Yves here. With the Western blather about “land swaps” as part of a settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict still being treated as a legitimate idea, due among other things to remarks by US special advisor Steve Witkoff over the weekend, the post below looks at the constitutional issues that Putin would have to surmount. Keep in mind that as far as I can tell, and as some Russia beat commentators have also said, no one on the Russian side has endorsed this approach. It looks like a US trial balloon that is bizarrely still aloft, apparently due to Russia wanting to be super nice to Team Trump while relations are on an upswing and not embarrassing them by saying “nyet” any more than absolutely necessary. After all, Zelensky and EU leaders are still loudly opposed to this scheme, so why does Russia need to play the heavy?
This post reminds readers of Russia’s formal process for the formal integration of the four oblasts in question, Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporzhizhia, into the Russian Federation, and what steps the very legalistic Putin and his inner circle might have to take to exclude parts of those oblasts. The procedural issues are an indirect proof that the Russian side at most listened politely when the US presented this approach and made non-committal noises.
The very fact that this piece is useful is yet another indictment of the generally terrible mainstream reporting on the summit and its aftermath.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website
The Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on this hypothetical scenario due to 2020’s constitutional amendment prohibiting the cession of Russian territory except in certain cases.
RT’s report on Steve Witkoff’s claim that Russia has made “some concessions” on territorial issues, which signal a “significant” shift towards “moderation”, prompted talk about whether Putin can legally stop the special operation without first controlling all the disputed territory that Moscow claims as its own. He himself demanded in June 2024 that the Ukrainian Armed Forces “must be withdrawn from the entire territory of these regions within their administrative borders at the time of their being part of Ukraine.”
Moreover, the agreements under which Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Khersonjoined Russia all describe their administrative boundaries as those that existed “on the day of [their] formation”, thus suggesting that the entirety of their regions are indeed legally considered by Russia to be its own. Putin also famously declared during the signing of those treaties in late September 2022 that “the people living [there] have become our citizens, forever” and that “Russia will not betray [their choice to join it]”.
Nevertheless, Putin could still hypothetically “moderate” this demand. Article 67.2.1 of the Russian Constitution, which entered into force after 2020’s constitutional referendum, stipulates that “Actions (except delimitation, demarcation, and re-demarcation of the state border of the Russian Federation with adjacent states) aimed at alienating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as calls for such actions, are not permitted.” “Moderation” could thus hypothetically be an “exception”.
To be absolutely clear, no call is being made within this analysis for Russia to “cede” any territory that it considers to be its own, nor have any Russian officials lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim. That said, if Putin concludes for whatever reason that Russia’s national interests are now best served by “moderating” its territorial claims after all that happened since September 2022’s referenda, then any proposed “re-demarcation of the state border” would likely require the Constitutional Court’s approval.
He’s a lawyer by training so it would make sense for him to proactively ask them to rule on the legality of this hypothetical solution to the Ukrainian Conflict. Even if he instead hypothetically proposes retaining his country’s territorial claims but freezing the military phase of the conflict and only advancing those claims through political means, he’d still likely seek their judgement too. They’re the final authority on constitutional issues and these scenarios require their expertise per their connection to Article 67.2.1.
If they hypothetically rule in his favor, the question would then arise about the fate of those living in the Ukrainian-controlled parts of those regions who Putin said “have become our citizens, forever.” They might rule that those who didn’t take part in the referenda, such as the residents of Zaporozhye city, aren’t Russian citizens. Those that did but then fell under Ukrainian control, such as the residents of Kherson city, might be deemed citizens who could move to Russia if Ukraine lets them as part of a deal.
To remind the reader, no Russian officials at the time of this analysis’ publication have lent any credence whatsoever to Witkoff’s claim that Russia made “some concessions” on territorial issues, so it remains solely a hypothetical scenario for now. Even so, Putin might hypothetically conclude that such “moderation” is the best way to advance Russia’s national interests in the current context (such as part of a grand compromise), in which case the Constitutional Court would likely have to rule on its legality.
