Poison pill noun
a financial tactic or provision used by a company to make an unwanted takeover prohibitively expensive or less desirable-Merriam Webster
Yours truly must confess to having overlooked a critical component of Putin’s proposed peace terms, which he articulated on June 14, and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov just reiterated in an exclusive interview to Newsweek, which was his position on sanctions. Admittedly, Putin included it almost as an afterthought.
First, let’s look at Lavrov’s recap, since it’s more compact than Putin’s formulation (which Putin set forth in two places in his speech, so it was not a tidy, self-contained list). From Newsweek:
On 14 June, President Vladimir Putin listed prerequisites for the settlement as follows: complete AFU withdrawal from the DPR [Donetsk People’s Republic], LPR [Luhansk People’s Republic], Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts; recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution; neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification; securing the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens; and removal of all sanctions against Russia.
Aside from Putin setting forth all these issues, including recognition of the four oblasts plus Crimea as being part of Russia, in his June 14 speech, important media outlets also stated the key points (see for instance the Anadolu Agency writeup).
We will skip over the fact that Putin warned, not long after the Istanbul talks collapses, that the longer the war went on, the harder it would become to negotiate with Russia. By implication, just by virtue of Putin’s last offer being made in June and it now being October, with Russia having made considerable breakthroughs on the ground, that Russia would insist on even tougher terms now. That is confirmed by Russia’s position that it would not negotiate with Ukraine at all as long as it has forces in Russia. And many commentators have said opinion in Russia hardened even more against Ukraine after the Kursk invasion, and more citizens wanting Russia to fully subdue Ukraine and dictate terms that before.
Currently, Western commentators are focusing on what is sure to continue to an area of no bargaining overlap: that of Ukraine neutrality and foreswearing membership in NATO. That was tentatively agreed in Istanbul in March-April 2022 because the US and NATO were allowing Ukraine the appearance of autonomy. That is no longer very much the case. NATO and other Western officials now regularly yammer that Russia has no business deciding whether any country joins NATO. Of course, a Ukraine under different management (including most Banderites dead or run out of the country) could but the US and NATO would not give any security guarantees. Some Western pundits and officials are engaging in new versions of cope, such as advocating Ukraine cede the Russian-occupied land (temporarily!) for NATO membership. Amusingly, Zelensky and the Azov types are incandescent.
The part of Putin’s proposal that I saw as particularly cheeky but got comparatively little attention in the Western press was the condition that Ukraine withdraw from all of the four contested oblasts, which goes beyond what Russia occupies and that that be recognized as Russian territory. For those who have not been paying careful attention, the Banderites have threatened Zelensky if he gives up any part of Ukraine.
From the Kremlin translation of the Meeting with Foreign Ministry senior officials:
Certainly, the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine must be fully protected. The new territorial realities, including the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, Kherson, and Zaporozhye regions as parts of the Russian Federation, should be acknowledged. These foundational principles need to be formalised through fundamental international agreements in the future. Naturally, this entails the removal of all Western sanctions against Russia as well.
You will see that Putin goes from agreement terms that can be granted by Ukraine alone, to ones to be granted by other countries, admittedly down the road. Even if a future Ukraine agrees to recognize the four oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia, it seems well-nigh impossible that the US and EU would ever concede that. However, most BRICS members probably would, so that would confer considerable legitimacy
It’s thus odd to see Putin, who obviously know what he is doing, toss in the idea of reversing all Collective West sanctions almost as an afterthought. These were formally imposed on a state by state basis. The US, UK, EU, Australia, Japan and South Korea all implemented sanctions packages. That included the seizure of Russian central bank assets by the EU, US, and UK, with the EU holding the bulk of the frozen lucre.
Let’s engage in some thought experiments. The EU has been desperately trying to “Trump-proof” various Ukraine arrangements. If Trump were to become President and be willing to meet Russia way more than halfway and give some sanctions relief, you can be sure that the EU would do everything in its power to undermine Trump, particularly where it has more degrees of freedom, as with the sanctions. Remember also that Ursula von der Leyen is about as hysterically anti-Russian as the Baltic states, and has filled the top ranks of the Commission with female uber-hawks. EU experts please pipe up. I assume modifying or ending the sanctions would require a unanimous EU vote, and not just a qualified majority, which amounts to na ga happen.
Mind you, I expect this implacable rejection to continue even when it became more self-destructive than now. What if things get so ugly in the Middle East that oil goes over $120 a barrel and stays there? Yes, China will be hurt, but so too would be the recessionary EU. But it seems vanishingly unlikely that they’d roll back the Russian oil sanctions, or that Germany would accept gas from the still-working one of four original Nordstream 2 pipelines.
Given all that, one has to think that Putin clearly understood that his Western potential interlocutors would reject not just some but all of his deal points with prejudice. So why make an offer that the other side is set to reject? First, Putin (as we and others have stressed) finds it important to make clear to his Global South economic partners that he’s not being the difficult party, that Russia is not the impediment to ending the war. Most of these countries are still viscerally uncomfortable with Russia invading and occupying a neighbor even if they understand why intellectually.
To put it another way, setting out terms, even if they are objectively reasonable, or at least a not-crazy opening position for talks, that the other side looks set to reject, looks like an exercise in papering the record, rather than negotiating. Lavrov underscored the idea with Newsweek: “At present, as far as we can see, restoring peace is not part of our adversary’s plan.”
So one can argue that Putin had concluded before June 14 that the only way to resolve the conflict was through a battlefield victory. His provisions were a way to make that official without saying so.
But second, this may have been Putin doing his own early Trump-proofing. Remember, he made this speech before the Biden-second-term-killing debate with Trump. Trump then looked to have good odds against Biden due among other things lack of enthusiasm for Biden dampening Democratic party fundraising. And Trump has told anyone who would listen that he can secure a peace in Ukraine in 24 hours.
So was this outline of terms a bit of Russian Trump-proofing? Recall how Putin over time found dealing with Macron’s various peace schemes to be tiresome. So he might want to short-circuit similarly pointless talks with Trump by pointing to his position and playing broken record.
It might be that at this stage, the Russians are expecting a Trump victory next month though they say the the US will still pursue the same policies, no matter which party is in office. They don’t call it the uniparty for nothing. But by putting these statements out there, they can be sure that Trump’s teams is reading them. Trump himself has the idea that if he becomes President, that he will phone Putin and demand a cease fire or else he will sanction Russia but that boat sailed a very long time go. So these public statements are really educating the Trump team what is possible and what is not.
Figaro Interview with Putin 2017
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54638
* * *
I have already spoken to three US Presidents. They come and go, but politics stay the same at all times. Do you know why? Because of the powerful bureaucracy. When a person is elected, they may have some ideas. Then people with briefcases arrive, well dressed, wearing dark suits, just like mine, except for the red tie, since they wear black or dark blue ones. These people start explaining how things are done. And instantly, everything changes. This is what happens with every administration.
I really do not think the the Russians expect much change in US policy, especially as we have seen how successful Obama was in closing the Guantanamo prison/torture site or Trump was in withdrawing troops from Syria. Given what is looking like an increasing mental decline. I don’t see Trump being able to assemble a decent foreign affairs team to do so but I am not from the USA.
It seems possible that some EU countries may be willing to break ranks with EU policy and drop sanctions. Any number of the citizenry in EU countries might be happy with the idea even if governments are not. Did not Austria just elect a new Government and the Scholz Government in Germany looks likely to implode any moment now.
I love the ties bit.
We need bow ties.
Bow ties are cool.
