It’s all connected, as they say. And the battles in Ukraine and Middle East between Washington and its adversaries are now spilling over into the Caucasus in earnest. US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack confirmed reports that we noted back on July 7 that the US is weaseling its way into the South Caucasus with its proposal to administer the 32-kilometer Zangezur Corridor. This route, long coveted by Ankara and Baku, would cut through southern Armenia along its border with Iran and connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave (and Turkiye). Washington is talking about acting as a neutral guarantor by taking out a 100-year lease on the corridor and having a private American logistics operator run it. Here’s Barrack:
US Ambassador to #Türkiye recommends the US take over a 32 km-long road segment in a 100-year lease #Azerbaijan has been eyeing for the Zangezur corridor project. #Armenia‘s leadership appears open to concessions to Baku and Ankara.
The corridor would run through Armenia’s… pic.twitter.com/NokISzJ7Sc
— Nagorno Karabakh Observer (@NKobserver) July 15, 2025
Barrack’s comments were the first official acknowledgment of the US interest in direct engagement in the corridor. And here’s Trump, for whatever it’s worth, promising that a deal between Baku and Yerevan is close:
Trump: “Armenia and Azerbaijan—we worked magic there and it’s pretty close, if not it’s already done.” https://t.co/7oxitEmv2O pic.twitter.com/9e13y5U2Hg
— Hov Nazaretyan (@HovhanNaz) July 19, 2025
It’s presented as some benign intervention by Washington to unlock peace between the two sides, but if you’ve been following this story the past few years, it’s clear this geopolitical power play was the plan all along in order to damage both Russia and Iran. We can go at least as far back as then-U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affair, James O’Brien’s Nov. 15, 2023 comments during “The Future of Nagorno-Karabakh” House committee hearing for insight on the US intentions regarding these corridors. Here’s what O’Brien said then:
“A future that is built around the access of Russia and Iran as the main participants in the security of the region, the South Caucasus, is unstable and undesirable, including for both the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. They have the opportunity to make a different decision now.”
It looks like that decision is imminent. If this happens, it means Armenia and Azerbaijan are reneging on the ceasefire agreement brokered by Moscow to conclude the 2020 war between the two countries. Point 9 of the trilateral statement signed by Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia at that time reads:
All economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the safety of transport communication between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with a view to organize the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions. Control over transport communication shall be exercised by the Border Guard Service bodies of the FSS of Russia.
Of course the US would go for this, but what about the other players? Why are they burning bridges with Russia and Iran at a time when both appear to be strengthening while the US and the rest of the West are in a downward spiral? And what are the short- and long-term repercussions?
The current Armenia has essentially been taken over by the West. The US has one of its largest embassies in the world in Armenia and even a representative of the US armed forces embedded in the Armenian Defense Ministry. While the opposition warns that this is inviting disaster (Ishkhan Saghatelian, a leader of the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation, says, “This is the beginning of a new storm, not only for Armenia but also the entire region,” and predicts a “new cycle of violence and instability with unpredictable consequences.”), the Armenian government is cracking down hard on dissent as an announcement is likely approaching.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan likes to talk about how this is all a grand rebalancing act, but if so, it has been horribly executed and is akin to getting in deep with the sharks. Or here’s another take:
This is only the logical continuation of his early beginnings. He cannot operate in any other way. He is everybody’s drunk uncle who does drunk things while sober. The tragedy is that he still draws applause.
— Artyom Tonoyan @tonoyan.bsky.social (@DrArtyomTonoyan) July 18, 2025
What about Türkiye and its famous balancing act?
Ankara is concerned about Russia and Iran gaining too much influence in the Caucasus and elsewhere, including over Türkiye itself. Fear over what comes after a Russian victory in Ukraine is likely in part driving the Erdogan clique’s decision making. Türkiye is also getting loads of deals from the EU and Washington. For months, the EU has been increasing Türkiye’s role in the bloc’s defense industries and it was recently capped off by news a few weeks back that the two sides will hold defense talks after a three-year pause. Ankara is looking for access to the EU’s new $170 billion defense fund. And the US is reportedly on the verge of easing up on the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
How about Azerbaijan? While Baku and Moscow have either been hit with a series of escalating unfortunate events or a calculated campaign to turn Russia away from the corridor project (we covered the spiraling ties here) It too has been lavished with deals from the West for its oil and gas. In 2022, Baku and Brussels signed a memorandum on the growth of supplies from 10 to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Gas supplies have already increased by more than 40 percent from 2021 to 2024, but Brussels is already asking for an additional 14 bcm as it tries to get completely off Russian gas.
