Category Archives: Credit markets

The 7 Things Really Wrong with the Treasury’s GSE Reform Plan

As readers no doubt know, the Treasury Department released its overdue plan for reform of the Fannie and Freddie, otherwise known as GSEs (for “government sponsored enterprise”) last Friday. We were surprised that some normally astute commentators, such as Mike Konczal and Felix Salmon, were taken in by this thin and misleading document. As banking expert Chris Whalen said by e-mail, “The proposal is completely disingenuous. Read 180 degrees opposite what it says.”

What is particularly striking is it is not very difficult to difficult to see through the stage management. Throughout the document, the Treasury calls its proposal a “plan” when it is anything but. Putting some stakes in the ground and then offering three mutually exclusive alternatives and no timetable for resolution is not a plan.

The reason for this failure to put forward a real proposal is that Treasury is trying to present itself as a fair broker of a politically fraught process. But that’s bunk. The outcome, unless the public wakes up to this new effort at looting, is already clear.

The fix is just about in.

Our Response to the Center for American Progress Objection to Our Post on Its GSE Reform Proposal

Readers have hopefully had the opportunity to read “The Center for American Progress Objects to Our Critique of Its GSE Reform Plan”, which contained an e-mail by David Min of the Center for American Progress presenting its bones of contention.

While we appreciate that the CAP has gone to the trouble to communicate with us directly, we are not persuaded by its arguments.

We’ll recap the e-mail and then address the issues individually:

1. You need to have some form of government guarantee to have a mortgage product that is fair to middle class consumers (his writing is a bit confused, at one point he uses “no” when he means “yes”, but this is the drift of his gist).

2. We’ve mistated who would eat “catastrophic risk” under the CAP scheme, since the Catastrophic Risk Fund and the new mortgage insurer investors would take losses first

3. Not all “banks” are behind or support the CAP proposal

4. This plan is the best option for the public and less lucrative to the financial services industry than a “privatization” model

Let’s dispatch these arguments in order.

Irish Bond Haircuts: Too Little, Too Late

The justification for Lenihan’s ruinous guarantee of both bank deposits and senior bondholders was partly a legal one. Irish law, like UK law, makes it hard to favour depositors ahead of bondholders; so FDIC-style resolutions aren’t an option. One might object that laws can be changed by sovereign governments, but the other justification was political: […]

Why are Half of the FCIC Interviews Being Withheld?

The FCIC has made a great show of being transparent, but if you are going to make that your signature, you can’t engage in halfway measures. Lambert Strether, in an e-mail titled “A data conversion effort that shows FCIC’s “Resource Library” is farcically bad and obfuscatory” noted:

Obviously, any independent evaluation of the material is not at all a priority with these guys. Yes, they’ve made it easy enough to DISTRIBUTE, and no doubt there will be an iPhone app any day now. Yay. But as far as making it easy to EVALUATE, which takes data you can interchange and manipulate and search, everything they have done makes that harder. Every single thing.

More tooth gnashing from Lambert here and here.

Another mystery is why so many interviews are being withheld.

Paulson Denies Culpability in Crisis, Yet Even Bear Turned Down His Deals

The release of the first batch of FCIC interview reveals interesting finger-pointing among some of the major players. We’ve argued (and in ECONNED, provided a considerable amount of supporting analysis) that the subprime shorts drove the demand for bad mortgages. There is no other explanation for the explosion of demand for “spready,” meaning bad, mortgages that started in the third quarter of 2005. As Tom Adams and I describe in a recent post:

Signs of recklessness were more visible in 2004 and 2005, to the point were Sabeth Siddique of the Federal Reserve Board, who conducted a survey of mortgage loan quality in late 2005, found the results to be “very alarming”.

So why, with the trouble obvious in the 2005 time frame, did the market create even worse loans in late 2005 through the beginning of the meltdown, in mid 2007, even as demand for better mortgage loans was waning? It’s critical to recognize that this is an unheard of pattern. Normally, when interest rates rise (and the Fed had begun tightening), appetite for the weakest loans falls first; the highest quality credits continue to be sought by lenders, albeit on somewhat less favorable terms to the borrowers than before.

In other words: who wanted bad loans?…

James Galbraith: Deficit Hawks Down – The Misconstrued “Facts” Behind Their Hype

By James K. Galbraith, a Vice President of Americans for Democratic Action who teaches at the University of Texas at Austin. Cross posted from New Deal 2.0.

Economist James K. Galbraith goes behind the scenes at a Pete Peterson gathering of deficit hawks to see what they have to say.

