Another Sighting of a Sensible Markets Reform Proposal

One of our ongoing beefs is that with all the ink that has been spilled on our snowballing credit crisis, there are almost no decent proposals as how to keep it from happening again.

Too few commentators and policymakers have gone beyond either fixating on the size and complextion of the mess, and when they do, their remedies are merely palliative, that is, they address the symptoms rather than the underlying causes. (Or even worse, thye do what the Fed’s Gary Stern did in a speech over the weekend: they admit the problems are serious, but then warn us than tinkering with our precious system is fraught with risk).

Even some of the bigger, bolder sounding recommendations are at best a surface fix, even assuming they’d work at that level (see here, here, here, and here for examples).

One of the very few exceptions comes from Stephen Cecchetti, professor at Brandeis. His idea is simple, elegant, exploits well understood frameworks and practices (i.e, no scary and untested new ideas like assignee liability).

Cecchetti’s idea? Force as much trading as possible to take place on exchanges.

That no doubt seems underwhelming, until you consider the nature of the problem. The tsuris, including lack of transparency, worries over counterparty risk, and regulatory oversight, are happening solely in what are called over the counter markets, like the credit markets, where investors buy and sell from various dealers and the dealers trade among themselves. And if investment banks keep suffering big writedowns, we may see a new problem: lack of liquidity due to reduced intermediation capacity.

We’ve discussed the merits of Cecchetti’s ideas in an earlier post; we are letting him do more of the talking this time via his presentation at VoxEu. In particular, he does a very good job of describing the role and advantages of an exchange’s clearinghouse:

To reduce the chances of another subprime-like crisis without stifling innovation, financial market regulators should work to increase standardization of securities, especially derivate instruments, and encourage their trade on organised exchanges.

There is a natural tendency for financial regulators and supervisors to fight the last battle, looking for systemic weaknesses revealed by the most recent crisis. It happened after the 1987 stock market crash, during the Asian crisis, and again following the LTCM collapse. And it seems almost certain to happen again this time. So, while it is surely important to examine the specific problems involving banking system off-balance-sheet activities, the quality of collateral used to back commercial paper, and the manner in which ratings are used, I believe that we need to look further.

While market forces seem likely to cleanup much of the current mess, punishing the people who had inadequate oversight and risk controls in place, government officials who create the regulatory environment in which these problems occurred still have work to do. My proposal is that existing international committees like the Financial Stability Forum examine the design and trading of securities, especially derivate instruments, working to increase standardised and encouraging the movement of trading to organised exchanges.

In looking at the financial landscape, we can see that securities fall into three broad categories: (1) exchange traded; (2) standardised, but over-the-counter traded; and (3) customised. In the first case, the securities are standardised, transparent, and traded through a clearinghouse system. The first two properties mean make it more likely that you will know what you own and that you will know the best way to try to sell it. The existence of the clearinghouse helps to improve the stability of the entire financial system. Let me explain why.

A critical part of any financial arrangement is the assurance that the two parties to it meet their obligations. In organised exchanges, there is something called a “clearinghouse” that insures that both sides of the contract will perform as promised. Instead of making a bilateral arrangement, both the buyers and sellers of a security make a contract with the clearinghouse.

Beyond reducing counterparty risk, the clearinghouse has other critical functions. The most important are maintenance of margin requirements and the “marking to market” of the gains and losses. In order to reduce the risk that it faces, the clearinghouse requires parties to contracts to maintain deposits whose size depends on the details of the contracts. And at the end of every day, the clearinghouse posts gains and losses on each contract to the parties that are involved – positions are marked to market.

Since margin accounts act as buffers against potential losses, they serve the same role as capital does in a bank. And marking to market creates a mechanism for the continuously monitoring the level of each participants capital.

It is important to realise that because they reduce risk in the system as a whole, clearinghouses are good for everyone. They are what economists refer to as “public goods”. But the fact that everyone obtains the benefits regardless of whether they pay the costs, means that they are difficult to set up. Private markets will not supply public goods, so governments have to get involved.

Looking at securities markets, where and how should we encourage the formation of clearinghouse-based trading? There are two ways to we could go about this. The first is to think about the natural maturation cycle of a security, and the second is to consider restrictions on what sorts of securities different financial institutions should be allowed to hold.

On the first, it is useful to think about securities the same way we think about drugs. Drugs are in four basic categories: (1) those anyone can walk into a store a buy, like aspirin; (2) those that require prescriptions for doctors, including antibiotics and steroids; (3) experimental drugs that are only available in drug trials; and (4) heroin and other drugs that are universally illegal.[1]

It doesn’t take much imagination to see how the three types of financial instruments are analogous to the first three categories of drugs. (There are financial transactions that are illegal. But since the problems we face are with what’s legal, I am going to ignore those.) As with drugs, safety should be the rationale for categorizing financial instruments. When a security is new, with prices that come from models based on historical data that may or may not be representative, safety is difficult to assess. With experience, we improve our understanding of both the pricing and the usefulness of securities and they can migrate from being experimental to available by prescription. Finally, once generally safety and standardization is established, a security move to being sold to being traded on an organised exchange.

