naked capitalism

David Einhorn, who enjoys his considerable reputation for hard-fought battles against firms with shaky finances and dubious accounting (Allied Capital and Lehman), has taken aim at a new and equally deserving target: credit default swaps.

In an interesting bit of synchronicity, Einhorn’s comments in a letter to investors overlap to a considerable degree with a post we wrote yesterday on why a clearinghouse for derivatives wasn’t a solution to the dangers posed by credit default swaps (and note the Orwellian branding, the reforms are about “derivatives” which include benign ones, names simple interest rate and currency swaps, yet the bill has loopholes that will let many, indeed probably most, credit default swaps escape).

Credit default swaps have no redeeming social value. They are a fee machine for Wall Street and their supposed value is considerably overstated (the world pre credit default swaps functioned perfectly well) and their costs, which are considerable, are not given the attention they warrant. And I don’t mean the failure of AIG, either.

Even though Einhorn gave a stinging, wide-ranging indictment, he missed one of the issues I find troubling, which is that credit default swaps result in information loss, which in turn lowers the quality of credit decisions. In other words, the product is inherently destructive.

In the world of old-fashioned fixed income investing, creditors would evaluate a borrower to make sure it had good odds of meeting its obligations. The lender could and usually did make inquiries about the borrower’s income, and its other commitments. If it was a business, the bank might also want to assess information that would help it evaluate the stability of the borrowers income (for instance, learning who its main customers were to determine how diverse and solid they were).

Just as with securitiztion, credit default swaps lower the incentive to do borrower due diligence. Why bother, when the CDS spreads on the reference entity tells you what the market thinks and you can use CDS to reduce or lay off the credit risk? But the original lender is in a privileged position; he is able to gather data from the borrower that it non-public and thus will not be incorporated in a market price. Thus giving creditors an incentive not to do that work systematically lower the quality of credit decisions.

But that reason is a bit abstract, although the costs are real. Einhorn focused on more tangible types of damage wrought by CDS, as summarized by the Financial Times. First, CDS are a means of extortion:

“I think that trying to make safer credit default swaps is like trying to make safer asbestos,” he writes in a recent letter to investors, adding that CDSs create “large, correlated and asymmetrical risks” having “scared the authorities into spending hundreds of billions of taxpayer money to prevent speculators who made bad bets from having to pay”.

Second, CDS speculators win if companies die. Given that the volume of CDS outstanding is a significant multiple of the amount of bonds outstanding, they are not used primarily for hedging, but for creating “synthetic” exposures. And those on the short side have compelling reasons to influence outcomes. When a company gets in trouble, the best outcome is often an out-of-court restructuring of debt before it gets even further in trouble. As much as the Chapter 11 process has certain advantages, it is also costly and risky. A CDS holder (one with a significant short position) can buy some bonds (now at a cheap price) of a struggling company to assure it has a seat at the table in negotiations so it can block a renegotiation of the debt and force a bankruptcy filing so it can assure its payoff on the CDS. From the Financial Times:

CDSs are “anti-social”, he goes on, because those who buy credit insurance often have an incentive to see companies fail. Rather than merely hedging their risks, they are actively hoping to profit from the demise of a target company. This strategy became prevalent in recent years and remains so, as holders of these so-called “basis packages” buy both the debt itself and protection on that debt through CDSs, meaning they receive compensation if the company defaults or restructures. These investors “have an incentive to use their position as bondholders to force bankruptcy, triggering payments on their CDS rather than negotiate out of court restructurings or covenant amendments with their creditors”

Einhorn also agrees with our contention, that a credit default swaps clearinghouse is not a viable solution. As we said yesterday in comments:

CDS are not economic if adequately margined. Adequate allowance for jump to default risk makes it very unattractive on a ROE basis. The way around that pre-crisis was making AIG and the monolines the bagholders. That game is over, but the Street is hooked on the revenues…..

….in invoking AIG, I am saying that an undercapitalized clearinghouse is a concentrated point of failure and a very big one too, a systemic risk all of its own.

Einhorn’s views:

“The reform proposal to create a CDS clearing house does nothing more than maintain private profits and socialised risk by moving the counterparty risk from the private sector to a newly created too big to fail entity,” he notes.

That’s because it is almost impossible to adequately capitalise against such developments. “There is no way a clearing house could demand enough collateral,” he says. “The market can be so big and discontinuous that it is very hard to figure out the correct amount of collateral.”

I think you need more people recognizing that CDS serve the interests of the financial sector at the expense of the real economy, and calling for the product to be banned. Only then might you see radical enough action taken.

However, as much as I hate CDS, I have reluctantly concluded that they cannot be taken out overnight. They have become sufficiently enmeshed in our financial infrastructure that eliminating them is like disarming a web of nuclear weapons. If you make a mistake on any one, they all go boom. One (and this is far from the only) problem is that the big banks not only have large CDS exposures, but they have other hedges related to them (such as interest rate swaps). So simply putting CDS into runoff mode could lead to dislocations in other markets.

I prefer regulating them very intrusively (like insurance, to make sure the counterparties are adequately capitalized), limiting new CDS writing to hedging existing positions (that would need to be tightly defined and monitored) and limiting CDS writing to end users (which would include proprietary trading desks) to where the investor had an insurable interest, as in owned the bonds, and only up to his exposure. That plus increasing capital requirement over, say, a three year period, to reflect the true default risk of the product should shrink the market enough to allow regulators to then ascertain whether it could then be put in runoff mode. But the intent of policy should be loud and clear: to strangle CDS, with the hope of killing them.

And for those who hope netting might do the trick, reader Richard Smith disabuses us of that notion:

Another point is about the struggle to keep up with ‘financial innovation’ in the OTC market. A problem for clients and regulators alike. CDS are probably the nastiest of these. They are so polymorphous – part of a basis trade, or a directional bet, or a sort-of-legit hedge, or a synthetic, depending on context; and no cap on speculation a la Gambling Act; and then vaguely like derivatives, or insurance, or short bond positions, or a prediction market.

