Lack of Trust Between the US and Türkiye Sees Same Sticking Points Derailing Sweden’s NATO Bid

It’s now been five months since US President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reportedly sealed a deal that would see Türkiye approve Sweden joining NATO in return for the US approving the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara.

As the July NATO Summit in Vilnius wrapped up, however, it was clear that all the rejoicing and declarations that the deal made the summit a success were premature. The same sticking points remained and still remain.

While Sweden, NATO, and the US continue to pressure Ankara and pretend that Türkiye is on the verge of ratifying Sweden’s accession, Erdogan continues to insist it will not happen until he gets what he wants.

Just to briefly recap, Finland and Sweden both applied for NATO membership back in May of 2022 in a move widely celebrated in the West as a blow to Russia, but accession requires the approval of all NATO members, including Türkiye – probably the second most important member of NATO due its large standing army and critical location that controls access to the Black Sea. In April, Türkiye approved Finland’s bid, but continues to insist that Stockholm do more to clamp down on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which has an influential presence in Sweden. Türkiye, the US, and the EU all deem the PKK terrorist group, although US military support for the Syrian branch of the PKK, is an ongoing issue between Washington and Ankara. Erdogan has also signaled he wants the US to approve the sale of F-16s to Türkiye, which was booted out of the US-led  F-35 joint strike fighter program after Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 air defense system in 2019. The S-400 is believed to be superior to the US-made Patriot system that Türkiye had been trying to acquire (with technology transfer) for decades, but Ankara was repeatedly rebuffed.

Long story short, Erdogan still wants F16s. The US is still holding up the deal.

While the Biden administration wanted Erdogan to deliver on Sweden and promised it would then deliver the F-16s, Erdogan clearly doesn’t trust the non-agreement-capable White House (Türkiye also has its own agreement-capability issues as evidenced by its release of Azov commanders who were being held in Turkiye after Russia released 215 of the soldiers in a prisoner exchange brokered by Erdogan). Turkiye wants to see more concrete action before proceeding. Here’s Erdogan last week:

“As the president, I’ve done my part, but I have an expectation as well. The US should pass this [F-16 sales to Türkiye] from its Congress, so that we can take these steps simultaneously,” Erdogan told reporters on Wednesday, according to broadcaster Haberturk and other Turkish media.

This in-tandem approach is not new; Ankara pushed it back in October:

“Given the lack of trust over the issue of F-16s and Sweden, Türkiye is not rushing to ratify the NATO bid and looking for a sign that the United States is taking steps at the same time,” said an official from Erdogan’s ruling AK Party.

A second person familiar with U.S.-Turkish talks said a rough proposal – in which each side would take steps toward ratifying the NATO bid on the one side, and the F-16s purchase on the other – had been delayed.

That approach was delayed by US-Türkiye friction in other areas, including a PKK bomb attack in Ankara on the day the Turkish parliament opened and, shortly after, the downing of an unmanned Turkish drone by the United States in northern Syria. Protests in Stockholm that include the burning of the Quran certainly haven’t made the politics of Turkish support for Sweden any easier.

Meanwhile, the West’s unbending belief that it can simply coerce Türkiye into doing what it wants is becoming increasingly comical. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg solemnly declared last week that “the time has now come for Türkiye to finalize the accession process.”

Canada has joined the party and says it will not resume the export of drone cameras to Türkiye until Sweden gets the green light.

Sweden also continues to announce that Türkiye is about to give its nod of approval only for Türkiye to deny that’s the case.  Consider this Reuters report from Nov. 29:

“I had a bilateral with my colleague, the (Turkish) foreign minister … where he told me he expected the ratification to take place within weeks,” Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom told reporters before the second day of a meeting of NATO foreign ministers.

A Turkish diplomatic source told Reuters that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan did not comment on a timeline for Sweden’s accession to the military alliance during his bilateral talks.

At the July NATO Summit national security advisor Jake Sullivan indicated that the F-16s were part of the deal saying the following:

Sullivan said Biden “had been clear that he supports the transfer.”

“He has placed no caveats on this … He intends to move forward with that transfer,” Sullivan told reporters, without giving details on the timing.

Shortly after Biden’s reported promise, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez said, not so fast. According to the Associated Press, “in order to get Menendez on board, the U.S. offered to provide Greece with unspecified tactical weaponry to defend from any future Turkish incursion, according to a Democratic senator, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly on the matter.”