IF you hear/read Putin’s throw-away remarks you realize that he has a very amusing dry wit. I have nearly been in hysterics over some of his remarks.
BTW, after I wrote my note I started to wonder if the sanctions remark was aimed at a lot of other countries and individuals whom the USA sanctions? They probably resent US sanctions fiercely and would applaud any country who got US or US inspired sanctions lifted.
The Austrians are going to be ruled by a coalition of losers (SucDems, responsible Cons plus a smaller, green or pink neoliberal helper). Which guarantees FPÖ winning next time.
Because the pain has not yet become unbearable for the wealthier bourgeoisie of West Germany, and because the currently ruling coalition is hileriously unpopular, the fanatically atlanticist wing of the CDU will dominate and rule after 2025. The party will suffer after that, but it remains to be seen who is going to benefit from this – the libertarian, light-fash but also sovereignist AfD or the orthodox SocDem (national-bolshevik by today’s skewed standards) BSW. Presidential election in France, likely a key win for Le Pen, are still some time away.
Tl;dr: It’s going to get a lot worse for the Europeans. The end of the old order is already in sight, but the next years are going to be grim and some damage to the continent’s societal fabric likely permanent.
“fanatically atlanticist wing of the CDU will dominate and rule after 2025”
While I might agree they will not fall out of power, I see nothing which indicates anything but an increasingly weakened position. Or, if the German PMC overreaches and goes hardcore on fascist behavior, a complete loss of control.
Maybe you’re buying into the official narratives?
⁹The CDU will be in a far, far stronger position after 2025 than the SPD is right now. And while Scholz is a pale, uninspired (and also crooked) leader he is in many ways an off-brand Merkel 2.0 and not really behind the disastrous war effort. I loathe him, it physically pains me to defend him, but this weakling is actually the adult in the room who is fighting against the green and yellow zealots.
In 2025, that configuration will come to an end. The CDU will be in charge and its nomenklatura is significantly more deranged. Yes their victory will be a hollow one, because their own policies’ repercussions will cause popular support to decline pretty fast and because Merz will have to deal with Eastern and Bavarian detractors who are not even remotely as russophobic as they currently still claim to be. But for a time window of acouple of years, supported by van der Loonies enforcers, he will be able to inflict a tremendous amount of damage.
The only cause for optimism is that a green-black government looks unlikely (maybe not even possible) so we will finally ged rid of the worst post-Ribbentrop foreign minister.
Do not underestimate how comitted the west-german PMC is to their liberal-democratic Jihad against the Russian infidels.
It doesn’t matter who’s elected…The US and EU can’t be trusted for one minute, as evidenced by Minsk 1 and 2, so Putin is making it clear that there will be no agreement without a showing of good faith, and probably a return of all Russian funds stolen by Western governments…That won’t happen, so it will be Ukraine’s unconditional surrender that ends this mess…
I’ve been surprised at how little discussion there has been in BRICS circles about any potential development of a materially significant anti-sanctions or counter-sanctions programs. Something to the effect of embargoing sales to (or other sanctions) countries sanctioning BRICS members. Arguably, the embargo / export tariffs, etc, could be made most severe for countries sanctioning the most members.
Though this doesn’t seem directly related to Russia’s latest mention of sanctions, perhaps Russia does plan to elevate sanctions as a topic.
One of the guiding principles of BRICS is no sanctions on anyone. Counter-sanctions are sanctions.
I’d never heard this explicitly stated, though it would explain why I never hear discussions along these lines.
Just in the news: China employs sanctions on Russia:
Russia’s Special Presidential Representative for SCO [The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation] Affairs Bakhtiyor Khakimov revealed last week that “It’s no secret, but we, for example, and I mean the Russian side, are facing serious difficulties in transferring our share contribution to the general budget of the SCO, because the bank is located in China, and, according to the basic documents, the share contribution is made only in US dollars.”
Andrew Korybko comments: China’s voluntary compliance with US sanctions therefore prevents Russia from paying its SCO dues.
https://korybko.substack.com/p/chinas-voluntary-compliance-with
Small point but Lavrov also mentioned in the Newsweek interview that any peace treaty would still need to include “neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification”.
These were also some of the main justifications for the SMO and have not changed.
Russia’s demands seem reasonable even as facts on the ground ratchet the advantage further in her favor.
“Neutral” and “non-bloc” are code for no NATO, which is the big concern.
True but could this also indicate willingness to exclude Ukraine from the CTO, the Shanghai Cooperation, Organization and BRICS? I cannot see any of those organizations wanting Ukraine at the moment but it would be a token concession from Moscow.
Interesting point. Here Putin may have been giving a dog-whistle to China, which is big on (legitimately) haranguing the US on “bloc confrontation”.
Also, and this is an artifact of insufficiently pointed drafting, I intended to convey where Putin was setting the bar too high for the West, even if his position is actually reasonable. As samaT below and others have pointed out, he does not want to waste time or worst get caught in non-starter negotiations.
I did not focus on de-militarization or denazification because:
1. The Istanbul draft agreement had a schedule on arms limits. The bid-asked spread was very large but they were talking about it.
2. The way things have evolved, there will be no negotiation until the neo-Nazis have fled or are dead. They have made clear no way no how will they talk with Russia. So if talks ever do happen, it would be the result of de-nazification already having substantially taken place.
that is an interestin wrinkle.
who, aside from russia, is gonna “guarantee” the “security” of the rump ukraine/404?
like you say, if “no blocs” means just that, the poor lil ol ukronazi rump will be all alone in the world.
i suppose blackrock, et alia have something like the hanseatic league, but with more corpse feudalism, in mind.
not sure russias gonna go for that, either.
crazy times…and i dont know the answers.
i just wish the usa would finally lose…and be seen to lose…so we might finally be rid of these neocon creatures and their neolib enablers.
the crises of legitimacy arent deep and stinky enough yet, it seems.
“the US and NATO would not give any security guarantees”
Indeed. I thought that by this time, almost three years into the war, would be evident for everyone with more than 2 neurons that the only security guarantees that Ukraine needs are from Russia. And it really looks like Russian guarantees would work two ways: to not attack Ukraine and to defend Ukraine in case of a third party attack.
“I just wish the usa would finally lose…and be seen to lose…so we might finally be rid of these neocon creatures and their neolib enablers.”
Well said!
Bugs and Yves Smith:
Yves Smith brings up the question of unanimity about sanctions and what kind of vote must take place. That sent me into a romp in the structure of the European Union. It is worse than I thought. The Council of the EU, which is the representatives of the twenty-seven members, cannot initiate legislation. The Commission, which is where all the power lies, can.
The European Parliament can only request legislation to be submitted to it by — the Commission. Supposedly, this is because the Commission is the guardian of European Law.
According to Wikipedia, “The Commission differs from the other institutions in that it alone has legislative initiative in the EU. Only the commission can make formal proposals for legislation: they cannot originate in the legislative branches.”
Oh. Why am I getting a whiff of Albania under Enver Hoxha?
This means that sanctions cannot be eliminated because Ursula van der Leyen “filled the top ranks of the Commission with female uber-hawks,” leaving sanctions untouchable indefinitely.
This is not healthy. Bugs, does what I have written square with your knowledge of the EU works?
That written, I note in Bugs’s quote above one important missing membership: The European Union.
Reading the conditions given by Putin and elucidated by Lavrov, I’d say that they are about as good a deal as the Ukraine Project can get. (Unless, of course, the neolibs and neocons are willing to sacrifice their own kids — highly unlikely.)
