Yves here. Readers may choose to dismiss this new version of a good old fashioned containment strategy, now attempted by the US in Eurasia, as doomed to fail. But even if it logically is, given the massive productive capacity of China and the arms prowess and natural resources wealth of Russia alone, the future might take longeer to arrive than anti-globalists might hope.
First, the US is vastly more willing to engage in violence to preserve its pretenses to global dominance than China and Russia are. While in the longer run this will be self-defeating (we can see how militarization and sanctions policies are already reducing living standards and increasing social and political fractures in Europe), it might have a measure of success as a costly delaying tactic (if the US and Europe had more managerial/execution competence, the odds would be a lot better).
Second, this article focuses on the biggest players in Eurasia, and touts, as Russia has taken to doing of late, the stature of “civilizational states”. That might sound wonderful to US oppoents reclaiming their mantles as Great Powers. But now that I live in Southeast Asia, it highlights new bossdom versus old bossdum.
Smaller countries of necessity usually get to be pretty good at playing bigger ones off against each other. Even with the compartively short time I have been in Thailand, I can point to initiatives the government is taking to placate each of China and the US/OECD. One indicator of the reservations, at least in this part of the world, about jumping enthusiastically on the China-Russia led BRICS/new world order bandwagon is the limited participation from this region in the recent Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, meant to be an altertive to the Munich Security Conference (see Karl Sanchez for details). Laos, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand did not send representatives.
We reported on doubts about aspirations versus emerging realities of the new multipolar order in “BRICS Are the New Defenders of Free Trade, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank” and Supporting Genocide by Continuing to Trade with Israel. A key section:
Vanessa Beeley (32:18): And as we keep saying, if you’re going to hold BRICS countries up, Russia and China up, as some kind of viable alternative to the paradigm we’ve been living in for decades and that the world is sick of, then how can we accept that they’re doing virtually the same thing?…
Fiorella Isabel (38:40): It is actually just a very formulaic type of, of cheerleading for a team. It’s just more iterations of that, you know, from the microscopic left, right paradigm to, you know, multipolar and unipolar thing. It’s become just very much iterations of the same type of mentality where you’re just choosing a team and you’re just repeating what is most advantageous for you, what is most popular, what X, Y analysts said and whatever they say goes. And so when you question outside of that, you break people’s brains.
Hence it is rational for smaller fry to try to play both sides rather than make firm commitments.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website
US-backed NATO, Pakistan, and the “Asian/Containment Crescent” of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines are poised to respectively face off against Russia, India, and China across this century.
The US is sending mixed signals about the Sino–Russo Entente, which was strengthened by the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline deal, after Trump said in September that he’s “not concerned” about it while Secretary of War Pete Hegseth claimed that he ordered him to “re-establish deterrence” against them. As was argued here, “Trump 2.0’s Eurasian Balancing Act Has Failed” largely as a result of this development, which importantly involved India’s tacit approval amidst its rapprochement with China.
Far from remaining divided, principally as regards China and India with all the complications that their continued rivalry would entail for Russia’s own balancing act, Eurasia’s three most powerful civilization-states are increasingly coming together to revive their dormant Russia-India-China (RIC) format. This platform is significant on its own but it’s also crucially the core of BRICS and the SCO, which play complementary roles in gradually transforming global governance as explained here.
These RIC-accelerated multipolar processes can’t be countered through direct military force, however, but the way in which the Pentagon might try to slow everything down is through provoking arms races. NATO’s, Pakistan’s, and the “Asian/Containment Crescent’s” (Japan-Taiwan-Philippines) US-backed military buildups (partial in Pakistan’s case) could help achieve this vis-à-vis Russia, India, and China as could reinforced US military presences (or a formal return in Pakistan’s case) in each.
Likewise, the “Golden Dome”, intermediate-range missile deployments in their regions, and more militarization of outer space can place additional pressure on Russia and China to this end, though these moves could also backfire by enhancing those two’s military-technical coordination too. To be clear, Russia and China aren’t allies that would go to war for one another, but their shared military-security and strategic interests raise the chances that they’ll provide support for the other during wartime.
China has thus far eschewed sending military-technical aid to Russia due to its complex interdependence with the West, but Trump’s tariff war, his accusation that President Xi Jinping is “conspiring” against the US, and the Pentagon’s plans for the “Asian/Containment Crescent” might prompt a recalculation. In a similar spirit, Russia might become comfortable sharing cutting-edge military-technical knowledgewith China to counterbalance US moves in Japan, which could extend to their shared North Korean ally too.
