Good to see Moody’s rebuilding its franchise. Their aura of mystery is still reassuringly intact, two years after the subprime CDO ratings fiasco; as a bemused Firedoglake notes, in connection with two diametrically opposed, and politically charged, opinions about the tax cuts and their projected effect on the US credit rating: Can someone tell me […]
Read more...By Satyajit Das, an international expert on financial derivatives and author of Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives.
Nicholas Phillipson (2010) Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life; Allen Lane
Matt Taibbi (2010) Griftopia: Bubble Machines, Vampire and the Long Con That Is Breaking America; Random House
Joe Nocera and Bethany McLean (2010) All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis; Portfolio
Hamish MacDonald (2010) Mahabharata in Polyester: The Making of the World’s Richest Brothers and Their Feud: New South
Jeff Kingston (2011) Contemporary Japan: History, Politics and Social Change Since the 1980s; John Wiley
Read more...n theory, I’m a wee bit late to the item at hand, a suit by failed mortgage bond insurer MBIA against Morgan Stanley on a second mortgage deal. But in practice, I’ve not seen any commentary on it and the suit has some interesting wrinkles.
Before we get to the details, however, a general issue: looking at this case is like deciding which of Cinderella’s bad sisters is less ugly. While mortgage bond originators and sponsors did not cover themselves in glory in the later years of the subprime business, MBIA is no prize. Of all the monolines, MBIA was the most dubious. In addition to the general, and now well known problem with the industry business model, that they were running at such high leverage levels that they could not take on any real risks, MBIA has its own special cause for concern, namely a less-than-arms-length reinsurance operation. And management has major ‘tude. I’ve never read investor reports that were as haughty and obviously truth-stretching as MBIA, and thus any claims it makes about the merits of pending litigation need to be taken with a fistful of salt.
Read more...On the one hand, I’m being proven somewhat wrong in my dismissive views of the impact of Dodd-Frank. Credit default swaps, a product I’ve viewed as essential to rein in (it’s a fee machine for Wall Street that has produced clear harm and has almost no socially productive uses) have fallen markedly in volume prior […]
Read more...By James K. Galbraith, the author of The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too. He teaches at The University of Texas at Austin. Cross-posted from New Deal 2.0, this post originally appeared at Common Cause. Obama must break his devil’s pact with the banks in order to succeed. […]
Read more...By John Y Campbell, Adi Sunderam, and Luis M Viceira, first posted at VoxEU The historically low yields on Treasury bonds are the hallmark of a bubble, according to some commentators. This column analyses the relationship between bond yields, the stock market, and inflation over the past 50 years. It finds that the riskiness of […]
Read more...By Viral Acharya, Professor of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, Thomas F. Cooley Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business and Faculty of Arts and Science, New York University, Matthew Richardson, Professor of Applied Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University, Richard Sylla, Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New […]
Read more...By Dr. Pitchfork, an iconoclast who writes at Daily Bail. The little-known story behind the House’s initial rejection of TARP from Bill Isaac’s new book Senseless Panic. — Bill Isaac was Chairman of the FDIC from 1981-1985 during one of the most tumultuous decades in American banking. He oversaw the banking system during the Latin […]
Read more...The Wall Street Journal has a report on Goldman’s new efforts to rebuild its damaged brand. The problem, of course, is that this is certain to be just that, a branding/marketing exercise, not an plan to make fundamental changes. And why should it be? Goldman, even with the heat it received and the fines it […]
Read more...By Marshall Auerback, a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, and a market analyst and commentator. Crossposted from New Deal 2.0. It’s time to put the perps of this scandal in jail. Yves Smith, Bill Black, and Mike Konczal have already done yeoman’s work in seeking to explain the lender fraud scandal in the securitized […]
Read more...Today, quite a few commentators fell in with the take of the writeup by Real Time Economics on a speech by Paul Volcker given a conference on macroprudential regulation hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Its lead-in: Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker scrapped a prepared speech he had planned to deliver at […]
Read more...Tom Adams and I saw an advance screening of the Charles Ferguson film Inside Job, a documentary on the financial crisis, due for theatrical release in New York on October 8. Given how well each of us knows the subject matter, we’re not easily swayed, but I can speak for both of us in giving […]
Read more...The Financial Times provides an update on the Mess That Ate the Markets, circa September-October 2008. As we’ve harped on, Lehman’s bankruptcy advisors have been remarkably unhelpful in providing much insight on why the firm had such a big hole in its balance sheet. The previous estimate we had seen was $150+ billion (a swing […]
Read more...The disastrous twins, ratings agency credit ratings and RWAs (risk weighted assets), are still embedded in Basel III. Dodd-Frank does not like this much. The ratings agencies are still a big part of Basel III, though the December draft does allow for the alternative possibility of using bank-internal models for assessing credit risk. Alas, the […]
Read more...Arriving at the rush, with extra impetus doubtless imparted by the recent and ongoing Eurobanking panic, we have the Basel III capital and liquidity reforms (there’s a one pager, a full press release and, oh, not wholly unexpectedly, a somewhat anticlimactic phase-in timetable). In fact, the liquidity reforms here are just timetable entries – the […]
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