Azerbaijan has had trouble keeping up with the demand. In 2024, the country produced 50.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and has even been importing more Russian gas itself in order to meet domestic demand and its obligations to Europe. There are plans to expand the Southern Gas Corridor which connects Azerbaijan to Europe, but for now it is already at full capacity.
Despite the current struggle to meet demand, it’s obvious why Baku would be interested in opening a corridor through Armenia. It could theoretically cut out Iran and Russia from grand designs to become a towering gas hub. There are visions of Azerbaijan upping its own output while sending gas west from Turkmenistan and elsewhere in Central Asia to Israel, Syria, and all over Europe.
Currently, it has to pay a transit fee to Iran just to keep the lights on in its Nakhchivan exclave—an arrangement it bristles at.
Türkiye, too, has long dreamt of this corridor that would cement it as a major energy and transit hub between Central Asia and Europe. But of course their gain would be Iran’s loss. Tehran would lose money, influence, and security. As a reminder of what the opening of the Zangezur Corridor would mean, it is the missing link in what would be the shortest land transport route between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans in a Eurasian trade and transport communications worth more than $1 trillion. And key to many involved parties is not only the shorter distance but the fact that it’s one of the few routes that entirely bypasses Russia and it would weaken Iran by opening an interlocked Turkic front across its northern borders. This so-called “Turan Corridor” is a major concern of Tehran for economic and defense reasons. From Security & Defence Quarterly:
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Azerbaijan used to pay 15 percent of the 350 million cubic metres of gas sent to Nakhchivan through Iran as a transit fee. With the opening of the new corridor, Iran may lose this profit.
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An agreement on sale of gas was signed between Türkiye and Iran in 1996. Based on that agreement, Türkiye has been buying gas from Iran for years. While Türkiye pays Iran US$490 for a thousand cubic metres of gas, it can buy the same amount from Azerbaijan for US$335.
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If a gas pipeline is built from Azerbaijan to Türkiye through this corridor, Iran’s loss of gas revenue may be huge.
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The planned gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan through Iran to Türkiye then to Europe was frozen in 2017 because of financial disagreements. Turkmenistan can now deliver this gas to Europe via Azerbaijan.
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The importance of Iran’s pipeline to Armenia has also decreased.
The Strategic Council of Foreign Relations in Tehran, whose director is Iran’s former minister of foreign affairs Kamal Kharazi, condemned the construction of the Zangezur corridor, indicating that the corridor has been introduced as NATO’s “Turan corridor,” a project ostensibly supported by Israel and NATO, which aims to foment ethnic unrest in the areas of Iran inhabited by Turks. As per the aforementioned Council, NATO’s Turan corridor is supposed to directly bring NATO onto the northern border of Iran, the southern border of Russia, and western China and lay the groundwork for their disintegration.
I’ve seen a few reports that Tehran is supportive of Armenia unblocking regional transport routes and that things are fine between Baku and Tehran. That would be quite the shock. Tehran has in the past called the Zangezur Corridor a red line, and they might be backing off that stance a bit because aside from occupying southern Armenia to prevent it, there’s not much to be done. But it’s pretty clear they view having the US on their northern border as the glue to a Turan corridor as a major problem. In a Thursday call between senior Iranian and Armenian security officials, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian, reiterated Iran’s consistent opposition to any shifts in the geopolitical landscape of the region. In May, Ahmadian warned that ““extra-regional” forces in the South Caucasus are “not interested in lasting peace in the region.” That’s quite the understatement.
With Azerbaijan already being used as an Israeli outpost to destabilize Iran and launch drone attacks, the idea of a strengthened and connected Türkiye and Azerbaijan across its northern border with the involvement of Washington is an absolute nightmare.