Crimea is not negotiable. Donetsk and Lugansk aren’t returning to Ukraine any time soon.
At this point, the Russians would be only too happy to offload the economic disaster and swamp of corruption that is Ukraine on the EU. Ursula van der Leyen and her lady warmongers will draw Ukraine to their collective bosoms, glad to know that a source of cheap labor, surrogate mothers, buff rightwing looneys, and hours of looting can come into the EU (and cause further deterioration).
Ursula, not the sharpest knife in the drawer, may then lift the sanctions. Why not? She has saved a whole nation by wearing blue-and-yellow pantsuits!
This is super helpful! Thanks a ton!
Very 19th century European monarchies, it seems: I think, at least in the beginning, new legislation could only be initiated by the king/emperor/whoever (or, his appointees–the prime minister and the cabinet) with the Parliament only having the right to debate over it and vote up or down….
Poynings’ Law – the only bills the parliament in Dublin could pass were those certified by the King and Privy Council in England. 1494.
IIRC though the sanctions have to be renewed every 6 months, so presumably if they are not, then they are lifted by default?
This is the issue with the use of the revenue from frozen Russian assets to funnel aid to Ukraine:: the sanctions would have to be in place for much longer.
Otherwise you are spot on about the Commission initiating legislating, though there are ways around that.
A good point, but if it is the European Parliament that does the renewing, they will always be renewed. They are ferociously anti-Russia.
A good point, and it is the Council that does the renewing. But look at how the Commission has been punishing Hungary (withholding EU funds) and even threatening to strip it of its vote for stepping out of line.
Hard for me to imagine allowing Ursula to get her hands on Odessa. Or even transnistria. And/or the Kharkov oblast. Plus the dnieper river is a decent barrier in the north half of Ukraine. Putin’s terms will likely stop talk of negotiations for at least a while even if trump wins, and seems the situation on the ground might be different by feb 22. Anyway, I’ve long thought the remaining 4 russ-speaking oblasts will have an opportunity to vote on referendums before this is over.
The EU legislative process does leave a lot to be desired. However, it isn’t relevant here as foreign policy is a Council matter (and only the states are on the Council).
And I think Yves is right that the foreign policy decisions need uninamity in the Council. However commenter Irrational is also right that the Council has been renewing sanctions for 6 months or a year at the time. These sanctions will lapse if not renewed, so any country opposed to sanctions could end them.
Correction after reading Ignacio down thread: This could very well be one of those 72% majority things. So a minority could block, not a single country.
The crux is whether all sanctions are needs renewing. That I don’t know.
I can see Ukraine, the deindustrialized, depopulated, resource-free, rump with vast debts, being welcomed readily into the EU. With one fell swoop, those irritating Ukrainian immigrants driving populist backlash across the EU will become citizens. Problem solved!
“denazification” always seemed to me to be an unachievable objective. Are we going to have Nuremburg II trials and hang the guilty? Can the world get rid of ISIS, Hamas?
One big outcome of the last few years of turmoil is that Russia has reassumed the status of a Great Power, and is beginning to act like one.
Set the terms of agreement high and later, if necessary, climb down a bit and look like you are making big concessions out of the goodness of your heart.
One thing to remember here is that Russia is self-supporting on the oil and gas front. World crude oil prices spiking due to Middle East ‘troubles’ is to Russia’s benefit.
And which civilization will best adjust to an oil spike? Russia, China, or the US.? Get that bike! (Actually, there will be no stores to ride it to in the US.)
Also USA domestic crude producers would benefit while crying crocodile tears about higher consumer prices.
It seems obvious that many of the USA elite would be quite pleased with higher prices caused by USA military actions.
Higher oil and gas prices hit Europe incredibly hard given how weak its economy already is and its lack of much domestic oil and gas production (Norway would be happy!). Outside the oil and gas corporations, the US economy is extremely dependent upon oil and higher prices just add to the cost of living crisis to crash demand in the economy.
China has extensive electrified mass transit (trains, trams, subways, buses, EV taxis), and a spike in oil prices would also supercharge the rush to EVs by Chinese car buyers – making things even worse for the Japanese and German car manufacturers. Also, many families have an ICE vehicle and an EV, so can simply use the latter more. China is much more electricity based than most societies, with the result that domestically produced coal (32.73 exajoules in 2023), natural gas (domestic and on long term contracts with Russia etc. – 14.57), hydro (11.46), new renewables (16.13) and nuclear (3.9) combined (78.79) dwarf oil (32.73). With the spike in EV sales in 2024, and the massive increases in new renewable installations the non-oil share of energy usage will only have declined in relative term further. China also still has much productivity gains available as it moves up the value add and technology curves.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/265612/primary-energy-consumption-in-china-by-fuel-type-in-oil-equivalent/
So good for Russia, not so bad for China, really bad for Europe, Japan, and the US.
Larry Wilkerson pointed out today that the US is the world’s biggest exporter of petroleum products, and by a surprising margin. So some parts of the US would come out as major winners.
Avoiding the negotiation trap, as Medvedev would put it.
I suspect that Russia has concluded that the time for face saving endings is past and that future peace requires that the US efforts against Russia be objectively defeated. As it stands, publicly at least, the illusion apparently persists that the US can impose terms. If the US is exhausted and NATO dissolves, it may be possible at some future date for Europe to establish friendlier relations including some restoration of energy imports following war crimes tribunals and denazification.
“…the illusion apparently persists that the US can impose terms….”
yeah. even out here in trump country, and tedfrellingcruz country, too,lol….i dont even talk about all this in public.
because we’re #1!, and all.
what a giant harshed mellow these folks are gonna have,lol.
however…away from the bewildered herd, out here at the Wilderness Bar…i can sometimes get a glimpse of actual zeitgeist.
just last sunday, Eldest’s new…and rather serious…girlfriend…said something(after 3 sundays of listening to my tale-telling with aplomb and even gusto)…and i answered with a sort of rambling exegesis about where we are on the sawtooth decline profile…and she was nodding her head.
i apologised immediately for lapsing into doomerspeak,lol…and she said “no! i agree!”.
she seems pretty smart, for around here…so maybe there’s hope for at least the people who can think(but who are not part of the local infestation of the PMC/bougie class abornin , with their 2 competing hiveminds nonsense)
it may b a classic naked emperor situation…exacerbated by the woke thing/cancelculture/etc…even out here, where the latter doesnt apply, save for the old time righty cancel culture that never went away.
self censorship is habit in the hinterlands of texas, if youre in any way heterodox.
(and i am heterodox in so, so many ways,lol)
“coming out” as an anarchist, anti-imperialist, or whatever, can be just as fraught as coming out as queer once was.
(hence the discreet bernie2016 sticker on my truck…as a sort of secret handshake…allowing the guy loading my sheep feed to ask a forbidden question.)
To my knowledge it is not the Commission but the European Council (which comprises the 27 Prime Ministers + Charles Michel (President) + vDL where the decisions on sanctions are taken. Some decisions here require consensus but (i might be wrong) in the case of the revision of sanctions policy this would account as a legal act and it would require a reinforced majority (72% of the members of the European Council comprising at least 65% of the EU population) not unanimity.
Ignacio: See my comment above replying to Bugs.
The whole setup is byzantine — deliberately so. Does this mean that the Council votes a “sense of the members” and sends it to the Commission to be turned into legislation and regulations?
My guess is that vDL, who is member also in the Council, whether she likes it or not, has to proceed with the conclusions of the European Council in timely fashion and redact the correspondent Decision, Regulation, whatever name it takes. If not, It would be the end of vDL days at the Commission.