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Putin’s greatest allies here may very well be Zelensky and the European leaders. They are still making absolutist demands as if the Ukraine had won this war. As an example, France’s Macron has said that out of the peace process, that there should be no limits to the size or equipment of the Ukrainian army so that they can repel any “attempted attacks.” Of course this would leave a strategic threat on Russia’s borders and would certainly mean that the war would start up again in 2 or 3 years when a new Ukrainian military has been built up but that is how the European leaders are talking. So, as the Europeans – and maybe Trump – will continue this war I would expect that Russia will take the land going up to the Dnieper rendering the rest of the country as a rump Ukraine. And much sooner than later. And at that point Russia may say that they will return those “extra” lands after certain obligations are met but that the Ukraine will have to hand over the rest of Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts for that to happen. And those certain obligations would mean a neutral Ukraine – no NATO or EU – a reduced military, no foreign troops, etc. In other words, eliminating root causes. Frankly at this point the continued belligerence and sheer bloody-mindedness of Zelensky and the European leaders will likely bring about this scenario as they refuse to compromise or negotiate. Idjuts.
Note how no MSM reporting (based on my limited reading of MSM) mentions that 50%-70% of Ukrainians want a negotiated end to the conflict, with responses varying primarily of whether territorial concessions are mentioned.
I also fail to understand why a peacekeeping structure composed of Indian, Brazilian, or other neutral monitors is not being discussed.
Macron today: Russian President Vladimir Putin is “a predator” and “an ogre at our gates”, President Emmanuel Macron said in an interview with French station LCI Tuesday, warning that Putin “needs to keep eating” for “his own survival”.
I don’t understand diplomacy at all, but that doesn’t sound like it.
A paradox is that, if the Euros keep this up, Russians WILL be in Berlin or Paris in say 10 years. Alexander I was not looking to conquer France in 1812, after all. But if Macron wants to be Napoleon IV so badly (or is it V? How do you count the pretenders?), maybe he wants to have what happened to I and III repeated.
If I were a betting man, I would put my money on Paris being taken under control of local Islamic militias, not Russians. :)
More like Napoleon XIV?
“They’re coming to take me away, hee hee, ho ho, ha ha, to the funny farm, where life is beautiful al the time,
And I’ll be happy to see those nice young men in their clean white coats”
These fools have erected a first, a media propaganda superstructure and second, security, aid and subvention agreements with a corrupt and failing state, that they can’t dismantle without their governments, and egos, collapsing. To listen to French radio and television, and read the MSM for a few days is to be subjected to an alternate reality where no history took place before the SMO. It would be like a mini collapse of the Soviet Union for it all to come down. History would need to be rewritten.
French radio and television was the same in the 1990s, with Serbs instead of Russians. They got away with it easily, and expect “rinse & reapeat” to work flawlessly. At some point they will realize that Russians are not exactly Serbs, and 2020s are not like 1990s, but not yet.
Putin cannot practically (which is what matters, not legalities) stop the war until he is at the Polish border.
Then he must do de-Ukrainization too, in order to solve this permanently, for it will only get worse in the future.
In fact, the war should have started at the Polish and Romanian borders, from the very beginning. This was priority number one — isolate Ukraine from NATO supplies.
But Putin tried to once again escape his historic responsibility and avoid tackling a major crisis at its roots, tried to “balance” various interests, some of which have absolutely no business even existing (oligarchs, that is), and the result is the predictable catastrophe we have now.
I wholeheartedly agree with the above comment.
It was the 2014-22 arming of “Ukraine” by the U.S. and NATO that led to the Special Military Operation. The West has been trying to kick the Russian fleet out of Sevastopol ever since “Ukraine” seceded from the Soviet Union. The massive military buildup post-2014 was clearly intended to “pacify” the Donbass and to conquer Crimea militarily in 2022 as a precondition for NATO entry.
