Yves here. I hate having to pay attention to prediction markets because the increasing popularity of gambling is a sign of social breakdown, although that tendency has been well greased by having regulators actively seek to have very low cost financial trading, which encourages speculation as opposed to investment.
By Parker Bach, PhD Student in Media and Communication, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Originally published at The Conversation
Though prediction markets have been legal in the U.S. for less than 18 months, they can’t stop making news and making money.
On prediction markets such as Kalshi and Polymarket, users can stake real money on just about anything, from the winner of the 2028 U.S. presidential election to when Taylor Swift will get married.
But this isn’t simple entertainment: In theory, these wagers serve as a means of collecting the public’s insights into the future.
That’s why you may have seen CNN’s pundits casually mention Kalshi’s election odds for the 2026 primaries, or watched CBS offer real-time Polymarket projections of which actors would win awards during the Golden Globes.
Existing research on the principles and history of prediction markets suggests they can be a valuable way of pooling collective knowledge about the future.
But as researchers like me, journalists and legislators race to understand the impact these markets are having on society and politics, several questions have emerged about the regulation of these platforms and their forecasting abilities.
The What and Why of Prediction Markets
In practice, prediction markets are quite simple.
Each market offers what are known as “event contracts” on whether some future outcome will occur. Each contract costs between 1 and 99 cents, paying out US$1 if the event occurs or nothing if it does not.
Similar to sports betting, purchasing a contract represents a wager. There are higher returns for positions on outcomes deemed less likely. Like in the stock market, a trader can buy and sell contracts over time, as odds – and thus prices – fluctuate.
At the time of writing, Kalshi traders put the odds of the passage of the SAVE Act, legislation centered on requiring proof of U.S. citizenship to register to vote, at about 10%. So each contract for this outcome costs 10 cents. If I think the act is more likely to pass than that, I could purchase some “shares” and sell them at a higher price if the odds go up in the future. If I hold them and the bill ultimately becomes law, I would receive a return that’s 10 times what I originally paid.
Two theories support the idea that prediction markets should excel at forecasting: the wisdom of crowds and the efficient market hypothesis.
First described over a century ago, the wisdom of crowds refers to the idea that the median judgment of a large, diverse group of people operating independently is often more accurate than that of a single expert.
A related argument appears in the efficient market hypothesis, which emerged in the mid-20th century among economists who championed free markets. It holds that prices encode all available information, reflecting the collective judgments of profit-seeking sellers and deal-seeking buyers.
At their best, then, prediction markets aggregate collective intelligence to weigh the likelihood of future events.
Polling’s Credibility Crisis Creates an Opening
Gambling on the outcomes of the day’s events has a long history. In 16th-century Italy, gamblers could wager on the election of civic magistrates and the outcome of papal conclaves. And from the 1880s to 1930s, New York City was the hub of political wagering, which sometimes exceeded the stock market in daily volume.
Reporting on bets ahead of the 1924 presidential election, The New York Times observed, “It is an old axiom in the financial district that Wall Street betting odds are ‘never wrong.’”
However, the rise of scientific polling and legal crackdowns on political wagering forced prediction markets to fade to the background.
That changed in 2024.
One month before the U.S. elections, a federal court granted the prediction market startup Kalshi permission to legally operate prediction markets concerning U.S. election results.
Around the same time, Elon Musk posted on X about Donald Trump leading Kamala Harris in prediction market odds. Trump followed suit. Kalshi put up billboards with live election odds in Times Square. Users and dollars flowed in. By election day, a volume of over $500 million in presidential election bets had been traded on Kalshi alone. Polymarketfeatured over $3.6 billion more in volume.
Trump now leading Kamala by 3% in betting markets. More accurate than polls, as actual money is on the line. https://t.co/WrsqZ2z8pp
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) October 7, 2024
Political polling, meanwhile, was facing a crisis of confidence. Response rates had been declining for decades, and Trump voters had been undercounted in 2016 and 2020.
The polls forecast the presidential election as a coin toss. The prediction market, meanwhile, favored Trump at roughly 60% odds to win.