I found this all very confusing. Just watching the process, I had assumed it would be a European Council drill, since states as opposed to MEPs were deciding. But the Queen of Europe was clearly running the process and even whipping the votes, as opposed to the head of the Council.
The European Council (heads of states) sets the directions though they do not write the rules. If they decide that sanctions have to be imposed or removed it is the task of the Commission to translate that Conclusion in a valid legal text that would then be passed to the Council of the European Union (not heads of state here but the relevant ministers) for approval.–This is my best guess of the process right now.
yeah. like DJG sez, byzantine, by design.
i havent even tried to learn about how it supposedly works, since i dont reckon itll be a going concern for a whole lot longer.
(took me work to get a handle on UK, French and German systems, before the EU was fully up and running, making them de facto moot, it seems)
but that woman has to go, if theres to be any progress, at all.
thats the only thing i know fer shure.
are there no compromising videos…i mean aside from everything she says out loud and in public?
what compromat would get her gone?
after all thats come before with her, it hasnt been enough….so some q-anon type craziness?
adenochrome?
lol
does anybody over there like her, at all?
and if not(which is what i glean from my disparate europress wanderings), how the hell is she still failing upwards?
I found the web page describing the procedure straight from the Council itself:
Critical points:
Unanimity or qualified majority depends on the issue, and shouldn’t change between adopting and extendning, so it should take unanimity to extend. And if not extended it should lapse (otherwise I don’t understand why they are taking active decisions to extend. My interpretation is then that it would only take one country blocking the extension for them to end. But that is my read, other interpretations are possible.
Yep, at the end of the they what matters is willingness to do anything (extend sanctions or block them for instance) rather than procedures which i believe can be chosen amongst those existing depending on the willingness to reach each particular outcome. Depending if they don’t want anyone or some blocking a decision which is considered a priority. Currently, among the Heads of State of EU members one does not see this willingness to end sanctions. It might change with time though it would require profound political changes that the PMC is trying to avoid by any mean available.
Just a guess here, but isn’t Trump having a peace plan a laugher? His stated terms were that Russia be given the area already taken in Ukraine, plus some deal with partial sanctions relief (only some US sanctions, not EU ones). I think Putin understand this very well.
BUT, a cliff resides in the following- if Russia did not agree to these terms, Trump would bring the conflict to a whole new level! In other word, Phineas T. Bluster rides again. If he sent more munitions and even soldiers to Ukraine, he would have to talk himself out of the complaints that he couldn’t keep his word and save America from engagement. If he didn’t follow up, he’d look weak, and the Dems would ride that ceaselessly. To me, this means no resolution on any of these terms.
This is a war that must be settled with a full confrontation, and that means NATO fully engaged in battle with Russia. All this weak tea about limits is a huge hoax, and slides the neoliberals into the ultimate battle they have dreamt of for so long, a war of worlds. We’ll maybe live to see how that turns out.
No, NATO will not engage. First, there is no mechanism for doing that. NATO is a very weak alliance. It had to be to get members to join. They did not want to surrender national sovereignity to the alliance. That is why they all have their own militaries and their own (often nationally idiosyncratic) weapons. NATO cannot make members do anything. Even the vaunted Article 5 merely obligates members to think about defending an attacked fellow NATO member.
For starters, Turkiye, which has the biggest and best NATO army in theater, would never join an attack on Russia.
Second, before Russia was doing as well as it has been, Colonel Macgregor, who served a long time in Germany, said the MOST the West would be able to do would be a coalition of the willing, the US, Poland, Romania and the UK (but the UK has an itty bitty army, its participation would be symbolic). They could field 90,000 to 100,000 men absolute tops. Their supply lines and logistics (due to the distance from their bases + so many different types of equipment) would be horrible.
So please no NATO fantasies.
lol. so im reading your comment, Yves, and thinking about whatever yapping dog baltic state recently announced theyd be defending europe from russia(with their tiny, barely there, military)…and that made me go into a reverie:…anklebiter balkan states=>ankle biter mosquitos i have here(aedes albopictus…like ankles and wrists)=>fleas.
what if the west has finally got around to reading the War of the Flea?
(one of my favorite books, btw)
i’ll put this question to the sheep, here in a minute, when i feed and confine them for the night.
i’ll report the general consensus in a bit.
welp.
mom came out as i was feeding.
mucking up my polling operations.
so i have no idea what the sheep think.
just following up.
Want to know what sheep think? Just read the Minutes of the European or any other western national Parliament, or of Congress.
Hoi polloi in Romania are really not willing at all, even though the channels tries to persuade them otherwise.
My understanding of the EU Sanctions is that they are decided on the basis of a qualified majority (which I think is defined as 55% of Council members (15 out of 27) representing 65% of the population. A minimum of 4 no. members are required to form a locking minority, irrespective of the percentage of population they represent. The Council members are the heads of state (or the relevant ministers if its under foreign or finance policy).
The sanctions are quite complex as they were decided under a variety of votes under different headings (and hence fall under different competencies within the Union), but I think the key ones are on a 6 month cycle, so technically they could be allowed fall by default if that was politically the most convenient way to do it.
The sanctions are enforced via a variety of Directives, which is where the Commission and Parliament can block or propose measures as appropriate. Its not quite clear to me as to what happens if the Commission wishes to block a Council decision.
As the sanctions seem to be largely driven by a passionate minority, with the majority reluctantly going along with them, the dynamics would be quite complex if the EU was presented with a Trump dilemma, as the ‘reluctant’ majority may use this as an excuse to block changes.
Thanks, Plutonium Kun. I may now understand the sanctions regime of the EU. The structure of the European Union is starting to look more and more like a Rube Goldberg contraption.
It still looks to me that the Commission has too much power and the Parliament not enough power, not that I am encouraged by the quality of the legislators partying it up in Brussels and Strasbourg.
Question: Can an officially neutral (non-NATO) country like Eire simply let certain sanctions lapse? Or would doing so be noticed by Brussels?
The EU has become a way for the European oligarchy to remove governance as far away as possible from democratic oversight and control. Any Rube Goldberg contraptions are a function not a bug, and therefore any “fixes” will be highly resisted.
The structure of the EU is quite complex, and a lot of people who should know better don’t bother doing the reading into how it really works.
Essentially, the Commission should be the creature of the Council, which is reasonable, as Council members are elected and the Commission is not. But in reality, the Commission has gradually been getting better and better at getting its way. One major dynamic of how the EU works is that most decisions don’t really excite most countries one way or another, so there is a sort of unwritten rule that nobody blocks something important to other countries unless they have a very strong interest in doing so.
Ireland is one of the few non-Nato members in the EU, but in practical terms would not be able to block a decision by the Council, although it could follow the route of taking it to the Court if it wanted to argue that either the Council or Commission was acting outside of its powers (which many think it is). But in reality, a small country will only take this step if it has some allies. It simply won’t do it if it is likely to be outvoted, it would be considered a waste of valuable soft power.
So to take, for example, the case with Gaza, while Ireland has taken a strong pro-Palestinian stance, it hasn’t attempted to block any business within the EU as it knows it would be outvoted. The classic diplomatic argument would be that you need to build up allies behind the scenes before attempting to block something a majority (or the Germans/French) want. Even Orban and Meloni, for all their public posturing, have not used their full blocking power to get what they want. Its just not seen as an effective way of getting your way in the long term.
