Category Archives: Investment banks

Goldman Ex-Prop Traders Flopping on Their Own

John Whitehead is being proven right.

Debunking the Myth That an SEC Capital Rule Change Helped Cause the Crisis

There is a great post by Bethany McLean at Reuters debunking a major “what caused the crisis” urban legend. Many, including Joe Stiglitz and Alan Blinder, have claimed that an SEC 2004 rule change regarding the leverage of securities firm holding companies allowed the leverage of major investment banks to skyrocket, helping to trigger the crisis. McLean’s article demolishes this idea.

Quelle Surprise! SEC Fails to Sanction Big Banks for Fraud

Ed Wyatt of the New York Times has released an important story tonight on how the SEC goes easy on big banks by giving them exemptions to laws meant to stop securities fraud. This report stands in stark contrast to a Reuters story which repeats the favorite Administration mantra: it’s really hard to prosecute financial-related cases. It sure is when you don’t chose to use the powers you have.

The gist of the Times piece is that the SEC gives the biggest banks like JP Morgan and Goldman waivers so that they can continue to have ready access to the financial markets without a lot of hassle. The overview:

Adam Davidson, the 1%’s Lord Haw-Haw, Fellates Wall Street

Although I endeavor to treat high dudgeon as an art form, it is difficult to find words adequate to convey the level of ridicule and opprobrium that Adam Davidson’s latest New York Times piece, “What Does Wall Street Do for You?” deserves. I had the vast misfortune to come across it late last week, and have gotten an unusually large volume of incredulous reader e-mails about it. Ms. G’s e-mail headline “NYT – Not a Parody” was typical:

This one is so bad, even for NYT, I’m wondering if the paper wasn’t secretly sold to Murdoch, Bloomberg & the Fed Reserve sometime in the past few days.

“Summer” Rerun: Why Big Capital Markets Players Are Unmanageable

This post first appeared on July 8, 2009

John Kay comes perilously close to nailing a key issue in his current Financial Times comment, “Our banks are beyond the control of mere mortal” in that he very clearly articulates the problem very well but then draws the wrong conclusion:

Felix Salmon Misreads AAA Bond Demand to Say “Overcaution” Caused Crisis

Lordie, I can’t believe someone who professes to understand markets has written, at length, that caution, no, “excess of overcaution,” was a major contributor to the criss. Or has Felix Salmon been spending too much time with lobbyists from ISDA and SIFMA?

I hate seeming rude, but Felix has a habit of tearing into Gretchen Morgenson for errors much less significant than the one he made in a post today. He wrote, apropos this chart, which comes from FT Alphaville:

Ezra Klein Should Stick to Being Wrong About Health Care

A recent post by Ezra Klein, “What ‘Inside Job’ got wrong,” manages the impressive feat of being spectacularly off base, rhetorically dishonest, and embarrassingly revealing of the lack of a moral compass all at once.

Since being off base is a major part of Klein’s brand, I suppose one should not be surprised; those who’ve had the good fortune to have limited contact with his output can read Jon Walker’s “Ezra Klein: Insurance Exchanges Don’t Work and Must be Expanded Dramatically,” or Physicians for a National Health Care Program’s “Does Ezra Klein really think ‘managed care didn’t kill anyone’?” for two of many examples.

I’m going to shred this piece in some detail, first, because it will be entertaining, and second, I hope that it will encourage readers to take a cold, bloodyminded look at the excuses made for malfeasance in our elites.

Mirabile Dictu! SEC Probes Relationship Among Toxic CDO Sponsor Magnetar, Merrill, and CDO Manager

It has taken forever for the SEC to probe the workings the biggest sponsor of toxic CDOs and of course the agency is going after only one highly publicized doggy deal. Nevertheless, the SEC has finally decided to look at the less than arm’s length relationship between the hedge fund Magnetar, whose Constellation program played a central role in blowing up the subprime bubble, and its collateral manager, which in this case a Merrill affiliated firm called NIR. As we will discuss, collateral managers were critical because they effectively served as liability shields for the other participants.

Note that Magnetar does not appear to be the target; the Financial Times reports that the SEC is examining how the deal’s underwriter Merrill sold the deal and how it worked with NIR.