The Fiscal Solutions Tour is the latest Peter G. Peterson Foundation effort to rouse the public against deficits and the national debt — and in particular (though they manage to avoid saying so) to win support for measures that would impose drastic cuts on Social Security and Medicare. It features Robert Bixby of the Concord Coalition, former Comptroller General David Walker and the veteran economist Alice Rivlin, whose recent distinctions include serving on the Bowles-Simpson commission. They came to Austin on February 9 and (partly because Rivlin is an old friend) I went.

Mr. Bixby began by describing the public debt as “the defining issue of our time.” It is, he said, a question of “how big a debt we can have and what can we afford?” He did not explain why this is so. He did not, for instance, attempt to compare the debt to the financial crisis, to joblessness or foreclosures, nor to energy or climate change. Oddly none of those issues were actually mentioned by anyone, all evening long.

So Why is the FCIC Protecting Bernanke & Co?

Yes, the question in the headline is rhetorical. We know that great efforts have been made and are continuing to be made not to reveal certain aspects of the financial crisis, and the only rationale that makes an iota of sense is the information would embarrass certain people in power.

The latest object lesson is the failure of the FCIC to post the full recording of its 2009 interview with Bernanke. The rationale is that the interviews contain “legal or proprietary information”, so it is being withheld for five years. Are these people unable to use a calendar? The critical phase of the crisis was pretty much over as of end of 2008. Any sensitive customer or transaction position information from that period is now stale.

Deep T: Australian Banking System on Unstoppable Path to Collapse or Government Bailout

Yves here. This long and informative post on the pending train wreck in the Australian financial system might seem to be too narrow a topic for most Naked Capitalism readers, but it makes for an important object lesson. Australia managed to come out of the global financial crisis largely unscathed because its banks did not swill down toxic assets from the US (chump quasi retail investors were another matter) and it benefitted from the commodities boom.

Nevertheless, one might think its bank regulators might see what happened abroad as a cautionary tale. Mortgage debt took center stage in the crisis, and Australia is in the throes of a serious housing bubble. Yet as this post describes, the regulators seem asleep at the switch as to one of its major drivers.

By Deep T., a senior banking insider who is fed up with his colleague’s reliance on public support. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.

Previously I have posted on how the major banks recycle capital in The Capital Rort. I want to extend that subject by showing how mortgage ‘rehypothecation’ in Australia has led to the massive expansion in liquidity available to Australian banks which is at the root of the mortgage affordability issues in Australia and has put Australia’s banking system on the unstoppable path to collapse or government bailout.

GSE Headfake: Yet More Looting Branded as “Reform”

As time goes on, the various Ministries of Truth just get better and better at their stock in trade. We’ve gone from artful obfuscation like “extraordinary rendition”, and “Public Private Investment Partnerships” to stress free “stress tests” (particularly the Eurozone version) designed to get bank stocks up and credit default swap spreads down, to even grosser debasement of language. What passes for the left has for the most part been dragged so far to the right that the use of once well understood terms like “liberal” and “progressive” virtually call for definition. And the word “reform” has virtually been turned on its head. Financial services reform was so weak as to be the equivalent of a jaywalking ticket; health care reform was a Trojan horse for even large subsidies to Big Pharma and the health care insurers. But GSE reform takes NewSpeak one step further by turning the “reform” concept on its head and using the label to describe an effort to institutionalize even bigger subsidies to the mortgage industrial complex.

While Team Obama appears to have backed down from the trial balloon floated by the Center for American Progress (note that press reports give another rationale) and is expected to offer a menu of choices for “reform” in its overdue white paper on Friday, don’t be fooled. The proposals coming from the lobbyists expected to have real influence on which ideas get the green light are virtually without exception serving up such a narrow menu of choices as to constitute unanimity. We offered our take as of the release of the CAP report; a subsequent proposal by Moody’s Mark Zandi (see details here) is more of the same.

It’s as if a population suffering from a toxic reaction to mustard was now offered options ranging from Dijon to pommery to spicy brown as meaningful improvements.

Questioning Goldman’s “Market Making” Defense

The notion underlying the Volcker rule is that too big to fail institutions have a government backstop and therefore their activities should be restricted to the types of intermediation that support the real economy. The taxpayer has no reason to fund “heads I win, tails you lose” wagers. Various firms, most notably “doing God’s work” Goldman, has tried to play up the social value of its role, whenever possible wrapping its conflict-of-interest ridden trading activities in the mantle of “market making”.

