Yves here. Below is an article served up as a reader critical thinking exercise, both for its reliance on dubious information (such as propaganda about the supposedly dire state of the Russian economy) So hopefully you will have some fun having at it as well as debating the finer points of where the conflict appears to be.
Let me offer a few to get the discussion rolling:
1. The idea that the US can presently “force Zelensky” to do anything is a canard given US politics. The way the US could quickly bring Ukraine to heel would be to cut off intel support which would include targeting assistance and satellite data. With Lindsey Graham still keeping up his “bone crushing sanctions” demand, which Trump now understands would wreck the US via Chinese retaliation, Trump can’t look soft on Ukraine. He has to at least have enough in the way of optics to keep the nutters at bay.
2. Notice the personalization, of Putin as bad guy, which serves to direct attention away from the fact that Russia has existential security interests at stake.
3. The framing that Ukraine can somehow still “win” the way. US officials have taken to saying that Ukraine must accept the fact that it has lost the territory Russia now occupies (how much they believe the Zelensky fig leaf that maybe Ukraine can get it back in the future is open to question). So what is “winning” give the current givens? For Zelensky, it is to hang on to power as long as possible and somehow get out alive. For Ukraine, there is no “win” but cutting losses and having a rump state that really is neutral, as in the West stops meddling, which would lead, as intended, to a later revival of combat. Good luck with that.
4. It is true that Russia has been chary of assaults on bigger cities. Some of that is seeking to keep Russian casualties down; slow strangulation, while not as satisfying to the peanut gallery, does the job too. But Alexander Mercouris today made a point regarding the Russians proceeding in a measured matter in the linchpin city of Pokrovsk, that the Russians prefer to have Ukraine feed yet more weapons and men in a futile defense. We’ve said repeatedly that the reason for the purportedly slow Russian advance is not just the difficulty of breaking through well fortified lines, but that Russia’s aim is to destroy Ukraine’s army. It’s much easier to do that by having Ukraine throw resources at Russian forces when Russia has short supply lines.
Although the importance of cracking the last defense line in eastern Ukraine would give Russia the opportunity to make big territorial advances (note that the Slaviansk-Kramatorsk line has repeatedly been depicted as weaker than the preceding three major lines, due both to geography and I believe less robust fortification), consider another view on the merits of fortifications, albeit via a fictionalized account.
Admittedly, this was well before our world of ISR.
By Rod Thornton, Senior Lecturer in International Studies, Defence and Security., King’s College London and Miron, Post-doctoral Researcher, War Studies Department, King’s College London. Originally published at The Conversation
In the recent summit talks in Alaska designed to halt the Russia-Ukraine war, Vladimir Putin demanded that Kyiv cede control of the entirety of its Donetsk oblast (region) to Russia. But this would effectively be tantamount to an acceptance of overall defeat for Ukraine.
In giving up this region, Kyiv would also be giving up its principal defensive barrier against further Russian encroachment into the whole of Ukraine – that is, it will lose its “fortress belt”. This is the name given (by the Russians themselves) to a series of fortified Ukrainian-held cities, towns and settlements in the west of the Donetsk region. This belt roughly links the city of Slovyansk in the north to Kostyantynivka, some 50 km to the south.
The current situation on the battlefield needs to be viewed with a certain context in mind – that of geography. The state that we now call Russia (which has included Ukraine for much of its existence) has been subject to many invasions throughout its long history. Foreign invaders – whether coming from the east, south or west – were generally able to make rapid initial progress in their invasions, not least because Russia had few natural barriers that could act as defensive lines.
In particular, the open steppe lands, lacking hilly or mountainous terrain, have represented an open invitation to invaders. This issue still pertains. But today, ironically, these largely indefensible steppe lands are Ukrainian territory that is under threat from Russian forces.
In light of this, Kyiv cannot rely on terrain to form defensive lines. It has to rely on creating urban barriers. Towns and cities are notoriously difficult to capture or to fight through. Buildings, especially large ones, provide ideal cover and fire points for defenders. Getting into urban areas is difficult because of the channelling effect of the road systems. Obvious routes can be well defended with mines, obstacles and covering fire. Rubble also makes movement difficult. Urban scenarios very much favour the defender.
The normal tactic for an assaulting force would be to try and outflank and surround such urban areas and to then to essentially lay siege to them to prevent their resupply and thus force their surrender. This is what happened, but on a smaller scale, with the capture of Mariupol by Russian forces early in the war.
The other alternative has been to “squeeze out” Ukrainian forces from any town they are holding. In such scenarios, towns have been enveloped on three sides by Russian troops. This has then forced the under-pressure Ukrainians to withdraw though the only remaining egress routes. Russian forces then occupy the abandoned town.
This is what happened at towns that Ukrainian forces lost earlier in the Donbas region: Avdiivka, Bakhmut and Soledar.
But both of these forms of attack on urban areas are currently being denied to Russian forces. This is because of the complex series of Ukrainian defensive lines that have been established now between the series of towns and cities in the Donetsk fortress belt. These make use of minefields, anti-tank obstacles, enfilading fire (firing along the enemy line to inflict maximum casualties) provided by tube artillery and copious drone use.
Because the Russians have largely been unable to break through these lines they have been prevented from surrounding or enveloping any of the major urban areas within the fortress belt.
Last Line of Defence
It is strategically vital for the Ukrainians that this belt continues to hold back the Russians. It appears that one of the main aims of the 2025 summer offensive by Moscow (according to Russian officers captured by the Ukrainians) has been to break through this belt. It was said to represent the “poslednii ryvok” (the “final push”) that would settle the war’s outcome in Russia’s favour.
But this has not happened and looks unlikely to happen anytime soon. Indeed, as the Institute for the Study of War put it recently, Russian forces “are engaged in an effort … to seize [the ‘fortress belt’] that would likely take several years to complete”.
