The Fed and the “Soft Landing” – Policy or Luck?

Yves here. This post provides a much-needed antidote to US inflation falling while the economy (for most) still looks pretty good. The Fed’s performance may be tested soon by the port strikes, which look likely to last long enough to create supply chain pressures, and a hotter conflict in the Middle East elevating oil prices.

By Thomas Ferguson, Research Director for the Institute for New Economic Thinking, Professor Emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Boston; and Servaas Storm, Senior Lecturer of Economics, Delft University of Technology. Originally published at https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/the-fed-and-the-soft-landing-policy-or-luck

The biggest factor in accounting for the strength in the economy is the continuing importance of the wealth effect in sustaining consumption by the affluent.

Late summer festivals have long been traditional high points in the world of arts and music. Nowadays, courtesy of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, central bankers repair to their own version of Bayreuth or Salzburg: the conference held in late August in Wyoming at the Jackson Lake Lodge in Grand Teton National Park.

This year’s gathering focused on the effectiveness of monetary policy. In marked contrast to some earlier conclaves, the mood was upbeat. Visibly relieved central bankers could be seen celebrating the fall of inflation, which had come down from a peak of around 10% in early 2022 to below 3%. They were happy to take a few victory laps, crediting themselves with an ultimately successful policy response to the sudden surge in inflation (Powell 2024). Their greatest source of pride appeared to reside in their ‘credible commitment’ to defeat inflation, which, in the official narrative, sent a decisive signal to markets, firms and workers that central banks would do “whatever-it-takes” to restore price stability.

To communicants, it was this steadfast commitment that choked off a 1970s-style wage-price inflationary spiral, by keeping inflation expectations ‘anchored’, as central bankers are fond of saying. As a result, they thought, inflation has come down without triggering a deep recession, a feat few mainstream economists had predicted.

But how much credit does the Federal Reserve actually deserve? Is the remarkable macroeconomic turnaround testimony to the Fed’s credibility, determination, and wisdom? Or it is just down to good luck that inflation fell without a sharp rise in unemployment?

Our new INET Working Paper analyzes claims that the Fed is principally responsible for the decline of inflation in the U.S. We compare several different quantitative approaches. These show that at most the Fed could plausibly claim credit for somewhere between twenty and forty percent of the decline.

The paper then examines claims by central bankers and their supporters that a steadfast Fed commitment to keeping inflationary expectations anchored played a key role in the process. The paper shows that it did not. The Fed’s own surveys demonstrate that low-income Americans did not believe assurances from the Fed or anyone else that inflation was anchored. Even a recent study by the International Monetary Fund (see Gourinchas 2024) concludes that expectations were empirically irrelevant in determining the recent rise and the subsequent decline in inflation.

The U.S. inflation rate actually fell because global supply-side constraints eased and food and energy prices weakened with the passage of time. Dollar appreciation helped by lowering the U.S. dollar cost of imports and by weakening export demand for American goods. The Biden administration also released stocks from the strategic petroleum reserve at key moments and made fitful efforts to resolve chaos at ports.

But a major factor in the decline is the simple fact that America’s workers were, in general, unable to raise their nominal wages in line with the rise in the cost of living. Falling real wages absorbed the shock to the price level, unlike in the 1970s, when U.S. workers (and unions) could still protect their real wages against rising inflation. We present clear evidence contradicting popular claims, e.g., by Autor et al. (2023), that COVID or the advent of the Biden administration ushered in a radical structural transformation of the U.S. labour market in favour of the least advantaged workers. If only this were true.

Based on our analysis it is clear that central bankers are claiming credit for developments that were mostly beyond their control. The issue is larger than just the their customary hubris, because Jackson Hole’s self-congratulatory assessment of monetary policy is legitimating a new round of what John Kenneth Galbraith (1973) called “Useful Economists,” propping up a fundamentally broken macroeconomic model in which the ‘inflation-expectations channel’ plays the central role in wage-price dynamics. The celebration also distracts from the continuing Fed failures to grapple with, or even to recognize, key factors that are still fuelling inflation, especially in services.

