Category Archives: Regulations and regulators

Mirabile Dictu! Central Bankers Getting Concerned About Bank Capital Levels Rather Late in the Reform Game

Something very peculiar is afoot. Well after the bank regulatory reform debate was supposedly settled, central bankers seem to be reopening that discussion. It’s puzzling because the very reason the banks won so decisively was that central bankers were not prepared to get all that tough with their charges.

I’m not clear what has led central bankers to get a bit of religion. Is it the spectacle of the Bank of England talking about breaking up the banks (they won’t get their way thanks to bank lobbyist working over the Independent Banking Commission, but no one doubted their sincerity)? Or the Swiss National Bank imposing 19% capital requirements, which as we discussed, is likely to lead to the investment banking are of UBS being domiciled elsewhere (assuming a country capable of bailing it out will have it)? Or perhaps it is central bankers being forced to recognize that their Plan A of extend and pretend and super low interest rates simply won’t lead banks getting to meaningfully higher capital levels when the staff continues to take egregious amounts out in compensation? Or have they realized how bad bank balance sheets are in the Eurozone and how tight the linkages still are among the major capital markets players, and they belatedly realize they need them to be much more shock resistant?

The bottom line is that various central bankers have taken the surprising step of insisting their banks meet more stringent requirements for the biggest banks than those originally planned to be to be included in Basel III. Per Bloomberg:

What Happens if the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Has No Director By Its Start Date?

A useful article in CNN Money (hat tip SA) describes what happens if the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau does not have a director in place by its official start-up date, July 21. That outcome looks certain, given that the House Oversight Committee has scheduled its ritual flogging of its defacto head, Elizabeth Warren, for July 14, and Senate Republicans have vowed to nix any candidate lest they get to strangle the agency by controlling its budget.

Even if Obama were to have a brain transplant and do something so out of character as to get in a fight with banks and the Republicans, the logical window of opportunity for breaking the Senate’s planned pro-forma sessions (a device to forestall a recess appointment) would be the four week end of summer Congressional break. That starts August 8. So it looks like a sure bet that the CFPB will go past July 21 with no chief in place.

Contrary to popular opinion (and bank lobbyist fond hopes) the CFPB is not stymied if a director has not been installed. What would happen is:

Mirabile Dictu! SEC Probes Relationship Among Toxic CDO Sponsor Magnetar, Merrill, and CDO Manager

It has taken forever for the SEC to probe the workings the biggest sponsor of toxic CDOs and of course the agency is going after only one highly publicized doggy deal. Nevertheless, the SEC has finally decided to look at the less than arm’s length relationship between the hedge fund Magnetar, whose Constellation program played a central role in blowing up the subprime bubble, and its collateral manager, which in this case a Merrill affiliated firm called NIR. As we will discuss, collateral managers were critical because they effectively served as liability shields for the other participants.

Note that Magnetar does not appear to be the target; the Financial Times reports that the SEC is examining how the deal’s underwriter Merrill sold the deal and how it worked with NIR.

Inept Obama “Anybody but Warren” Stance Reveals Fundamental Bank v. Middle Class Fault Line

It is obvious that Elizabeth Warren should head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. No less than our favorite NC nemesis, the staunch Administration defender Economics of Contempt, has said she is “tailor made” for the job. In the face of increasingly vocal bank opposition to the notion of an effective bank watchdog for consumers, she’s done better than anyone anticipated. And despite the Republican bluster about using a pro forma session to keep the Senate in business to block a recess appointment, the Democrats could break that maneuver if they wanted to.

So why does Team Obama try to hide its choice not to appoint her behind silly “compromises” like its trial balloon of serving up the CFPB’s number two, Raj Date, as a candidate to lead the agency? The Republicans have already said they will approve no one unless they can cut off CFPB’s air supply by controlling its budget. You can’t negotiate with someone who won’t negotiate. Your options are to defy them or capitulate.