Hence, it becomes easier to understand why Putin needed to make the demand that he did at Anchorage. What cannot be achieved on the ground in terms of breaking through the fortress belt he is trying to achieve via a peace deal brokered with US assistance.
Gaining control of the west of the Donetsk region is the key to winning the war. Putin knows this. If Donetsk and its fortress belt are given up, then the open steppe land to the west would be exposed to Russian advances. Great swaths of Ukrainian territory would rapidly fall.
As one Russian source put it this week, the fortress belt “is the last serious line of defence for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Beyond it, Kyiv has no other prepared lines of defence to Zaporizhzhia and the Dnipropetrovsk region … [and] … the Russian army can … advance to the Dnieper River”.
If Russian forces came to be camped on this part of the Dnieper, then it’s hard to imagine that Ukraine would not then have to accede to yet further, strategically damaging, territorial demands from Moscow. With such a scenario in mind, the future course of the whole war hinges on Ukraine not giving up its fortress belt in western Donetsk.
Perhaps an irony in Putin’s demand that the whole of the Donetsk region be handed over is that it could be seen as coming from a position of what appears to be weakness and not strength. He cannot wait the years it may take to seize the cities and towns that form the fortress belt. Russia cannot remain on a war footing for too much longer, according to reliable reports on the state of its economy.
But even so, Kyiv may have to accede to Putin’s demands because it will potentially come under pressure from the Trump administration, which itself does not want to wait years to see a resolution to this conflict. If Kyiv does accede, though, then this may amount to Ukraine accepting its overall defeat. It may, indeed, lose the war.
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It is worth bearing in mind that the two authors are based at King’s College London, a hotbed of Brittish intelligence and anti-Russian propaganda.
I saw yesterday a Ukrainian source claiming they had a battle plan to retake Crimea over a 10-15 year period. As long as Ukraine, supported by Nato, maintains such wishful thinking, the more Russia will have to destroy the military strength of Ukraine and ensure no Nato forces, whether ‘peacekeeping’ or a ‘coalition of the willing’ ever set foot in the area.
Clearly also, Russia must take Odessa and block Nato from establishing naval bases on the Black Sea in what was Ukraine. Bad enough for Russia to face such bases in Romania and Bulgaria.
Putin knows that sooner or later, Donbass, where the overwhelming majority of residents favour reunion with Russia, will be de facto part of Russia. Is it really a sign of weakness to want to minimise the number of casualties on both sides, but mainly Ukrainian losses?
Until Nato accepts its expansion plans cannot ever include Ukraine, there will be no peace. Just more Russian gains on the battlefield. To misquote Hemingway, “How did you collape millitarily? Two ways: Gradually, then suddenly.”
We will soon be at the suddenly stage.
Your point regarding Odessa is a really good one. Before 2014 the United States was so confident that it would be able to establish a naval base in Crimea that contract requests were sent out for remodeling schools, industrial naval facilities, military facility renovation etc. For 200 years the Anglo world has coveted a naval base and control of the Black Sea which means control of Russia since this area is the warm weather port. Right now it appears that they have been able to lock down Romania and the course of the last election was very instructive.
As the Russian are currently securing their positions north of Pokrovsk 30-35 km west of the “defense line” mentioned in the article, the good lecturer of defense studies should look in to Maginot line, flanking of or even operation Desert Storm.
If he wasn’t so focused on taking/losing ground, he might realize that withdrawing from Donbass and thus simultaneously throwing the Russians off balance and saving the forces to fight another day is pretty much the only chance Ukraine has to militarily effect the end result of the war.
Of course, at this point Ukraine likely doesn’t have the capability for a quick and controlled retreat like the Russians did from the right bank of Dnepr pretty much overnight in November 2022.
The fundamental error in this piece lies in asserting that, by evacuating Donetsk (under pressure from Trump), thus losing its line of fortified cities,Ukraine would open all of its territory to the west to Russian invasion. But, any Ukrainian withdrawal, as distinct from a loss by arms, would come with an agreement that would prohibit Russia from advancing further. I think it can be safely assumed that Russia would not violate such an agreement, unless the West violated it first, as with the Minsk agreement.
accede vs. concede… interesting word-choice, and entirelly wrong given the context.
I do wonder how the west would handle a President Medvedev or an actual hard-liner, but I guess we’ll find out in 2030. And I’d also be curious to know what are the sources of these “reliable reports” on the state of the Russian economy.
The ‘reliable reports’ are from CNBC, quoting analysts who don’t live in Russia, so there you go. But it’s a fun read. E.g., ‘Russia’s beleaguered economy, with its slowing growth and widening budget deficit…..’ and then it notes that Russia’s budget deficit has reached 2.2% of GDP and the economy is expected to grow between 1 and 2% in 2025. While those numbers aren’t as good as they used to be, they still look decent if one takes the time to compare them to other large economies (which CNBC doesn’t do, of course). Context matters.
Comparable deficit figures for USA and UK and Germany and Japan: 6.5%, 4.4%, 2.9%, 2.9% respectively (courtesy of IMF):
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXCNL_G01_GDP_PT@FM/ADVEC/FM_EMG/FM_LIDC
Comparable growth forecasts for USA-UK-Germany-Japan: 1.9%, 1.2%, 0.1%, 0.7% respectively (courtesy of IMF):
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/07/29/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2025
Russia’s economy has its issues, but I don’t see the wheels falling off anytime soon. It can continue supporting the UKR conflict at its current tempo for many more years.
So, the message for the Ukrainians keeps the same. Resist, resist! One day Russia will give up! Four years of the same message to keep Ukraine following the primrose path. At some point this will fire back as more and more Ukrainians come to the realisation they have been used as cannon fodder. The Ukrainians aren’t friends or equals, just peons sacrificed in the great game.