Looking at the topography of the financial system, we see several immediate candidates for migration to exchange trading. I will mention two: (1) bonds and commercial paper, and other fixed income securities; and (2) interest-rate swaps and other derivatives that are traded in large volume. Bonds as we know them have been around since at least 16th century. And the quantities outstanding are substantial – in the United States there something like 4000 distinct corporate bond issues with a market value of roughly $10 trillion. I can see no reason that these “fixed-income” instruments are not traded on an exchange.

Among the myriad of derivative instruments that are out there, interest-rate swaps are the most important ones that are not traded on an exchange. The Bank for International Settlements reports that at the end of 2006 interest-rate swaps with a notional value of $230 trillion and an estimated gross market value of over $4 trillion outstanding.[2] While this market has been growing at a rate of more than 20 percent per year, it has been around for nearly a quarter century.[3]

Not only is the interest-rate swap market mature, but a small number of commercial banks dominate the trading. In the U.S., for example, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reports that of the $81.3 trillion of notional value outstanding at the end of 2006, the top five banks were responsible for $79.9 trillion – that is, all of it! Internationally, one suspects that the top 10 to 15 banks account for virtually the entire market. This sort of concentration suggests that the banks making this market have already standardised the instruments, so moving the trading to an exchange should not be all that difficult.[4]

How can we encourage the movement of mature securities onto exchanges? The answer is through a combination of information and regulation. On the information side, it is important that less-sophisticated investors realise the importance of sticking with exchange-traded products. The treasurer who manages the short-term cash balances for a small-town government should not be willing to purchase commercial paper, or any security, that is not exchange traded.

As for regulation, over the years we reached broad agreement on which financial institutions are critical to the operation our economic system and proceeded to impose substantial restrictions on the assets that they can hold. These come as a combination of outright prohibitions and differential treatment in capital regulation. For example, commercial banks in the United States are not allowed to hold equity, and they are discouraged from holding corporate bonds. It is not difficult to imagine changes in regulation and supervision that would encourage migration of a variety of bonds, commercial paper, and derivatives onto organised exchanges.

In conclusion, as we think about the right response to the current and future crisis, there are two things to keep in mind. First, we do not want to stifle innovation. In the same way that we all want newer and better drugs, we all want newer and better securities. Second, the innovators will always find and exploit the weakest point in the system. So, just as drugs are tested outside the general population, we need to test financial innovations in places where they are least likely to do damage to the parts of financial system we deem critical. But then, once we know that something is safe, it should be standardised and pushed onto an organised exchange where it will be traded through a clearinghouse.

Print Friendly, PDF & Email


  1. vlade

    While I think that securities trading might become easier/more transparent if we moved all securities to exchanges, I don’t think we can move derivatives there easily.
    As you agree in one of your comments to an earlier blog entry, there’s a huge potential problem even with vanilla CDSes – I was being looked as mad when I was pointing out two years ago that there is a immense systemic problem of a chain reaction should one of the big parties went under, and because you can easily write way more protection than there is outstanding debt (and, as Adelphi shows, even though almost everything should be physically settled, people bend and cash settle).
    I can’t imagine that an exchange would be willing to take the cpty risk on this either, and I can’t see how you’d margin it and still make the contracts economical. The problem you’d run into is that if the underlying asset (on which the CDS is written) is correlated with the cpty. Then when your cpty defaults, you don’t get to do the margin call anymore but the value of the asset has moved – in the worst case it defaulted and you as an exchange are exposed to potentially very significant loses.
    If the exchange doesn’t take the cpty risk (as per futures), then there’s no discernible advantage (as pricing for vanilla CDSes is relatively transparent even now). You’d get better data as to volumes/exposures etc., but ultimately, if it’s not interesting for the participants, you’d not destroy the OTC market – there would always be a jurisdiction which would allow OTC and all of sudden the whole CDS/whatever market would move there.
    Admittedly, you could start making complicated legislation that would ensure that the banks could own (directly or indirectly) only exchange traded contracts, but that would be very complicated and would kill inovation – as any new product, or bespoke product would have to go via the exchange which might not be economical (imagine a bespoke credit/inflation/IR/FX exotic combo that a specific customer wants and you can’t easily decompose into well defined constituents).

  2. Anonymous

    Thanks Vlade,

    As I was reading Checchetti, I kept thinking ‘yes, but…’ what about jurisdictional shifts, what about customized products…

    There seems a moreless general failure among economists to recognize the non-standard or, as you say, bespoke, quality and, I’m thinking, different evaluation models.

Comments are closed.