Its important to realise of course that at any one time, there are dozens of contentious issues being decided in Brussels. There is a lot of ‘we won’t block your favourite new measure if you vote for us on what we want’. Few EU politicians are as famously blunt as an Irish PM who blocked EU business in the 80’s to force Germany to pay for a rail electrification project in his Dublin constituency (he graciously gave the contract to Siemens). It was precisely to stop games like that which led to the weakening of blocking powers in the 1990’s during the expansion to the East.
As for the Parliament, it doesn’t have a lot of power, but its hard to see any justification for giving it a lot more power as this would implicitly lead to complete dominance by the more populous countries. The current system gives a lot more say to smaller EU countries.
The most important point which is often forgotten with the EU is that there was an implicit understanding among all parties that the EU would never have more power than the head of state of any one country. This is why the Council (rather than Commission or Parliament) has the final say. It is the Head of State (PM or President) of each country who gets the final vote and decision, no other body. In theory anyway, the EU is the creature of the individual heads of state, not vice versa.
Yes, this helps explain how von der Leyen’s land grab came about. Thanks.
I think her success – and it is unprecedented in the EU’s history, is based on a consolidation of the centre right block in Europe into the EPP. The right was traditionally broken up into a variety of shades of Christian democrat, neoliberal, nationalist right, Gaullists, etc., but in many ways the rise of the far right has helped them all hop into the same boat. Even though she is widely loathed even within her own EPP grouping, they can’t dislodge her for fear of the far right or the nominal left from taking advantage.
To add to that, she is very good at using her one really significant power – patronage over Commission posts – to strengthen herself. As one example, the new Irish Commissioner was given what was perceived as a demotion (the Justice portfolio instead of one of the economics ones) as punishment for Ireland being seen as rocking the boat over Palestine. This is all part of the very delicate behind the scenes balancing game which is what Brussels politics is all about.
I suspect that at some unspecified time in the future the Council will slap down the Commission to put it back in its box, but now isn’t seen as the time.
would love to read more of this.
p.s. German MEP Martin Sonneborn :””I expect only the worst from the next five years: an aggressive austerity and war policy, surveillance, curtailment of press freedom and civil rights. Nothing that would put me in a good mood.”
Any reading suggestions? I know only Perry Anderson used to write awfully long pieces which I never really found the time for which I regret now, and those two English investigative reporters whose names I forgot…
I can’t think off the top of my head of any specific reading – tbh its been a while since I’ve followed European politics in detail.
I think a key underlying process has been the victory of the neoliberal and neocon right over other ‘flavours’ of the centre and right – such as Christian democracy. This has aided a consolidation of a more limited view of Europes future. This didn’t originate in the EU – in fact I think its fair to say that the EU bureaucracy was a stalwart against it. Leftists who accuse the EU of imposing neoliberalism have it exactly backwards. Neoliberalism has grown at national level (especially in northern European countries), and was gradually imposed on the EU bureaucracy, which always favoured a more French flavoured statism with a German flavoured ordoliberalism, along with a sprinkling of Social Democracy, and at root I think still does.
I’ve known many people who have worked within the EU or at its fringes. Most are very committed at the concept of Europeanism. Back in the 1990’s my then barrister room mate was taking the exams for the commission. She had stacks of books on western culture to read, as she was warned that a deep knowledge of obscure European philosophers, writers and artists was considered a minimum to get past the first round (definitely not an exam for STEM enthusiasts). Most are loosely social democratically minded – certainly left wing by US standards, but very committed to ‘the system’.
The system is stronger and the “House always wins”.
It would be naive of me to believe there is no déformation professionelle.
Especially if loyalty is rewarded with privilege.
But I would have assumed when the substance of the Union itself is at stake realism sets in. After all institutions usually are designed to avert threats and survive. Of course this begs the question where is the difference between the institution and its members.
p.s. I am e.g. abhorred over what I am reading on TWITTER accounts by WMD specialists and their “communities” – many member of some elite Europen club. Just think of that infamous video when all OSCE-members walked out of the room after the RU delegation had arrived.
sorry one more:
Despite the vast structure of the EU – (I visited EU Brussels only once which was enough) – in essence its´ acting bodies and ruling groups are surprisingly one-dimensional and limited in understanding judged from afar.
Not to see what is happening? Not to foresee in the 1990s that they would need allies all over the place. Need to change tone? That´s odd.
People that I met in my life – as students however out for EU careers – had all been to Africa and South America. They were aware of realities. I am not saying they ended up in influential positions. But the ruling elites like their personnel to speak some fancy languages. All that life experience that comes with that can´t just evaporate.
Or was it indeed simply fear of the US crushing everything if they wouldn´t abide?
Pretty much all the EU connected people I know are multilingual and have lived in multiple countries, and lots have lived outside of Europe. I have some very EU connected in-laws and in social situations I’ve been somewhat in awe of the way in which they will casually switch around 3 or 4 languages, while I’m stuck with my school level French. But that said, even the very diversity can lead to a sort of groupthink which is very deeply embedded (and deliberately so).
That’s my experience as well: it’s a very strong but completely artificial culture which creates the classic “people from nowhere,” often married to other Eurocrats from other countries, and carrying a little bubble with them everywhere they go. If you walk down the rue Archimède at lunchtime, they’re all there, speaking a curious form of English, looking alike and thinking and speaking alike. You won’t hear a word of French, let alone Flemish. Comparisons to the medieval Church are not entirely facetious, in my view.
“You won’t hear a word of French, let alone Flemish. Comparisons to the medieval Church are not entirely facetious”
Good point.
The structure of the European Union is starting to look more and more like a Rube Goldberg contraption.
You slander Rube Goldberg!
Rube Goldberg contraptions, as silly as they were, always actually accomplished a task at the end.
When European Council decisions are originated in the very same Council (do not come as a question from the Commission or other institution) a reinforced majority is necessary to be adopted. I doubt that vDL’s Commission would bring the question of removing sanctions to the Council so a qualified majority wouldn’t be enough in that case.
I think negotiations are off the table at this point, certainly until there is regime change in Kiev. Putin’s June peace plan (which he surely knew would never be accepted) preceded the Kursk incursion, which changes everything. Even the Moscow Times (which is as fond of Putin as MSNBC is of Trump) had an interesting article a few days ago quoting an (alleged) high-level Russian govt source as follows: ““Ukraine’s forces are being exhausted…… the Kremlin can carry on waging war like it is at the moment for decades.”” The article is here, and inside it is a link to the original Runet article:
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/04/putin-abandons-peace-talks-seeks-to-destroy-ukrainian-state-after-kursk-incursion-report-a86561
Russia will establish facts on the ground and then dictate terms. This might take a while; wars have a tendency to drag on for longer than people expect. And nobody seems to be in a hurry to wrap this one up, certainly not Putin.
“…If Trump were to become President and be willing to meet Russia way more than halfway and give some sanctions relief, you can be sure that the EU would do everything in its power to undermine Trump…” — Oh, I’m not so sure about that. Since 24/2/22, the USA has been the driving force behind the Russian sanctions, with the EU (which has/had far more business ties with Russia than the USA did) skittering along semi-reluctantly behind it. Behind the facade of solidarity, there is already a lot of political division within the EU re the Russian sanctions and Ukraine policy in general, and EU businesses are deeply unhappy about losing the Russian market. Just yesterday, KLM became the first EU airline to ask Brussels to address the “unfair” competition from Chinese airlines (which of course can overfly Russian airspace, as can Air India, Emirates, Turkish etc):
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-07/dutch-carrier-klm-seeks-eu-measures-to-curb-china-competition
If Trump wins and chops back on the Russian sanctions, I think the Eurocrats in Brussels will come under overwhelming pressure to follow suit.
