The fire was still raging Sunday at a segment of Iran’s most important port with helicopters and aircraft dumping water from the air in an attempt to extinguish it. Iran says the cause of the Saturday morning explosion at Shahid Rajaei port will be revealed after an investigation.
Initial speculation has centered around the possibility that flammable materials were mishandled at the storage facility or sabotage. It’s entirely possible it was an accident aided by years of US sanctions that have crippled Iran’s infrastructure and increased risks from aging equipment and poor maintenance.
But the timing is also incredibly coincidental as there have been reports recently that Israel would attack Iran in some form in an effort to derail the talks between Washington and Tehran.
Instead, Israeli and Western media are implicating Chinese missile fuel. The Times of Israel was reportedly the first outlet to make the connection between the blast and sodium perchlorate shipped from China. Some background from Maritime Executive:
In February and March, The Maritime Executive tracked the progress from China of two sanctioned ships owned by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), MV Golbon and MV Jairan, which then unloaded their cargoes of sodium perchlorate at Bandar Abbas. Sodium perchlorate is processed and fashioned into ammonium perchlorate rocket fuel at the Iranian facilities at Parchin south of Tehran and Khojir. Ammonium perchlorate makes up 70 percent of the standard fuel load of most of Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missiles, such as medium range Khybar-Shikan and Fattah missiles, and the shorter range Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles.
Other media outlets like the New York Times and Associated Press picked up the China connection and are running with it. According to the Times of Israel, “the fuel was going to be used to replenish Iran’s missile stocks, which had been depleted by its direct attacks on Israel during the war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.”
Why it remained sitting in storage at the port remains unexplained. There’s also the fact that the commercial port is just 10 miles west of the Bandar Abbas Naval Harbor, which hosts Iran’s Navy. Why would missile fuel components be stored at the commercial port? They likely wouldn’t be:
Iranian officials have stated that Western claims about missile fuel are fake news. The released footage of the start of the fire confirms that the claims made by Western media are part of malicious psychological warfare. https://t.co/bStJ2zZVTg pic.twitter.com/mRrO1Yzp63
— Seyed Mohammad Marandi (@s_m_marandi) April 27, 2025
In an interview on Sunday with the Islamic Republic News Agency, defense ministry spokesperson Brigadier General Reza Talaei-Nik said there were no military-related export or import cargoes at Shahid Rajaee Port. Iranian state media “indicated that the explosion likely originated from a fire at a hazardous and chemical materials storage depot, with multiple containers reported to have detonated”.
Israeli officials, for their part, denied playing any role in the blast. Many are nonetheless noting that the blast came as Iranian and US delegations held indirect nuclear talks in Oman and connecting the dots:
There is still no evidence yet as to whether the explosion in Bandar Abbas, Iran, that has left at least 500 people injured, was an accident, or whether it was an act of sabotage, and if the latter, by whom.
But it is happening in a context in which many of us had predicted… pic.twitter.com/94HLw37KAO
— Trita Parsi (@tparsi) April 26, 2025
As of now, despite the talks between Tehran and Washington, the “maximum pressure” encirclement of Iran continues. If it indeed was an act of sabotage it fits with Israeli—and US— attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as their economic warfare and destabilization strategies.
It wasn’t even two weeks ago that the US launched a series of airstrikes on Yemen’s Ras Isa oil port in northwest Hodeidah. The bombings killed at least 80 people and injured hundreds. It also caused ongoing disruptions to the flow of fuel at the only major oil terminal controlled by the Houthis. Israel was also behind a cyberattack that brought activity to a halt at one of the Bandar Abbas port terminals in 2020.
Here is some background on the importance of Shahid Rajaee, from AFP:
The Shahid Rajaee Port is one of Iran’s most crucial maritime hubs, located on the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which one-fifth of global oil output passes. Spanning 2,400 hectares, with extensive warehousing and storage facilities, it is regarded as Iran’s largest and busiest commercial port.
The area has been designated a Special Economic Zone, serving as a key centre of Iran’s import, export and transshipment operations. Local media has reported that the port handles around 50 per cent of Iran’s total trade, and around 85-90 per cent of all container traffic.