But you couldn’t rule out the possibility that equally nasty new products could be developed by some smart aleck. Maybe there should be a charge on the inventors to cover the cost of regulatory catch up. Or something equivalent to airworthiness regulations, which even libertarians accept without demur, as far as I understand. That would slow the innovators down a bit – proving the ‘wings’ aren’t going to come off their new financial products and kill all the passengers.

Another observation I’d been meaning to make on ‘CDS trade compression’: the 20-40% that some commentators are so pleased about. I worked on an app like this for a large IB (recently unpopular in the guise of an mollusc) at the turn of the millennium. They had half a million daily NASDAQ trades at that time and their settlement IT guy in NY was freaking out as his mighty mainframe began to wilt under the volumes. Even with quite a conservative approach to compression (there are choices about how aggressively you net the trades – we thought we could get it down to 25,000 trades per day if we really went for it) we got 80% compression straight away, so, 100,000 netted trades per day. Of course those are highly standardized trades. The aggregation was something like stock, side, settlement date, counterparty, trade flags. NASDAQ is often characterized as an OTC market so it is really the product standardization that matters, rather than the nature of the venue perhaps. I think it went to 90% within a month or two as we got bolder but I may be confabulating; it’s a while ago.

If they can only get 40% trade compression out of CDS, after a year, there must be an awful lot of detritus left over (especially when IIRC most of the counterparties are TBTFs). So things like contract clauses, reference entity, duration of cover must be all over the place in what remains. Difficult to hedge or lay off I should think. And some unconfirmed trades too no doubt. A total mess.

Ignoring all the other shortcomings of CDS the natural thing would be to standardize the product:: that’s happened so many times before, but IBs hate standardization of course for the margin erosion it brings, and anyway now we get this cartel-like protection of the margins, under the guise of support for ‘finanical innovation’.

The implication is that what is on the banks’ books now is a bit hairier to manage than they are ‘fessing up. As other experts who similarly hate the product, like Satyajit Das have observed, simply banning new protection writing would probably lead to hugely disfunctional behavior prior to the date and also lead to problems (as in big time losses, which in a worst case scenario could result in another bailout) as positions that were in runoff mode would be essentially frozen and could not be managed.

But if we can get agreement on aims, which is the product should be killed, then it becomes possible to debate the best (least painful and costly) means.

As Gillian Tett points out in the Financial Times today, clearing derivatives centrally has come to be viewed in policy circles as a magical solution. As a result, it has not gotten the scrutiny it deserves.

The reason for the enthusiasm is that, in theory, a clearinghouse would make sure all agreements were adequately backstopped, so that if customer defaulted, it would not produce cascading counterparty defaults. The clearinghouse would have enough margin and capital to absorb the loss. And observers take great comfort from the fact that no significant exchange (which also has central clearing) has failed in a very long time.

But that view is based on precedents that have limited relevance for credit default swaps, which is the product that is the biggest source of risk. First, the CDS market is dominated by a comparatively small number of very large counterparties. So the failure of any one would be a vastly more serious blow than any modern exchange has suffered.

Second, the cheery view of the safety of exchanges is based on the airbrushing out of a near failure. In the 1987 stockmarket crash, a large counterparty of the Chicago Merc had failed to make a large payment by settlement date, leaving the exchange $400 million short. Its president, Leo Melamed, called its bank, Continental Illinois, to plead for the bank to guarantee the balance, which was well in excess of its credit lines. The officer in charge said no,. It was only because the chairman walked in and authorized the backstop only three minutes before the exchange was due to open that the Merc kept going.

Melamed has said repeatedly that if the Merc did not open that morning, it would not have opened again, and the head of the NYSE has said if the Merc did not open that morning, the NYSE would not have either, and it might never have repoened either.

Remember that. One decision with three minutes to spare kept the two biggest exchanges in the US from collapsing in the 1987 crash. See Donald MacKenzie’s An Engine Not A Camera for details.

Third, a clearinghouse for credit default swaps is certain to be undercapitalized. That means it is an AIG, a concentrated point of failure. The reason is that the contracts will be undermargined. CDS are not true derivatives, but are the economic equivalent of credit insurance. When a “reference entity” has a “credit event” meaning a bankruptcy or default, CDS prices jump to default. That means they shoot up massively because a payout on the CDS is certain, the only item in question is the precise amount.

A large enough initial margin to allow for jump to default risk will make CDS uneconomic (that’s an outcome I welcome, but that is contrary to the motives for the clearinghouse). So dealers and counterparties will fight for a lower margin, meaning the exchange will be undercapitalized relative to the risks it faces.

Tett has some overlapping concerns:

And yet, as so often in the current regulatory debate, there is a crucial catch: most notably, that a clearing house can only offer that all-important sense of reassurance to investors, if it is always perceived to be absolutely rock solid – no matter what. And what is notable about the reform debate so far this year, is that there has been remarkably little public discussion among politicians – or even among regulators – about how to guarantee that any future clearing house will indeed be strong enough to withstand any future shocks….

I suspect the silence may also reflect delicate political sensibilities. If politicians were to demand that a clearing house should be so utterly rock solid that it could withstand even financial Armageddon, the future members of any clearing platform would have to make massive financial commitments. That would necessarily limit membership, to a small cabal of ultra-powerful banks – not something that most politicians wish to encourage.

However, if a clearing house is made more accessible to a wider pool of members, then it will only carry real credibility if it is ultimately backstopped by the government itself, to ensure that trades are always settled, no matter what. And most politicians are not keen to highlight that option either, given the wider sense of public anger about the degree to which the government is bailing out the financial world.

Nevertheless, a few lone voices are now trying to stir up more debate, Gerry Corrigan, the former governor of the New York Fed, for example, recently declared that any future clearing house be placed under the supervision of central banks. More controversially, he also demanded that any clearing house for credit derivatives should have enough resources to withstand the failure of two large members on the same day and still keep trading. “I believe that the operational and financial integrity of such counterparty clearing facilities must be virtually failsafe,” he sternly declared*.