A big problem in taking about market making versus position trading is that, Goldman piety to the contrary, the two are closely linked. Even though all the major dealer banks created proprietary trading operations to allow top traders to speculate with the house’s capital, plenty of positioning also takes place on dealing desks. While dealers are obligated to make a price to customer (well, in theory, it’s amazing how many quit taking calls in turbulent markets), they are shading their prices in light of how they feel about holding more or less exposure at that time. And the dealing desks, just like the prop traders, are seeking to maximize the value of their inventories over time.

A Goldman discussion of risk management presented yesterday (hat tip reader Michael T) gives reason to question that much has changed on Wall Street regarding the role of position taking, now taxpayer supported, in firm profits.

Is AIG Getting Yet More Presents from the Treasury, Meaning the Chump Taxpayer?

On the one hand, as we pointed out, the Treasury has from the get go of its ongoing rescue of AIG engaged in continued subsidization of the giant insurer, starting with the all too frequent restructurings of its financings. The net effect was not simply to provide more dough to the AIG, but to put the taxpayer in a worse and worse position. The taxpayer effectively owned AIG, with the first financing secured by all the assets of the company and further holding 79.9% of the equity. The first rule of being a creditor in a troubled company is that you want the most senior position in the capital structure, always. That rule was repeatedly violated with AIG.

The latest until now took place in the pre-IPO restructuring, which looks to have provided a further $6 billion to AIG.

Amended Complaint in LPS/Prommis Solutions Litigation Provides More Details of Alleged Kickbacks, Impermissible Fee Sharing

e’ve been following litigation against Lender Processing Services, which among other things is the leading provider of default management services to mortgage services in the US, handling over 50% of foreclosures. The complaint that is moving forward the fastest (and fast in litigation land is not all that fast) is the Mississippi Northern District Bankruptcy court and alleges that Lender Processing Services along with another service provider in the default services space, Prommis Solutions both engaged in impermissible sharing of legal fees (only law firms are permitted to do legal work; even referral fees are consider not-kosher fee splitting). This case is seeking class action certification, and the Chapter 13 Trustee for the Northern District has joined the plaintiffs on her own behalf and for all Chapter 13 Trustees as a class.

Lender Processing Services continues to give investors the impression that there is nothing to see here. In a conference call last week, its only mention of this case was that its motion for summary judgment was “outstanding” which is technically accurate but more than a bit misleading. Consider: while LPS has tried to depict this case as a mere “fishing expedition”, its general counsel attended a procedural hearing in late January. How often do general counsels of public companies sit in on unimportant litigation in geographically disadvantaged location?

And the hearing did not go well for the defendants.

Mirabile Dictu! SEC is Taking a Hard Look At Bad Mortgage Practices

While it is far too early to break out any champagne, the Powers That Be seem to be taking notice of the continuing train wreck in courtrooms all over the US as far as banks’ ability to foreclose is concerned. Apparently, the American Securitization Forum’s “Drive on by, nothing to see here” mantra is becoming less and less convincing with every passing day.

It’s worth nothing that only the Financial Times seems to be carrying this story (yours truly did check on key word variants in Google News and came up empty-handed). They also deem it to be worthy of front page placement. This is only an isolated sighting, but one of the features of the runup to the financial crisis was an ongoing news disparity between the Financial Times and US business press, particularly the Wall Street Journal. The FT would pick up on stories that seemed important and were too often either completely ignored or reported by the American financial outlets only in in a selective manner. So if we see more bypassing of inconvenient news by the usual suspects in the US, take heed.

What is particularly interesting is that the SEC seems to be targeting specifically the sort of abuses that we have chronicled at length on this blog…

Florida Foreclosure Mill King David Stern Shows Crime Sure Did Pay

The Associated Press has a juicy story on the rise and fall of Florida’s foreclosure mill kingpin David Stern (hat tip Lisa Epstein). It combines sordid detail with an account of how his business as a business went wildly off the rails.

For those new to this blog, the Law Offices of David Stern was the biggest foreclosure mill in Florida, one of the first to be targeted by a state attorney general, and per both reports on the ground as well as revelations from official and media investigations, one of the worst abusers of court procedures and borrower rights.

Aside from depicting how utterly out of control Stern was as a businessman, the AP story helps explain how the mortgage business got to be such a horrorshow. Moe Tkacik, a financial writer who has poked around the dark corners of the securitization and muni finance businesses, and I chatted a couple of nights ago about the foreclosure crisis. One of the questions that was nagging at her was who came up with the idea of robosigning?