Economic Fallout
Iranian officials said that all Bandar Abbas’ oil shipping infrastructure was unaffected by the explosion, but the economy could be harmed elsewhere as the Shahid Rajaei commercial port was affected. It could exacerbate existing problems with the Iranian economy, which include high inflation that is hitting food prices particularly hard and weak economic growth due to sanctions. Shahid Rajaei handles roughly 85 percent of Iran’s non-oil and gas exports and imports, and is connected to Iran’s transnational rail network. Here’s Financial Ports:
Iran’s customs authority moved swiftly to suspend all imports and exports through the affected port, creating immediate bottlenecks for international shipping routes crucial to Iran’s economy. According to the Port and Maritime Organization of Iran, the port’s container terminals will remain closed until a thorough safety assessment is completed.
Some sections of Shahid Rajaei look to still be operating, however:
“Routine operations at the Shahid Rajaee port are ongoing”
Farzane Sadegh, Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development says routine operations at the Shahid Rajaee port are ongoing, emphasizing that the loading and unloading continue as scheduled. pic.twitter.com/uc1a6J7eED
— Press TV 🔻 (@PressTV) April 27, 2025
Still, there is expected to be ripple effects from even a partial shutdown:
The Financial Ports platform noted that disruptions at Iranian ports could have a domino effect on shipping patterns across the Middle East and Asia, leading to rerouted cargo and longer delivery times. Shipping insurance premiums are also expected to rise sharply for vessels operating in or near Iranian waters until stability is restored.
The hope in Neocon-Zionist land is that the damage to Bandar Abbas will cause economic difficulties in Iran and help lead to a toppling of the government. Here’s the Middle East Forum reveling in the death and destruction and dreaming of regime change:
Apart from damaging the regime’s military capabilities, Shahid Rajaee Port is a major trade hub, handling 85 percent of the country’s total loading and unloading of goods, including electronics, agricultural products, and pharmaceutical raw materials. It contributes significantly to Iran’s gross domestic product. The explosion has left regime-linked traders and businessmen stunned, and disrupted their import-export trade. These businesspeople now will question the regime’s reliability and ability to create a stable economic sphere for its loyalists. Their frustration could weaken the regime’s economic credibility and encourage many in industry to turn against it.
Dissatisfaction with the regime will increase. Many workers suffered injuries and lost belongings. The frustration could be enough to trigger another round of protests calling for regime change. Even if such protests do not erupt, the explosion near Bandar Abbas will reinforce the perception that the regime is unstable, and its end is near. The Islamic Republic leadership is aware of the danger they now face. Regime outlets are instructing citizens to avoid fueling “rumors” that could “allow the enemies to take advantage of this situation.”
Whether accidental or not, the explosion exposes military, economic, and social weaknesses. The coincidence of talks between Iran and the United States on the same day as this explosion adds to the perception that the regime is doomed. One day before the explosion, President Donald Trump said in a Time interview that Israel will not drag the United States into war with Iran, but the United States will lead the charge if negotiators fail to reach a deal. Considering Trump’s ongoing decisions on Iran policy and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stance on ending threats against Israel, Iranians may sense the chaos in Bandar Abbas is a sign for the people of Iran that the time to push for regime change is now.
I’m not sure why the frustration from business people and others would cause them to look longingly at the current Syrian model, but what do I know?
Unsurprisingly, due its prominence in Iranian trade, Shahid Rajee Port also played a prominent role in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Russia and India.
The INSTC would shorten shipping times between Russia and the Persian Gulf by 40 percent compared to Suez Canal and reduce reliance on Western-dominated maritime lanes, but Iran needs stability, international cooperation, and must fix structural issues at home in order to make it happen.
Russia has invested $1.3 billion to help Iran upgrade the Rasht-Astara railway, which runs over rough terrain and is the segment most holding the INSTC back from heavier usage.
The Eurasian Development Bank forecasts that the INSTC could generate $1.5 billion in transit revenue for Iran by 2030. But that’s if Tehran can succeed in infrastructure upgrades while overcoming sanctions and other destabilization efforts. The explosion at Bandar Abbas is an obvious setback.
