As much as I’m fond of the name “Naked Capitalism,” I am beginning to wonder whether a more accurate description of this blog’s beat might be “Naked Corruption.” Our continuing discussion of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s foreclosure whitewash reviews serves as an object lesson.
By Michael Olenick, founder and CEO of Legalprise, and creator of FindtheFraud, a crowd sourced foreclosure document review system (still in alpha)
The people in flight from the terror behind — strange things happen to them, some bitterly cruel and some so beautiful that the faith is refired forever.
– John Steinbeck, Grapes of Wrath.
I’m Jewish: my father is a Rabbi, my mother a prominent Jewish artist, but having been raised in the US it’s impossible to miss both the holiday and the meaning of Christmas.
As Christmas lights and Chanukah menorahs light up our dark winter nights it’s impossible not to look back over the prior few years, and contemplate the difference sunlight — in the form of the Internet shining information — has made in the US and around the world.
Read more...Given that the Office of Bank Boosterism Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is the clear first among the highly competitive ranks of bank-friendly regulators, the fact that the OCC launched a program for borrowers to obtain restitution for financial harm suffered due to foreclosures seemed more than a bit sus.
Gretchen Morgenson does an admirable job of exposing the multiple shortcomings of this OCC program.
Read more...While quite a few bloggers, prosecutors, economists, and other experts have taken the Administration to task on mortgage-related abuses, the mainstream media for the most part has not seriously challenged the mind-numbing Obama claim that the banksters did nothing illegal.
Reuters refreshingly opposed that bullshit assertion frontally yesterday. In a piece pointedly titled, “The Watchdogs That Didn’t Bark,” reporter Scot Paltrow shows that the mortgage arena is a target-rich environment:
By Michael Olenick, founder and CEO of Legalprise, and creator of FindtheFraud, a crowd sourced foreclosure document review system (still in alpha)
“There Goes the Neighborhood,” which ran on 60 Minutes last Sunday, is a must-see piece. Scott Pelley walks through a pillaged house in Cleveland, slated for demolition in a county neighborhood stabilization program. This abandoned house is owned by Structured Asset Investment Trust 2003-BC11. An investor reports lists the property as “in foreclosure” despite no court filing. Ohio is a judicial foreclosure state, so a foreclosure filing requires a lawsuit, but there isn’t one.
Read more...The New York Times reports faithfully that the Department of Justice has entered into the biggest fair lending settlement on record with Bank of America on charges that Countrywide had charged more 200,000 Hispanic and black borrowers higher rates and fees than white borrowers with similar credit records. It also engaged in discrimination by marital status.
Impressive, no?
Read more...Quite a few housing market experts have argued that principal modifications to viable borrowers are the best way to resolve the housing market malaise. In the stone ages when banks kept the mortgages they originated, mortgage modifications, including principal mods, were standard practice when a borrower got in financial difficulty but was still salvageable. And because these restructurings were done behind closed doors, no one but the banker and his grateful customer were the wiser. But now that servicer bad incentives have meant they don’t do mods unless cajoled or bribed by the government (and not much even then), the topic has entered the public debate.
It had appeared that any principal mod program was going to come over the dead bodies of the banks, who have been feigned compliance with various Federal programs but either dragged their feet and/or gamed the schemes. So it was surprising to read that the acting head of the FHAF, Edward DeMarco, is considering what amounts to a principal mod program implemented through bankruptcy courts.
Read more...We’ve commented previously on Tom Miller as the contemporary exemplar of what in the 1960s was called a credibility gap. Readers no doubt know that he is the lead negotiator on behalf of the state attorneys general in what was formerly called the 50 state attorney general [mortgage] settlement. (Notice separately how the state AGs are providing cover for several Federal banking regulators, HUD and the Department of Justice, which are also parties to this deal).
A partial recap: Miller started by promising criminal prosecutions, then reneged. He has refused to do investigations, then has the temerity to try to claim they took place). He said there would not be a big waiver on mortgage liability, when as we discussed, that was the only thing Miller & Co. could offer that would get a deal to the numbers he had unwisely committed himself to (north of $20 billion). And several state attorneys general have walked from the deal precisely because they object to the plan in motion: a big release when they have an inadequate idea of how much questionable activity is being forgiven.
But the truly absurd part is the continued pretense by Miller that a deal will get done.
Read more...The development reported by the Financial Times’ Shahien Nasiripour, that the inspector general for the FHFA, the supervisor of Fannie and Freddie, and the Federal Home Loan bank, has decided to share information with New York State attorney general Eric Schneiderman, is far more significant than it appears on the surface.
It’s a well deserved slap in the face of the Department of Justice.
Read more...Bill Black, the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives
Sixty Minutes’ December 11, 2011 interview of President Obama included a claim by Obama that, unfortunately, did not lead the interviewer to ask the obvious, essential follow-up questions.
I can tell you, just from 40,000 feet, that some of the most damaging behavior on Wall Street, in some cases, some of the least ethical behavior on Wall Street, wasn’t illegal.