The Special Military Operation appears to have been a Russian feint intended to bring a negotiated settlement recognizing Russian control of Crimea, as had been previously negotiated prior to the Euro-Maidan coup d’état. This was nearly accomplished in Istanbul in May of 2022 except that U.S./NATO hard-liners convinced the “Ukrainian” side that their weaponry would make short work of completing a rout of the “retreating” Russian forces. Soon “Ukraine” would reap all the benefits of Western consumerism and Russia would return to the 1990’s collapse.
The Russians apparently had no “Plan B” to the Istanbul negotiated settlement. “Ukraine” simply has too long a border with NATO to effectively cut off supplies of weapons and ammunition in the near term. They were left with the necessity of grinding down “Ukrainian” formations and Western munitions. Not a quick way to end a conflict.
The problem here is that “Ukraine” is a fiction dreamed-up by the Soviets. Most of the people living there were engaged in the fantasy that Western consumerism would ensue if they rejected their motherland. Now a third of the population has been displaced and at least 12 percent have fled the country entirely while their post-Soviet oligarchs desperately cling to power in a ruined economy. This is the major impediment to a settlement.
There should have been another 50-100K going south from Brest to seal the border in the first hours of the SMO.
Then Ukraine is finished, because it would not be able to resupply.
But that required proper planning and preparation…
Excuse me. I mistakenly understood your original comment to have been in good faith.
Brest is not in the Russian Federation, nor is Moldova. It is fantasy that Russian forces could have sealed and held the western borders of “Ukraine” with 50-100K troops.
Putin has admitted that it was a mistake to believe that the West would allow the parties to reach a negotiated settlement. Biden, Blinken, Johnson, and Truss were/are all as mad as hatters and happy for “Ukrainians” to die in the service of their delusions of kicking Russia out of Sevastopol.
Trump’s madness is different. There needs to be a political accommodation with the West before the fighting can stop. It would be foolish not to pursue this. Trump loves “deals” as ends in themselves.
Mmmm, I’d politely suggest your concept of war is not quite right.
Technically speaking, it’s much easier to destroy your enemy if you let him come to you in small incremental steps, rather than chasing him into the hostile territory 1000+ miles away. So you remove or protect your valuables (civilians), then sit on your side of the fence, roast a pig, fire a spliff, get some beer running and wait for a torrent of displeased enemies to come to your door. Then you open up your fire and delete them. Then wait for them to repeat the same thing, over and over again until such time there is no more of them. That’s why all major bridges on Dniepr still stand. That’s why all rail channels from Poland and Romania still function. That’s why all ships laden with weapons are allowed to reach Odessa, only to be sunk two minutes before unloading the cargo on the dock.
Make the enemy spend as much time, money, manpower and everything else as possible, to come to your door and then destroy him at the cost of 1/50th of his investment.
Militarily, for Russians, it’s pure genius.
For Hohols and their handlers, just confirms their endless stupidity. At some point the NATO meat will cease to be, and THEN, driving to Polish border or wherever else may be required, will be a rather relaxed affair.
Very well said, this persistent argument that Putin is playing it too nice is ridiculous. In it for the long game, the Russians always are.
Perhaps one day the Russians will realise winning quickly with few casualties is better than a long expensive war.
Huh? The Russian economy has performed extremely well. The present slowdown was engineered by the central bank to reduce inflation. And the point is to attrit the Ukraine army, which natively is a slow process.
Winning quickly with few casualties is better than a long expensive war. Also, being rich and healthy is better than poor and sick.
ArtThops – your wish has been granted! Russia did go in hard and quick and did offer Ukraine an end to the war quickly which Ukraine was pretty happy with – all in the Spring of 2022. Perhaps you missed it.
What happened next was that Ukraine was persuaded to abandon the peace negotiations and fight “as long as it takes”. This is not a clever thing to say to a Russian – the culture there is to fight back and, if possible, hit you with the same weapon you threatened him with. You want a long war – OK, lay on, MacDuff!
