A Quick Guide to the Power Restructure in the Middle East

The power and security architecture of the Middle East—or West Asia—is undergoing a deep restructuring. Traditional explanations of regional politics—Sunni vs. Shia, Arab vs. non-Arab, or pro-US vs. anti-US—no longer capture the shifting alliances and emerging blocs. A more useful way to understand today’s dynamics is through two analytical axes.

On one axis, the divide is between political religion and religion without politics. On the other, it is between support for post–Sykes-Picot state borders and a disregard for those borders. These categories allow us to position the region’s countries—from Egypt to Iran—in ways that reveal patterns of alignment and tension.

Of course, the situation is more nuanced than any classification table can convey, and other axes could be argued, but it is perhaps a helpful generalization for understanding the ongoing power shifts and alliances.

1. The Two Axes: Definitions

Before examining the countries, we first need to define what each axis means in this context.

Political Religion

By the category ‘Political Religion’, I mean states which claim legitimacy from a political process but whose political actors sponsor and promote a particular version of their religion. I have avoided the term “Political Islam” because it is too restrictive (as it has come to be associated in this region primarily with the Muslim Brotherhood). In this definition, religion is used as a strong driver of politics.

Religion Without Politics

‘Religion without politics’ is a category including countries whose state does not claim legitimacy through a political process but rather from an inherited right or one acquired by force. For these states, religion is presented as something that should not impinge on the political. The state is seen as the guarantor of religion, but only the version sanctioned by it. Subjects are expected to support the state because it upholds a version of religion, but not to use religion to drive a political process against it.

Post–Sykes-Picot Respect

The post–Sykes-Picot border agreement category means that the country’s main government generally agrees with the borders drawn between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, not necessarily only with those coming out of said agreement. It includes Iran, whose borders predate it by centuries; Turkey, which was never part of it; Egypt, which is older; or Saudi Arabia, whose borders were established later. These states advocate for strong central control within those national borders.

No Post–Sykes-Picot Respect

Non-respect for Sykes-Picot means that the country’s main government, either publicly or by action, does not respect the borders drawn around that agreement and time, as explained in the previous category. These states are willing to challenge the central authority within those borders, either for their own territorial gain or for some other form of benefit and leverage.

In Dispute

Finally, there is the category “In dispute”. It means that there is not a single hegemonic voice expressing support either for a “political religion” or for “religion without politics;” more often than not, both tendencies are present. I have divided it more clearly along the axis of agreement or disagreement with Sykes-Picot because there is a prominent voice within them that clearly seeks it, but this is far from hegemonic and is contested by other groups.

2. Table: Country Placement

	Political Religion	Religion w/o Politics	In Dispute
Post S-P Respect	Turkey, Iran, Qatar	Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain	Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen
No Post S-P Respect	Israel	UAE	Syria, Yemen

 

3. Country-by-Country Explanations

A. Political Religion + Post–Sykes-Picot Respect

Turkey

Turkey fits neatly in this category. The current government claims its legitimacy through an electoral process, no matter how much it might be tarnished. It supports a view of religion—in this case, Islam—that informs the political but which in itself is not a source of political legitimacy. At least, not yet. It uses religion to justify its political agenda. Turkey also voices strong support—at times taking concrete steps, as in the case of Syria and Libya—for strong centralized states and opposes fragmentation.

Iran

Iran is slightly different, though it can also be placed in this category. Although it supports a theological and political doctrine articulated as “Wilayat-e-faqih” (the supervision of the state by a religious authority), the state also claims political legitimacy from being the expression of the will of the people through an electoral process. It’s perhaps the epitome of the merger between a political state and a religious denomination; to oppose the state is akin to opposing the religious denomination it upholds.

The placement of Iran as a country that agrees with the Sykes-Picot border might be less clear because of the “axis of resistance,” but these proxies were either states themselves, like Syria, or sought to function as a state within a state, not necessarily to replace it. In the last 20 years, revolutionary energy has waned significantly, and support for territorial integrity has increased, even while keeping its proxies.

Qatar

Qatar’s placement in this category is more debatable. The country functions as a constitutional monarchy with a very limited political process. However, the reason to place it in this category is its support—both rhetorical and factual—of political religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its close ties with Turkey and, to lesser extent, Iran. Given its small size and population, it strongly supports territorial integrity and relies on the U.S. for its own protection.

B. Religion Without Politics + Post–Sykes-Picot Respect

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain

These governments claim their legitimacy from an inherited right, and the public political process is very limited. These countries use religion in order to justify the status quo, but fight the expression of political religion that might question it. Upholding established territorial integrity follows from this. If borders are questioned, that creates a political process that might open an avenue to question the status quo as well.

Egypt

Egypt falls here for different reasons. The current government derives its legitimacy by claiming to be the protector of the nation—i.e., the army. There’s no space for a political process as the current government crushed it when it deposed President Morsi. This is the clearest case of religion without politics. Religion is completely under the supervision of the state and obeys its demands, which mostly are to not question the status quo and restrict itself to personal morality.

C. Political Religion + Sykes-Picot Disregard

Israel

The most striking thing about Israel is that it falls alone in its own category. Israel derives the legitimacy for its existence from a religious claim, but the legitimacy of its government from a political one. Like Iran, Israel is trying to merge religion and state into a single entity. On the other hand, Israel is an ongoing occupational project, and by definition, it cannot respect the territorial integrity of other nations. Because of that, it actively encourages fragmentation where it is useful to its interests.