These strike me as sensible suggestions. And behind the scenes, some policy makers strongly support what Corrigan has demanded. Yet, thus far, it is still unclear whether such tough standards will be imposed – even though some clearing houses are now emerging. And that is precisely why men such as Corrigan are growing uneasy.

After all, one lesson that financial history shows is that the issues which blow up the financial system are not usually those which caused the last crisis. Instead, the biggest threats tend to come from the areas swathed in a lazy consensus, or where there is a strong political impetus to clutch at easy solutions. That might yet apply to the clearing houses. In theory, I still believe that clearing houses could – and should – make the derivatives world safer. In practice, though, they could also end up creating new dangers if they are not put on a sound footing, particularly if the fact that no clearing house has ever failed before creates a false sense of complacency

Clearinghouses are the wrong remedy for CDS, but that horse has left the barn and is already in the next county. And I must confess, they sound deceptively appealing (I was a proponent early on) until you dig further into how they would work for CDS. They need to be regulated intrusively, with the intent of shrinking the market considerably over time, and like insurance, with tough capital requirements and frequent examinations of the capital adequacy and claims-paying ability of the sponsor. But the real need is to cut off the air supply to CDS to reduce the size of the market so the product itself no longer represents a systemic threat.

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By Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed. Since them, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

A number of economists, economic policymakers, regulators, and central bankers have attempted to explain away their failure to both foresee and mitigate the current financial crisis by asserting that no one saw it coming. The inference is that they cannot be held accountable for something so unusual, so extraordinary, and so unforecastable that that no one saw it coming. Robert Shiller, in a November 1, 2008 NYT OP-ED, noted the following example:

Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, acknowledged in a Congressional hearing last month that he had made an “error” in assuming that the markets would properly regulate themselves, and added that he had no idea a financial disaster was in the making. What’s more, he said the Fed’s own computer models and economic experts simply “did not forecast” the current financial crisis.

However, the Fed and other policymaking agencies cannot honestly claim that no one saw it coming. There is ample evidence that:

• Economist and commentators “saw it coming”; and

• Economists and others repeatedly brought their observations to the attention of the authorities including the Fed, but were ignored.

In fact, the Fed increasingly exhibited a willingness ignoring critics and criticism. The existence of this pattern at the Fed can be illustrated by looking at two presentations by Kohn. The first is from 2003 and the second is from 2005. But first, a return to Shiller’s OP-ED piece:

Mr. Greenspan’s comments may have left the impression that no one in the world could have predicted the crisis. Yet it is clear that well before home prices started falling in 2006, lots of people were worried about the housing boom and its potential for creating economic disaster. It’s just that the Fed did not take them very seriously.

Schiller blamed self-censorship and group think. Shiller reports that while he was a member of the economic advisory panel of FRBNY, he felt the need to use self-restraint and stated that he only gently warned about bubbles in the housing markets.

It is one thing for someone to practice self-censorship. It is another thing all together for an institution charged with a public responsibility to allow and foster an atmosphere in which someone well respected enough to be asked to sit on an advisory board feels as though he or she must temper their statements or pull punches. What was the role of the advisory board, if the members did not feel free to raise and discuss competing views or alternative policy paths? In the context of the dynamics of globalization and financial innovation, why was conformity to a static consensus tolerated and even encouraged?

Furthermore, while the Fed had a responsibility to promote economic and financial stability, Shiller did not. Once well respected economists and analysts highlighted the possible risks the Fed had an obligation to assess those risks. Shiller also reported that the group-think that ignored signs of the impending financial crisis extended well beyond the halls of the Fed:

I gave talks in 2005 at both the Office the Comptroller of the Currency and at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. I argued that we were in the middle of a dangerous housing bubble. I urged these mortgage regulators to impose suitability requirements on mortgage lenders, to assure that the loans were appropriate for the people taking them.

The reaction to this suggestion was roughly this: yes, some staff members had expressed such concerns, and yes, officials knew about the possibility that there was a bubble, but they weren’t taking any of us seriously.

Returning to the Fed, a speech by Kohn in February 2003 indicates that while Shiller was self-censoring, other commentators had been pointed enough in expressing their concerns to merit a response:

In particular, a number of commentators have raised the specter that imbalances are being created in the markets for consumer durable goods and houses–unsustainably high prices or activity–that will produce macroeconomic strains when, inevitably, they correct. These concerns obviously echo those expressed by some observers that monetary policy allowed run-ups in equity prices and capital spending in the 1990s that ultimately proved to be destabilizing.

In a footnote, Kohn went on to say:

Another possibility is that the buildup of debt associated with the strength in household investment will feedback adversely on financial conditions, especially as the boom unwinds. Such consequences could occur even in the absence of a “bubble” in housing prices if households were overextended and lenders had not taken adequate precautions against even a measured drop in collateral values… Moreover, loan-to-value ratios on mortgages have been about flat, leaving ample cushion for moderate housing price declines, should they occur. These observations suggest that widespread credit difficulties with important macroeconomic effects are unlikely when interest rates rise.

Kohn not only acknowledged the existence of the commentators and their concerns and took them seriously enough to present evidence that he thought should lay to rest those concerns to rest. He also suggests that the likely short-lived nature of the interest rate -driven increases in housing prices and real estate investment implied that any resulting macroeconomic or financial problem would be of a manageable scale:

Judging from this analysis, and bearing in mind its inherently tentative–if not speculative–character, it seems likely that as the economy strengthens and interest rates rise in response, household investment and prices are likely to soften some relative to recent trends, but not to break precipitously. Houses and cars would not be providing the impetus to economic activity they often have in past recoveries…

At the Jackson Hole Conference of 2005, a speech by Rajan, the then Chief Economist at the International Monetary Fund, “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” and a response by Kohn allows us to get a read on Fed policymakers reactions to warnings about possible economic or financial dislocations two years later. In the opening paragraphs, Rajan argued that the transformation of the financial sector had made it more efficient, but at the expense of increased risk:

The expansion in a variety of intermediates and financial transactions has major benefits,…However, it has potential downsides, which I will explore ..