The West is geared up for short, quick wars so fighting a long, slow grind – which the Russians can do and are good at – puts Russia at an immediate advantage. Russia has also successfully wiped out most of NATO’s arsenals and created vast dissatisfaction across Europe with the various leaders. And Russia was able to adapt from PlanA to PlanB in a few short months.
Interestingly, the PlanA peace negotiations were kept very secret and were driven by Putin and led many to think he was over-gerous and nice to Ukraine. The PlanB negotiation position has been widely published (from Jun 2024) and no-ne (AFAIK) has said Ukraine is getting too good a deal, but most analysts seem to think the demands are within reason.
And how do you win quickly?
Keep in mind when you outline your strategy that you cannot use more then the number of troops (180k-200k) that Russia used in 2022 since you have no more available that can cross the border without declaring war (Something which Putin has been trying to avoid for some damned good reasons).
You can only add more troops to this at the same rate the Russians have done.
You are allowed to pull tricks like declaring conquered territory to be your country as to free the units mentioned above from having to do guard duty.
You are only allowed to add materiel at the same rate that the Russians have been doing.
You must outline a strategy that will result in fewer casualties then the “let the Ukrainians commit suicide on our defenses”-strategy employed.
Also you want to keep in mind that around half the Ukrainian population is positive with regards towards Russia (and only a minority of around 20% wants to join NATO) so your attacks shouldn’t antagonize the population too much.
You also do not want to inflict too much damage on infrastructure due to that reason and that you would like to use said infrastructure yourself.
Symbolic hits (like the initial attacks on the energy infrastructure that graphically show that you can damage stuff at will but easy to repair) are on the table.
You also must work within the constraint that if you go overboard with your aggression that you will lose the support of China, India and the rest of the Global South, at which point the sanctions will hurt when those countries start enacting them as well.
I can add a few more pages worth of constraints if this is to easy to solve as is.
As H.L. Mencken said : “For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong”. You might have noticed from all the constraints I started outlining that your simplistic notion of what Russia should have done is one of those answers.
You might not like it but the cheapest option to win was the one that Russia performed. A blitzkrieg to intimidate Ukraine into signing an agreement that benefited Russia. And not just any blitzkrieg but the second time ever that a blitzkrieg succeeded against a near peer or better opponent (granted that the scuttlebutt is that the US helped this along when they prohibited the annihilation of the part of the invasion force going for Odessa). It was only when the US intervened and managed to convince Zelensky to keep fighting till the last Ukrainian male not associated with someone influential that it failed.
More importantly, know-it-all armchair generals are in the I’m-the-smartest game. Whatever Putin does, they will be sayin’ that he should have done something else, because they know better. It has to be ridiculous, because it excludes Putin doing something right by pure chance, not the mention that the results show that he must be doing something right (though it goes without saying that Internet experts would do it better).
The answer to the question “can Putin stop the SMO short of controlling the disputed territory without changing the Constitution?” is obviously “yes.” There is no direct legal connection between the two. There are examples elsewhere of disputed territory or territory that has been fought over and which a state lays claim to, but is not trying to reclaim militarily. If for some obscure reason the Russians decided not to occupy the whole of the disputed territory, this would be a political decision, not a legal one. Only if Russia formally gave up all claim to the rest of the territory would it become a legal issue.
I suspect Witkoff is just confused. The “concessions” were probably related to the point at which the Russians would be prepared to open negotiations, not the final settlement, and if any actual “concession” were discussed, they might include (for example) Odessa, outside the current disputed area.
Mercouris contends (pointing to many past instances of the same behavior) that this is the US trying to depict one of their ideas/asks as something Russia put on the table.
Witkoff seems to be frequently “confused”–a neocon in sheep’s clothing? He and Trump have this good cop/bad cop routine but both are still cops. We the public have to decide whether “cop” means deep stater or mere bumbler.
As for the above I think Yves’ point is that for Putin legal and political are conjoined and perhaps the source of his legitimacy for the Russians.