Look at it from the other side. There were many commentators saying Ukraine would collapse in 2022. They didn’t. The same was said in 2023. They didn’t. The same was said in 2024. They didnt. And the same has been said this year. Now this year isn’t over yet, but it is getting very close to the end of the campaign season.
Russia may be winning but they have not won yet. They have taken heavy casualties and had a fairly significant part of their young population flee the country. They have used up a lot of their inheritance of military equipment from the Soviet Union.
As far the Russian economy goes. Who knows the exact state of it. The Russian state is unlikely to be fully truthful in what it says. But their official inflation rate in july was 8.8%, interest rates ate 18%. I think we can be pretty sure that the general populace is getting squeezed.
Russia may be winning but they have not won and who knows how much longer the population will gladly send their sons to die. Putin may have to compromise and accept he won’t get everything he wanted from this war as well.
And as for Ukraine joining NATO being sn existential threat to Russia. I csn understand why they may have thought that. But based on how hard it has been for NATO to keep arms flowing to Ukraine, I’d say that fear was in mo way accurate. NATO was notnin any position to invade Russia even if it had been desired.
You mean the side of delusions? I get it.
Ukraine isn’t going to win. But that doesn’t mean the war is going well for Russia. Or do you think Putin expected this to be ongoing years after it was launched?
But I see you don’t even try to counter any of my points.
Russia would have won the first few months of the war and the Ukraine gotten real good terms in the Istanbul negotiations. But then Boris Johnson got off the plane and the entire Collective West threw everything that they had into the fight meaning that Russia was now fighting some forty countries which is why the war has been going on so long. They will win and not just against the Ukraine but also the entire Collective West which is resulting in all the hysteria that you are seeing.
They probably would have won. But would haves don’t really matter. The point is they did not win and have still not won several years later. They are winning but very slowly. I’m not convinced it isn’t in Russias best interest to make peace even if they don’t get everything they want.
Ukraine lost in about three months in to the war. Russia is currently fighting against the weight of NATO and the other usual suspects, while being the most sanctioned country in the history of sanctions and trying to avoid civilian casualties.
NATO has made it very clear that if Russia does not get what it wants, there will be a new war in the near future. This has been stated even by Russian grunts from the front lines.
I don’t think Russia will stop until NATO itself is dissolved. Which may be closer than we think but further than we hope.
If one goes by Wikipedia, the Ukrainians used up to 80.000 thousand troops to defend Bakhmut and were able to do rotations. This was during 2023 spring. Two years later, to defend Pokrovsk, according to this site, including recent reinforcements, the Ukrainians have now deployed about 24.000 troops in and around Pokrovsk. I think this is telling.
Obviously 80.000 troops, not 80.000 thousands.
We read it right in the US and UK, with the decimal separator we prefer :-)
Peace was never an option. Only infinite “Minsk agreements”, till the bitter end.
This is very true: peace has never been an option for the West (I include Trump here. He muses for peace but his actions are anything but peaceful). They only want ceasefires for regrouping. Obviously they won’t get it simply because they want to. War to the last Ukrainian is very true so far.
BTW, claim about USA wanting to fight Russia till the last Ukrainan predates SMO. I have even seen pre-SMO article debunking it as Russian propaganda. Those paying attention knew what was going on long before guns started blazing.
It doen’t make any sense to loose any minute to “counter your points”. If you wan’t to believe that inflation is the ultimate miracle weapon of the West, so be it. If you want to believe the Russians are on their last legs so be it.
I don’t think the Russians are on their last legs. I don’t think inflation will win the war for Ukraine. But neither have they won the war yet. We are about to enter another winter where the conflict will freeze. I doubt Russia is going to win it this year. Which means another year of war. Which means more Russian dead, more equipment lost.
So they can keep pushing for the maximum they can get, and keep the war dragging on. Or they can relent on some of their demands and perhaps end it sooner, having achieved most of what they want.
Russia is not relenting on its demands.
And Russia can bring Ukraine to its knees over the winter with further electric grid attacks if it wanted to.
But the most apparent flow in your argument is that Russia can’t continue the war indefinitely. It is still having 30,000-40,000 men enlist every month. Casualty levels are falling even with the pressure on Ukraine lines increasing. The Russian economy is doing just fine.
Your problem is that you are engaged in the same shortcuts the CW makes about the causes of war ant the putative interests of the Russians. Russia never had territorial interests. The Minsk agreements where signed between Ukraine and representatives of Lugansk and Donetsk Republics with a Swiss OSCE rerpresentative and the ambassador of Russia as witnesses. Russia wasn’t wanting to annex any territory. The Russians stated at the beginning of the SMO that the objectives were the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, and the protection of the civilians in the independent Republics of Lugansk and Donetsk though they were incorporated later in Russia to facilitate the intervention domestically and now they are part of Russia no matter if the CW doesn’t recognize the fact. Of course, behind this, another objective was to keep Ukraine outside of NATO. The demilitarization is on its way but still far from complete, not to mention denazification and security assurances that Ukraine will remain neutral or outside NATO. So, if you believe that Russia “has achieved most of what they want” is only because you keep deluded by the CW shortcut explanations about Russian intentions. The Russians keep saying one day after the other that any peace agreement should incorporate bullet-proof security assurances and a new architecture of European security different from NATO unlimited expansion. Russia is not relenting by any means except in some overheated heads. Russia is determined and confident now (much more than in 2022 – 2023 judging by public declarations of Russian leaders), and its leadership has much more public support than any of the CW leaders could ever dream to have. To expect that Russia will relent is extremely delusional and increasingly becoming a hard sell in Ukraine herself (Ukrainian Support for War Effort Collapses).
As a signal of Russian confidence, in their latest bombing in Kyiv the Russians targeted EU and UK assets. The message is clear IMO. At least it should be clear for anyone with ability to understand.
Based on our experience post WW2. in the US it is not hard to find those who have completely lost the ability to recognize what winning a war looks like.