… the incentive structures of investment mangers today differs from the incentive structures of bank managers in the past in two important ways. First,… managers have a greater incentive to take risk. Second, their performance relative to other managers matters.

The knowledge that managers are being evaluated against other managers can induce superior performance, but also perverse behavior.

One is the incentive to take risk that is concealed from investors—since risk and return are related , the manger then looks as if he outperforms peers,,, typically the kind risks that can be concealed most easily… are known as tail risks.

Both behaviors can reinforce each other during an asset price boom…An environment of low interest rates flowing a period of high rates is particularly problematic, for not only does the incentive of some participants to “search for yield” go up, but asst prices are given the initial impetus which can lead to an upward spiral, creating conditions for a sharp messy realignment…..

…the most important concern is whether banks will be able to provide liquidity to financial markets so that if tail risk does materialize, financial positions can be unwound and….the real consequences to the real economy minimized.”

The balance of the Rajan paper was a development of these ideas along with the presentation of considerable amount of supporting evidence. He referenced over 50 plus scholarly papers. Rajan never forecasted or predicted the crises which were to follow relatively quickly. However, he concluded:

a risk management approach to financial regulation will be important to attempt to stave off such states through the judicious operation of monetary policy and through macro-prudential measures. I argue some thought also should be given to attempting to influence incentives of financial institutions mangers lightly, but directly.

Kohn was a Discussant, but his response was not so much a discussion or rebuttal of the Rajan theses as it was simply a restatement of his and presumably the Fed’s belief that the greater dispersion of financial risk away from banks necessarily implied lower levels of systemic risk. There was no discussion of the implication of the changes in incentive structures or herding behavior. Kohn dismissed concerns about tail risk citing reduced volatility of output and inflation over the previous twenty years. However, who believes that tail risk has to either manifest itself in a twenty year period, or be non-existent. Furthermore, the factors cited by Rajan had come to dominate the financial sector only during the prior ten years.

No mention was made of LTCM or the Tech bubble. Concerns that low interest rates may contribute to increased risk in the financial system were dismissed on the grounds that those policies contributed to greater stability in output and inflation. Kohn never addressed the point that the shift away from bank-center finance might leave the system short of liquidity should risks materialize.

In short, Kohn’s response to Rajan’s theses was nothing more than a curt dismissal when compared to his detailed response to the specter of imbalanced -induced concerns voiced by the unnamed commentators in 2003. It appears that the perceived need to respond, even if only in words, to well researched warnings by prominent economists had disappeared.

Furthermore, Kohn on this occasion and presumably others, never publicly revisited (to my knowledge) the contingencies which were in part the basis of his rejection of the warnings in 2003. Interest rates had risen very slowly amidst a jobless recovery and a failure of investment spending to propel the economy. Ten year Treasury yields were only about 25 bps higher and monetary policy remained accommodative. Loan to value ratios had started to erode as had lending standards. If Kohn had re-checked the reasons he cited in his in 2003 rejection of warnings he would have found that the conditions he had cited for being sanguine no longer obtained.

In summary, numerous people, including well respected economists and officials saw the grounds for economic and financial crises being laid. Furthermore, these warnings were brought to the attention of US policymakers. Assuming the two presentations cites above are representative, the warnings were at first treated as worthy of a serious response. However, even as evidence of serious imbalances and bubbles grew, the responses to warnings became perfunctory and devoid of serious analysis.

Houston, we have a problem.

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the “hedging your bets on the economy” camp. He has declared the markets to be frothy because super low dollar borrowing rates have turned the greenback into the funding currency for the carry trade.

Far more important than the peppy rally in the stock market is the resumption of early 2007 style risk taking in the credit markets. As Gillian Tett of the Financial Times noted last week:

Earlier this month, I received a sobering e-mail from a senior, recently-retired banker. This particular man, a veteran of the credit world, had just chatted with ex-colleagues who are still in the markets – and was feeling deeply shocked.

“Forget about the events of the past 12 months … the punters are back punting as aggressively as ever,” he wrote. “Highly leveraged short-term trades are back in vogue as players … jostle to load up on everything from Reits [real estate investment trusts] and commercial property, commodities, emerging markets and regular stocks and bonds.

“Oh, I am sure the banks’ public relations people will talk about the subdued atmosphere in banking, but don’t you believe it,” he continued bitterly, noting that when money is virtually free – or, at least, at 0.5 per cent – traders feel stupid if they don’t leverage up.

“Any sense of control is being chucked out of the window. After the dotcom boom and bust it took a good few years for the market to get its collective mojo back [but] this time it has taken just a few months,” he added. He finished with a despairing question: “Was October 2008 just a dress rehearsal for the crash when this latest bubble bursts?”

In other words, everyone seems to be in on this bubble except most borrowers in the real economy. But that wasn’t the main objective…it was to reflate asset prices to save the global banking system…by rerunning the same movie that drove it off the cliff in the first place (well, this is a sequel, so there are some minor plot changes, like the dollar rather than the yen as the basis for the carry trade).

From Roubini in the Financial Times:

Since March there has been a massive rally in all sorts of risky assets… and an even bigger rally in emerging market asset classes (their stocks, bonds and currencies). At the same time, the dollar has weakened sharply, while government bond yields have gently increased but stayed low and stable.

This recovery in risky assets is in part driven by better economic fundamentals…. Whether the recovery is V-shaped, as consensus believes, or U-shaped and anaemic as I have argued, asset prices should be moving gradually higher.

But while the US and global economy have begun a modest recovery, asset prices have gone through the roof since March in a major and synchronised rally….Risky asset prices have risen too much, too soon and too fast compared with macroeconomic fundamentals.

