Category Archives: Doomsday scenarios

Kevin O’Rourke on the Irish/Eurozone Mess

This INET video focuses on how Ireland got into its mess as well as the domestic and international political dynamics as to how it is being resolved. There is an interesting tension between the cool talking head style and some of the coded descriptions of the stresses and the stark choices at hand.

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Alexander Gloy: Merkel to Sinn: “In my office. NOW.”

Yves here. Outbreaks of candor and foresight among the political classes are so rare that they bear watching. As Gloy’s sighting suggests, they have to be arrested quickly lest they prove to be contagious.

By Alexander Gloy, CIO of Lighthouse Investment Management

Hans-Werner Sinn, head of German research institute Ifo, has just put his life into peril. He had to pick a Swiss magazine (“Bilanz”) to express what nobody else is allowed to mention in Germany: “Greece is a bottomless barrel”.

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Michael Hudson: Will Greece Let EU Central Bankers Destroy Democracy?

Yves here. This is a long and important post. Hudson reports that he has gotten a great deal of correspondence from Greece saying that articles like this arguing against the pending stripping of Greece by banks are being translated and circulated widely to provide moral support. If you cannot read this piece in full, please be sure to read the discussion at the end of how Iceland stared down its foreign creditors.

By Michael Hudson, a research professor of Economics at University of Missouri, Kansas City and a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Cross posted from CounterPunch.

Promoting the financial sector at the economy’s expense

When Greece exchanged its drachma for the euro in 2000, most voters were all for joining the Eurozone. The hope was that it would ensure stability, and that this would promote rising wages and living standards. Few saw that the stumbling point was tax policy. Greece was excluded from the eurozone the previous year as a result of failing to meet the 1992 Maastricht criteria for EU membership, limiting budget deficits to 3 percent of GDP, and government debt to 60 percent.

The euro also had other serious fiscal and monetary problems at the outset. There is little thought of wealthier EU economies helping bring less productive ones up to par, e.g. as the United States does with its depressed areas (as in the rescue of the auto industry in 2010) or when the federal government does declares a state of emergency for floods, tornados or other disruptions. As with the United States and indeed nearly all countries, EU “aid” is largely self-serving – a combination of export promotion and bailouts for debtor economies to pay banks in Europe’s main creditor nations: Germany, France and the Netherlands. The EU charter banned the European Central Bank (ECB) from financing government deficits, and prevents (indeed, “saves”) members from having to pay for the “fiscal irresponsibility” of countries running budget deficits. This “hard” tax policy was the price that lower-income countries had to sign onto when they joined the European Union…..

At issue is whether Europe should succumb to centralized planning – on the right wing of the political spectrum, under the banner of “free markets” defined as economies free from public price regulation and oversight, free from consumer protection, and free from taxes on the rich.

The crisis for Greece – as for Iceland, Ireland and debt-plagued economies capped by the United States – is occurring as bank lobbyists demand that “taxpayers” pay for the bailouts of bad speculations and government debts stemming largely from tax cuts for the rich and for real estate, shifting the fiscal burden as well as the debt burden onto labor and industry.

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On the Shortcomings in US Nuclear Emergency Plans

I normally leave the nuke/Fukushima aftermath beat to George Washington, but furzy mouse sent me a link to this very straightforward and well done video by Arnie Gunderson of Fairewinds.

This evokes weird parallels to what we learned in the wake of Hurricane Katrina: it was obvious more needed to be done to protect public safety, but no one was willing to do it. And in visit to New Orleans over the Christmas holidays, I learned the levees have not been made higher as the Army Corps of Engineers recommended. All that happened was the breaks in the levees were patched.

Gunderson gives a straightforward account of theory v. probable practice in a nuclear accident:

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“Debtors’ Prison”: Bob Kuttner on the Costs of Rentier Rule

Bob Kuttner has an elegant and important article at American Prospect, “Debtors’ Prison“. It’s an evocative, historical form of the argument made here and elsewhere: that advanced economies have gone down a disastrously bad path in not writing down debt that can’t realistically be paid.