The key is that Russia seeks a Western surrender, not Ukrainian. The handicap they face is that they have to go about extracting it without (physically) attacking the West. I’ve thought that this is impossible and that Russia will have to take the gloves off to cut off the chicken’s head when there’s a good enough rationale to do it, but, explicitly including sanctions as the starting point of talks is a subtler, more peaceful way of signaling what is required. Very Putin-esque, I suppose, although it also means that the West would not respect it in the near term as much as Russian missiles wiping out, say, RAF Waddington (this is the RAF ISR hub, so the most logical target had UK officially OK’ed Ukrainians using Storm Shadows against pre-2014 Russia).
yer last paragraph.
excellent.
i respect Putin more and more as time goes on.
(waves to nsa)
this wont end until the usa is well onto the back foot, and dealing with more than it can chew,and especially internal issues(fermenting merrily just under the biofilm of our collective experience).
and, even more importantly…is on such a back foot in a way that cannot be denied.
houthis sinking a carrier, etc.
when our weakness and papertigerism is finally exposed, thats when this will end.
and i say this as an American Patriot, no less.
Does the US also harbor a poison pill in the deals Yellen and the Atty General signed with Zelensky? I am assuming Z signed over valuable land/resources as collateral for the US paying billions to keep Ukraine supplied with materiel, etc. And in the event Ukraine ceases to exist as Medvedev has insinuated, do those documents also become invalid or can they be a bargaining chip? Like, OK we’ll give you the Donbas but we want extraction rights.
*Sigh*
I have no idea what you are talking about regarding deals the attorney general signed with Zelensky.
While there was no collateral for the loans, the IMF does have this nasty way of demanding asset sales from underwater creditors.
If Ukraine were to cease to exist, and a new state were to take up part of its territory (Kievistan), the prior obligations could probably be repudiated, particularly if they could do all their trade with the Global South and tell the West to bugger off. But I have no idea if Russia wants to be that confrontational. The flip side, if they did want to go that far, is that could be a threat: “No sanctions relief? No unfreezing of our assets? Fine, we’ll take Ukraine as liquidated damages and this is how we structure it.”
One important consequence of insisting on sanctions being part of the negotiations is that that presupposes that the West is part of the conflict. Note that, even today, the West operates as if it is not part of the conflict–so all the pressure, supposedly, on Ukraine to negotiate while the West would not be involved. I used to joke that Russia should insist on Ukraine ceding Alaska or something, but an insistence on sanctions being part of the negotiations is a clever, practical way of “including Alaska in negotiations,” i.e. forcing the West to negotiate, and, ultimately, surrender.
The weird (but unexpected) bit about the current talk about “land for NATO” (the Duran terminology) in the Western press is that this perpetuates the myth that the conflict in Ukraine is over territory. It never was and, in fact, it was never even really between Ukraine and Russia. Russia needs the West to surrender in some fashion to wrap up the war and forcing them to officially agree to end sanctions (whether it actually happens or not) is certainly easier (and better PR) than retaking Paris (which probably won’t be enough).
should have been “not unexpected”….
In the long run whether there is a negotiated settlement of the Ukraine project or not, the sanctions-regime will deteriorate and eventually fall apart. People find ways around laws and regulations limiting economic freedom. The sanctions are absurd and cannot be maintained indefinitely. The West simply lacks the power to continue to enforce these sanctions.
As for the war in Ukraine, there is no reason why the Russians should negotiate in the short and medium-term. The war is slowly turning positive for Russia. As for Ukraine, it seems it can continue to fight as long as the West sends it sufficient money that continues to enrich the Ukrainian oligarchs. Trump, if elected, may have the mandate to move away from throwing money towards the criminals and neo-Nazis that run Ukraine but he will not end the war just, maybe, allow it to slow down enough so that realpolitik may become a thing again. If Harris wins, I’d say nothing changes since the Democratic Party is now all-neocon all the time but, eventually, a bit of realpolitik may slip past the fanatics. I don’t think Harris is a fanatical neocon so she may be more flexible than Biden who loves gangsterism for its own sake.
If there is an expansion of the war in West Asia then all bets are off and Ukraine will be dropped as an imperial project because the US/Israel will not have an easy time defeating Iran–it will cost a lot of money and be a horror show as it is now but is generally shielded by the Zionist-friendly media in the US and Europe but won’t be when real war breaks out in that region.
The sanctions are absurd and cannot be maintained indefinitely.
IIRC, the sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea managed to spur Russian agricultural production and close a very lucrative market to Europeans. More recent sanctions seem to have mammothly boosted Russian industry and agriculture as they replaced imports.
It may be (barely) practical to impose punitive sanctions on a country such as Cuba with a fairly small population base and limited natural resources but we have seen how successful the US has been there.
Sanctioning the world’s largest country by area, a large and highly educated population, with massive resources from agriculture to mining to forestry products, and a highly developed and technically competent industry is pure hubris.
Besides Russia has Iran and Venezuela to teach it how to avoid sanctions :)
In December before the SMO, Putin set out the Russian position that NATO needed to exit Eastern Europe (not one inch east). I have seen no sign that this position has been rescinded.
In my view, this will require Europe to become an economic basket case and agree despite US objections.
“Putin set out the Russian position that NATO needed to exit Eastern Europe (not one inch east). I have seen no sign that this position has been rescinded.
In my view, this will require Europe to become an economic basket case…”
So, unless Eastern European countries stop threatening Russia militarily, such as when Poland threatened and invaded Russia along with the rest of Napoleon’s Grande Armee in 1812, Europe will become an “economic basket case?” Poland then exists to threaten and in time invade Russia.
Forgive me, for not understanding why this is so.
Two things are perhaps going on here. First, there’s a concept known as “negotiating fat” which is what you build into your position that you are prepared to trade away or, in the last analysis give away. Sanctions are not Russia’s primary concern, and they are much more likely to be ready to wait for the West to finally come round on economic issues than security ones. Moreover, whereas the security issues are relatively stark (either Ukraine is in NATO or it isn’t, silly ideas like Ukraine being partly in NATO are just that, silly) “sanctions” is a very broad term encompassing lots of different measures introduced in a panic by a whole range of different organisations, not just the EU. So in the security volet, given now the complete lack of trust on all sides, I think we’ll see the Russians applying force and coercion as much as anything else, creating realities on the ground that are subsequently translated into texts.
Sanctions are very different, because there, it’s the decision-making processes of governments and the EU the Russians are targeting. I suspect they will seek to play states off against each other, reasoning that the range and scope of the sanctions is so wide that in any given case there will be one or two countries that are dubious about continuing. To add to what’s been already said, sanctions are normally decided by the European Council, and normally for a limited period of time. That is, there has to be a positive decision to renew them after a while, and, whilst I don’t have all the texts in front of me, I’d be surprised if this is subject to Qualified Majority Voting, because after all you’re dealing with the economic interests of countries. If that’s right, then all the Russians have to do is apply pressure and nibble around the edges, in the hope that, one by one, the sanctions will fall away as various states defect. Bear in mind also that if sanctions are lifted it will be a series of de facto decisions: there’s no need for negotiation.
I don’t agree at all that Putin’s inclusion of sanctions relief is anything remotely like a serious or throw-away trading chip because there will be no trading. Russia will not negotiate with the West. This is all posturing by Putin to demonstrate to his economic and geopolitical allies that Russia is reasonable and the West is not. So it costs him nothing to add sensible-seeming starting positions that actually serve to make at best vanishingly low odds negotiations even more impossible.