So what is behind this massive rally? Certainly it has been helped by a wave of liquidity from near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing. But a more important factor fuelling this asset bubble is the weakness of the US dollar, driven by the mother of all carry trades. The US dollar has become the major funding currency of carry trades as the Fed has kept interest rates on hold and is expected to do so for a long time. Investors who are shorting the US dollar to buy on a highly leveraged basis higher-yielding assets and other global assets are not just borrowing at zero interest rates in dollar terms; they are borrowing at very negative interest rates – as low as negative 10 or 20 per cent annualised – as the fall in the US dollar leads to massive capital gains on short dollar positions.

Let us sum up: traders are borrowing at negative 20 per cent rates to invest on a highly leveraged basis on a mass of risky global assets that are rising in price due to excess liquidity and a massive carry trade. Every investor who plays this risky game looks like a genius – even if they are just riding a huge bubble financed by a large negative cost of borrowing – as the total returns have been in the 50-70 per cent range since March.

People’s sense of the value at risk (VAR) of their aggregate portfolios ought, instead, to have been increasing due to a rising correlation of the risks between different asset classes, all of which are driven by this common monetary policy and the carry trade. In effect, it has become one big common trade – you short the dollar to buy any global risky assets.

Yet, at the same time, the perceived riskiness of individual asset classes is declining as volatility is diminished due to the Fed’s policy of buying everything in sight – witness its proposed $1,800bn (£1,000bn, €1,200bn) purchase of Treasuries, mortgage- backed securities (bonds guaranteed by a government-sponsored enterprise such as Fannie Mae) and agency debt. By effectively reducing the volatility of individual asset classes, making them behave the same way, there is now little diversification across markets – the VAR again looks low.

So the combined effect of the Fed policy of a zero Fed funds rate, quantitative easing and massive purchase of long-term debt instruments is seemingly making the world safe – for now – for the mother of all carry trades and mother of all highly leveraged global asset bubbles.

While this policy feeds the global asset bubble it is also feeding a new US asset bubble….

The reckless US policy that is feeding these carry trades is forcing other countries to follow its easy monetary policy….This is keeping short-term rates lower than is desirable. Central banks may also be forced to lower interest rates through domestic open market operations. Some central banks, concerned about the hot money driving up their currencies, as in Brazil, are imposing controls on capital inflows. Either way, the carry trade bubble will get worse: if there is no forex intervention and foreign currencies appreciate, the negative borrowing cost of the carry trade becomes more negative. If intervention or open market operations control currency appreciation, the ensuing domestic monetary easing feeds an asset bubble in these economies. So the perfectly correlated bubble across all global asset classes gets bigger by the day.

But one day this bubble will burst, leading to the biggest co-ordinated asset bust ever: if factors lead the dollar to reverse and suddenly appreciate – as was seen in previous reversals, such as the yen-funded carry trade – the leveraged carry trade will have to be suddenly closed as investors cover their dollar shorts. A stampede will occur as closing long leveraged risky asset positions across all asset classes funded by dollar shorts triggers a co-ordinated collapse of all those risky assets – equities, commodities, emerging market asset classes and credit instruments.

Why will these carry trades unravel? First, the dollar cannot fall to zero and at some point it will stabilise; when that happens the cost of borrowing in dollars will suddenly become zero, rather than highly negative, and the riskiness of a reversal of dollar movements would induce many to cover their shorts. Second, the Fed cannot suppress volatility forever – its $1,800bn purchase plan will be over by next spring. Third, if US growth surprises on the upside in the third and fourth quarters, markets may start to expect a Fed tightening to come sooner, not later. Fourth, there could be a flight from risk prompted by fear of a double dip recession or geopolitical risks, such as a military confrontation between the US/Israel and Iran. As in 2008, when such a rise in risk aversion was associated with a sharp appreciation of the dollar, as investors sought the safety of US Treasuries, this renewed risk aversion would trigger a dollar rally at a time when huge short dollar positions will have to be closed.

This unraveling may not occur for a while, as easy money and excessive global liquidity can push asset prices higher for a while. But the longer and bigger the carry trades and the larger the asset bubble, the bigger will be the ensuing asset bubble crash. The Fed and other policymakers seem unaware of the monster bubble they are creating. The longer they remain blind, the harder the markets will fall.

The Journal has a less apocalyptic story on the very same topic: “Dollar Calls the Tune for Stocks, Bonds, Oil“:

A joke making the rounds among stock investors is that they’ve all become currency traders. In recent weeks, the relationship between moves in the dollar and stocks has been incredibly tight; as the dollar rises, stocks fall and vice versa.

And it isn’t just stocks. Links between the dollar, corporate bonds, energy prices and gold have grown closer. Traders and analysts point to one factor as the cause: the Federal Reserve’s efforts to flood the financial markets with dollars. They say the Fed has created an unusual environment where investors essentially have two choices — hold onto dollars or buy something, anything else.

The connections between assets have been growing as investors become more fixated on how and when the Fed will turn off the spigot.

The intensity of the links “tells me there is a lot of nervousness and a lot of fast money,” says Michael O’Rourke, a market strategist at BTIG.

As a result, some believe the markets are in a new bubble, driven by interest rates essentially at zero, which will pop sooner rather than later. That camp includes Pimco’s Bill Gross, who last week wrote that the six-month rally in riskier assets, spurred on by the Fed and U.S. Treasury, “is likely at its pinnacle.”

McClatchy, the only major US news organization to question the Iraq war until is was obvious to all that it was a misguided exercise in neocon hubris, has started a series on Goldman’s famed “short subprime” exercise. While the timing and overall outline are not new (as to when and allegedly why the investment bank went short), it delves into some details that have heretofore not been examined, as to how much subprime paper it dumped onto investors during this period, whether this duplicity was permissible, and what sort of damage was visited on foolhardy borrowers.

Unfortunately, for my taste, the series does not appear to be getting enough into the nitty gritty (and it indicates clearly that Goldman has successfully kept mum about the details of how it executed its short). I am keenly interested, because my understanding is that any simple subprime index short would have blown out spreads and thus been very costly to execute.