After Trump won at the ballot box, prediction markets declared victory over polling as the new, trustworthy forecasters of public opinion.
The Utility of the Markets
Over the past 50 years, journalists have increasingly incorporated quantitative data in their reporting, and audiences have come to expect political forecasting as part of their news diet.
With polling experiencing a crisis of confidence, prediction markets have become an increasingly attractive way for journalists to offer a data-backed snapshot of public beliefs.
Prediction markets have other advantages over polls for journalists. They respond to events in real time, and they’re free to access. Polls, meanwhile, take time and money to administer. They provide forecasts for political outcomes that go beyond elections – such as Cabinet nominations and Supreme Court decisions – which are usually outside the purview of polling.
In recent months, Kalshi and Polymarket have inked several partnership deals with news outlets. There’s a symbiotic relationship at play: Prediction markets provide journalists with data to report and discuss. Journalists, in turn, legitimize prediction markets by citing them as a trusted source.
Prediction markets have historically performed well on elections. Whether they’re more accurate than polls on other kinds of questions is still up for debate.
If traders behave purely rationally, in the economic sense, they might flit between positions to maximize profit based on new information, personal biases aside.
But when wagering on elections, most traders have seemed to consistently buy and sell only one position, rather than switching between them. They may think they’re trading rationally while exhibiting a “wishful thinking” bias. Or, like many sports bettors, they may be wagering out of fandom or for entertainment.
All of these scenarios could undercut the accuracy of these markets.
The Elephant in the Room
Many journalists are embracing the data even as their news outlets run stories about concerns over insider trading in predictive markets. Because the outcome of events is often determined by human actors, those privy to certain plans – say, a looming ceasefire deal – would have access to information not available to the public and could profit handsomely off that information.
Two anonymous accounts made hundreds of thousands of dollars predicting the downfall of Nicolás Maduro and betting on the toppling of Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, with traders putting their money down just before the U.S. took military action. This timing has raised some eyebrows.
Kalshi prohibits insider trading, and in early 2026 it fined and suspended two high-profile traders who were using inside information.
Likely in response to bad press and statements from lawmakers seeking to regulate the platforms, Kalshi and Polymarket also announced new insider trading rules on March 23, 2026, centered on politics and sports.
A single secret account made $500,000 off of betting precisely right when Trump would go to war with Iran.
We have a corruption crisis in America, and new prediction markets are making it worse.
Today, @ChrisMurphyCT and I introduced a bill to crack down on this corruption. pic.twitter.com/niLg9GnC5V
— Congressman Greg Casar (@RepCasar) March 17, 2026
The legal mechanisms for enforcing these rules, however, are less clear. SEC Rule 10b5-1 prohibits trading securities on the basis of material nonpublic information.
But event contracts are not governed by the SEC. They’re under the purview of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a much smaller agency. As things stand, the small agency has too few employees to regulate the legality of specific event contracts, which are governed by the Commodity Exchange Act. Kalshi and certain other prediction market platforms are instead given the latitude to self-certify the legality of each contract.
Any efforts to meaningfully regulate insider trading would, in my view, require clear rules and viable enforcement mechanisms.
From Participation to Profit
As I conduct my research, I often consider what the booming popularity of prediction markets says about American culture and politics in 2026.
In 1969, sociologist Erving Goffman theorized that Americans’ attraction to gambling stemmed from a need for “action” in an increasingly bureaucratized society. Similarly, studies have suggested that betting on sports makes fans feel like they’re participating, not just observing.
Congress is less productive than ever. Most Americans feel they have little influence over the workings of the government, with many looking on helplessly as democratic guardrails have been dismantled.
Who knows what will happen in the coming year. The filibuster might be weakened, or the U.S. could invade Cuba. Most Americans will have little say. But prediction markets at least offer the chance to make a buck off the action.


Great article! Thank you.
Two things stick out to me about how these markets can’t provide good information on what will happen. And one on why they can’t provide good information to journalists on what will likely happen.
Firstly, your average US citizen has no insight into what is going to happen with regards to a vote in congress or a war starting. They either make a guess on what they think will happen or what will give them a big win. They don’t know what is happening behind the scenes to influence these decisions.