Moscow was previously on board despite the opposition from Tehran, but that was when Russia was to be included in the corridor and would benefit from it.
Now with so much money flying around, Azerbaijan and Türkiye both seem to have made the decision that their economic interests are better served by the West. Armenia looks to be committing national suicide by entering into deals with Azerbaijan and Türkiye with its security guaranteed by …Washington? France? Good luck with that.
Op-ed by Vartan Oskanian, Armenia’s former foreign minister
In today’s press conference, Nikol Pashinyan likened the idea of granting control over a corridor through Armenia’s sovereign territory to a third party with outsourcing national infrastructure such as the airport,… pic.twitter.com/lfPje2niPd
— CIVILNET (@CivilNetTV) July 16, 2025
Both Ankara and Baku potentially believed that they wouldn’t face much consequences from Russia. They appear to have miscalculated.
Moscow is hitting back. Hard.
🇷🇺‼️Russia brutally punished Azerbaijan: A key refinery blew up – Moscow just showed Baku where it belongs ‼️
In a series of precision strikes, Russian forces hit the Kremenchuk refinery, the Drohobych oil plant and a facility in Odessa, which for years served as a logistics… pic.twitter.com/AkGX5QaNII
— Peacemaker (@peacemaket71) July 18, 2025
With regards to Armenia, the price of liquified petroleum gas (LPG), which is widely used in cars there, has surged by 40 percent after Georgia blocked the transit of gas from Russia. Moscow hasn’t come out and said it, but it’s believed in Armenia that Georgia is acting on behalf of the Kremlin, and it is intended to send a message. Georgia also recently blocked the export of Armenian brandy to Russia, and there are plenty of other levers Moscow can pull. As Fitch Ratings notes, Armenia’s economy relies significantly on Russia for both trade and energy. For example, Armenia also currently pays Russia $165 per thousand cubic meters of gas, well below the market price in Europe, and Russia is Armenia’s number one trading partner.
But is this another instance in the New Cold War where Russia technically wins (it can inflict more damage on Azerbaijan, for example) but loses long term. Short of another military intervention, how does Moscow stop the Zangezur Corridor from opening without its involvement? Both Armenian media (for the past two years) and Azerbaijani media (for the past seven months) have been hard at work stoking anti-Russian flames and blaming Moscow for incidents large and small.
And should the relationship between Moscow and the two South Caucasus countries (and Ankara) continue to deteriorate, how much will that hurt Russia’s position in the South Caucasus—a region Moscow has major plans for with regards to trade corridors and countering Western isolation efforts?
Russia, to varying degrees, plays major roles in the energy economies of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkiye. Due to Russian companies’ large investments in the Azerbaijani oil and gas sector, it is one of the bigger beneficiaries of Brussels’ efforts to increase energy imports from Azerbaijan in order to replace Russian supplies. Türkiye gets nearly half of its natural gas and a quarter of its oil from Russia on good deals and profits from sending Turkstream gas on to Southeastern Europe.
But Russia also relies on both to counter Western isolation efforts. There aren’t many good options for Russia aside from applying more economic pressure, but that also has the potential to turn public opinion more against it. Yes, it could rely on its superior force but at what cost? Or it allows a Turkic/NATO corridor that allows Ankara to expand across the Caucasus and into Central Asia creating a whole host of new headaches for Moscow?
The US, meanwhile, sits back and nods in approval. Either it gets a 100-year lease foothold in the South Caucasus from which more trouble will no doubt spring and/or it makes more progress on the infamous RAND plan to “overextend and unbalance” Russia.
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It will go through. West will control the corridor. West play chess while Russia play checkers.
Doubtful. Georgia’s aspirations for membership of the Western global order were snuffed out in just 8 days (in counterpoint to Ukraine’s 1243 days and counting of resistance). Azerbaijan’s position in terms of geography, population, and military power are far more reminiscent of Georgia than they are of Ukraine. If Russia, China, or Iran want to block NATO penetration into central Asia they absolutely have the resources to do so.