Goldman used another route….and the road, not surprisingly, was through AIG. From an e-mail over the summer:

This also points out a *VERY* good nugget re: banks who used CDOs/AIG offensively as opposed to as a hedge. This is likely what bothered me most about the AIG debacle. The trades GS had on with AIG were generally *not* super senior CDOs GS was long simply because they had
underwritten CDOs and were “stuck” with the AAA risk as a result. Rather, GS had a whole program of issuance — something they called “Abacus” — which were deals they put together with the sole purpose
of getting short subprime/CDO risk. Their sole purpose in doing the deals was to get long protection/short risk on the underlying collateral. AIG was simply the vehicle they chose to moneitze that PnL. Call me crazy, but I put the AIG counterparties in two different camps: guys like SocGen, who bought bonds in good faith and then hedged the credit risk by buying CDS from AIG, and guys like GS, who used AIG as their lottery ticket for offensively constructed trades to capitalize on mispriced subprime risk. The former, to me, seem much more deserving of a bailout than the latter…

DeutscheBank had a broadly similar program called Start.

This of course makes complete sense. There simply was not enough insurance capacity (the monolines plus the volume on the Markit indexes) to account for the big names that went short (Paulson, Goldman, one other large but secretive player we are aware of). That road had to go through AIG as well.

And bear in mind another fact: asset backed securities CDOs (and the subprime kind were that type) were managed rather than passive. That mean when the collateral paid down, the manager would go and find new collateral. Again from an e-mail:

AIG got out of subprime in 2005/2006 – whenever – but it didn’t matter.  Why??  Because the same crappy borrowers that made it into 2005/2006 subprime RMBS refinanced and ended up in the 2007 vintage.  Guess who had to buy the 2007 subprime RMBS paper when the 2005/2006 paper repaid?  You got it – the 2005/2006 CDOs.  CDOs have reinvestment periods (4 yrs for SF CDO) whereby they have to continue to be fully invested rather than letting their liabilities get repaid.  The liability buyers don’t want their valuable paper to be repaid early – or, do they????

Readers who know the terrain, and Abacus and Start in particularly, are very much encouraged to comment or ping me at yves@nakedcapitalism.com.

Now to McClatchy:

McClatchy’s inquiry found that Goldman Sachs:

Bought and converted into high-yield bonds tens of thousands of mortgages from subprime lenders that became the subjects of FBI investigations into whether they’d misled borrowers or exaggerated applicants’ incomes to justify making hefty loans.

Used offshore tax havens to shuffle its mortgage-backed securities to institutions worldwide, including European and Asian banks, often in secret deals run through the Cayman Islands, a British territory in the Caribbean that companies use to bypass U.S. disclosure requirements.

Has dispatched lawyers across the country to repossess homes from bankrupt or financially struggling individuals, many of whom lacked sufficient credit or income but got subprime mortgages anyway because Wall Street made it easy for them to qualify.

Was buoyed last fall by key federal bailout decisions, at least two of which involved then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, a former Goldman chief executive whose staff at Treasury included several other Goldman alumni.

The article continues here.

Harper’s Magazine has written up the lengths to which the authorities will go in censoring views that dissent with what is the unstated official policy: that no demand of the banking industry is too unreasonable not to be catered to.

The object lesson is the gutting of the falsely-branded derivatives reform bill. It arrived with a loophole so large you could drive a truck through it, namely that customized derivatives were not covered. So this bill will do nothing to impede the growth of complex opaque products; in fact, it encourages it, since banks will have no oversight if they tweak a product so that is can be deemed “customized.” It was further weakened by excluding most of the banks in America and by excluding a whole swathe of end users. The final insult was making the derivatives clearing house self-regulating.

The hearings on the bill had testimony scheduled only from what amounted to industry flacks. Someone apparently realized at the 11th hour that that might not go over with the correctly angry public too well. So less than 24 hours prior to the session before the House Financial Services Committee, an invitation was issued to Rob Johnson, a former managing director at Bankers Trust Company and former economist at the Senate Banking Committee and Senate Budget Committee.

So what transpired? As Ken Silverstein recounts:

Johnson, who came last, offered the only serious critical viewpoint… After about five minutes of his testimony, Congresswoman Melissa Bean—another industry-funded committee member who chaired the hearing because Frank was absent—had heard enough. “I’m just going to ask you to wrap up because we’re running out of time,” she told Johnson.

Johnson gamely continued. “When I hear the testimony today that are largely financial institutions and end users, I believe that I represent a third group that comes to the table, which is the taxpayers, the working people of the United States,” he said.

“I do need a final comment,” Bean interjected seconds later.

That put an end to Johnson’s testimony. “I was just called to this hearing last night, so I will provide detailed comments on your bill and a statement for the record that will finish my comments,” he concluded.

So what happens next? >The House Financial Services Committee has refused to publish his testimony, offering “the dog ate my homework” level excuses, first that they hadn’t gotten it, then that it was in the wrong format, then that their IT department was experiencing difficulties (always a good one when real reasons are running thin). The last one was pure Catch-22: that he had gotten his written testimony in too late.

You can read his statement, which is obviously too offensive to powerful interests for it to see the light of day in any officially-sanctioned venue, at the Roosevelt Institute.

The numbers aren’t as impressive as AIG’s but the general premise is the same. The automaker’s financial service arm it asking for a third taxpayer-provided cash transfusion. Might help if someone stanched the bleeding first.

But no, bleeding is part of the game plan. The reason for more dough to GMAC is so GM and Chrysler can continue to finance auto purchases, not as a result of greater than expected losses on its existing portfolio. So this is cash for clunkers under another brand name.

From the Wall Street Journal:

GMAC Financial Services Inc. and the Treasury Department are in advanced talks to prop up the lender with its third helping of taxpayer money…

The U.S. government is likely to inject $2.8 billion to $5.6 billion of capital into the Detroit company, on top of the $12.5 billion that GMAC has received since December 2008, these people said. The latest infusion would come in the form of preferred stock. The government’s 34% stake in the company could increase if existing shares eventually are converted into common equity.

The willingness by Treasury officials to deepen taxpayer exposure to GMAC reflects the troubled company’s importance to the revival of the auto industry….

