Category Archives: Credit markets

Pending Legislation in VA Would Give End Use of MERS, Give Borrowers More Foreclosure Defenses

The securitization industry may be about to reap the whirlwind of its failure to take the need for reform seriously. As we’ve indicated, industry incumbents have adopted a denialist approach to widespread evidence of serious documentation problems and procedural abuses, and have fought reasonable, pro investor proposals tooth and nail.

The Washington Post reports on several pending legislative proposals in the state of Virginia, all of which seek to level the power imbalance between the financial services industry and mortgage borrowers. The interesting thing about this pushback is that Virginia is not at all left leaning state. These measures instead appears to result from the fact that it has one of the fastest foreclosure processes in the US.

Should We Believe Jamie Dimon’s Crocodile Tears Over How Much Mortgages Have Cost Banks?

Jamie Dimon told the press on Friday that the mortgage crisis has been costly (but not TOO costly) for JP Morgan. From MarketWatch (hat tip Lisa Epstein):

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Chief Executive Jamie Dimon said Friday that the foreclosure process is a “mess” that’s cost the financial-services giant a lot of money.

Dimon also said litigation over troubled mortgage securities is “going to be a long, ugly mess,” but won’t be “life-threatening” for J.P. Morgan….

More Reasons Why Banks Should Worry About Ibanez Decision

Banks and the securitization industry have been spinning the Ibanez decision as hard as they can, even going so far as to put forward Baghdad Bob style claims that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling said that mortgage assignment in blank worked, when a reading of the ruling show the polar opposite.

Georgetown law professor Adam Levitin has done a bit of digging to see if the securitization industry defenders’ claims, that most mortgages in RMBS meet the documentation standard set forth in Ibanez, actually holds up. He find that many deals fail to meet the decisions’ requirements:

Greenspan Put, aka “Be Nice to Banks”, Trumped Recognition of Housing Bubble in 2005

In an interesting bit of synchronicity, we’re getting other “how did we get there” snippets from the global financial crisis today. Bloomberg reports that the Federal Reserve actually did see that a housing bubble was underway, but stuck to its guns of measured interest rate increases. The problem is that its account is far too kind to the Fed and comes awfully close to being revisionist history:

Federal Reserve staff and policy makers identified a housing bubble in 2005, and failed to alter a predictable path of interest-rate increases to slow down the expansion of mortgage credit, transcripts from Open Market Committee meetings that year show….

The FOMC in June heard presentations from staff economists, with some raising alarms about housing markets, the transcript shows. Those warnings didn’t translate into a more aggressive policy. The committee raised the benchmark lending rate a quarter-point at that meeting and said “policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured.”..

SIGTARP on Citi Rescue: Ignoring a Bomb That Has Yet to Be Defused

On the one hand, I must confess to a “I love the smell of napalm in the morning” response to reading the SIGTARP report on the extraordinary assistance extended to Citigroup, starting in November 2009. The well-documented, blow by blow account, taken from the perspective of regulators, dovetails neatly with the reports here and on other blogs during those fear-filled, gripping times. (As an aside, frustratingly, the media is treating some factoids in the account, such Citi’s reliance on over $500 billion of uninsured foreign deposits out of a $2 trillion balance sheet, as news, when it was noted repeatedly in the blogosphere, particularly here).

But on the other hand, the SIGTARP report is annoying, in that it fails to connect some critical dots, diminishes the importance of its key finding, and is far too complimentary to the officialdom.

Securitization Industry Defenders Present Even More Dubious Defenses

Wow, having liability on opinion letters on securitizations will lead law firms to try to pass off distorted readings of court decisions to save their bacon.

The latest example is K&L Gates, one of the signers of the executive summary of an American Securitization Forum paper issued last November. It endeavored to defend securitization industry practices that have led securitization trusts which own mortgages to have difficulty foreclosing. Even thought its claims are increasingly being rebutted in court decisions, the ASF cohort seems to believe that if it tells the Big Lie long enough and loudly enough, the problem will go away. But judges have this funny habit of being very independent, so I sincerely doubt this strategy has any chance of succeeding.

DC Puts Its Bankster-Friendly Solution for Foreclosure Fraud on the Table

We’ll analyze a proposal to fix the foreclosure mess put out by a DC think tank known as Third Way. Normally this blog steers clear of delving into random policy documents. In this case, though, it is likely that Third Way is speaking for the administration.