To me, that the story about “missile fuel sodium perchlorate” appeared immediately in the NY Times and the rest of regime media is a strong indicator that the explosion was the result of a targeted attack. An operation by the usual imperial evil suspects. The Iranians are reacting with restraint in order not to create hysteria and an unreasoned response but Iran is within its rights to respond and respond forcefully.
Remember the Beirut detonation?
This may be a smaller example.
Exactly.
That likely wasn’t an accident either.
The question is what is Iran going to do about it.
If it is once again nothing, expect more mushroom clouds over even more sensitive objects.
I’m perfectly open to the suggestion that was caused by foreign intervention by some malign country or another. The Iranian, Russians and Chinese will know who it is if it was the result of foreign intervenntion and it is in the current interest of Iran to deny that it was anythiing other than an accident.
However, I always have some nagging doubts when the Israeli and Western media suggest, for no particular reason except that is suits them, that it is down to the Chinese supplying and presumably holding sodium perchlorate at Iran’s most important commercial port when it is is of vital strategic interest to Iran’s military wellbeing when it has a military port a few kilometers away, and at such a convenient moment for Israel and its friends to influence discussions to seek ways to imprive reltion between the USA and Iran
It will be very, very interesting to see how this one turns out.
It also didnt spread as fast as a perchlorate fire would – almost explosively – assuming the video is accurate.
Official story is another load of Male Bovine Excrement.
And further interesting to see how Congress handles this genius proposal passed up the grapevine.
Has MSM any such clue yet or just the usual smelling salts ?
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1795
The main question that interests me is whether one of the alternative military ports was actually capable of handling bulk chemical cargo and storing it safely. Many military ports are not, and many in fact are just naval bases. Since we have experts on everything at NC, I’ll wait for one of those to chime in.
IANAE, but I have to say that as a Skunk Party* wannabe, something REALLY stinks here. Coinkydink? Fool me once…
To Aurelien’s point though – it seems reasonable to temporarily store even a powerful oxidizer (like the ammonium nitrate in Lebanon which, in contrast, was poorly warehoused long-term) at the point of entry for before distributing to (likely multiple) missile assembly facilities throughout the country. (And not at a dedicated military facility, making it an even “jucier” target).
* see Yves’ deathless epic, “Skunk Party Manifesto”, in the NC archives (sorry for my HTML ineptitude ;^)
I’m also skeptical of the “military port” notion. It’s been decades since I’ve worked in a warehouse on a naval base, but such bases generally aren’t set up to handle bulk cargoes.
In any event, if one were concerned about an imminent attack destroying stocks of rocket fuel precursors essential for deterrence/retaliation, might it make sense to store them away from obvious military targets, perhaps in among the microwave ovens and agricultural fertilizers in civilian warehouses?
While speaking of deterrence/retaliation, those with the strongest motive to destroy chemicals needed for rocket fuel — if indeed that is what exploded at Bandar-Abas because it could have been any kind of chemicals as far as we know — appear to be the settler-apartheid folks currently threatening to unilaterally attack Iran. It is possible that the source of ignition was destroyed in the explosion and fire and that we will never know the cause.
For now I’ll focus my sympathy on the hundreds of injured port workers who are suffering.
Thank you. Innocent lives really matter.
I am not an expert in these matters, but I’ll also point out that I’m not aware of any instance in America where a bulk component for what will be solid rocket fuel (or anything similar) is shipped to an American port – it all comes internal and by the time it shows up for the Navy, it’s a munition of some sort. The only large bulk component handled at a base would be fuel, and some other consumables used during deployments.
But even large bulk storage of things like grain is dangerous (highly explosive dust) and needs to be properly handled to be safe.