Although the lion’s share of Pakistan’s military-technical equipment comes from China, the US might break into this market if Chinese exports decrease due to the Sino-Indo rapprochement, which could also lead to a decrease in American exports to India and the need to replace them with exports to Pakistan. Russia might even regain its traditional role as India’s top supplier by far if exports to it spike in response to more US exports to Pakistan in a de facto revival of the region’s Old Cold War-era military dynamics.
All of these strategic dynamics set the stage for a security dilemma between the Eurasian Rimland (NATO, Pakistan, and the “Asian/Containment Crescent”) and the Eurasian Heartland (RIC) instigated by the US in order to “re-establish deterrence” vis-à-vis the Sino-Russo Entente. The purpose is to pressure one of them or their shared Indian partner into capitulating to the US so as to then more effectively divide-and-rule the supercontinent. This hegemonic plot will define Eurasia’s 21st-century geopolitics.
There is another tactic not mentioned and that is the use of proxy terrorist groups. ISIS, Al Qaeda – doesn’t matter what they call themselves. They will be financed, recruited, equipped, trained, protected and sent to pressure points to cause all sorts of chaos in the region. We are seeing that in the Sahel region of Africa right now because the countries there kicked the French out as well as Americans. Add to the mix Ukrainian specialists in drone warfare and those nations will have a tough fight on their hands. And of course mysterious unmarked helicopters will fly in equipment and supplies and if it looks like a group is about to collapse, those same helicopters will be sent in to evacuate the leaders and their families. I’ve seen this movie before.
This seems very likely. The CIA and special ops seem to be the last functional parts of the US war state.
“it is rational for smaller fry to try to play both sides rather than make firm commitments.”
Indeed it is. That they will even get the opportunity to do so is why I am in favour of the end of American hegemony and the emergence of a multi-nodal (to use Chas Freeman’s preferred) world system.
Related from Bhadrakumar: Rumbles of regime change in Afghanistan
When looking at geopolitics I find Bhadrakumar’s analysis to be a vital barometer. When he said BRICS is a Russian project on Glenn Deisen’s show a month ago that really stuck with me.
As world war becomes more and more likely(are we already in it?), is it likely that after the three main empires consolidate their power then simple game theory becomes more relevant? Meaning #2 and #3 powers should theoretically cooperate against power #1. And if #3 cooperates with #1 against #2, after the war it just makes #1 even stronger and #3 almost vassalized.
Strange things happened between FDR’s quarentine speech through Munich, the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement and then finally Barbarossa. Even in 1940 there is evidence that the British had plans the invade the Soviet Union through Finland or Iran. And the communication between the empires is difficult to make sense of with modern eyes. Seems like we are in a similar spot here. Russia is #3 but we don’t know yet who is #1, China or US. It may also explain why Putin continues to negotiate with what appears to be a NATO who has gone completely mad.
And smaller nations who think they have agency sometimes unexpectedly find out when it comes to world war they are vassals. mussolini thought he had agency and did all the way until the fall of France. But he quickly because a vassal of Hitler after that, especially after he invaded Greece without telling Hitler.
This is obviously a bit simplistic when analyzing a phenomenon as big as world war, but the thought that Russia and China’s interests are not completely aligned I’m sure is taken into account by the Kremlin. They would be foolish to give the Chinese their militarily technology. It is their main advantage over the other two powers.
Unconvinced, if only because go the number of times the author uses the word “could.” Many things “could” happen, but we are most likely to see continuation of previous practice, as Yves mentions, with smaller countries playing both sides against each other. In any case, as I pointed out in my essay yesterday, a very large part of the discourse of the political class these days is the equivalent of Twitter posts, seeking “likes” from each other, and with no necessary or obvious connection with reality. Trump is perhaps exceptional in this, with his almost total disconnection from the real world, but it’s a general problem. There is no chance of “re-establishing deterrence” against Russia and China and the more intelligent actors in Washington understand this, but the point is headlines and Likes.
On a specific point, it’s a while since I was in Pakistan, but I doubt if the political climate has changed: the arms embargo by the US still leaves bitter memories, whereas China is regarded as the only trustworthy partner.
I do have issues with the whole Heartland theory. Mainly because when I read history, the area from Ukraine to Central Asia has not been just a place for clashes, but a main road for innovations and wealth to travel from East to West. Silkroad made Europe to what it is, and then Europe tried to destroy it.