The usual poster child for “why not writing down debts is a bad idea” is Japan, but that isn’t gripping enough to evoke the right responses. Even though its post-bubble growth has been dreadful, Japan is still a well-run, tidy country with a low crime rate, universal health care, long life expectancy, and tolerable unemployment. That in turn is due to factors that do not obtain much of anywhere else: Japan was very cohesive to begin with, and its elites chose to have their incomes fall relative to everyone else to save jobs. Wage compression at large companies has increased dramatically. This is the polar opposite of what has happened in the rest of the world, where the gap between the haves and the have-nots has widened.

Kuttner provides another set of examples as to why we need to get the creditor boot off all our necks:

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Will Greeks Defy Rape and Pillage By Barbarians Bankers? An E-Mail from Athens

Wow, this is what debt slavery looks like on a national level.

The Financial Times reports that a new austerity package is about to be foisted on Greece. It amounts to asset stripping and a serious curtailment of national sovereignity:

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Michael Hudson: Breakup of the euro? Is Iceland’s rejection of financial bullying a model for Greece and Ireland?

Yves here. This piece describes how voter opposition may derail rule by bankers via IMF, European Commission, and ECB austerity programs in Europe.

By Michael Hudson, a research professor of Economics at University of Missouri, Kansas City and a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Cross posted from CounterPunch.

Last month Iceland voted against submitting to British and Dutch demands that it compensate their national bank insurance agencies for bailing out their own domestic Icesave depositors. This was the second vote against settlement (by a ratio of 3:2), and Icelandic support for membership in the Eurozone has fallen to just 30 percent. The feeling is that European politics are being run for the benefit of bankers, not the social democracy that Iceland imagined was the guiding philosophy – as indeed it was when the European Economic Community (Common Market) was formed in 1957.

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Fed’s Use of $80 Billion Facility as Subsidy Vehicle Confirms Regulatory Deficiencies

Bob Ivry has done a solid job of reporting on some of the documents that Bloomberg forced the Fed to release through a Freedom of Information Act request. In short form, the Fed created a special facility called the single-tranche open- market operations. It was established in March 7, 2008, the week before the Bear meltdown, and continued through the end of December. The facility size was $80 billion and the program was limited to 20 primary dealers. Three groups, Credit Suisse, Goldman, and Royal Bank of Scotland each borrowed at least $30 billion at various points.

Why is this program now controversial?

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Former Treasury Restructuring Official Supports View That Dodd Frank Resolution is Failure Prone

As readers may know, we’ve been engaged in a long-running argument with a persistent Administration defender on the subject of Dodd Frank resolution, which is the one of the big arguments used for not doing much to make the TBTF banks less TBTF (see here for the latest in the series). The argument goes that since they will be allowed to fail, and they can be resolved non-catastrophically, the problem is solved. We’ve gone through the FDIC’s example of how they say they could have used the new powers under Article II of Dodd Frank and pointed out numerous (ahem) unrealistic assumptions, as as well as made more general arguments against its viability with anything other than a purely domestic institution. It’s also worth noting that a number of domestic banking and bankruptcy experts, as well as the BIS Cross-border Bank Resolution Group and the Institute for International Finance have also expressed serious doubts about the viability of Article II resolutions.

The latest critique comes from former Treasury official Jim Millstein who was the chief restructuring officer and headed the AIG rescue

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Marshall Auerback: IMF’s Predatory Policies Likely to Continue with New Leadership

By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist and hedge fund manager. Cross posted from New Deal 2.0.

It doesn’t matter who leads the IMF when the institution is governed by ideology.

Greece and Ireland appear to have lost an important political ally with the sidelining of Dominique Strauss-Kahn as both plead for more financial assistance from European partners to avoid an early restructuring of debt. The key word is “appears,” as in truth, arsenic remains arsenic, even if it is coated in sugar by an ostensible champagne socialist like Mr. Strauss-Kahn.