“Or do you think Putin expected this to be ongoing years after it was launched?”
Actually he did.
One doesn´t even have to look at the numbers of revamped and reopened factories, of increased numbers in production plants for SUs, tanks, shells and so on. Not to mention the new missile systems and the build-up of the Pacific Fleet.
Putin bid farewell to Macron on the phone Febr. 2022 “we won´t see each other for a long time”.
He also made clear to RU General Staff in April same year they may take as much time as necessary.
Keep in mind the West has no clue of conducting war lest grasping what war is.
If you don´t have a problem with the antics of Andrei Martyanov listen to 10 minutes of his rant yesterday with Nima around min. 30.
The Russians are prepared for this, the West is not.
This is also not about taking territory as fast as possible. It is about destruction of equipment and above all killing enemy soldiers.
RU Armed Forces could have well rolled over this country in a few months and destroyed everthing in the course of such a huge operation and also taking many more casualties. But that next to all the madness many times larger then what we have now would have a been a genuine crisis and triggered some NATO reaction, I assume.
In fact US and UK military personnel voiced surprise in 2022 when SMO started for real, that RU did not do US “total” war as in Iraq. Did RU carpet bomb?
In very few comments in Western press you could read “This is not the way we would have done it.”
As to the claims Ukraine would fall – Russian High Command never said that. They have their plans knowing everything about the infrastructure of Ukraine. They have their “method”.
And if you are not member of the Russian Armed Forces officers corp you will not be invited to knowing these plans.
The issue is that no Kings College person in fact will be able to put him or herself into the shoes of Russia.
Mark Sleboda who is originally a former US Army member and I think even took some classes at LSE has been warning of the “collapse of Ukraine” myth since the war started.
What Sleboda knows, well, RU army staff will too…
p.s. Jacques Baud has an excellent book on this out since 2024 “The Russian Art of War”…
Does Russia want Ukraine to collapse?
As some have mentioned, Russia might be well served by leaving a rump Ukraine to be a future festering problem for the EU.
The USA appeared to have military victories in Afghanistan/Iraq, only to watch a collapse occur after spending 8.8 trillion over a 20+ year period.
Russia may have learned a great deal after their own experience in Afghanistan and watching the aftermath of the USA’s so-called victories in the Middle East.
Mark Sleboda was nuclear reactor technician, in a submarine, so not US Army. :)
Patrick Lancaster was on a surface ship.
Stanislav Krapivnik was US Army tankman.
Mike Jones was British Army infantryman.
John Mark Dougan was a marine, and a police officer.
The guy from WIld SIberia Youtube channel was also in the marines.
The guy from American Sputnik Youtube channel also served, in the US Army I guess.
That’s all served-in-the-west-and-now-in-Russia that I could list off the top of my head. :)
P.S. Jones and Dougan were banned from Youtube a while ago.
Yes, thanks for pointing out!
The amateur calling everything army because it has to do with arms😉
The last 4 I only heard of.
Anyone you would recommend?
Jones (aka iEarlgrey, aka Foreign Agent Intel) and Dougan are barely active since Youtube ban. They used to go to Donbass on regular basis (bringing humanitarian aid in a buhanka, and doing other things), but nowdays don’t put out much, if anything. Another foreign journalist like them is Graham Phillips, but he did not serve as far as I know, so I did not list him. He is also banned from Youtube, and barely active nowdays.
Last two are not about geopolitics, but everyday life in Russia, from their point of view. Both are freshly married with Russian wives, and go fishing, work in the garden, visit places, and stuff like that.
Sleboda has turned out to be the analyst with the best track record of all, and I do watch (listen, to be exact) everything he links to on his substack. He is regular guest on multiple shows.
Krapivnik also appears as guest on multiple other channels (like The Duran), and I listen to those when I run into them.
Brian Berletic is also a former marine, and with track record almost as good as Sleboda’s. He is not in Russia so I did not list him. Also of mixed Slavic origin, but probably without Russian wife, since he is in Thailand. :)
In spite of his experience Lancaster still looks like he does not know what he’s doing, but has the cojones to go where no one else does. Much respect for that, because he puts the life on the line. Also has a Russian wife, so there must be something about them. :)
I believe Berletic’s family is from somewhere in the Balkans from his reply to a question about how to pronounce his name. The response was was along the lines of ” people have mangled it so often that anything vaguely close was okay”.
Re Patrick Lancaster
“In spite of his experience Lancaster still looks like he does not know what he’s doing,….”
He does come across as a bit of a country bumkin. When you can fake inexperience as a journalist you’re golden. He does look amateurism but somehow hits a lot of key points and places. I guess he’s just lucky. :)
bonus trivia:
Dougan and Phillips took a lot of flak for doing interviews with Aiden Aslin, a British idiot that was captured by Russians, sentenced to death, and then exchanged (alongside a couple of his buddies). In a pathetic attempt to save his life, Aslin even decided to sing Russian anthem in Dougan interview (which you might have seen, because it was reposted everywhere).
bonus (unrelated) joke:
Since you speak German, don’t miss out on some German-English wordplay from yesterday:
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2025/08/links-8-28-2025.html#comment-4271043
I think it works in Russia’s favor to drain NATO dry trying to keep its vassal afloat, yes.
Russia has taken heavy casualties is Nato/Ukro propaganda. Russian has far more forces available than Nato/Ukro and far fewer deaths. One main aim has been to avoid casualties. Yes many young wealthy class kids left for Georgia and similar places, but most have returned, in the knowledge that Russia is a far better country for them. There is no conscription, other than the standard national service, none of whom have been sent to danger zones against their will.
Beware of western propaganda.
Sure don’t fall for Western propaganda. Don’t be so foolish to then think you are not exposed to russian propaganda. I have no idea what the exact Russian casualties are. But I’d suggest neither do you.