Let’s be real here about the legal obstacles, too. If there were any to be found, Putin would have no trouble passing any changes to any laws needed. And for a more cheeky point, would there be anyone to step up with any problems, and would there be institutional interest in these, unless Putin wanted any? No siree.
Korybko misses the elephant in the room -that the Russians want peace negotiations and have set up a mechanism – meetings at Istambul – to achieve this. Through this they have presented their formal position to Ukraine; Putin secured support from Trump to negotiate in Alaska; Russia now probably expects Ukraine to finally reply with their own proposals and then negotiations can start. Should the Ukranians suggest any land partition of the Russian-claimed oblasts then – and only then – would Putin need to actually consider this matter legally.
The same principle holds for every other speculation about military size, security guarantees, etc etc. Russia has issued its position – it will expect a proper response and negotiations at ‘expert’ level before any meeting of Putin and Zelinsky.
This is false.
Russia does not want peace negotiations per se. It was Trump that wanted the Alaska meeting.
Putin has not budged an inch on the need to meet the objectives of the Special Military Operation.
On top of that, he knows an agreement with the US is worth less than used toilet paper.
If he can get Russia’s needs met through a peace agreement, that is certainly better than more fighting. But Russia is clearly winning and can sustain this pace of operation pretty much indefinitely. So they have no reason to compromise.
I can see Ukraine continuing the war until its military is completely destroyed. Then Russia taking what it wants.
I also think this is Putin’s plan. He isn’t going to agree to peace unless his demands are met. And I think at this point he hopes Ukraine won’t meet his demands. He sees that the ultimate beneficiary of Ukraine stupidly rejecting peace at every turn, (see Minsk Accords & 2022 Istanbul peace agreement) will be Russia.
I beg to differ. Russia does want negotiations – hence the Istanbul process. But negotiations don’t mean compromising on Russia’s objectives – it is more sorting out the details (such as the size of Ukraine’s military).
It is also the case that Russia wants to negotiate new security arrangements with the West, as per the ‘non-ultimatum’ of 2021 – although, as you quite rightly say, agreements with the USA may be of little value. And while – as again you rightly point out – Russia is winning and is in a position to achieve most of its objectives by force, it will still need long-term treaties and agreements with both the EU and USA.
Having said that, Russia has also intimated that if things are not resolved now then the price goes up – maybe from 4 oblasts to 8, or maybe the whole of Ukraine if the war continues until Ukraine is forced to surrender. So peace now on the terms laid out in Istanbul is a genuine offer in good faith by Russia showing that it does want peace by negotiation as I commented above.
To refresh, today it is still often spoken of the full Russian invasion of February 22, 2022. Russia invaded (they were invited into the Donbas) with 180k men when Ukraine had ca 600k, a 1 to 3 disadvantage (3 to 1 is the conventional wisdom for offense, see the battle for Berlin: 2M Soviets vs 700k Germans, the Soviets lost 200k). 40k west of Kiev to hold down 100k Ukrainian troops thereabouts. Putin has been criticized by his hard liners for playing a soft hand (Western pundits ignore the numbers to say Russia performed poorly) but it brought about Istanbul. The West’s treachery therein led to the extended conflict and a reinforcement of Russia’s basic unchanged terms. This conflict will end with the facts on the ground which favor Russia. It is a tragedy of the West’s own making. The Empire never apologizes.
Just spitballing here, but since the details are quite vague about these land deals, I have to wonder if Putin may have told Trump that Ukraine should concede Odessa now as part of a peace deal. Or they could do it the hard way instead and keep fighting until it’s captured by Russia.
I cannot see this war ending without Russia taking Odessa. Ukraine is too stupid to end it before then, same as it was too stupid to choose peace every other time it was previously offered.
I can’t help wondering if some sort of fever dream of a new wunder waffen is behind Europe’s and the D.C. neocons’ oafishness. “If we just hold on until we all have our own super sonic missles, etc. we’ll eventually turn this fiasco into a win.” The MIC is pretty good at convincing or bribing politcians into believing that there are always more tricks up their sleeves.
