Armenia Freezes Participation in Collective Security Treaty Organization, Further Poisoning Ties With Russia

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has told the national assembly that Armenia is “freezing” its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan announced in the National Assembly that CSTO is a threat to the national security of the Republic of Armenia.

He noted that Armenia has de facto frozen contact with the CSTO, and if this process continues, it will also be officially… pic.twitter.com/RWnZJOz6nE

— 301🇦🇲 (@301arm) February 28, 2024

He first delivered the news to media in his main new benefactor country, telling France 24  on Feb. 22. “As for what comes next, we shall have to see,” he said. Indeed.

Pashinyan added that as of now there’s no discussion to close Russia’s base in Gyumri in northwestern Armenia as that is subject to another treaty. But a permanent exit from the CSTO would appear imminent considering the anti-Russian course Armenia has been on for months now.

Why Is Armenia “Freezing” Participation in the CSTO?

Pashinyan and Armenian nationalists continue to scapegoat Russia for the country’s recent defeats.

“The Collective Security Treaty has not fulfilled its objectives as far as Armenia is concerned, particularly in 2021 and 2022. And we could not let that happen without taking notice,” Pashinyan said.

At the risk of oversimplification, following the USSR collapse, Azerbaijan joined the Armenian nationalists’ enemy list and were equated with Turks as the two new countries fought over their border and Nagorno-Karabakh. Although Armenia won control of the territory, it came at a high cost. Yerevan had no other choice but to fully embrace Russia as security guarantor. The Armenian democratic movement did not view Moscow as a friend, but it needed protectorate status in order to ensure victory.

So Armenia emerged from the conflict with the Nagorno-Karabakh exclave (internationally recognized as Azerbaijan territory), mostly surrounded by enemies, and reliant on Russia for protection (it’s also reliant on Russia economically).

In the 2020 war in which Armenia was outmatched by Azerbaijan, the peace was brokered by Russia, and Moscow had since been attempting to work with both sides to implement parts of that agreement and resolve the Nagorno Karabakh issue. When Pashinyan complains about the CSTO not fulfilling its objectives for Armenia he is referring to article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty, which establishes that an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. In Pashinyan’s view Moscow should have fully backed Armenia even if that meant going to war with Azerbaijan. Instead Moscow worked to restrain Azerbaijan, which possessed the military advantage, and sent 2,000 peacekeepers.  Russia enjoys close ties with Azerbaijan and would prefer instead a lasting Russia-brokered peace that preserves Moscow’s dominant role in the region.

There was also little need for Russia to intervene forcefully on behalf of Armenia. It was previously conventional wisdom that the Armenian fear of being overrun by its neighbors Azerbaijan and Türkiye cemented Yerevan’s reliance on Moscow for protection and meant it couldn’t turn West, but that was upended last year when PM Pashinyan began to undertake the gambit while still at odds with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

It should also be noted that Armenia’s “loss” of Nagorno Karabakh was entirely self-inflicted. And it came under the guidance of the West.

Against the backdrop of the Ukrainian war and the new Cold War, mediating countries began to compete for the status of the main moderator of the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations. Yerevan began to favor the West, and talks mostly moved to Western platforms. It was during those meetings that Armenia agreed to officially recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.

Once Armenia did so (and PM Pashinyan declared so publicly), the die was cast. The region was (and is) recognized as Azerbaijani territory by the international community but was overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Armenians. Roughly 100,000 of them fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan blockaded the region for months and then moved militarily to assert control in September – an operation that resulted in hundreds of deaths.

Despite moving the negotiation process under the guidance of the West and publicly recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, the Pashinyan government has sought to lay all the blame for its loss at the feet of Russia. And Pashinyan now largely refuses to participate in summits with Russia.

While all of this has been happening, there has also been a step-by-stp poisoning of ties with Russia from Armenia’s side, including the following:

• Not allowing the head of the Russian Society for Friendship and Cooperation with Armenia into the country.
• A visit by Pashinyan’s wife to Kiev along with a shipment of humanitarian aid, the first sent by Armenia to Ukraine since the outbreak of the war.
• In October, Armenia joined the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The ICC, which much of the world views as no more than a political tool of the West, has an outstanding arrest warrant for Putin for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. That now means that if Putin were to visit Armenia he should face arrest there. Moscow called the ratification by Yerevan a “hostile act.” It’s certainly interesting timing on Armenia’s part considering the statute came into effect all the way back in 2002.
• Armenia hosted military exercises with the US late last year.
• There have been media reports that Armenia will supply weaponry to Ukraine, although those haven’t been reliably confirmed.

Pashinyan’s announcement on the freezing of CSTO participation came after he met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the head of MI6, Richard Moore, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Pashinyan’s office released only a brief notice of the gathering without mentioning anything that was discussed, so we can only guess.

Germany is also reportedly dangling a bunch of money to entice Yerevan to take anti-Russia steps, such as purging the government and armed forces of anyone harboring friendly views towards Moscow.

Faced with Armenia’s situation of conflict with neighbors and reliance on Russia, it seems it had roughly three options:

1. Continue the Russia-led peace process and work to carve out some mutually beneficial arrangement with its neighbors.
2. Do “a” but use a flirtation with the West to apply some pressure on Russia and maybe get some better terms in agreement. Instead Armenia opted for…
3. Torpedo relations with Russia (and we’ll have to see what happens with Iran) while turning fully to the West. And do this despite the current relative decline of the West in terms of power – at a time when even POLITICO now recognizes that the West destroyed Yugoslavia and now Ukraine has been chewed up and is in the process of being abandoned. There are many differences between Ukraine and Armenia, but the similarities in the anti-Russia path are starting to add up. We’ve seen this show before, and what’s unfolding in Armenia is like watching a slow-motion car crash.