Secondly, when it comes to predicitng elections it is only giving the views of the section of the population that votes. And again only says who they think will win or whose win would profit them most. It doesn’t even tell you who these individuals will vote for.
The last point I have is that gambling firms are known to change odds to balance the bets they hold. To make sure they have no or little over all loses. If 90% of people are placing bets on candidate A winning then the company will change the odds to encourage people to place bets on candidate B.
Yes, as more people bet on outcome A, the price of that contract rises. So instead of a bookie adjusting the line to balance bets on both sides, you have a computer algo adjusting the price to balance supply and demand. There are some articles about how Polymarket makes markets.
As for lay people making bets with no knowledge, or from a specific segment, I think efficient market hypothesis says that these dumb bets would get compensated by smart money. Like if I place 100k bet on LeBron James winning in 2028 (he’s a option), the price of an LBJ contract will momentarily rise. But then the smart money will see that inefficiency and bid everyone else back to the presumably logical level.
The stock market works the same way. Dumb money loses to smart money.
Soooo many concerns with this article… I’ll list two:
First, I have the same complaint about ‘prediction markets’ as I do about cryptocurrencies: In an attempt to claim that what they are doing does not fall under current regulation, their inventors and shills have come up with a whole new set of terms to describe traditional activities, thus claiming that their currency wasn’t a security, and thus not regulated by the SEC; that it’s a ‘prediction market’, and not a regulated futures transaction, or a state-regulated gambling enterprise.
Second, the author claims that for journalists prediction markets are better than polls, by focusing on their free access and broad range of topics. But he sweeps under the rug the fact that information from prediction market wagering is sourced only from those who gamble with money. Quality polling is supposed to define source populations accurately, and where necessary, explain and adjust for potential gaps in the desired population. The anonymity of prediction markets makes no such effort (and thus cannot also provide detailed analysis of specific patterns in those polled, relegating their value only to ‘mob’ sentiment). The assertions about the supposed value to media are undermined by one of his links, which found, as it relates to social media, “…that despite social media users not reflecting the electorate, the press reported online sentiments and trends as a form of public opinion that services the horserace narrative…”. Nobody has shown that that prediction market participant populations indeed accurately reflect the electorate — the example of ‘predicting’ the recent Trump win is not a valid proof.
Regulation of gambling has typically been up to state governments, and the prediction markets crowd cleverly found a loophole in structuring wagers as financial futures contracts, thus throwing regulation to the CFTC. States are working to grab the regulatory power back by asserting that this activity is just traditionl gambling, and we’ll see if state power can actually overcome a fully captured federal regulator.
It would seem like you are confusing people betting on a candidate with they themselves voting for a candidate. The idea of a prediction market is that if someone thinks they have better analysis or information about the candidates, they can make money. Smart money isn’t placing hopium bets.
In reality, if you follow these markets, they generally follow the polling. For example, if a new poll comes out tomorrow showing AOC leading the dem field, you can expect to see an immediate sharp adjustment in the market. In other words, the polling data drives polymarket most of the time. I mean, if Wall Street believed that there was enough money to be made, they could conduct their own poll and use that to drive their polymarket bets. Anything for an edge.
I’m no fan of prediction markets, but I am fascinated by them.
Some “researcher”, lol. Author points out the credibility crisis in polling, proceeds to make zero mention of prediction markets’ own emerging credibility crisis, vis a vis the whole, erm, Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle of it all, i.e. the motivation these observers have to try to change the system being observed, as they have money on the line.
Suffice to say, this journalist has a very different take on the utility of prediction markets to journalism:
https://www.timesofisrael.com/gamblers-trying-to-win-a-bet-on-polymarket-are-vowing-to-kill-me-if-i-dont-rewrite-an-iran-missile-story/
Cory Doctorow covered this angle with his usual acerbic insightfulness a few days ago:
https://pluralistic.net/2026/03/24/degenerated-gambling/#oracle-capture
When I played blackjack & craps in casinos, little did I know that I was investing in prediction markets.