A lot of people seem a bit too eager to take Russian claims at face value
Please tell me what vector Russia has for “Russian propaganda”. Please identify a Russian influencer or even MSM outlet that is sympathetic to Russian interests. Citizens in Russia have actually complained how Russia sucks at info warfare.
To be fair, everyone else in the world is pitiful at propaganda, compared to the US.
would you include Israel in your “world”? they seem rather adept at propaganda.
They count as US state, or more than one.
+1
Quality, not quantity. The zionist spew stupendous amounts of bullshit, but they don’t really even bother trying to make it credible. Without USians adding their own substantial layer – whether openly contracted, or via blackmail – the genocidists would have no support at all.
I think they don’t need quality. Their targets either have a visceral reaction to any real or perceived threat to Jews (100% sincere in a lot of Jews, judging by my experience), or know that they should fake one for the benefit of those who do have that reaction and of other fakers (and some from both groups are in position to heavily punish many of those who do not play along, so there is a good cause to fake it just now). You really do not need to waste your time on some clever plausible stuff when that is what your target audience is like.
Despite of no 100% evidence available…
We have the BBC/Meduza casualty numbers on RU with 108k-150k (I personally go for the lowest estimates.)
We have the 10:1 artillery shell ratio of 2022/2023 to RU´s advantage that has even been acknowledged in our holy lands and the fact that ratio is transferrable to the actual kill ratio.
We have then the various Ukraine “leaks” by mobile phone services, or cemeteries revealing insane numbers.
We have the RU MoD figures of around 1.4M.
You wonder why trust RU?
RU has no interest and no need to lie like “our” side does.
For RU this war is existential. And the huge majority of RUs knows this.
Jacques Baud (again, sorry) has in fact an excellent rational explanation for that which lies in the simple ugly truth that NATO is loosing this war and that NATO and the AFU and SBU have no other means but fakes and terrorist attacks to respond.
Since NATO countries supply equipment but no troops all NATO has to do is keep the rabble at home in line by selling a successful war. Successful war in face of the true course of this war means, lying 24/7.
In fact I was reminded of Operation Ultra in WWII. There British Intelligence had to make up a lie for every single truly successful operation based on thwarting Enigma communications. So they published the lie and kept secret the truth. It was the largest military disinformation campaign up to that point, some say.
This experience was formative I might think, and helpful as to understand how PR, lying, mass media and the public mind work for the MI6 “culture” of today.
What we experience is an Ultra 2.0 on a global scale as far as the West is concerned.
RU has no need to do this. Their dead, their investment in this war is real.
Ukraine is probably as divided in this as is the country.
p.s. Baud pointed out that in fact even in Western Ukraine there are underground groups sabotaging AFU efforts even though those groups are not necessarily always friendly to RU but they regard the Kiev war effort as far more dangerous to the country then RU. Some of these entities seem to provide target data to RU.
I think “a government’s reports of enemy casualties during a war” is one of the least trustworthy forms of information possible, regardless of the government. Maybe we’re experimenting with telling the truth, here, but I wouldn’t trust us either. Even if we didn’t want to, we’d inevitably get the numbers wrong, simply because it’s hard to know precisely how many enemies are dead, missing, heavily wounded, lightly wounded…
“For RU this war is existential. And the huge majority of RUs knows this.”
What do you base this on? To be honest, I find it hard to tell what the population is really thinking. There certainly are some people who claim that we are fighting for our very existence. But a majority? As far as I could tell (from various polls – for whatever those are worth, but we do not have anything better), the majority is vaguely in favour of the war and Putin, but does not believe itself to be in any serious danger, much less an existential threat to the nation with everything that would imply. Most would just as easily accept a peace, even if it’s the sort of peace that the alarmists think would leave the existential threat intact.
Life goes on as usual. There is neither a widespread panic nor a patriotic mobilisation of the sort that was seen during WW2 (or WW1; it took a while for that to run out back then). There seems to be no shortage of volunteers yet, but they have other motives too and I do not think they are representative of the majority (after all, the majority has not volunteered). The population looks largely apathetic. On the one hand, I don’t think it’s all that easily affected by propaganda (IMHO it’s generally overrated, but crude Soviet overuse of it has created a higher than normal resistance here). On the other hand, to whatever extent propaganda may encourage more self-sacrifice, the government does have an interest in it – especially if it truly does believe we are in an existential struggle (here I really have no idea, not being or having access to an insider), or even if it doesn’t.
No one here is eager to take anything at face value (except maybe you).
The BBC/Mediazona count estimate about 220k Russian KIA with 125k actual names known. Their methodology seems reasonable to me. Demographically this is a very small hit and I see no evidence the Russians publics support for the war has been diminishing.
https://en.zona.media/article/2025/08/29/casualties_eng-trl
In other words, if the Russians need to fight another 3-4 years to achieve their goals they could probably do it.
I think I quoted May status.
But I also have registered that Meduza – to my knowledge – rejected to answer completely who is funding them.
So 220k? Nope.125 still strikes me as very high.
Depending on Western investors (incl. MI6?) takes you only so far.
I recall Meduza editors were actually caught on film receiving money and instructions from a representative of British Foreign Office some years back. I’m sure it was just a matter of Her Majesty’s concern of the misinformation abound.
There was also something about Mediazona starting to use some new algorithm to get a bigger casualty number, since the factual was not “good enough”.
Financiers of Mediazona complained about the “rookie numbers”, so they had to ramp it up. Still they can’t massage the numbers high enough.
I suspect that too, but to be fair to the BBC/Mediazona people, their methodology, from what I have read, is good but almost certainly gives an undercount. The problem is does the new estimation procedures make any real sense?