So this “compromise” is an inept sleigh of hand to shift responsibility for the Adminsitration’s refusal to appoint Warren on the Republicans.

The failure of the Team Obama to move beyond this impasse is revealing. It isn’t merely, as we have repeatedly mentioned, a sign that the Administration is in bed with the banksters. That’s a given. We predicted that Warren would not get the job.

But what is astonishing is how she has managed to out maneuver them and how Team Obama has failed for months to come up with responses. It isn’t as if this crowd feels any compunction to hide the contempt it has for the idea of keeping prior promises; just look for some of many examples, at this video Lifting the Veil, from 7:00 to 13:00, or at Glenn Greenwald’s discussion of how in mere weeks what was promised to be a mere fly over exercise in Libya is now turning into another nation-building exercise.

The Warren fiasco reveals deeper layers of the Administration’s character defects: its indifference to the plight of the middle class and its tactical incompetence

HUD: Bank of America “Significantly Hindered” Mortgage Probe (Updated)

We said Bank of America would rue its purchase of Countrywide shortly after it took at stake in the troubled subprime originator:

[E]ven though the financial press has almost universally hailed Bank of America’s investment in Countrywide as a bold and savvy stroke, the market has remained singularly unimpressed.

I will confess I haven’t studied the details of the deal for a simple reason: I’m appalled that B of A would even consider it. The two banks had reportedly been talking for six years. That means B of A knew, or ought to have known, Countrywide very well. An article by Gretchen Morgenson in Sunday’s New York Times paints Countrywide is, at least in spirit if not the letter of the law, a criminal enterprise…. But I know lawyers who have Countrywide in their crosshairs, and I am certain they have plenty of company.

To put it another way: there’s enough fraudulent selling in the the subprime market in general, and smoke around Countrywide in particular, to deter anyone investor who takes litigation or reputation risk seriously.

In my day, no respectable institution would make a high-profile equity investment or otherwise closely link its name with an organization that had the whiff of serious liability about it (except in liquidation or some other scenario which got rid of the incumbent management team).

It looks like Bank of America, in a misguided effort to limit Countrywide-related damage, has adopted some of its less than seemly habits, namely a disregard for oversight.

New York Attorney General Schneiderman Investigating Validity of Mortgage Transfers at Bank of America (Updated: Trustees Bank of New York and Deutsche Bank Also Being Probed)

The mortgage industry defenders are looking more and more like fools or liars.

Last year, a case called Kent v. Countrywide created a firestorm because both Bank of America’s attorney (who was admittedly just a typical foreclosure mill type) and a senior executive from Countrywide’s servicing unit said that Countrywide as a matter of business practice retained mortgage notes. That was the wrong thing to say in court. From a November post:

We’ve had a series of posts (see here, here, and here) on the judge’s decision in a case called Kemp c. Countrywide, which provided what appeared to be the first official confirmation of what we’ve long suspected and described on this blog: that as of a certain point in time post 2002, mortgage originators and sponsors simply quit conveying mortgage notes (the borrower IOUs) through a chain of intermediary owners to securitization trusts, as stipulted in the pooling and servicing agreements, the contracts that governed these deals. We say “appeared to be” because Bank of America’s attorney promptly issued a denial, effectively saying that the employee whose testimony the judge cited in his decision, one Linda DeMartini, a team leader in the bank’s mortgage- litigation management division. didn’t know what she was talking about. As we discussed, this seems pretty peculiar, since she was put on the stand precisely because she was deemed to be knowledgeable about Countrywide’s practices….

If true, this has very serious implications. As we’ve indicated, it means that residential mortgage backed securties are not secured by real estate, or as Adam Levitin put it, they are “non mortgage backed securities….With the ramifications so serious, expect industry denials to continue apace until the evidence becomes overwhelming.

That time has arrived.

Goldman Sycophants of the World Unite! You Have Nothing to Lose but Your Virtually Non-Existent Reputations!