Türkiye and Greece are currently toning down their most recent period of animosity, in which Washington played a large role, and Menendez has since stepped down from his position as chairman after being indicted on bribery charges, but opposition remains in the US Congress to sending the fighter jets to Türkiye. A February letter from 27 senators outlining their stance on any potential F-16 deal sums up the problem. The bipartisan group opposes the sale of F-16 fighter jets for as long as Türkiye held up Sweden’s accession.

Erdogan did his part a month ago, but there was no movement from the US side – despite Biden reportedly assuring his Turkish counterpart of the F-16 sale at the NATO Summit. Right after Erdogan sent the ratification protocols for Sweden’s NATO accession to parliament, the chairs and ranking members of the foreign affairs committees in both the Senate and House poured cold water on the corresponding F-16 deal. Not to mention, the US State Department must first formally notify Congress of the Türkiye F-16 sale, which it had not done at that time and still hasn’t.

There is either a disconnect between the Biden administration and the State Department and Congress, the US is hoping to win this game of chicken, or there are other issues at play. Democrat Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Ben Cardin said in October that “there are other issues that we’ll be looking at.” Those could perhaps including Turkiye’s role helping Russia bypass sanctions or blocking Black Sea access for NATO warships.

The US and Sweden are already proceeding with defense cooperation deals as the NATO bid remains up in the air. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and his Swedish counterpart Pal Jonson signed a deal on Dec. 5 that paves the way for bilateral exercises and new joint procurements. According to Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the agreement “will enable enhanced defense cooperation, such as legal status for U.S. military personnel, access to deployment areas, and pre-positioning of military materiel. The DCA also creates the conditions necessary for U.S. military support when requested, and is, therefore, an agreement of great importance to both countries…This is going to put our close partnership even closer. It’s going to create better conditions for U.S. forces both to use Swedish territory as a staging and basing area, and also for exercising, and it’s all about also deterrence.”

Why is it so important that Sweden join NATO when it has been a virtual ally of the bloc for years? Primarily coordination and more money for military industrial complex:

Strategically, [Finland and Sweden] are now free to work seamlessly with the rest of the Nato allies to plan for collective defence. Integrating strategic plans is extremely valuable, particularly considering Finland’s massive border with Russia and Sweden’s possession of critical terrain like the Baltic Sea island of Gotland. This will increase strategic interoperability and coordination.

Nato allies also open their defence planning books to one another in unprecedented ways. Finland and Sweden will now undergo bilateral (with Nato’s international secretariat) and multilateral (with all allies) examinations as part of the Nato defence planning process. They will also contribute to the strategic decisions that undergird that process.

Their defence investments will also be scrutinised (and they will scrutinise the spending of other allies). Initial analysis suggests that while Finland and Sweden have lagged behind their Nordic neighbours’ increases in defence investment since 2014. Finland’s investment in defence leapt significantly leading up to and following its accession to Nato. While we may not know for months if the same is true of Sweden, we may expect similar increases on its part. Alliance norms and peer pressure are powerful.

Sweden’s defense spending is reportedly increasing from $8.4 billion to $10.8 billion for 2024.

As for Türkiye and the F-16s and whatever else is holding up a deal, Ankara has at least feigned interest in buying Eurofighter Typhoon jets. According to Reuters, Türkiye began the talks with European states after recognizing that its request for F-16s jets might not work out, but Germany objected to the idea. It’s very difficult to imagine Europe going ahead with such a sale without the same issues that are holding up the F-16 deal or if such a transfer were to be against the wishes of the US, although Türkiye is trying to use the possibility to pressure Washington:

“For regional power balances, Türkiye’s need for a new technology fighter jet is no secret,” defence analyst Tayfun Ozberk said. “In this context, the move to acquire the Eurofighters may have been made to pressure the Biden administration to persuade the Congress for the sale of F-16s as soon as possible.”

The Typhoons are “really the last chance to keep Türkiye in the Western defence industry”, said Serhat Guvenc, an international relations professor at Kadir Has University.

In the past, there has been smoke about Türkiye buying the Russian-made Su-35s and Su-57s, but Türkiye likely doesn’t want to over rely on Moscow for its military hardware. Such a move would also widen the chasm between Ankara and the US. But Türkiye may not have a choice if the F-16 drama gets dragged out much longer. Greece is upgrading its air force and Ankara is under pressure to do the same. Retired Turkish Air Force commander General Abidin Ünal told the Turkish daily Hurriyet earlier this year that “If our project to modernize the F-16 aircraft fails and Greece realizes its own projects, the Greek side will gain the upper hand in terms of combat fighter aircraft in 2025. Therefore, our program to procure 40 F-16 / VIPER aircraft and modernize up to 80 F-16s is vital.”