I really do not hope that this was an Israeli sabotage scheme meant to derail any thought of a US Iran peace plan. I suppose we will know if the Israelis gift Trump a gold-plated container like they did with a gold-plated pager. Thing is, if the Israelis were stupid enough to use a container to send a bomb into a port that would be catastrophic. There are about 226 million shipping containers transported worldwide each year. Can you imagine the effect on trade if suddenly all those countries looked with suspicion on shipping containers entering their ports? Can you imagine even the US having to check each and every container for the signs of a bomb? How would you even do it? Especially if you have hundreds of containers stacked aboard a ship in port. Could even Israel do it?
Missiles concealed in shipping containers has in fact been a thing for a long time.
The future actually looks very bleak if we enter an era of unrestricted nuclear terrorism and no arms controls. How do you maintain safety in such a situation?
Let’s review the rumored delivery means that officially nobody has deployed, but for some we are quite certain they have been made operational, and the rest is a matter of someone deciding to do it, not of overcoming any technical barriers:
1) Orbital bombardment. Since the early 1960s the Outer Space Treaty has prohibited deployment of nukes in space, but in a state of total war will anyone pay attention? Of course not.
2) Nukes smuggled in shipping containers or other cargo. Given the volumes of cargo moving around, this is an attack vector that is near-impossible to track. And you can smuggle multi-megatone charges in shipping containers. Tsar Bomba comfortably fits in one, and that was barely lifted up in the air back in the days, it was so huge, but since then miniaturization of nuclear bombs has naturally advanced tremendously.
3) Missiles in shipping containers. Doesn’t even have to involve the crew of a ship being aware of them, they just have to be on top layer in the container stack, and can be launched automatically from point blank range as the ship approaches its destination, or merely passes by the target. Or launched from within the port. Or after the container is moved inland by trucks/rail. Endless possibilities.
4) Low flying hard to detect drones. Ukraine has successfully sent drones carrying 250-kg FAB bombs 1,000 km deep inside Russia. That 250 kg capacity is enough to carry a megaton nuke. Thus drones should be treated as potentially nuclear armed cruise missiles and responded to accordingly, and it is only the fact that Russia is run by traitors who desperately want to be part of the West again that has maintained the illusion of normalcy while the completely inadmissible has become a daily reality. But that would presumably not be the case elsewhere and forever.
5) Drones delivering nuclear charges for sabotage operations, i.e. the drone crosses the border, agents on the ground pick it up, then plant it at a sensitive location. This is very similar to what both sides were rumored to have been doing during the Cold War with the backpack nukes (which are supposed to have been delivered with small low flying cruise missiles to agents waiting for them somewhere deep in the woods).
Etc., this does not exhaust the possibilities in any way.
Notice that most of these present an obvious first strike threat because there will be no warning. Orbital bombardment may be detected, but there will be a couple minutes before the explosions, not quite enough to react, and it can disable ICBM silos and mobile launchers quite efficiently. Planted nukes are ideal for decapitation of command and control centers. Drones carrying nukes launched from the immediate vicinity can be used to disable nuclear silos with pinpoint precision. And so on.
In order to guard against something like that you have to go #NorthKorea+++ in your paranoia. That means:
First, total isolation. Nothing is allowed to get in, in order to prevent smuggling of sabotage devices.
Second, as a corollary, total autarky. You have to be able to make everything locally.
Third, total Kesslerization of space. Both in order to prevent orbital bombardment, and in order to cut off communication with any possible enemy’s agents on the ground.
Fourth, near-impermeable air defense barriers all along the perimeters in order to prevent drones from infiltrating.
And there may still be holes, e.g. well camouflaged all-terrain UGV drones will be extremely hard to track and stop.
So you can imagine the planet being divided in a few such self-sufficient, isolated from and in permanent war with each other zones, perhaps with some zones of total chaos in between.
It’s either that, or whoever is most ruthless will use unrestricted terror tactics to subjugate everyone else.
Right now it’s trending towards the latter scenario, but who knows…
And I’m told that I’m a bloody pessimist…
An optimist says that we live in the best of possible worlds.
A pessimist fears that this may be true.
Etc.,this does not exhaust the possibilities in any way
to me, GM is an ascendent prognosticator of illuminating proficiency. Stealing bases before
the ball is thrown….Major League Rickey Henderson perhaps. A Fan.