The Goldman defense against the Levin report is so late and so pathetic that it looks increasingly evident that the bank is simply hoping to cause confusion and muddy the waters rather than mount a frontal, fact-based rebuttal. Mind you, sniping and innuendo can prove reasonably effective if done persistently and loudly enough. The book Agnotology describes how Big Tobacco managed to sow doubt over decades of the link between smoking and lung cancer well after the medical evidence had gone from suggestive to compelling.

The first Goldman salvo was an Andrew Ross Sorkin piece on Monday which we deemed as unpersuasive. While it did point to an error in the Senate report, it failed to make a real dent the report’s findings, and most important, the notion that Goldman staffers, in particular Lloyd Blankfein, were pretty loose with the truth.

The most contested statement is the Blankfein denial that the firm had a “massive short” position; as Matt Taibbi points out today, the only way out on that one is to get into Clintonesque parsings of the word “massive”. Given the overwhelming evidence that Goldman intended to get out of its mortgage risk in late 2006 and its staff DID get the firm short in February 2007, then reversed that position in March to correctly catch a short term bounce (the market recovered from March to May, when it went into its free fall). And in the March-May period, it was still getting as much crap product out the door and lying to clients about its position in the deals, claiming its incentives were aligned when its effective short position in the deals meant the reverse, that it would profit if they tanked, which they did.

But focusing on the “massive short” issue is misdirection pure and simple.

Obama Still Desperately Seeking Anybody But Warren to Head New Consumer Agency

The Administration is playing true to its craven form. And it isn’t hiding that sorry fact terribly well either.

The latest public-be-damned ploy by the Obama Administration is the floating the name of Raj Date, a former McKinsey consultant and financial services industry executive currently ensconced in the nascent Consumer Financial Protection, as the possible new head of the agency.

Remember the state of play on the nomination of the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. That individual is to be in place as of July 21. Even assuming everyone plays nicely, the timetable is now too short to go through the conventional approval process, meaning a recess appointment is the only way to get a permanent leader in place.

The Republicans have taken the stance that they are not prepared to be bound by the law, meaning Dodd Frank, despite the fact that most of what is promised to do was kicked over to studies and rulemaking, which assured it will be watered down to nothingness. 44 Republican Senators wrote a letter saying they won’t approve of any nominee from either party unless the CFPB is ~~gutted~~ reformed. And they are trying to block a recess appointment through the use of a “pro forma” sessions, as they did over the Memorial Day break and presumably will over the July 4 holiday.

But the Republican intransigence works to Obama’s advantage, were he not fundamentally opposed to elevating Warren.

Call Your Senators Over Sneak Attack On the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

The Republicans have threatened to kill the CFPB and they look to have finally pulled out their gun and taken aim. I received this message from Mary Bottari:

In a last minute development, opponents of financial reform are pushing for votes TODAY on amendments to gut the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) (AMENDMENT NUMBER #391 – Moran), and to repeal the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act entirely (AMENDMENT NUMBER #394 – DeMint) . A vote to delay and try to derail curbs on fees banks charge merchants – and thus the consumer – on debit cards is already scheduled (AMENDMENT NUMBER #392 – Tester).

Call your Senators now and tell them to oppose these proposals to gut the CFPB!

Alexander Gloy: Merkel to Sinn: “In my office. NOW.”

Yves here. Outbreaks of candor and foresight among the political classes are so rare that they bear watching. As Gloy’s sighting suggests, they have to be arrested quickly lest they prove to be contagious.

By Alexander Gloy, CIO of Lighthouse Investment Management

Hans-Werner Sinn, head of German research institute Ifo, has just put his life into peril. He had to pick a Swiss magazine (“Bilanz”) to express what nobody else is allowed to mention in Germany: “Greece is a bottomless barrel”.

Goldman Uses Wall Street’s Favorite Reporter to Make Unpersuasive Defense Against Levin Report

Last night, the Wall Street Journal reported that Goldman was going on the offensive against the Levin report:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., trying to counter a Senate subcommittee report that is fueling investigations and suspicion of the firm, plans to accuse the subcommittee of drastically overstating Goldman’s bets against the housing market in 2007….