I’ve been wondering if China might lean on Baku. One would think so, but so far haven’t seen any issues with their comprehensive strategic partnership. Might have missed it.
I don’t think China has to really lean much on Baku, as the “Araz corridor” is very much in the Azeri interest, too.
According to Aliyev in last May the bridge from Azerbaijan to Iran were almost complete. The Zanzegur corridor will become operational in 2029, if ever.
As you said, Iran’s main opposition to Zenzegur corridor is related to NATO, not the corridor itself. Azerbaijan wants it mostly just to weaken Armenia even more, but since it doesn’t want to be dependent solely on Turkiyet, Georgia or Iran to connect Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan, it will play with.
For now, until the Ukrainian conflict is settled, Russia’s game is basically to stall and delay any geopolitical developments in the Caucasus region.
West play chess, like a pigeon.
Larry Johnson posted an alternative view of Azerbaijan and Iran relationship from one of his contacts, on Friday 18th.
Apologies to any Azers reading but their country appears to be as corrupt as any around so I think its unwise to believe any position is anything but expedient at the time.
Two main points were that the rail link project from Russia to Iran appears to be proceeding and that Israel did not launch drones from Azerbaijan, a piece of Armenian misdirection.
Who knows?
I’ve seen a lot of people say Israel launched drones from Azerbaijan. But I haven’t seen any proof of that provided.
Talking to an Azeri aquintance years ago, he did say Israel had paid ro refurbish an ex soviet air base for their use, in exhange for selling military equipment. But again I’ve not seen solid evidence of that.
Johnson’s “email from a reader” was interesting, although others like Prof Mohammad Marandi have been steadfast in their statements that drones were coming from Azerbaijan, and Iran’s president “urged” Baku to investigate. Azerbaijan has of course denied this with some saying it’s Armenian misinfo. Regardless, we know that Israel has a presence in Azerbaijan and the two have a very strong weapons-for-oil relationship. On the International North-South Corridor, there would be no reason for Baku to blow that up. Its rail links have been completed and they’re waiting on Iran. Baku still envisions itself playing a key role in that directional trade as well as East-West.
My brother-in-law phoned last night from Armenia. He went there on the plane via Baku, and on the approach flight noticed a group of rather raucous black people who began unloading their overhead baggage before the plane had landed, ignoring the protests of the stewardess. Being South African by birth he probably expect to find that they were Nigerians or something, but to his surprise they all turned out to have Israeli passports.
He also had a lot to say about the Iranian trucks bustling across the Armenian border; apparently Armenia is a major sanctions-busting entreport.
Call me cynical, but as there are no direct flights between Baku and Armenia, that story doesn’t quite add up.
Crooke confirmed the Israel-Azerbajian cooperation on Hedges´s program
ps. so odd that these countries´ elites so far away geographically still trust personnel controlled by Washington D.C. of all places…after the fraught history of the colonial powers there
Cooperation between them is well known. Azerbaijan has spent a long time buying military equipment from Israel, including small warships. But did they confirm drones were launched from a
Azerbaijan into Iran? If so did they provide proof?
Crooke:
“(…)
And then special forces, Israelis have admitted they had special forces in Iran at that time, and the special forces then were coming and using ballistic missiles guided by American software, the Battlescape software system onto the targets that they wanted. Now, there were no aircraft crossing into Iranian airspace except that some aircraft from Israel flew right along the north of Iran, which is very mountainous and really deserted, into Azerbaijan, the airspace.
And from Azerbaijan, Israel launched drones, attack drones. They didn’t have such a big warhead. But they also then flew down the Caspian till they were opposite Tehran. And from there, the Israeli planes fired these latest ballistic cruise missiles. Those are the ones that hit Tehran and made a big impact on it. So it was a very complicated setup that had taken months, if not years for Mossad to put all of those into position to infiltrate people, pre-position them.
(…)”
“(…)
Anyway, it’s very secular. And the Iranians, all the Azeris in Iran are very, very loyal to Iran. And people talk about, well, the Azeri’s glass ceiling. And I slightly laugh at that. And I say, well, there’s one person you probably have heard of who’s really well-known poet and he writes in the Azeri language and he’s fluent in the Azeri language and he is Azeri and that’s the Supreme Leader. So it’s not that the Azeris are completely sort of outliers in Iran.