Setting aside the legality, if Putin were to hold a peoples referendum tomorrow among the four oblasts and there were regions which wanted to remain in Ukraine, which we know there aren’t, and he ceded those to Ukraine, would the Ukrainians continue to engage in terrorist activity not only in those oblasts but also throughout Russia? The answer is yes, so this makes no difference, is removed from consideration.
Setting aside the legality, supposing it might be somewhat helpful, just a little, to end the economic sanctions against Russia if Putin ceded some territory? An end of sanctions is not going to happen no matter what, so makes no difference, is removed from consideration.
Setting aside the legality, supposing it might be somewhart helpful, just a little, to end all this hostility toward Russia, to welcome Russia into the EU or even NATO? Not going to happen no matter what, makes no difference, is removed from consideration.
Setting aside the legality, what about just to end the conflict, which Russia is winning? Not going to happen, remove from consideration.
So what possible reason could Putin have to even consider the legality of the question? There is none, so this is all very silly indeed. Give the world something to work with, a good enough reason, give the Russians something to work with.
Now, let’s consider the opposite perspective. According to Articles 133 and 134 of the Ukrainian Constitution, Crimea is clearly defined as Ukrainian territory and an “indivisible part of Ukraine.” Will Ukraine continue to fight indefinitely to reclaim Crimea while adhering to the constitution? Of course not. Instead, Ukraine will assert that Crimea belongs to Ukraine and is currently only temporarily occupied by Russia. This allows Ukraine to avoid constitutional issues.
‘Will Ukraine continue to fight indefinitely to reclaim Crimea’
I would expect something along the lines of the Lost Cause of the Confederacy-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lost_Cause_of_the_Confederacy
Not only it is rather unlikely that Russians will “cede” any territory they have rightfully conquered as a result of their military endeavours (talking about the 4 Oblasts here), but, I think it almost certain that once NATO is burnt out from Russia’s neighbourhood, the further 4 or 6 Oblasts will happily hold their plebiscites whether they would want to join Russia as fully fledged constitutional republics or whether they would prefer the alternative of the twilight zone offered by …. arrr….emmm…the skint colonial hasbeens of the “coalition of the willing”.
I wonder if The Don and The Vlad exchanged ideas on this topic.
The Ukraine war is far from over, with no ceasefire in sight despite what the US is claiming.
That the EU had to rapidly decamp to Washington shows the panic, with further meetings being held online
The coalition of the willing remains the three imperial powers of UK France Germany.
Nothing has changed.
Russia has said ‘no NATO troops’
US has said ‘no US troops’
Zelensky (counter to Ukrainian protests) won’t negotiate, demanding Donbass (which didn’t vote for him in the elections – so long ago, where he banned the Russian language) must be Ukrainian.
The three willing still want their NATO troops as ‘peacekeepers’ as if they were somehow independent and trustworthy despite these being the very troop movements that were the excuse for the war.
The western media (including many alternative media) have ramped up their accusations against Russia as the root of all evil.
All sides are evil, it is a war which is by definition evil.
The US war machine is happy to sit on the sidelines, blame Biden (although Trump armed Ukraine during his first term) and sell arms to Europe for forward shipment but we do not know what the US will do if arms shipments are blocked by Russian bombing of supply lines. Russia will avoid the optics of Gaza but it can still do much more damage to the logistics of Ukraine as the war moves deeper into a phase of attacks on infrastructure.
Nobody wants to be seen to ‘lose the war’ but neither can either side ‘win the war’ (or the peace, as NC has discussed), leaving he unpleasant option of a war lasting until there are either no soldiers left (Hesse ‘if the war goes on’) or there is a rebellion to overthrow the government.
Of course, the west would resist any rebellion, possibly using that as an excuse to send in troops, raising the question of if ‘the willing’ are prepared to kill their own citizens and if those citizens would really be prepared to die