The subcommittee’s 639-page report in April denounced Goldman as an unusually strong example of wrongdoing by financial firms during the crisis. According to the report, Goldman systematically sought to profit from a “big short” against the housing market and betrayed clients by putting the firm’s own interests ahead of theirs.

Goldman initially said it disagreed “with many of the conclusions of the report,” though the company added that it takes “seriously the issues explored by the subcommittee.”

Tonight, Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times offers what appears to be a preview of the Goldman defense. If this is the sort of thing Goldman plans to provide, it is not terribly convincing.

On the Shortcomings in US Nuclear Emergency Plans

I normally leave the nuke/Fukushima aftermath beat to George Washington, but furzy mouse sent me a link to this very straightforward and well done video by Arnie Gunderson of Fairewinds.

This evokes weird parallels to what we learned in the wake of Hurricane Katrina: it was obvious more needed to be done to protect public safety, but no one was willing to do it. And in visit to New Orleans over the Christmas holidays, I learned the levees have not been made higher as the Army Corps of Engineers recommended. All that happened was the breaks in the levees were patched.

Gunderson gives a straightforward account of theory v. probable practice in a nuclear accident:

Goldman Subpoenaed Over Levin Committee Hearing Findings

On the one hand, this is just a subpoena of Goldman from the Manhattan DA’s office, but on the other, after all the crisis investigations, we finally have a prosecutor somewhere deciding to take some abuses during the crisis seriously enough to see if they add up to a legal case. (Yes, the SEC did file a suit against Goldman on one synthetic CDO, one transaction out of 25 in its Abacus program, which Goldman settled for $550 million, but this was litigation on one deal, not on broader patterns of misconduct).

And it came not out of the splashy but designed not to accomplish much FCIC, but the quieter and more tenacious Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. I hardly ever do media briefings, but I was on the blogger call for both reports, and the contrast was night and day. The FCIC briefing was softball PR, with Phil Angelides and Brooksley Born (who by definition had not done the work and therefore were not big on detail) leading the call. The Senate call was led by staffers who demonstrated impressive command of the products and industry economics and transmitted information at a very high bit rate.

Not surprisingly, the information request comes from a local prosecutor. The DoJ continues to be missing in action.

Banker Derangement Syndrome I: Lawyers Offer to Get Rid of Their Profession to Save the TARP Banks

We’ve decided to publicize the rapid rise of a dangerous ailment, Banker Derangement Syndrome, which has become so widespread that the media is publicizing examples on virtually a daily basis.

Banker Derangement Syndrome occurs when someone who might once have been sensible is acting as a mindless mouthpiecs of particularly rancid banking industry propaganda. Note that financial services industry employees by definition do not qualify; they are simply engaging in the time-honored industry practice known as “talking your book” when they say something that is patently ridiculous and self serving. No, Banker Derangement Syndrome occurs when an independent party say something so blatantly and embarrassingly wrong in support of the banking industry, whether to curry favor or via having taken an overdose of its Kool Aid, so as to do severe damage to their credibility. In other words, if the questionable behavior could be explained as an over-zealous effort to win points with our new financial overlords, it backfired big time.

Banker Derangement Syndrome II: William Cohan Can Give No Reason for Not Appointing Warren, Except Some People Don’t Like Her

As we indicated, this is the second post in a series on Banker Derangement Syndrome, in which people who might once have been sensible are acting as mindless mouthpieces of particularly rancid banking industry propaganda. We suspect it has to do with being too long in close proximity of zombie banks; they probably need to suck grey matter out of the living to keep functioning.

William Cohan wrote a particularly wretched piece for Bloomberg on why Elizabeth Warren should do everyone a favor and put herself on the next train out of DC. There is a decent case to be made against having Warren head the CFPB, but that’s not what Cohan provided. He instead made a weak argument (if you can even call it that) and got screechy to cover for it.