Or maybe it’s the same idea using different words, but it seems to me that if Europe seeks to thrive, it has to tap into that flow of good things instead of trying to control it. Europe did manage to disturb that artery of human development for a few centuries while looting and enslaving most of the world, but that era seems to be ending now.
Multipolarity (read: silkroad) is not “historically deterministic”, for sure, but I think it has more staying power than monopolarity based on arms race. Even if we are all dead in the long run.
I have a strong suspicion that we’re simply going to see the world’s center move to SE Asia. Not only is China now the center of industrial manufacturing and innovation, but its also a country of 1.4 billion. Countries that are close to China, or have good logistics routes to it, will prosper. Those on the periphery (Europe and maybe the US) will become far more marginal.
Although Mackinder is viewed as old hat by some, it appears that Zbig’s Grand Chessboard is still relevant to view US policy.
Because of the mentioned inconsistencies, and contradictions from the US regime, it is hard to take anything from them seriously. If the US had a coherent policy, we might be able to make better assessments and predictions. However, as Aurelien mentions, it appears that a continuation of long-term policy is most likely, and little has changed in the larger picture.
Of course, the relative power of the US has declined, and will continue to decline. The difficulties (and unwillingness in some cases) of BRICS, SCO etc to form a true alternative to the western dominated institutions have been well noted here on NC. I would agree that China uses its economic power and leverage, but China thus far does not seem willing to use its military in an aggressive way like the US and vassals. Some optimistic observers may think that a major shift in global power relations is afoot, but we can’t underestimate the power and recklessness of a great power desperate to maintain hegemony – especially when headed by incompetent and lawless leaders. (One could even say, mentally ill, but I’m no psychologist)
Side point: Does Russia even need China’s “military-technical aid”? It looks like they are doing quite will on that front. The new weapons that Russia has unveiled recently show that Russia is in the lead on that.
(The elephant in the room, is the increased likelihood of nuclear war, given the lack of diplomacy, lack of treaty agreements, and the reckless behavior of the US “leadership”.)
While some argue that China’s model of economic and foreign policy is less imperialistic, or is based more on “win-win” and all that, I understand that we must not have unrealistic expectations from the emergence of a new dominant great power. Humans will be humans after all
I think what this article misses is that many of these tactics would only work if the US still had the military, and industrial, capacity to sutain an arms race. In the past 20 years it has started two arms races – one with Russia (over nukes), and a second with China. It lost the first (the US nuclear deterrent is in a bad way, and it’s quite likely that only the submarine part is still functional), and is rapidly losing the second. And nobody in the world seems to have noticed that the US military is in a state of very rapid collapse. They can’t recruit, they can’t build ships (and the existing ships are at, or beyond, their lifetimes in many cases), they’re a couple of generations behind on missiles and drones and they essentially do not have an expeditionary force any more. They can’t even afford to maintain all these military bases scattered all over the world. As a military force they’re largely over.
Similarly the US has tried to win a war of influence through its arms shipments, and to some degree that’s still working, but I think its going to be difficult for them to sustain for three reasons. 1) US weapons just aren’t very good these days. 2) The US can’t actually produce the weapons at a pace that even meet its own needs, let alone those of its export market. 3) They put a ton of restrictions on how those weapons can be used, and what can be done with them.
And in the SE Pacific I suspect things will be complicated by two factors. First of all, they are far more integrated now with Chinese markets, than US ones. If they had to choose (and they obviously do not want to), reality would force them to choose China. Tariffs have simply made that more attractive by demonstrating US unreliability. And secondly, building a defense network in those countries makes those countries a target. They have far more to lose in such a war (being closer, and containing US military bases). If anything this might reduce US hegemony in the region, as it makes them eager to distance themselves from US aggression. Nobody wants to be the next Ukraine (and indeed in Taiwan this and tariffs have accelerated the general trend towards some kind of negotiated and peaceful union with the mainland).
I don’t think any country in the world (except possibly China, though they currently are hiding it well if this is true) wants China to replace the US. If the US had left China alone, China probably would have been fine with the status quo. Most of Chiina’s actions have been in response to US attempts to reign them in (a similar strategy to that imposed upon Japan in the 1930s). The US still seems to think that it’s 1950, and hasn’t woked up to the fact that it’s basically Britain prior to the Suez crisis.
Where the US can exploit tensions is through subversion (CIA, Special Ops, State Dept), and by exploiting their neighbors very real concerns about this new (and huge) powerful country on their border. The former seems very possible – and I imagine we’ll see lots of proxy wars in Africa and S. America to try and destabilize Chinese mining and industrial interests. The latter I’m unconvinced. The US is really really bad at diplomacy, doesn’t seem to realize this and is probably the most arrogant and stupid its been in at least 100 years. Pulling off subtle diplomacy in SE Asia does not seem to be an area where they will excel.