Federal officials also are moving to shore up GMAC’s ability to fund its daily operations, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. telling the company Tuesday the agency will guarantee an additional $2.9 billion in debt, according to people familiar with the discussions. The FDIC guarantee will make it easier for the company to sell debt to investors. The FDIC backed $4.5 billion in GMAC-issued debt earlier this year.

The FDIC approval came just four days before the expiration of the regulator’s program that guarantees debt issued by certain banks. It ended months of tense negotiations between GMAC and regulators. Without a deal, the company would have been forced to further reduce its lending volume. New-car loans by the company tumbled 55% to $5.6 billion in the second quarter from a year earlier.

Wow, I should not be surprised, but this is a stunner nevertheless.

It had generally been assumed that the AIG payouts of 100% on credit swaps (when the insurer was under water and bankrupt companies do not satisfy their obligations in full) was the result of some gap in oversight plus traders at AIG exercising discretion (they were unhappy about bonus rows and had reason to curry favor with dealers, who were potential employers).

The article makes clear that AIG had been negotiating to settle on the swaps prior to getting aid from the government, and was seeking a 40% discount. The Fed might not have gotten that much of a discount, but there was clearly no need to pay out at par.

This massive backdoor subsidy to the likes of Goldman, DeutscheBank was authorized by Geithner while he was at the New York Fed.

From Bloomberg:

[Elias} Habayeb, 37, was chief financial officer for the AIG division that oversaw AIG Financial Products, the unit that had sold the swaps to the banks. One of his goals was to persuade the banks to accept discounts of as much as 40 cents on the dollar....

Beginning late in the week of Nov. 3, the New York Fed, led by President Timothy Geithner, took over negotiations with the banks from AIG, together with the Treasury Department and Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s Federal Reserve. Geithner’s team circulated a draft term sheet outlining how the New York Fed wanted to deal with the swaps -- insurance-like contracts that backed soured collateralized-debt obligations....

Part of a sentence in the document was crossed out. It contained a blank space that was intended to show the amount of the haircut the banks would take, according to people who saw the term sheet. After less than a week of private negotiations with the banks, the New York Fed instructed AIG to pay them par, or 100 cents on the dollar. The content of its deliberations has never been made public.

The New York Fed’s decision to pay the banks in full cost AIG -- and thus American taxpayers -- at least $13 billion. That’s 40 percent of the $32.5 billion AIG paid to retire the swaps. Under the agreement, the government and its taxpayers became owners of the dubious CDOs, whose face value was $62 billion and for which AIG paid the market price of $29.6 billion. The CDOs were shunted into a Fed-run entity called Maiden Lane III...

The deal contributed to the more than $14 billion that over 18 months was handed to Goldman Sachs, whose former chairman, Stephen Friedman, was chairman of the board of directors of the New York Fed when the decision was made.....

“In cases like this, the outcome is always along the lines of 50, 60 or 70 cents on the dollar,” [Donn] Vickrey [of financial research firm Gradient Analytics Inc.] says…..

One reason par was paid was because some counterparties insisted on being paid in full and the New York Fed did not want to negotiate separate deals, says a person close to the transaction. “Some of those banks needed 100 cents on the dollar or they risked failure,” Vickrey says.

As Vickrey indicates, the fact that this was a backdoor rescue means the Fed is acting as an extra budgetary vehicle of the Treasury. This is a violation of the Constitution and shows how patently false the Fed’s claims of independence are.

Update. Some readers have argued “The government was backstopping AIG, ergo it had to honor all contracts.” That argument is rubbish; AIG under Fed supervision stiffed other creditors. From a reader by e-mail:

Liddy sent a letter to Congress which gave a summary the losses at AIG. As I remember it it only 53% of the losses covered by the Fed resulted from activity at AIGFP. Of the 43% realized at the insurance subs a substantial fraction were losses on GIAs with state pension plans-including Californis and Virgina. The losses were in to the billions. Was the Fed suppose to pay 40 cents on the dollar to state pension funds while paying off foreign banks in full?

Now I know the argument goes something like “these were regulated subsidiaries, AIG FP was at the parent level.” Again, I don’t buy it. Creditors in distress who have not declared BK frequently renegotiate their obligations. As readers know well, even credit card issuers will lower the amount due by overextended individuals, and the Fed clearly had more clout here that a mere individual versus has with, say, BofA. The real issue is that the Fed BY DESIGN bailed out banks, including foreign banks, through a device not authorized by Congress.

By Marshall Auerback, an investment strategist and analyst who writes for New Deal 2.0.

How appropriate that with Halloween just around the corner, the Fed and Treasury have announced a coordinated effort that will put the central bank at the forefront of pay regulation on the zombie firms now kept alive courtesy of US government largesse. Trick or treat for the US taxpayer?

The new pay regulations are ostensibly designed try to align the financial incentives of managers with the longer-term performance of their firms. The Federal Reserve will have direct oversight over the pay of tens of thousands of executives, bankers, and traders. The oversight is being justified as a “safety and soundness issue“, according to Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke.

Had the Fed and Treasury demonstrated similar concerns about the overheating housing market, the degeneration of lending standards, and the proliferation of dangerous Over The Counter (OTC) derivatives during the past 10 years, it could have done much to alleviate today’s still profound financial instability.

This measure, by contrast, reeks of bogus populism. In the words of Reuters’ columnist, Jeffrey Cane:

By making executives at seven companies wear hair-shirts, some of the populist anger over bonuses and Wall Street may be assuaged – anger that should rightly be channeled into calls to prevent banks from engaging in risky activities. There’s no reason that banks that are back-stopped by the government should be in the securities business. Taxpayers – voters – should ignore the media fascination with pay and urge that Congress heavily regulate and tax such risky activities.