Third Way is an influential think tank whose board is composed of a special Wall Street-type – the Rubin Democrat. These people sit at the nexus of politics and finance, and are conduits for big bank friendly information flow into the administration and Congress. The President of the think tank, Jonathan Cowan, was the Chief of Staff for Andrew Cuomo at HUD in the 1990s, and Third Way is well known in policy circles for delivering ‘politically safe’ and well-packaged conventional wisdom. Oh, and one more thing – the new White House Chief of Staff Bill Daley, who just left the most senior operating committee of JP Morgan, was on their Board of Directors.

So by looking at this proposal, we are looking at the state of play among high level policy makers in DC, particularly of the New Dem bent. This is how the administration will probably try to play foreclosure-gate.

Their proposal, not surprisingly, is yet another bailout.

Richard Alford: Why Has the PPIP Scandal Been Swept Under the Rug?

By Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed. Since then, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side. I long ago stopped reading the reports by SIGTARP and ceased following Treasury’s PPIP program. It was a mistake. […]

Barclays’ Bob Diamond to Non-Bankers: Drop Dead

Bob Diamond, Barclays’ chief executive officer, no more said something as inflammatory as “drop dead” to the UK Treasury select committee yesterday than Gerald Ford did in a 1975 speech refusing to extend financial assistance to save New York City from bankruptcy. But the substance was every bit as uncooperative.

Despite its artful packaging, Diamond’s presentation was yet another reminder of the banking industry’s continued extortion game, namely, that they can take outsized, leveraged risks and when they work out, pay themselves handsome rewards, and when they don’t, dump them on the taxpayer. And they’ve only been encouraged to up the ante. Not only did they get to keep their winnings from their last “wreck the economy” exercise, no senior executive was fired, no boards were replaced, and UBS was the only major bank required to give a detailed account of how its screwed up so badly as to need government support. And before you tell me Barclays was never bailed out, tell me exactly how well it would have fared had any other major UK or international bank failed, or had the officialdom not provided extraordinary liquidity support when interbank funding dried up.

Satyajit Das: European Death Spiral – End Games

By Satyajit Das, the author of “Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives”

Politics now increasingly dominates the economics. Commenting about the EU bailout of Ireland, the Irish Times referred to the Easter Rising against British rule asking: “was what the men of 1916 died for a bailout from the German chancellor with a few shillings of sympathy from the British chancellor on the side”. An Irish radio show played the new Irish national anthem to the tune of the German anthem.

In Greece, the severe cutbacks in government spending have resulted in strikes and violent protests on the streets of Athens. Faced with cutbacks in living standards, Europeans are fighting back. The Rolling Stones’ late sixties anthem has been resurrected in Europe: “Everywhere I hear the sound of marching, charging feet, boy/ Summer’s here and the time is right for fighting in the street, boy.”

Warning Sign or False Positive – Divergence Between Stock and Credit Markets on Eurobanks

One of the noteworthy features of 2007 was a pronounced divergence in sentiment between the bond and stock markets, with the credit indices sending out warning signals while equities continued to soar higher. This is hardly surprising; an old joke is that the bond market predicted 9 of the last 4 recessions.

We are seeing the same type of divergence again, this time in European bank stocks. And if the credit worry warts are correct, this could be a harbinger of bigger shocks.

SEC Enforcement Chief Khuzami Under Scrutiny Over Citi Settlement

We were very critical of the SEC settlement with Citigroup, negotiated by its head of enforcement Robert Khuzami, over Citi’s failure to report losses on subprime holdings as the market for those holding tanked. In our post “The Wages of Sin: Former Citi Execs Pay Token Fines for Lying to Investors,” we remarked:

Satyajit Das: European Death Spiral – Communicable Diseases

By Satyajit Das, the author of “Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives”

Communicable Diseases

European politicians and central bankers have provided useful geographical clarifications. Prior to succumbing to the inevitable, the Ireland told everyone that they were not Greece. Portugal is now telling everyone that it is not Greece or Ireland. Spain insists that it is not Greece, Ireland or Portugal. Italy says it is not in the “PIGS”. Belgium insists it was no “B” in “PIGS” or “PIIGS”.

EU pressure on Ireland to accept external “help” was to safeguard financial stability in the Euro area, as much as rescue Ireland. However, contagion is proving difficult to prevent.