Goldman Sycophants of the World Unite! You Have Nothing to Lose but Your Virtually Non-Existent Reputations!

The Goldman defense against the Levin report is so late and so pathetic that it looks increasingly evident that the bank is simply hoping to cause confusion and muddy the waters rather than mount a frontal, fact-based rebuttal. Mind you, sniping and innuendo can prove reasonably effective if done persistently and loudly enough. The book Agnotology describes how Big Tobacco managed to sow doubt over decades of the link between smoking and lung cancer well after the medical evidence had gone from suggestive to compelling.

The first Goldman salvo was an Andrew Ross Sorkin piece on Monday which we deemed as unpersuasive. While it did point to an error in the Senate report, it failed to make a real dent the report’s findings, and most important, the notion that Goldman staffers, in particular Lloyd Blankfein, were pretty loose with the truth.

The most contested statement is the Blankfein denial that the firm had a “massive short” position; as Matt Taibbi points out today, the only way out on that one is to get into Clintonesque parsings of the word “massive”. Given the overwhelming evidence that Goldman intended to get out of its mortgage risk in late 2006 and its staff DID get the firm short in February 2007, then reversed that position in March to correctly catch a short term bounce (the market recovered from March to May, when it went into its free fall). And in the March-May period, it was still getting as much crap product out the door and lying to clients about its position in the deals, claiming its incentives were aligned when its effective short position in the deals meant the reverse, that it would profit if they tanked, which they did.

But focusing on the “massive short” issue is misdirection pure and simple.

Goldman Subpoenaed Over Levin Committee Hearing Findings

On the one hand, this is just a subpoena of Goldman from the Manhattan DA’s office, but on the other, after all the crisis investigations, we finally have a prosecutor somewhere deciding to take some abuses during the crisis seriously enough to see if they add up to a legal case. (Yes, the SEC did file a suit against Goldman on one synthetic CDO, one transaction out of 25 in its Abacus program, which Goldman settled for $550 million, but this was litigation on one deal, not on broader patterns of misconduct).

And it came not out of the splashy but designed not to accomplish much FCIC, but the quieter and more tenacious Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. I hardly ever do media briefings, but I was on the blogger call for both reports, and the contrast was night and day. The FCIC briefing was softball PR, with Phil Angelides and Brooksley Born (who by definition had not done the work and therefore were not big on detail) leading the call. The Senate call was led by staffers who demonstrated impressive command of the products and industry economics and transmitted information at a very high bit rate.

Not surprisingly, the information request comes from a local prosecutor. The DoJ continues to be missing in action.

Tough Swiss Regs Induce UBS to Consider Glass Steagall Lite Partition, So Risky Ops May Become US Problem

Switzerland has taken the sensible move of recognizing that it cannot credibly backstop banks whose assets are more than eight times the country’s GDP. It is in the process of imposing much tougher capital requirements, expected to be nearly 20% of risk-weighted assets, well above the Basel III level of 7%.

UBS apparently plans to partition the bank in a Glass-Steagall lite split, leaving the traditional banking operations in Switzerland and putting the investment bank in a separate legal entity outside Switzerland. This resembles the approach advocated in the preliminary draft of the UK’s Independent Banking Commission report, of having retail banking and commercial banking separately capitalized.

The problem is that the devil lies in the details.

Lehman, Resolution Regime Failure, and Credentialism as a Mask for Weak Arguments

It’s telling in extended blogosphere debates when one side starts resorting to cherry picking, distortions, ad hominem attacks, and projection as its main lines of attack. In his last offering on the FDIC’s paper which uses Lehman to show how it would use its new Dodd Frank resolution authority, Economics of Contempt proves only one thing: that he’s not interested in open or fair-minded discussion (see here to see what that might look like) and that he wants to put a stop to it.

So, mindful of the possibility that I might simply be feeding a modestly upmarket troll, it seems that all I can do now is illustrate how he has misrepresented my arguments; for instance, by absurdly suggesting that I missed the fact that the FDIC would be on site, in its Lehman counterfactual, when I raised a completely different issue, that their presence would become too large and too intrusive to keep secret (EoC seems blissfully unaware of the fact the word was all over the markets when the FDIC went in to kick the tires of Citi’s portfolio of loans to see-through buildings in the early 1990s).