Brad Setser and Nouriel Roubini have collaborated in research and publishing on currencies but since are working independently. Roubini issues a grim outlook for China (”Roubini Foresees Chinese Hard Landing“). A cornerstone of Roubini’s analysis was that China was export-dependent and exports are falling fast:
Note that China is an economy is structurally dependent on exports: net exports (or the trade balance surplus) are close to 12% of GDP (up from 2% earlier in the decade) and exports represent about 40% of GDP. Real investment in China is about 45% of GDP and, leaving aside the part of this investment that is housing and infrastructure spending, about half of this capex spending goes towards the production of new capital goods that produces more exportable goods. So, with the sum of exports and investment representing about 80% of GDP, most of Chinese aggregate demand depends on its ability to sustain an export based economic growth.The trouble –however – is that the main outlet of Chinese exports – the U.S. consumer – is now collapsing for the first time in two decades.
Setser characteristically is more measured, and (while not naming Roubini) takes issue with the notion that China is as beholden to exports as Roubini maintains (note he clearly regards net rather than gross exports as the relevant metric):
There has long been a rather sterile – at least in my view – debate over how much exports contributed to China’s recent growth. It has long been clear that:
a) Most of China’s growth didn’t come from exports. It couldn’t. Net exports almost never generate 10% growth on their own.b) The absolute size of the contribution of net exports to China’s growth was large. In 2005, 2006 and 2007 net exports added between 2 and 3 percentage points to China’s growth. When net exports added close to 3 percentage points to the United States growth in the second quarter, no one argued that the contribution to US growth from net exports was small.
….The World Bank expects that net exports will contribute around one and a half (1.5) percentage points to China’s growth. Real export growth topped real import growth – though both slowed. 1.5% percentage points from net exports isn’t bad. It is more than the US had gotten on average over the last seven quarters. Indeed, it is not all that different from the average contribution net exports have made to US growth in 2008.
The Chinese exporters who were doing well just weren’t as vocal as the textile and toy producers who weren’t. They also tend to be more capital-intensive and thus employ fewer people.
And despite all the (true) talk about the difficulties some Chinese exporters now face, net exports almost certainly contributed positive to China’s growth in the third quarter. Real export growth in the third quarter (on a y/y basis) still exceeded real import growth. That is why China’s nominal trade surplus was basically flat during the first three quarters of 2008 even though China was paying way more for its commodity imports.
The sharp contraction in US consumption, the rise in the yuan v the euro, Europe’s own slowdown and the latest data from China suggests that real Chinese exports could soon fall. If net exports are contributing to growth, it will be from a fall in imports, not a rise in exports. That is sure to slow China’s growth.
Absent the close to 3% contribution from net exports in the boom years, China’s growth would have been a (respectable) 9% rather than above 11%. With a negative 3% contribution to growth during the boom (as is often the case), growth would have been close to 6%. And if net exports turn negative now China’s growth clearly would slow sharply.
But the real key to forecasting China’s future growth consequently is determining whether domestic consumption and above all investment will continue to grow strongly in the absence of strong export demand. Remember, over the past few years both domestic investment and exports increased rapidly. If they fall together as well, Chinese growth will slow quite significantly.
And unfortunately the latest indicators seem to suggest that they are correlated; consequently domestic demand may fall along with exports.
That isn’t good for anyone.
The (likely) fall in construction is particularly worrisome. China’s new capital intensive export sectors haven’t been huge job generators. Building buildings by contrast employs lots of people – including a lot of migrants from rural areas.
Chinese policy makers recognize that China’s economy is slowing. They are trying to stimulate the economy in a host of ways. Loan limits have been lifted (and amusingly, their presence was only formally acknowledged when they were lifted). New infrastructure projects have been announced. Useful (though tardy) steps are being taken to improve China’s social safety net. It just isn’t clear if they will be powerful enough to offset a smaller contribution from net exports and a (likely) slowdown in investment.
I should note that China is also taking steps to promote exports, notably by increasing its export rebates. That is far less helpful to the global economy.
If the signs from China continue to point to a sharp slowdown, all the large parts of the global economy may enter into a slump at the same time. That isn’t good.
A final point: it is often argued that China needs rapid growth in order to generate jobs, and consequently 6-8% growth doesn’t cut it. That is only partially true. A lot depends on the composition of growth. Recent Chinese growth has been capital not job intensive, so very rapid growth hasn’t translated into rapid job growth. If China shifted the basis of its growth, it might be able to generate more jobs even if the overall pace of growth changes. The risk though is that China won’t change the basis of its growth – so slower growth will mean fewer jobs. But we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that it is unusual for a country growing at 5-6% not to be able to generate strong job growth.
Richard Kline 
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Remind me of a interesting reading by Michael Pettis few days ago – Don’t count too heavily on China’s domestic market