TBF, around 100k KIA is a quite heavy casualty. But the claims beyond that are delusional…
“And as for Ukraine joining NATO being sn existential threat to Russia. I csn understand why they may have thought that. But based on how hard it has been for NATO to keep arms flowing to Ukraine, I’d say that fear was in mo way accurate”
Come now. If NATO were fully able to access airports and land routes throughout the Ukraine, it would indeed be an existential threat to Russia. It would take only days to get operational mobile missile launchers stationed throughout the east, with NATO techs running them and US space forces guiding them.
You should send a letter to Kremlin explaining them that NATO is not a threat.
P.S. Are you the guy that blames Russia and China for genocide in Gaza?
“They (Russia) have had… a fairly significant part of their young population flee the country.”
Citation needed.
This sounds awfully close to the “Russia has had a million casualties” line.
Part of population did flee. Part commonly known as 5th column. That’s why Putin’s approval rates increased. On the other hand, much more of those that want to live in Russia came, and brought their land with them. I would call that a good trade for Russia.
It’s certainly a good trade for Putin. I would note, however, that a lot of the people who left the country support Putin and the war, sometimes more fervently than most of those who stayed. (This is anecdotal, but I’ve been receiving a lot of such anecdotes from people who had visited the countries to which they fled over the years.) It’s just that, for whatever reason, many of them did not want to risk getting mobilised. Many others wanted to keep their jobs and happened to be working for a company that deemed it necessary to move its operations elsewhere.
Then again – as mobilisation fears abated and life abroad proved harder than expected, a lot of the people who left then started to quietly move back in, “fifth columnists” and others alike.
Still, no question that this played out to our government’s advantage more than to its disadvantage.
Anecdotally, Belgrade is full of Russians (and Ukrainians) that hate Putin.
Most of what I’ve heard to this effect was about Armenia and Kazakhstan, so I wonder if “loyalists” tend to stay closer to home. Though there is no shortage of “haters” there too – it’s just that the emigres are bitterly divided about this, not united in opposition.
I do know some implicitly anti-Putin sorts who moved to Serbia, myself. I think it’s seen as mostly comfortable, culturally pro-Russian but politically neutral. The really hardcore liberals don’t tend to like that but for others it’s a decent compromise.
Russia didn’t see it that way and the U.S. knew it. Moreover, one can as easily say that the strength of Ukraine’s resistance shows, from that Russian perspective, that they were right to not wait. This is not a defense of Russia’s invasion, but a criticism of my government for not compromising to forestall the foreseeable war. I see this failure, along with previous U.S. actions in Ukraine, as a violation of both the UN Charter and the Budapest Memorandum. So both sides are in violation, not just Russia.
Col Jacques Baud has said that Russia intervened in Ukraine to protect Russians living in Ukraine under a provision of the UN charter. So the intervention was legal under international law.
It certainly sounds reasonable to me.
Two points: first, winter does not freeze the conflict. If you recall, Avdiivka fell in February 2024. Second, there is no peace Russia can seek here. For four years the collective West has rhetorically backed themselves so tight into a corner that the only peace they could accept from Russia is unconditional surrender.
So leave Russia to ensure their own survival, and give up the sill notions they should surrender. The collective West simply will not let go of their hegemony, that’s the real barrier to peace.
Methinks I detect the beginnings of a legend. How the Ukraine had its own Maginot Line in the form of the Fortress Belt that not only protected the interior of the Ukraine, but in fact protected all of western Europe from the invading Mongols, errr, Russians. And the brave Ukrainians, particularly the Azov forces, had fought the Russians to a standstill for three years and all was going well until the Russian economy would eventually blow up causing them to sue for peace and thus leading to a Ukrainian victory. But then Trump came in and wangled a deal with Putin, betrayed the Ukrainian people and that they were forced to hand over their Fortress Belt to the Russians without a fight. Lindsay Graham may have tried to stop him but in the end, it was Trump that lost the Ukraine. They were stabbed in the back, I tells ya. Stabbed in the back.
No doubt that’s how it will be.
At least for 18-24 months. But too many tectonic plates have started shifting and there will be serious fractures on the regime-state-economic level in the West over the next five years
There is a precedent for it (with unf Godwin implications): Czech fortifications in Sudetenland.
[I]n the end, it was Trump that lost the Ukraine
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Hmmm. It has has just occurred to me that the amount of obloquy to be loaded onto Trump in 2029 – assuming he doesn’t leave the presidency the is going to be very close to infinite. That, if nothing else, is going to stoke the fires of contempt and hatred for everyone who is not him. The question is, I posit, when will he decide he has wrecked and abused to county (and world) enough that he has maximized his chance of staying in power?
Looks like a best seller, book and movie, to me Get writing and establish premiere author’s rights. We expect an invitation to the Academies at least.
I stopped at “the state we now call Russia”.
The territory ruled from Kiev is a Lenin/Stalin whim! Administrative establishment,
Trump is with the program. Since Churchill ruled at Potsdam.
“Loss” in Kiev’s lust for Stalin’s SSR is a tactical loss. The strategic level is US vs BRICS.
Deep state is using Kiev as a flanking operation.
Is this what Yves is referring to as ISR?
Yes.
I take a small grain of comfort from this analysis that the author presumably must concede that after RF does complete the penetration of the final defensive belt of the “four cities” in western Donetsk region (which I think is a certainty; Ukraine does not have sufficient infantry or fires to hold on to it), negotiation with RF for peace terms will (finally) make sense from a Ukrainian perspective.
One suspects at that point, though, that the point of view will change to one advocating retreat to the western bank of the Dniepr River and the waging of partisan warfare in the territories occupied by RF.
The Soviet Union prepared for a NATO invasion. Hence concrete bunker style apartments and the extreme redundancy of the electricity grid (compare it to NE US). Russia is now having to overcome those defensive barriers that the USSR constructed. They were well constructed, but will ultimately fall.
Again. Even though Russia controls only 20% of Ukraine’s landmass, it is roughly 85% of their potential GDP (which is why Ukraine wanted it so badly).