Chris Hedges
Didn’t Israel launch drones from there? Isn’t that a launch point for…
Alastair Crooke
Yeah, exactly. They launched drones and also, as I say, the airspace of Azerbaijan was used for standoff firing of drones that had these new cruise missiles, multiple cruise missiles. They could launch them once they were in Iranian territory.
(…)”
https://chrishedges.substack.com/p/everything-you-need-to-know-about
I don’t have the time though to listen to the entire thing again to hear whether or not Crooke mentions something about evidence. But it´s mentioned multiple times and he appears rather certain. When he is not he usually points that out too.
However it´s unclear what kinds of drones. With a small warhead? Or with missiles? Or both? But there must be some real events the statements are based on.
Thank you for that. Interesting to read.
I’ve found with Ukraine,Israel and anything along similar lines that there often seems to be a rush to people saying this is exactly what happened, with little or no proof. I guess people don’t get invited onto podcats or to write articles if they don’t come across as definite.
Azerbaijan and Armenia leasing that 32-kilometer corridor to the US would be absolutely nuts and I do not think that either country would be enthusiastic about it. It would enable a Trump America to have a death grip on a major transport corridor which could be shut down for any number of reasons. And you would expect the setting up of American mercenary bases there to “protect” that corridor and this lease they are talking about would be for a hundred years and if either country decided to withdraw from it, then they can expect the sanctions from hell to be leveled on their countries until they backed off. It would not matter which party would be in power in Washington as the US would never, ever leave that corridor.
I am having some difficulty understanding how people involved in this mess in Armenia are rational actors. They seem to be driven by a combination of nationalism and fear. Which is not healthy.
In light of current events, this is folly: “Washington is talking about acting as a neutral guarantor by taking out a 100-year lease on the corridor and having a private American logistics operator run it.”
All the plucky and gullible Armenians have to do is look at the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a private concern held up by crutches of propaganda and bullshit, now causing the further slaughter of hundreds each day. All the Armenians would have to do is check the history of Guantánamo and Okinawa, which aren’t private concerns, but point toward where the Zangezur Corridor would end up de facto.
I once read an essay in which the author explained how countries in Mitteleuropa and Central Europe have little concern for the form of government. Those in power, as well as much of the populace, want national independence. Kingdom, republic, illiberal democracy, and, now, NATO satrapy — so long as the elites and the various banners and the legends of the Nation are not touched, all is right with the world. See: Estonia and Latvia.
I wonder how bribable the figure heads of Azerbaijan and Armenia are keeping in mind bribery is one of the major tools of Israel and the States. These are minor players amongst Israel, the U. S., and Turkey. As a demonstration of the A As minor status Armenians in Palestine are a target of pogroms as are Azeris in Turkey influenced Syria. I am looking at this great game through Russian influenced rose colored glasses.
And the Panama Canal, of course!
They’ve had their backsides handed to them in a war with Azerbaijan, Russia failed to back them up. And they now have little choice. A lot of people talk about how short termism rules in the West. But it rules in a lot of other places as well.
Having their backsides handed to them in a war with Azerbaijan was a part of Pashinyan’s cunning plan. Russia can not help those that do not want to be helped. Recently, he even bragged about it, and said that losing Nagorno Karabah is how Armenia got statehood. There is nothing short term in his quislinginian (if that’s a word) work. It’s a long term effort, and the curent main focus is destroying the Armenian Apostolic Church, while surrendering more territories is in preparation.
it’s a phrase oft-repeated, “Russia cannot help those who do not want help”, and it holds verity in that Pashinyan was late to request and perhaps never wanted assistance – but as to the Armenians themselves, they responded immediately. I attended too many funerals of Armenian young men ages 19-21 etc, who did all they could, but had no technological answer for Azeri/Turkish/Israeli drones. the government is one entity, completely bought out by the west, the armenian people are another.
I cannot find any info re the width of the Zangezur Corridor (input from the commentariat is welcome), so I’m guessing it’s narrow (perhaps a few hundred meters).