My own prediction, for the little it’s worth, is that the US will self-destruct over its own internal tensions, the collapse of the real economy (which is being rapidly replaced by scams) and the fecklessness of the ruling class.
Your prediction is backed up by clear historical examples as well. The institutional corruption, political dysfunction, lawlessness, and polarization does not bode well for denizens of the US. The current crop of kakistocrats round out the picture, a declining empire headed by cartoon-like buffoons. I have a good laugh when Andrei Martyanov gets fired up and calls the US leaders “morons”, “idiots” and calls DT “a real-estate shyster” who has lost his marbles. At least we have ready-made tragic humor and entertainment.
Well said! To me the biggest mistake of the US has been deindustrialization. Short-term gain for long term pain. Sure it felt good while the country could buy goods on the cheap, but it did so by paying in dollars instead of exports. This led to trading partners holding more and more US assets like debt, real estate and companies. As the US moves to reduce imports, trading partners are less willing to hold these assets, leading to higher interest rates,more inflation and making even harder to grow domestic industrial investment. Maybe the US got Trump V2 because people are desperate for a change.
There will be a lot more balancing acts than the people in the West think: most East Asians are, at least, deeply distrustful of the Chinese–not only is there a lot of historical baggage, China does forcibly intrude on other countries routinely–border disputes, fisheries disputes, etc. Sure, standard problems for neighboring countries, but a superpower neighbor is a handful.
The counterbalancing force is that a rich Chinese neighbor is also a great business partner. Economic cooperation with China is at such point that I’d expect even Japan, say, would choose China over US if they ever had to make a choice economically–all the more reason they are trying to balance so hard–they don’t want to have to make that choice as long as possible. For Taiwan, I suspect, this goes for double: they are already “Chinese,” with privileged access to China (although they complain that this gives the mainlanders a massive leverage over them–doubtlessly true, too) that they don’t want to give up. This is different from Eastern Europeans and the West: even in 2010s, EU looked so much better than Russia–at least for certain kinds of Eastern Europeans (younger, educated, multilingual). I think we passed that point a decade or two ago in East Asia, but the preference of Asians is to not have to make a choice–neither West nor East, let us just deal with both sides.
Both the West and the East can mess this up: the ludicrous war scare Westerners drum up periodically, I think, actually alienates Asians as they see them as crude attempts at hoodwinking them. But the Chinese heavyhandedness causes them to find balance elsewhere. Nothing is set in stone: it’s a highly unstable situation that can turn in any number of directions over next decade or two.
I would day that stability in the medium term, at least, requires a real “rule of law” in the region, where smaller states can be assured that they can do business with both (and all) sides without goalposts being moved. But a “superpower” is a power that is allowed to move the goalposts at their whim, no? (And this applies to China, Russia, and, to a lesser degree, India, too.) Ironically, I think the world could use a great power being “world’s policeman” and many smaller powers would be happy to make concessions if that’s all that there is. A great power as the world’s vigilante, however, is a different question.
I wonder how a us market crash would affect all this going forward. The crash would be us centered but perhaps affect foreigners investing in us markets… anyway, my guess is us would be seriously weakened vs China/russia even as I assume China would suffer unemployment… plus, there’s still trump, seems likely he’d make any disaster worse.
So best case for us is the market marches on, but the past isn’t encouraging when it’s at these lofty levels.
“The only thing that’s up is the stock market, which just hit a record high. In fact, it hit a record high 48 times in the last short period of time. Growth is surging. Manufacturing is booming. The stock market, as I said, is doing better than it’s ever done. And all of you in this room benefit by that. Almost everybody.”
from Trump’s UN Speech 2025
Meanwhile, on the financial side:
https://johnhelmer.net/no-gdp-growth-no-inflation-no-war-by-2028-central-bank-governor-nabiullina-follows-us-nato-imf/
Just grab some popcorn or spitballs…have at it.
The game of war has always been about getting thousands of surplus farm boys to the front to kill the enemy, before said farm boys die of disease. Today, surplus farm boys only exist in India and in Africa south of the Sahara. (There may be some in South America, I haven’t checked.)
This means that “security” will have to be pursued by other means: financial warfare, industrial warfare, trade warfare, autonomous weapons of all sorts and computer hacking. And maybe weather warfare.