From the West’s perspective it makes sense: use Armenia to apply pressure on Türkiye, Russia, Azerbaijan, or just foment chaos in the region. But that strategy implies the willingness to risk devastation for Armenia. The question is, what is in it for Armenia? Or what’s in it for the Armenian officials like Pashinyan who saw the West’s sinking ship, and decided to climb on board?

What Comes Next?

Neocon think tanks in Washington like the RAND Corporation and Middle East Media Research Institute have long advocated for stirring up trouble in the South Caucasus as another way to weaken Russia and Iran and potentially cause a rift between the two.

So far, the opposite is happening. It is bringing all the other regional players closer together and further isolating Armenia.

The spook-run Middle East Media Research Institute gloats that Russia doesn’t uphold its end of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is made up of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Presumably Washington will now tell other former Soviet states that Russia cannot be trusted.

The West is also attempting to play games in Azerbaijan in an effort to create headaches for Russia, but Baku appears less willing to play along. For example, when the new US ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mark Libby, was hastily dispatched to the country in December, one of his first actions was to visit the Alley of Martyrs dedicated to those killed by the Soviet Army during Black January 1990. Azerbaijanis weren’t falling for it.

Back to Armenia. By openly embracing the West (and potentially inviting Western forces into Armenia), Yerevan is also straining ties with its other regional backer: Iran whose President Ebrahim Raisi told Armenia’s Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan on Feb. 15 that the intervention of “outsiders” in regional disputes would only exacerbate issues. It was a clear reference to the US and the EU. From the Armenian Mirror-Spectator:

Armenian opposition groups say Tehran’s stance is another reason why Yerevan should exercise caution in its dealings with the West. They argue that unlike the West, Iran could intervene militarily to prevent Azerbaijan from opening an extraterritorial corridor to its Nakhichevan exclave through Syunik, the only Armenian region bordering the Islamic Republic.

Armenia is now in a precarious position, having said no thanks to its security guarantor while Azerbaijan and Türkiye are eager to take more Armenian land to open a corridor connecting the two countries.

Aside from Armenia insisting on EU involvement, the main roadblock to any deal between Baku and Yerevan remains the Zangezur Corridor – a transportation connection between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave wedged between Armenia, Turkiye, and Iran.

On January 10, Aliyev stated that, if this corridor remains closed, Azerbaijan refuses to open its border with Armenia anywhere else. Armenia says the border issues must be resolved as part of any peace deal.

The nine-point ceasefire agreement signed under Russian mediation that ended the 2020 war included a  stipulation that Armenia is responsible for ensuring the security of transport links between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, facilitating the unhindered movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions. Azerbaijan and Turkiye have latched onto that point, insisting they have the right to set up transportation links through southern Armenia.

Baku wants travel of people and cargo between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan to be free of inspection and customs and expects Yerevan to agree to the deployment of Russian border guards along the corridor.

Moscow agrees with the deployment of its border guards, even if it doesn’t see eye to eye on the customs issue (it wants the Russians to conduct the security checks).

As the Caucasus sit at the key crossroads of East-West and North-South transportation routes, any alteration to its ecosystem would have far-reaching consequences. Armenia is likely banking on that fact in order to secure outside help. Will it be enough?

France and India are currently the two biggest backers of Armenia, which is spending a boatload in the process. Armenia has almost doubled its defense spending since 2022  when it was roughly $750 million. It is now around $1.5 billion.

France, which is the home to the largest Armenian diaspora community in Europe, is sending 50 Arquus Bastion armored personnel carriers, Thales-made GM 200 radars, and Mistral 3 air defense systems. There are also discussions to send CAESAR self-propelled howitzers, as well as 50 VAB MK3 armored vehicles manufactured by Renault Trucks Defense.

“Yerevan is looking to those partners who truly provide security,” French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu said on a recent trip to Armenia. Just how much security France can provide is an open question. After all, AFP just reported the country (and all of Europe) is facing a gunpowder shortage, as well as a range of other problems.

India, which doesn’t want to see Türkiye-Azerbaijan control of trade routes in the Caucasus due to their close ties with Pakistan, is also upping its support for Armenia, supplying PINAKA multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank munitions, anti-drone systems, and other ammunition to Armenia. It was India’s first export of PINAKA and announced New Delhi’s stance on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Meanwhile, Armenia continues to bring its armed forces up to NATO standards and increase interoperability. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently outlined Russia’s concern. From TASS:

“I hope, Yerevan is aware that any deepening of cooperation with the alliance may result in its losing sovereignty in the sphere of national defense and security,” Russia’s top diplomat said…

“This cannot but cause our concern. We have repeatedly drawn the attention of our Armenian colleagues to the fact that NATO’s true goal is to strengthen its positions in the region and create conditions for manipulation based on the ‘divide and conquer’ scheme,” Lavrov concluded.

Being stuck in the middle can be lucrative in the new not-so-Cold War if one plays their cards right. Türkiye is one example where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan thrives at extracting concessions from both sides, but it can also be risky (see: 2016 Turkish coup attempt).

There is little evidence that Pashinyan is as skilled a player, and if NATO attempts to use Armenia to destabilize Azerbaijan and/or Turkiye like it exploited Ukraine against Russia, the results could be devastating for Armenia. And it’s highly unlikely NATO would be riding to the rescue.