The paper then takes up the obvious question of why steep rises in interest rates have not so far led to big rises in unemployment. We show that recent arguments by Benigno and Eggertson that shifts in vacancy rates can explain this are inconsistent with the evidence. Benigno and Eggertson (and many others) treat the job openings data with no sense of their fragility. They take no account of faux positions or their likely seismic increase once COVID hit. We think the vacancy data are worthless as evidence about the real state of labour markets.

The biggest factor in accounting for the strength in the economy is the continuing importance of the wealth effect in sustaining consumption by the affluent. This arises, as we have emphasized in several earlier papers (Ferguson and Storm 2023, 2024a, 2024b, 2024c), from the Fed’s quantitative easing policies. Absent sharp declines in wealth, the continuing importance of the wealth effect is likely to feed service sector inflation in particular. So, we think, will climate change and continuing shocks from a multipolar world economy. In the US, regulatory weakness in the face of intense money politics is also likely to threaten price stability as demand for electricity soars from firms in artificial intelligence and crypto currency mining.

 

References

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13 comments

  1. JohnnyGL

    Anyone take a look at the effects of fiscal policy?

    I know MMT-ers have pointed to loose fiscal policy as the reason we dodged a recession. I figure there’s maybe something to that idea.

    Reply
    1. eg

      Indeed. Frankly all this noisy attention to monetary policy is a distraction from the real action, which is fiscal policy — all part of the ongoing accountability dodge for economic outcomes on the part of our elected representatives and policymakers.

      Reply
    2. Skip Intro

      What Military Keynesianism giveth with one hand…
      I wonder how the oil prices will respond to the war in the Middle East, and whether than might impact inflation.

      Reply
  2. Louis Fyne

    one big unsung factor is natural gas. prices are in the gutter for a variety of reasons, which set up a cycle of attracting high-wage EU industrial production (see churning factories in the Southeast)

    Reply
  3. TimD

    Since October of 2021, the Biden administration has pumped about $6.9 trillion in deficit spending into the economy. That buys a lot of softener.

    Reply
  4. eg

    “Team Transitory” ought to be taking a victory lap if only 20-40% of the disinflation can be attributed to interest rate hikes.

    And the “expectations” narrative is a transparent farce intended to prop up the obviously shambling zombie that is the state of neoclassical orthodox macroeconomic modeling.

    Reply
  5. Nels Nelson

    Wolf Richter at Wolf Street has posts wherein he says American consumers are so flush with wage gains that they are spending like “drunken sailors”. My response to this is that his analysis suffers from the “aggregate problem”. Not knowing income distribution and income source i.e. not disaggregating the data tells very little and provides a positive economic headline. Thomas Ferguson’s analysis is much more telling. The use of aggregates in lieu of more detailed breakdowns is by design because it hides the gross inequality of income distribution and economic well being in the US.

    Reply
    1. eg

      Endorsed. Many socioeconomic ills are hidden beneath the anodyne veneer of aggregated macroeconomic data — that orthodox neoclassical economists ignore distributions is not at all to their credit and after a certain point leads to suspicion of wilful blindness at best and outright mendacity at worst.

      Reply
  6. Mikel

    “The biggest factor in accounting for the strength in the economy is the continuing importance of the wealth effect in sustaining consumption by the affluent.”

    Soft landing = the wealthy making it thru, undisturbed by problems or turbulence in the economy.

    Got it!!

    Reply
    1. Revenant

      A hard landing is when you land on me.
      A soft landing is when I land on you.

      Tomorrow’s lesson: balancing your books on the backs of the poor.

      Reply
    2. esop

      John Galbraith’s 2nd to last book was The Culture of Contentment (1992), his last book was The Economics of Innocent Fraud (2004). Where were you in 1992?

      Reply

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