Disrupting this corridor with the occasional nighttime drone swarm will be easy work for Iran and/or Russia. And logistically, I don’t see how the already over-stretched USA will be able to defend it either (although ‘…having a private American logistics operator run it…’ sounds like a nice grift for someone with the right connections).
Without the (at least tacit) agreement of both Iran and Russia, the Zangezur Corridor is unlikely to pencil out.
It’s not really a corridor, it’s a two-lane road on the northern bank of Araks-river, on the border of Armenia and Iran. In the Soviet times there used to be a railroad from Yerevan to Meghri (which is now important Armenia-Iran border crossing) along the same river valley, but since it went trough Nakhichevan it was abandoned in 1991 (and probably looted, too).
You don’t really need drones, obviously just a large rock pushed down the slopes will do.
In the list of possibilities: perhaps Russia could play the subterfuge hand too, not just the West. The Soviets could give as well as they got. Would Baku risk a serious Russian destabilization campaign – once Baku becomes convinced it is probable? The intel goes both ways, and Azerbaijan has no geostrategic depth – Azerbaijan is not essential to any other country.
The big issue is that the corridor intentionally runs next to the Iranian border, so that there is no Armenian territory “stuck” on the other side of it. So while transport links (road, rail) through this region would be viable, any pipeline would be highly vulnerable to small drone attack, sabotage, etc.
The corridor (and the border) follow Aras river valley and the region is generally hilly/mountainous, so favorable for covert operations and especially drone operations, since there are no clear line of sights. Iranians could easily infiltrate sabotage teams and hit the corridor with small drone attacks while maintaining deniability. Same for Russians and pro-Russian Armenians. Ukrainians showed how easy it is to hide and transport these, so it would be foolish to assume that Russia or Iran would allow the corridor operation should it be contrary to their national interests.
It seems to me that armchair geostrategysts the world over are fall over themselves in this “War of Corridors” narrative without minding too much about facts and details.
As far as I know (HAPPY to be corrected), the sticking point is that the Turks and Azeris want to be able to traverse this 32km corridor without border checks or tolls for all traffic, a soverign corridor that they could do with as they wish including impinging on North-South trade between Armenia and Iran. The Armenians want to maintain (sovereign) control over the area, with border checks and would concede some “light touch” crossing for domestic Azeri traffic to the Nakhichevan exclave.
On the Macro level, trade routes need to be profitable otherwise they’re an expensive Plan B. How many intermodal (rail, ferry, rail/road, ship) hand off points, with loading & re-loading, insuring and re-insuring would there be on the proposed Turanian corridor? How is this competitive with the Northern/Southern Silk road routes? You’re going to compete with the Chinese on construction costs and logistics?
Finally, trade and investments require political stability: both Iran and Russia could roll over the Azeri coastal plain if they keep putting their fingers where they don’t belong. Killing chickens to scare monkeys, as the Chinese say, in case the Georgian ( & Chechen) examples are not considered.
Could it be that this talk of corridors in just Kabuki from arsonists? A loss on this front diminishes already depressed credibility?
There was a treaty not many years ago inked between the Caspian Sea littoral countries which I think stipulated something with regards to the no-no on the presence of outside forces.
As far as I can see, the Caspian is almost a Russian/Iranian lake (I don’t think the naval industry in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are developed. How is the Turanic corridor going to bypass that sea if the Russians and Iranians say no-no?
You mean like the Russo-Iranian CASAREX 2025 naval exercise that started today. Supposedly to “simulate maritime emergencies to improve regional safety and cooperation between participating navies” but allegedly to assert Russia and Iran as the regional top dogs and demonstrate the limits of outside influence (specifically to Aezrbaijan).
Between this post and the other from links today Will ‘Greater Syria’ and ‘Greater Israel’ Collide or Co-exist under the Al Qaeda Regime? – Vanessa Beeley, there is much to digest.
One thing occurs to me as a fleeting thought…a main way to pressure the USA and associates is to pressure Israel. That is the thing they would go through hell and high water to protect. It’s a pressure point like Ukraine is for Russia.