Again. Russia will form a land bridge to Transnistria consisting of the entirety of the Black Sea Coast, including Odesa. There are those who claim Russia wants no part of the organized crime infested Odesa. They forget that the whole of Russia was organized crime in the 90’s, and Russia brought it to heel.
When Russia accomplishes this, it will leave rump Ukraine a landlocked, bankrupt welfare state consisting of mostly farmland. In addition, the ethnic Russians in Transnistria will be relieved of their ‘quasi’ blockade and guaranteed their rights.
“according to Russian officers captured by the Ukrainians”
Reading the linked article itself, should read instead
“According to Ukrainian soldiers claims of what ‘captured Russian officers told them'”
Every other source for that claim is even less credible.
My theory was always that Russians are concerned with occupying a territory with the hostile population and being subjected to Western funded insurgency. Slow rate of advance has two advantages: one, population has enough time to move out so they are capturing territory but not unwilling population; two, they are elimanating the most motivated, most anti-Russian segment of the population.
Ukraine is done as a country, its population is down to 20 million or less, predominantly older with little reproductive capacity. Young people will continue to emigrate in high numbers. So any postwar Ukraine will be an economic basket case with high retiree-to-working population.
My suspicion is that postwar Ukraine will be ruled by president Zaluzhny and be split up into criminal principalities run by different nationalist militias (Axon, Kraken, etc.) that will leverage their wartime organization for criminal gains. That will last a few years until internal turmoil makes the population welcome a Russian intervention.
This is why Russians are less concerned about territory, they know time is on their side, Ukraine has entered a irreversible and terminal population decline. So they know they have won the war, they are now trying to preserve their ability to take over postwar Ukraine and reshape it on a Belorussian model.
This rings true to me and has the further advantage of fitting the existing situation and the last 3 years.
I am still surprised Z opened the borders for 18-22 y.o. Is it a bid to build up a large diaspora style community? Will he let the parents follow? Weird.
The movie character Patton’s blithe dismissal of fortifications belies the fact that his Third Army got bogged down for weeks around Metz.
The fact that Coppola wrote “Patton” and this bit about Coppola by John Milius always was cause for mean laughter:
He sees himself as a great humanitarian, an enlightened soul who will tell you such wonderful things as he does at the end of Godfather 2 — that crime doesn’t pay … Talent-wise, he’s no John Ford; character-wise, he’s no Steve Spielberg. Francis can’t stand to have any other creative influence around … Francis Coppola has this compelling desire to save humanity when the man is a raving fascist, the Bay Area Mussolini.
Indeed considering how Coppola always sold himself (the generous intellectual, more insecure victim than relentless “maker”) there is huge dishonesty, not a bit unlike the Patton myth that you´re pointing at…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7h8gWqEJcU&t=63s
Larry Johnson | NATO stunned as Russian Special Forces enter Odessa
If true, this action by Russia is over.
If true what? Clickbait title? Based on the shirt, the video is stolen from Redacted video, with less clickbaity title (though they also go overboard too often).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8B7HWj2TSrQ
For Larry Johnson’s stuff it’s always better to check his site directly, and not give views and promotion to those that steal content.
For another view about Russians, strategy and Ukraine, see this from the Armchair Warlord.
This is excellent, thanks for posting. Humiliation is far more powerful than mere conquest. Lasts longer, stronger aftertaste. I suspect this is exactly the mindset in the Kremlin and the RU MOD.
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: there remains a non-zero probability that Z will reach an accomodation directly with P. Without the involvement of the Yankees or the Euros.
I’ve wondered about this for some time.
Ukraine probably has lost, what, 1/3 to 1/2 of pre 2014 population? Maybe 6-7 million took their land to Russia, another 6-7 million went West, and up to 2 million dead, with a lot of deaths and migration falling among the economically, and more importantly, biologically productive populations. This means, by now, Ukraine is already dead as a country. It probably is no longer viable as it was already demographically precarious to begin with. I was curious, if the permission by Kiev for the young people to leave the country is based on this recognition: the only hope of a Ukrainian nation, so called (that is totally separate from the “Russian” family of nations), surviving is through a diaspora in the West.
I suppose I’m being quite evil secretly hoping that the West will frustrate that hope by sending them back…
In war, the enemy gets a vote. Even if you’re winning, you’re not the ultimate decision maker–the enemy’s posture delimits your response.
What will the west vote for? Given that the west knows Ukraine will win the war, what “losing” outcome will it prefer? On the one hand, you have “frozen conflict” with Russia controlling (for sake of argument) at least the four oblasts and Crimea or maximally the four oblasts + Crimea + Odessa + land bridge to Transnistria. In this scenario, Ukraine retains a rump–larger or smaller depending.
One the other hand, you have “force Russia to take all of Ukraine.” In this case the war drags on, Russia calls up a million reserves, Russian forces cross the Dnieper, at some point there’s a crisis in Ukraine and the government goes into exile somewhere.
Which is better, from a western perspective? The first option results in a tar-baby rump Ukraine that wags the western dog and sucks in enormous resources as a garrison state. It will be unstable and unpredictable. Huge head-ache. Very expensive politically and materially. A bleeding ulcer.
The second option means the tar-baby is Russia’s. They have to occupy and supply the garrison, while the west need only support a government in exile and a covert guerrilla movement in country–a comparatively cheap prospect: dirty war of a kind the west has experience developing successfully (as in Syria). A bleeding ulcer for the Russians.
The machiavellian west I think will vote for total “defeat” in the hope that the west can turn it into a pyrrhic victory for the Russians. So I doubt there will be any peace agreement to address Russia’s security concerns and cede the four oblasts + Crimea to them.
If Russia is forced to take Lwow, I think the game will have fundamentally changed: Alexander I solution will be in play, whether by design or not–neither the Vistula nor the Rhine will stop the Russians, I think.