Agree. The sanctions are the “negotiating fat”. It took Russia many years to partially reorient their economy away from the West. They can’t rely on the permanence of any sanction relief. The West can impose new sanctions any time for any reason. I think Russia would settle for a face-saving token reduction of existing sanctions, which the West will be happy to provide in the area most economically beneficial to it.
I wasn’t suggesting there would be formal negotiations, except possibly at the end over points of detail. Rather, my analogy was with negotiations, where you want a number of different things but you only have so much time, energy and negotiating capital, so you push harder on some things and go slower on others. I think sanctions are a second priority for the Russians, and they will largely allow time and economic pressure to do the work for them. As I said I think the lifting of sanctions will be a de facto process, and if there are negotiations it will be the West having to negotiate with itself.
Aurelien is more or less right. The sanctions issue is obviously important in that Russia wants to be treated as a normal country and so long as the US demands that sanctions be imposed on Russia this will not be the case. It is, I suspect, fairly pointless to handwave over the ridiculous structures which the Eurocrats have built into their anti-democratic political system, because if Washington says frog the Eurocrats will hop as high as desired. In the end, the Russian demand for normalisation amounts to a demand to Washington. It is actually a reasonable demand simply because once Ukraine is a Russian puppet state there will be nothing more to be gained by those sanctions. Unfortunately US elite politics does not operate on a cost/benefit analysis basis, but rather on a kind of Shogun Japanese face-saving basis, in which no decision can ever be acknowledged as wrong.
Hence it seems to me that the Russian demand is probably partly, as Aurelien suggests, part of the negotiation stance which you are prepared to abandon (like a trade union demanding 12% but settling for 7%) but also partly an appeal to sanity. Which, again, is obviously in short supply in NATO.
Ultimately sanctions against Russia will only harm the countries which apply them – not only because they prevent trade with a successful and wealthy country, but also because they antagonise other successful and wealthy countries trading with Russia. So although sanctions are ideologically something which Russia wants gone, objectively they strengthen Russia’s position and weaken NATO’s.
I have to differ. There will be no negotiated outcome. Among other things, the West has demonstrated itself to be utterly untrustworthy. Putin is posturing. This is all theater to keep showing that were the other side willing to consider reasonable terms and honor them, he would talk. But he knows full well that nearly all of the things on his list are non-starters.
And Putin has given up on the idea of wanting or needing the West. Russia and the West have gotten a divorce, and Russia found out it’s better on its own.
I don’t think we differ at all. For the present, obviously, NATO is unable to negotiate (perhaps it wasn’t clear what I meant when I suggested that they are more or less in the position of eighteenth-century Japan). However, at some stage there will have to be negotiations since Russia can’t be kept out of Europe indefinitely.
In a sense all political utterances are posturing. But the posture which the Russians are taking is simply the posture of good sense, whereas the posture which NATO is taking is the posture of mental illness. The point being that Russia will not have to change its position whereas NATO eventually will, assuming that it survives long enough.
Again, I don’t think you understand my point. Russia does not have any interest in Europe any more. The extreme bigotry, multi-fronted bigotry, cancellation of Russian artist and athletes and even the purging of Russian literature from some curricula, convinced ordinary Russians that the West had always regarded them as inferior dirty Slavs. They don’t want to curry favor with them any more.
Putin is trying to dethrone the colonialist West with his push for a multipolar order. Russia does not need or want Europe. And Europe and the US have shown themselves repeatedly as entering into deals and breaking them. There is point in negotiating with parties that are not agreement capable.
We´re looking at Russia to much from a Western perspective. Russia is also under a lot of pressure from China. Witness the breakdown of the negotiations between China and Russia regarding the gas from Western Siberia that formerly flowed to Germany. China posed such conditions for the delivery of gas that finally Russia said no. That means Russia is banking on a reviving economic relationship with Germany and Europe and that means she is banking on a lifting of sanctions. I believe Putin might be right. The pressure on the German goverment is growing and popular discontent is reaching heretofore unheard of dimensions. If there ´s a serious energy crisis in the winter – say Ukraine blocks further gas delivery from Russia from the January 2025 combined with very cold weather – things might really start to move in completely unexpected directions.
I don’t agree. There is no evidence in Putin’s statements that he anticipates any such thing; he’s taken to taunting Germany over NS2 and refusing to talk to Scholz, which is not what you would do if you wanted to keep doors open. The fact that Russia is negotiating hard with China in fact shows that Russia is not subordinate to China, as many like to claim. Russia is the dominant and/or “safest” (as in not subject to US/NATO pressures) supplier of many key materials that China needs. He is continuing to reorient Russia away from Europe, which many BRICS pundits also depict as in economic decline. Europe depended not just on cheap Russian energy but also heavily-US-funded defense. One has gone away and the other is going away.
I beg to differ. I was in Mongolia when Putin showed up. Mind you that was after the Mongolian parliament had not included provisions for the planned pipeline anymore. Mongolian TV showed nothing but flat out veneration for Putin for days on end. He was welcomed with military honors and celebrated with a big show on Ulaanbaatars main square. It was definately a defiant gesture of being on Russia´s side in the face of Chinese pressure. That in turn means that in the medium term Russia is convinced that it will deliver gas to Europe by pipeline and the sanctions are lifted. Right now Russia is forced to burn the gas as only a small part can be exported through LNG tankers and that was the reason for the planned pipeline to China. Everybody thought it would go ahead. The building time was estimated to be two to three years. I believe that is the timeframe in which the Russians are convinced that most (if not all) the sanctions are lifted. I believe they are right. Europe is in for chaotic times and things will change trtremendously. What looks inconceivable now could very well be reality. Think of the fall of the wall and the end of the Soviet bloc. Changes of that magnitude are ahead. Certainly not pleasant for Europe but reality.
The tell is the pause, and the shrug: “…Naturally, this entails the removal of all Western sanctions against Russia as well.”
For the borders, is there any wiggle room for Russia to accept (say) a Kherson that includes what they now control but not Kherson city?
No, Russia has made the four oblasts part of Russia even though it does not control them. So even Putin cannot trade that away.
Yes, according to this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_annexation_of_Donetsk,_Kherson,_Luhansk_and_Zaporizhzhia_oblasts.
It reads: “The boundaries of the areas to be annexed and their borders were not defined; Russian officials stated that they would be defined later.”
Russia provides food for thought. Meanwhile, the march toward the Dnieper continues, winter approaches, and the power supply west of the river is occasional. Of course, the US and the EU, greater NATOstan remains quite comfortable.
Winter is when the ground freezes – before that comes Rasputitsa and impassable roads of mud
We know from other comments that Putin has made earlier, last year I think it was, that Russia became quite ambitious in seeking to rearrange global power balance as far as it can in its favor. And it appears to be doing this by drawing out the conflict for as long as possible since the rate of economic, military, and diplomatic losses in the West exceed Russia’s and its allies’ and the costs of sustaining the fight are tolerable. If that’s Russia’s plan then demanding peace terms that sound reasonable to rest of world but, owing to Western hubris, are, as Yves says, na ga happen would be just the ticket.
This is also consistent with Russia continuing the war until Ukraine military surrenders, and then dictating all terms without any western input. Plus every day the west both weakens itself and distracts itself from the ME war as well as delaying any pivot to China, likely pleasing their Chinese partner.