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Lehman, Resolution Regime Failure, and Credentialism as a Mask for Weak Arguments

It’s telling in extended blogosphere debates when one side starts resorting to cherry picking, distortions, ad hominem attacks, and projection as its main lines of attack. In his last offering on the FDIC’s paper which uses Lehman to show how it would use its new Dodd Frank resolution authority, Economics of Contempt proves only one thing: that he’s not interested in open or fair-minded discussion (see here to see what that might look like) and that he wants to put a stop to it.

So, mindful of the possibility that I might simply be feeding a modestly upmarket troll, it seems that all I can do now is illustrate how he has misrepresented my arguments; for instance, by absurdly suggesting that I missed the fact that the FDIC would be on site, in its Lehman counterfactual, when I raised a completely different issue, that their presence would become too large and too intrusive to keep secret (EoC seems blissfully unaware of the fact the word was all over the markets when the FDIC went in to kick the tires of Citi’s portfolio of loans to see-through buildings in the early 1990s).

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David Apgar: Trash Trichet’s Stockholdings to Save the Euro Zone

By David Apgar, the founder of ApgarPartners LLC, a firm that helps companies and development organizations learn by treating goals as assumptions to be tested by performance results. He blogs at www.relevancegap.blogspot.com.

The best hope for the euro zone may be to find a few bank stocks rattling around in European Central Bank (ECB) Governor Trichet’s brokerage account. There’s no chance that the long-time French civil servant would compromise his policy views to benefit himself, but it’s the kind of made-for-muddled-media factoid that, if found, could put a quick end to the farce he and the ECB perpetuate in pretending Greece is not bankrupt. Europeans tolerate this farce and the crisis it prolongs only because it will suppress the euro and block export-led recovery in the US. And if there’s one thing more attractive to the Euro-policy crowd than ending a crisis of the euro, it’s blocking US recovery.

A leader in this week’s Economist lays out the dimensions of the problem.

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Jeffrey Frankel: The ECB’s three mistakes in the Greek crisis and how to get sovereign debt right in the future

Yves here. While Frankel’s take on the ECB’s errors has some merit, his recommendation, of imposing much harder limits on eurozone members who run deficits in excess of permitted levels, is more debatable.

Any country running a large intra-eurozone trade deficit is going to show rising debt levels. If the increase in debt funds investments that increase economic productivity, that might work out fine in the long run, but that seldom proves to be the case. We’ve seen that big debtors either rack up rising government debt levels directly (Greece) or have rising private sector debts that eventually result in outsized financial sectors that produce financial crises that lead to collapses in tax revenues that then lead to rising government debt levels (or directly via bailouts, see Ireland). Note in most countries the explosion in debt to GDP is primarily the result of the impact of the global financial crisis on tax revenues). So fiscal deficits cannot be addressed independent of trade and cross border capital flows.

By Jeffrey Frankel, Professor of Economics at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard. Cross posted from VoxEU

It is a year since Greece was bailed out by EU and IMF and there are many who label it a failure. This column says that while there is plenty of blame to go around, there were three big mistakes made by the European Central Bank. Number one: Letting Greece join the euro in the first place

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More on Greece Restructuring and Eurozone Worries

While the Euro recovered from its stumble last week and the EU officialdom put out a round of denials of a story on Friday that Greece was considering an exit from the eurozone, the Euro tea leaf readers are still chewing over the significance of a not at all secret secret meeting over the weekend. The trigger is the fact that Greece is already on the verge of breaking the terms of its loans last year. This is hardly a surprise; austerity does not work and the Greek debt burden was clearly unsustainable. Per the Guardian:

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Geithner Blocked IMF Deal to Haircut Irish Debt

Was the US Treasury Secretary’s deep sixing of a plan by the seldom-charitable IMF to give the Irish some debt relief Versailles redux? By that I mean the Treaty of Versailles, the agreement at the end of World War I devised by the victors to dismember the German economy. Bear with me as I tease out this conceit.

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