Yes, T90s rolling down the Picadilly might be a Pyrrhic victory for the Russians. But what about the West?
Nah. Picadilly will be conquered by the people from countries that British used to conquer, that have been landing in rubber boats. Russians migh just speed up the process by sending an Oreshnik or two, and maybe some weapons for the “moderate rebels”. Things are already slowly brewing in the British Isles, and we just might live long enough to see a well deserved balkanization for once.
I think Russia might prefer that Poland take Lvov, as they have their own memory of Bandera, while Hungary will get some of SW Ukraine. Russia will be contiguous with Transnistria. Poland and Hungary would then be conduits for the EU funds that will need to pour to those regions.
Even fiercely nationalist populations have a limit for how much war and death they can endure. And guerilla wars are particularly brutal for the populations that support the insurgencies. I suspect part of the Russian plans are that their meat grinder approach is both killing future potential insurgents and sapping the will of the civilian population to support such an insurgency in the future.
If you can imagine these scenarios, can’t the Russians themselves likewise and choose accordingly?
I thought Putin has said clearly that all four oblasts that voted to join the Russian Federation have to be vacated by Ukraine, permanently. So I’m not sure why Thornton makes the above statement as the basis for his argument. The only possibility for a ceasefire that Russia has mentioned is to allow AFU soldiers to withdraw from the four oblasts once they have agreed to do so. And that means a temporary ceasefire but not an overall end to the hostilities. It really is confounding how so many western analysts claim to have inside knowledge of what Putin is telling Trump he wants when Putin has said multiple times quite openly what that is.
>>>Trump can’t look soft on Ukraine. He has to at least have enough in the way of optics to keep the nutters at bay.
Trump had a very narrow window to dump the Ukraine, err Freedom Project ™.
His classic-Trump dithering (spun as 4-D chess by some of his supporters) cost him that window. He owns Ukraine now, but he doesn’t know it.
ymmv
I agree, he had a window to act, but it’s closed. If Ukraine goes down now, he will be blamed.
But America is so stupid and fickle on this “losing wars”. I thought one of Biden’s finest moments as President was finally getting America out of Afghanistan, but he was pilloried in the MSM for it.
Why? I’m not sure. He didn’t get America into Afghanistan, and he didn’t make the agreement for getting out (Trump, to his credit, did that). Plus he was criticized for HOW the military got out. I’m pretty sure he didn’t order the military to [family blog] that up so it was really on the military leaders in charge as to that mess.
The only reason Biden got out of Afghanistan, is the fact that the next war is in the pipeline. The order was to GTFO ASAP, because Slava Ukraine can’t wait. Trump is still there because he can’t make up his mind about the next big one. He preferes smaller kind, where he can declare victory at any moment and GTFO, while keeping Ukraine at the backburner.
What’s really the problem here, is the idea that figurhead presidents have agency beyond the superficial level (skin tone, and teatrics).
Trump never had a chance to dump the Ukraine, because it’s all connected. This is not some isolated confilct that he could just write off like a bad investment, but just one 2D plane on the 4D chessboard. That’s how Berletic and Sleboda, and Russians, knew that nothing big will change with Trump. Those that hoped for a change, should have put down the hopium pipe when doing the analysis.
“according to reliable reports on the state of its economy”
You got to appreciate the cheek of the author for pulling out this old chestnut.
When has there been a reliable report on the imminent collapse of the Russian economy?
Russian articles are positing that Ukrainians are trying to hold the line with drones which is having limited effect. This effect is most noticeable in cities where infiltration units are finding the defense so porous they are actually in and among the drone operators because there’s no infantry in the buildings.
This has put up tactical problems and tactical opportunities.
The opportunities are obvious. The two or three man infiltrators use massive tactical support and fire preparation to attack and this means they have good communications to relay their position and that of the enemy to the support. If the support can pinpoint the drone operators through their electromagnetic signature then the infiltrators can deal with them. This pinpointing problem has been the tactical problem since the war went drone as the drone operators use frequency-agile signal repeaters between them and the drones.
The problems are also self-evident. The cities are large and the infiltrators are playing hide & seek against explosive drones trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack.
This brings to light the old thinking of the report; city fighting like all fighting has changed but they either haven’t accepted it or they’re not telling us. Cities are not a rerun of The Battle of Stalingrad, they’re more like a horrid video game. In this way cities can be denied to the attacker.
But it also means cities are now far less relevant as they do not shelter large amounts of the enemy who can suddenly sally out of them.
What’s missing from Thornton’s analysis are some fundamental facts. Russia, for example, borders 14 different countries, as well as being separated from Japan and its US military bases by a narrow strip of water. It is no surprise that Russia’s foreign policy, taking into account 16 countries on its border is, from a security point of view, far more complex than what the US faces.
Second, Besides EU NATO member countries, NATO has what’s referred to as “Global Partners” and countries like Japan, Australia, Mongolia, Pakistan, and others are a part of it, and regime change or interfering with energy supplies is not beyond its mission.
Moreover, the Ukraine Russia border is more than a thousand miles and nearly impossible for Russia to secure and protect if Ukraine were a hostile member of NATO.
Thornton hangs his hat on the assumption, “Handing over the remainder of the Donetzk oblast, with its ‘fortress belt’ of fortified cities, would clear the way for a rapid Russian advance into central Ukraine.” Yet, Putin wants to negotiate for this area because were he to fight for it, this would take Russia years and Russia’s economy “cannot remain on a war footing for too much longer.” I see no hard evidence that Russia’s economy is failing but lots of evidence Ukraine’s economy is finished.
It’s obvious Ukraine cannot last without US support. Nonetheless, let’s assume Ukraine was part of NATO when Putin launched his SMO. What would the US and NATO do differently? How would it defeat Russia? It’s clear to me that Putin demonstrated NATO is not nearly as strong as it pretends to be and peace and cooperation are the only alternatives.