Obama did not explain what Wall Street behavior he found least ethical or what unethical Wall Street actions he believed was not illegal. It would have done the world (and Obama) a great service had he been asked these questions. He would not have given a coherent answer because his thinking on these issues has never been coherent. If he had to explain his position he, and the public, would recognize it was indefensible.
I offer the following scale of unethical banker behavior related to fraudulent mortgages and mortgage paper (principally collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)) that is illegal and deserved punishment. I write to prompt the rigorous analytical discussion that is essential to expose and end Obama and Bush’s “Presidential Amnesty for Contributors” (PAC) doctrine.
Read more...By Michael Olenick, founder and CEO of Legalprise, and creator of FindtheFraud, a crowd sourced foreclosure document review system (still in alpha)
The National Association of Realtors (NAR) has announced that their estimates for home sales have been materially incorrect since 2007, and that they plan to restate the number of homes sales downward. Apparently the NAR derives their homes sales information from the Multiple Listing Services, the proprietary “want-ads” real-estate agents use to list houses for sale.
Read more...The New York Times (hat tip Mary B) took note of a seamy JP Morgan effort at brand burnishing:
In a gambit to promote its charitable work — and maybe polish its image, which has suffered since the financial collapse in 2008 — JPMorgan Chase is financing and sponsoring the “American Giving Awards,” which will be televised by NBC on Saturday night. The two-hour show, with Bob Costas as host, will profile recipients of Chase donations, will be book-ended by Chase commercials and will regularly remind viewers that the whole event is “presented by Chase.”…/
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Yves here. As the headline indicates, the steps taken Bank of America that Michael Olenick describes in this article call into question the idea that Bank of America can shield itself by putting Countrywide into bankruptcy. Note that, some litigants, particularly AIG in its petition in opposition of the proposed $8.5 billion settlement of putback liability on 530 Countrywide trusts, made a persuasive case that Bank of America has operated Countrywide in such a way post acquisition so that it is no longer bankruptcy remote from BofA (that is, you can’t BK Countrywide and deny Countrywide creditors access to BofA assets).
Nevertheless, as attorney and former monoline executive Tom Adams noted by e-mail, the reason Bank of America might want the servicing at BofA rather than Countrywide if Countrywide is put into bankruptcy is probably to avoid a servicing termination event. If the servicer is bankrupt, the trustee or investors could, in theory, terminate them as servicer. This is really only theory, because almost no one (other than BofA) would want to be servicer for these loans, so it would be hard to see it as a driver of the changes Olenick describes.
An interesting related issue is that BofA, like other servicers in this new world of costly and lengthy foreclosures, is at risk of over advancing on mortgages. Servicers advance principal and interest even after a borrower has defaulted and reimburse themselves when the foreclosed property is sold. In theory, they can stop when a loan is clearly irrecoverable. In practice, historically many servicers have kept advancing up to the full principal balance of the loan. With loss severities rising and more borrowers fighting foreclosures, they can incur more costs than the house is worth, but on average, they still recover their advances. But with foreclosure timelines attenuating, legal costs escalating, and foreclosures grinding to a halt in states like Nevada, New York, and New Jersey, where they are now real sanctions for filing questionable foreclosure documentation, servicers face increasing doubts about their ability to recover advances from the proceeds of home sales. I hope the FDIC is watchful enough not to allow deposits to be used to fund servicer advances.
By Michael Olenick, founder and CEO of Legalprise, and creator of FindtheFraud, a crowd sourced foreclosure document review system (still in alpha)
Read more...Tom Adams, an attorney and former monoline executive, provided considerable input into this post.
There is nothing more useful to people in authority than when a writer with an established brand name does their propagandizing for them.
Harvard Law graduate and Pulitzer Prize winning author James B. Stewart penned a remarkable little piece in the New York Times over the weekend. Titled “Few Avenues for Justice in the Case Against Citi,” it contends that Judge Jed Rakoff’s ruling against a proposed $285 million SEC settlement with Citigroup over a $1 billion CDO (Class V Funding III) that delivered $700 million in losses to investors and $160 million in profits to Citi is misguided. Stewart argues, based on “some reporting,” that the SEC is unlikely to do better in the trial that Rakoff has forced on the agency by nixing the settlement.
We will look at the caliber of Stewart’s “reporting” in due course, since his article reads like dictation from the SEC’s head of enforcement Robert Khuzami (the SEC’s interests are aligned with Citi’s in wanting the settlement to go through). He either did not read or chose to ignore critical information in the underlying complaints, which the Rakoff ruling cites, and he also overlooked relevant cases.
Read more...This move by GMAC, now Ally, is remarkably brazen. GMAC has effectively said that Massachusetts must hew to its demands of how to deal with foreclosures. It announced it is withdrawing from mortgage lending in the state in an effort to bring it to heel.
GMAC may be in a better position to exercise this sort of threat than other banks, since with their broader business lines, government bodies in the state could retaliate by moving other business (pension funds, cash management, payment services) from them.
This is very similar to the retaliation described in Gretchen Morgenson and Josh Rosner’s Reckless Endangerment, when Georgia had the temerity to try to pass tough lending laws:
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