As Cane acknowledges, the curbs only apply to the newest wards of the state, the likes of AIG, Chrysler, GM, Bank of America, and Citibank. The more than 700 banks and other companies that have directly benefited from the government’s largesse are not affected – even those who are minting profits from credit markets propped up by trillions of dollars of the taxpayers’ money, and who continue to benefit as a consequence of the FDIC guarantees of their commercial paper, which substantially reduced borrowing costs at a time of uniquely high financial stress. Yet we’re still neither proposing any kind of serious regulation, nor any kind of resolution mechanism to deal with the problem of “too big to fail” banks.

The Fed has other big ideas: Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has also called on Congress to ensure that the costs of closing down large financial institutions are borne by the industry instead of taxpayers. He has called for a “credible process” for imposing losses on the shareholders and creditors, saying “any resolution costs incurred by the government should be paid through an assessment on the financial industry.” That would be the very same financial industry that has already received trillions of dollars in financial guarantees and aid by the Federal Government, wouldn’t it? The left hand giveth, and the right hand taketh away. It’s all a big shell game. Given the absence of structural changes in the industry, this will simply increase the cost of credit, so the taxpayer will end up paying again.

What’s with the Fed’s new-found populism? It’s as if Ben Bernanke has started to channel his inner Huey Long. There could well be other motivations at play here.

The Federal Reserve, as we know, is now under uncomfortably high public scrutiny and its hitherto secretive actions are being subject to the greatest degree of Congressional and press scrutiny that the institution has experienced in its 96-year history. True, in the 1970s, the then-Chairman of the Committee of Financial Services, Henry Reuss, sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Open Market Committee’s ultimate decision-making power on monetary policy, but he was denied standing. The Supreme Court never ruled on the issue. But now, like so many other things, the Fed’s privileged status in our society is again being queried. A healthy dose of skepticism in regard to their actions is well merited.

And what of the Obama Administration itself? It demonstrates a similar kind of cognitive dissonance evinced by the Federal Reserve. Having left open the gates of the asylum, the President and his main economic advisers profess shock, (”shock!”) that the sociopaths who run our investment banks are back to their old tricks, daring to gamble in a totally uninhibited manner with the taxpayers’ dollars. These are the same dollars which have been all but guaranteed by Treasury Secretary Geithner, who promised that there would be “no more Lehmans”. These are the very same tax dollars now being deployed to lobby against financial reforms, which will mitigate the practices that created the mess in the first place. The next time, these same banks are likely to leave a catastrophe far scarier than any Halloween costume. Having been duped, the President now seeks to deploy a cheap political trick. He is attacking an easy political target, but as usual, doing nothing concrete to ameliorate credit conditions. Indeed, his actions will likely increase the cost of credit.

Just over the weekend, the President again lambasted the banks for failing to enhance credit availability. During his weekly address, the President said banks should “return the favor” of their recent taxpayer-financed bailout by lending more money to small businesses. As a taxpayer, I don’t recall ever granting this “favor”, but that aside, the President still demonstrates huge conceptual confusion when it comes to the economy. Under the guidance of Larry Summers and Timmy Geithner, policy has continued to preserve the interests of big financial companies, rather than implementing government programs that directly sustain employment and restore states’ finances. To make matters worse, the Obama Administration is already preoccupied with “paying for” additional spending through tax hikes or spending cuts elsewhere. It does not appear to be willing to let the fiscal position of the federal budget grow as needed to meet current challenges.

All of which collectively will serve to cause incomes to stagnate and personal balance sheets to deteriorate, thereby diminishing creditworthiness. Repeat after me, Mr. President: “Enhance creditworthiness and improved credit conditions will follow; personal balance sheets before bank balance sheets.” You improve aggregate demand, and incomes will rise, as will the borrowers’ capacity to borrow. All of which makes it easier for lenders to lend.

It’s so simple that even a banker can figure it out.

And here is why the whole model of securitization itself precludes improving credit conditions. In the words of L. Randall Wray and Eric Tymoigne in “It isn’t Working: Time for More Radical Policies“,

When a commercial bank makes a loan, the loan officer wonders “how will I get repaid”. Because the loan is illiquid and will be held to maturity, it is the ability to repay that matters-and it is most prudent to rely on income flows rather than potential seizure and forced sale of the asset at some time in the possibly distant future and in unknown market conditions. On the other hand, when an investment bank makes a loan, the loan officer wonders “how will I sell this asset”. The future matters only to the degree that it enters the value of the asset today because it will be sold immediately.

It’s Halloween at the end of this week, so it wouldn’t be right to conclude this post without a bit of Halloween imagery. Last week, I described the bankers as vampires (with full tribute to Matt Taibbi ) and the banks as zombies. I have also noted (as has my colleague, Anat Shenker) the tendency of many deficit terrorists (many of whom are the largest beneficiaries so far of taxpayer bailouts, but who still claim we “can’t afford” to help the vast majority of Americans) to deploy imagery relating to our government spending as something unnatural or unhealthy. We hear characterizations of the budget deficit as a “national cancer” (former Illinois Senator, Paul Simon), or government spending as something akin to a heroin addiction (a description I heard last week at a Financial Forum in Denver, Colorado). True to my love of Hammer Film horror classics, I prefer a different image to describe our government spending. It’s a necessary blood transfusion, without which the patient (in this case, the US economy) dies.
But like any blood transfusion, you want to give it to a sick patient who has a chance to get better, not a terminally ill one (i.e. like our TBTF banks), who are being propped up by phony accounting (what we might call a life support system, where the government steadfastly refuses to pull the plug).

Unfortunately, these “blood transfusions” have hitherto been misallocated. No amount of populist grandstanding by the President or the Fed can change that. When we aid banks in this way, it is like using our blood to feed vampires instead of giving that blood to people who could genuinely use a transfusion. This causes those vampires, in turn, to prey on the rest of us. By the same token, introducing pay restrictions on the likes of AIG, BofA, or Citi is akin to complaining about the quality of the clothing being worn by the zombies as they rampage and munch away on the living.

Happy Halloween everybody.

Rob Parenteau, CFA, sole proprietor of MacroStrategy Edge, editor of the Richebacher Letter, and a research associate with the Levy Economics Institute, responds to DoctoRx’s post, “Debate on Deficits.”