in the real world, we call that fraud. In the banking world, that’s called securitization.

      He goes on quoting some anonymous property lawyers:
      ““The other real issue here is one of trust law in New York. How is a property put into a trust? You will note that the declarations completely avoid any law on this issue. If the parties intended to put the asset in the trust and some defect did not result in the actual transfer, the court would typically allow for the defect to be cured and treat the asset as part of the trust.”

      What defect? You mean NOT TRANSFERRING THE ITEM BEING SOLD? How is that a “defect”? Again, eBay example above.

      Then goes on to say he was ripping on banks and servicers before it was cool:

      “Long-time readers know that I was among the first to call banks to the mat for their poor business practices in servicing, long before the current batch of commentators had begun to follow this same trail.”

      Okay, so what? We should listen to when you say that everything is fine now?

      “That said, I think that in some instances commentators are pushing their anti-bank campaigns too far out of bounds. While nobody should look to excuse the banks for their egregious conduct (robo-signing comes immediately to mind), my stance is and always has been that muddying the waters and confusing the issues at hand only makes it that much harder to ultimately do the right thing for aggrieved parties.”

      Jesus, we have to fight for every inch of ground. But at least we know it’s working!

      I assume “aggrieved parties” doesn’t count people who have been wrongly foreclosed on.

      “Rather than coming up with new and novel ways to prolong the misery, isn’t it time we started working on solutions to this mess instead?”

      The prolonged misery keeps needy people in houses, prevents property prices from hitting rock bottom, keeps houses maintained and safe, prevents squatting, pays property taxes (instead of banks sitting on REOs), and keeps property law alive. Who exactly is miserable?

      And if you want a solution, here’s mine: banks buy back every single note that didn’t get transferred to the trusts, pay counties the fees they stiffed them by using MERS to get around transferring notes properly, and no bailouts this time. If you are in trouble, time to cash out.

      What? Don’t want to buy back notes you sold to multiple trusts? Too bad.

        1. ScottS

          Haha, that’s one way to do it!

          Judge Starnes is Facebook friends with — I wonder if he’s hinting that defendants should start looking for a place to rent.

          “There are a number of reasons someone may
          be needing short-term housing including
          separation, divorce, relocation, travel,
          foreclosure, building a new house or selling
          your home before your new residence can
          be occupied. Be wise, save money and
          make a short-term decision, not a long-term

  10. JohnanB

    It seems curious to me that there is so little focus on companies that are still providing the services that were offered by the much maligned DocX. Richmond Monroe Group still provides collateral file creation services, among others. It would seem that by keeping the focus on what has happened in the past we obscure the view of what is going on in the present.

  11. VanessaR

    This isn’t the first time Paul Jackson has used HousingWire to come to the defense of LPS in an editorial, nor I suspect will it be the last. He is their hero and their shill. In return, they pay him back big-time! Just look at the amount of advertising that LPS pays for in HousingWire publications and conferences! Journalistic integrity? HousingWire is just another trade rag pandering to the worst elements of the industry. Although Mr. Jackson, of course, attempts to present himself as the most honest of all. Right. Look at the ownership of the organization – a former sub-prime lender, a foreclosure attorney and God knows who else. What do you expect from that group?

  12. f247

    If I remember correctly, Jackson’s father is also an REO broker. (I think he was on a panel at a servicing conference last year.) I think this adds some context to Jackson’s defense of LPS and foreclosure industry standards. Wouldn’t it be great if that big backlog eventually rolled through?

Comments are closed.