Why selected Eastern European armies must always threaten and now and again invade Russia, or “Those whom (God) wishes to destroy he drives mad”:
https://www.marxists.org/archive/tolstoy/1869/war-and-peace/book-9-chapter-2.html
1865 – 1869
War and Peace
By Leo Tolstoy
1812
On the twenty-ninth of May Napoleon left Dresden, where he had spent three weeks surrounded by a court that included princes, dukes, kings, and even an emperor. Before leaving, Napoleon showed favor to the emperor, kings, and princes who had deserved it, reprimanded the kings and princes with whom he was dissatisfied, presented pearls and diamonds of his own— that is, which he had taken from other kings— to the Empress of Austria, and having, as his historian tells us, tenderly embraced the Empress Marie Louise— who regarded him as her husband, though he had left another wife in Paris— left her grieved by the parting which she seemed hardly able to bear. Though the diplomatists still firmly believed in the possibility of peace and worked zealously to that end, and though the Emperor Napoleon himself wrote a letter to Alexander, calling him Monsieur mon frere, and sincerely assured him that he did not want war and would always love and honor him— yet he set off to join his army, and at every station gave fresh orders to accelerate the movement of his troops from west to east. He went in a traveling coach with six horses, surrounded by pages, aides-de-camp, and an escort, along the road to Posen, Thorn, Danzig, and Konigsberg. At each of these towns thousands of people met him with excitement and enthusiasm…
And yet in Oct 1813 the Tsar commanded the largest battlegroup on European soil until 1914 in Battle of Leipzig when Napoleon‘s Grande Armee including forces of Saxony was destroyed
Funnily enough the huge memorial to this battle was not unveiled until 1913
https://www.rt.com/russia/605350-putin-speaks-rt-project/
Putin in English: Listen to the Russian president’s words like never before (VIDEO)
RT has converted key archive speeches delivered by the Russian leader into spoken English using the help of AI
https://putinspeaks-rt.com/
“Amusingly, Zelensky and the Azov types are incandescent.”
👍
“you can be sure that the EU would do everything in its power to undermine Trump,”
I doubt that.
If such a thing as a Trump decision truly materializes in this matter, by that point in time it is being implemented by the bureaucracies. And I doubt EU bureaucracy will fight US bureaucracy.
But hey, may be I am underestimating Von der Leyen´s Jiu Jitsu skills.
As Putin goes: He knows it doesn´t matter WHAT is in those Russian demands. Everything short of surrender.
So as power is concerned these ARE empty gestures. But not due to the Russians.
When did the Russians realize eventually that this would end on the battle-field only?
Already summer 2022? 2023?
Certainly before 2024.
1. Remember “The Life of Brian” when it comes to bargaining.
2. It´s not so extraordinary to demand the end of sanctions that are illegal.
3. Bottom-line: There are no rules here any more, and for sure no laws that could be brought up by the Russians with the intent to be taken seriously.
If this war had ONE major success from the US POV – it destroyed intern. law. And without that there is no reference one can fall back onto.
(or in Yves´s words: “Most of these countries are still viscerally uncomfortable with Russia invading and occupying a neighbor even if they understand why intellectually.”)
The “diplomacy” baggage has to be invented from scratch now.
Not sure the antiwar movement has understood this. (Or those who have won´t articulate it for tactical reasons.)
And that the action in the South China Sea is also suitable to make sure China won´t get funny ideas to push for international law in Ukraine too hard.
I understand from A. Mercouris that a former Ukrainian spin doctor (Arestovich?) expects the Ukrainian army to collapse in 3-4 months so perhaps the war will come to an end or a head sooner than we expect. Also, the Chechen general in charge of Chechnya’s forces in the Donbass predicted about the same several months ago, Mike Liston
I have made the mistake of expecting Ukraine’s military to have collapsed by now, as in Sept-Oct. Even though Ukraine is very low on weapons, the US and NATO are still dribbling them in. Mark Sleboda pointed out that if Ukraine lowered the conscription age, they could theoretically dragoon another 300,000 into service.
Having said that, the impact of the winter on Ukraine may be the hammer blow. Keep in mind that with a fragile grid, higher demand alone is likely to cause more breakage.
Sanctions function like reverse tariffs. Prices rise in hbf sanctioned country but no tariff revenue accrues instead the exporter suffers welfare loss.
Sanctions saved Russia. It was acting like a raw materials exporter importing everything it should have been making itself – even ricotta cheese. Now it has flourishing new companies making goods and Western Europe has given China the Russian market if it is not exporting via Turkey into Russia.
I do not believe any treaty settlement is worthwhile – Gorbachev created this mess. There were no wars in Europe until Germany reunified – then it was Serbia and Ukraine with Germany deeply involved in both through CSU in Croatia and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Kiev and Timoshenko and Klitschko and Merkel protégés
Incidentally those wars all had Green Foreign Ministers in Berlin
The facts on the ground have changed. Putin is 71 and part of STAVKA – he has been too accommodating to West and Israel and Russia has now to face Permanent War on its western border. China is being protected as U.S. cannot engage China unless Russia ceases to destroy its forces in Ukraine
Winter is key. Unemployment is mounting in Germany as BASF cuts 14% installations in largest integrated chemical plant in world at Ludwigshafen
There is no political accommodation possible. Britain has succeeded in boxing in Germany with Poland snd breaking the Franco-German Élysée Treaty alliance created by Adenauer when he was angered by JFK not stopping Berlin Wall and he had to rush to Berlin to assure them US stood with them
Europe is unstable – immigration and economic collapse will be more potent than NATO and Russia with 2.3 million in the military will never allow US forces back on this continent
I believe Russia and China are reluctantly prepared for war and U.S. simply sounds off without awareness of how it has set the ball rolling
The ‘poison pill’ in Putin’s comments is, to me, the demand for ‘denazification’. In everything else you’re dealing with matters to be deal with by negotiators across the table and agreements and understandings set out in black-and-white signed by those with the authority to commit legally recognised states to them. Yet even if ‘denazification’ could be sufficiently defined to be outlawed at the personal level – dissolution of ‘nazi’ organisations and publications etc. – it cannot be eradicated from people’s minds, merely driven underground where it develops a presence still influencing everyday life on the surface and becomes, perhaps, even more dangerous.
Attempts at ‘denazification’ would be as successful as the frequent attempts to ‘dechristianise’ Rome by a series of Emperors, or attempts to ‘stamp out’ Catholicism – and at other times Protestantism – in England and elsewhere. One might even point to the continuing attempts with varying degrees of heavy-handedness to stamp out commmunist heresies in the US.
What would actually fulfill Putin’s requirement of ‘denazification’ has no objective measure anyone could declare achieved, allowing him not only to suspend as long as he wanted any commitments on his part under any agreement, but to revisit any such commitments at any time should nazi-ism rear its ugly head again – or at least for Putin to claim it had.
You are too obsessed with words. For decades there was no Western Battle Group in Russia after it was disbanded because no threat was perceived from Western Europe. Now US has re-opened WW2 in Europe and until U.S. withdraws its occupation forces from Europe entirely a state of war will exist permanently
Demographics in Western Europe do not favour military spending unless you want to equip Musllm armies – large parts of Bundeswehr are Russlanddeutsche and otherwise Ossis – they will not fight Russia
Most European countries are insolvent with very angry voters and turmoil will overthrow most regimes. US will need to do everything itself and boost its deficit snd national debt.
Russia can turn away from Europe and turn Ukraine into Libya with millions of Ukies simply staying in Germany and Poland. Turkey can open gates and flood Southern Europe with asylum seekers from West Asia
There need be no settlement suited to US interests in a Continent once ravaged by 30 Years War or 100 Years War. It is a conceit – US despoils but cannot establish stability