D. Religion Without Politics + Sykes-Picot Disregard

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The UAE, like Israel, is an outlier. Each of the Emirates has its own ruler, which creates a political field, but those rulers do not allow for public politics in their respective emirate. Generally, they stand against any religious political movement that upsets the status quo. Because of the relative unimportance of each separate emirate compared to the wealth they command, the UAE has followed a policy of questioning—if not publicly, then by supporting separatist movements—others’ territorial integrity. They do this because they can extend their strategic interests better with weaker central states.

E. In Dispute

Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine

Both Yemen and Syria host competing centres of power with conflicting visions of religion, statehood, and borders. Their internal divisions mirror the axes of the broader region. Similarly, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine contain competing factions aligned with different regional blocs. Their politics cannot be explained by a single dominant category; instead, they sit at the intersection of the axes.

4. Case Study: The UAE–Saudi Clash (Yemen & Sudan)

To illustrate how these axes play out in real time, we can look at the recent clash between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—two countries that until recently maintained good relations but whose strategic interests increasingly diverge because of their position on these axes.

On the 18th of November, Muhammad bin Salman, de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, visited the U.S. and met with Trump, who claimed that he had asked him to “help” with Sudan. Although we don’t know the exact request, it is widely assumed that it was a request to restrain the UAE in its unofficial support for the RSF, one of the warring parties in the Sudanese civil conflict.

In this conflict, Saudi Arabia supports the regular army of General Al-Burhan, which claims to be the heir to the Sudanese state of the deposed Omar al-Bashir. Ironically, Al-Burhan was implicated, together with the RSF, in the deposition. Al-Burhan fights to maintain the current Sudanese territory as a single entity, while the RSF is trying to achieve, if not de jure, then de facto, a separate state. 

Beyond territorial integrity, Saudi has historical interests in Sudan that would benefit from a united country, while the UAE perceives benefits from a fragmented one. The recent massacres committed by the RSF have also received wide media coverage, which further complicated the UAE’s position. This led to the U.S. publishing comments pledging “support” to end the conflict.

This, together with the media campaign linking—or rather, blaming—the UAE for RSF actions which Abu Dhabi has strongly rejected, might have enraged Mohammed bin Zayed, ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the UAE, who subsequently might have given the greenlight to the STC to launch a wide offensive in Yemen. 

On December 2nd, the Southern Transitional Council launched an offensive that took over most of Yemen in a couple of weeks, with the exception of the Houthi-controlled territories, including the Hadramawt province bordering Saudi Arabia. The STC has been financed and trained by the UAE, which was a party against the Houthis in the Saudi-led coalition, but which clearly harbored other interests.

Abu Dhabi embedded itself in independentist southern Yemen movements and encouraged them, creating a network of client entities. This gave it enormous influence in Yemen, including taking over the Isle of Socotra as a military air base. The interest of Abu Dhabi was to control strategic points in the Red Sea, which is why it also strengthened its relations with Somalia in order to penetrate Africa. Somalia has recently and surprisingly publicly ended all relations with Abu Dhabi, probably at the pressure of Saudi Arabia and others.

The STC took control over territories in Yemen previously controlled by Saudi-backed factions, especially in Hadramawt. Riyadh did not like that. It communicated that it was a red line and, in a very rare public display, gave an ultimatum to the UAE, which went unheeded. Saudi Arabia subsequently bombed a military shipment in the port of Mukalla allegedly belonging to the UAE intended for the STC. Although Abu Dhabi publicly withdrew its troops from Yemen, it did not order the STC to back down. To be fair, it is possible that it was no longer able to do so.

Then Saudi Arabia did what no one expected: it launched an offensive with its own troops backing allied Yemeni factions, which in a matter of days retook the entire territory of Yemen—except the Houthi-controlled region. Abu Dhabi lost significantly on a project in which it had invested for 10 years, including the Isle of Socotra.

5. Emerging Alliances and Implications

I have summarized the current events in Yemen because it exemplifies a conflict between two countries that had good relations but which fall into two different categories on the table and found their interests in direct opposition. Furthermore, the implications of this rift go far beyond Yemen.

After Yemen, Riyadh has gotten involved in Sudan, enlisting Turkey, Egypt, and even Pakistan. The purpose is to force the RSF to capitulate and restore a central government in Sudan. This directly opposes the interest of the UAE and, importantly, Israel. There is an alliance forming between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, which might include Iran and Qatar, versus the established one between Israel and the UAE.

Israel and the UAE normalized relations through the Abraham Accords and have solidified that relationship through commercial agreements. Both countries challenge established borders to support their interests and help each other in doing so. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland can be interpreted in that light, likely driven by the lobbying of the UAE. Despite Israel’s position in the political religion section, Israel despises any political religion other than its own, especially Islamist movements. This is a core ideological alignment they share with the UAE together with disregard for territorial integrity,

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, though in two different categories regarding politics and religion, find common interest in maintaining established territorial integrity. Their current governments have tacitly accepted each other’s version of religion as an internal issue, agreeing not to meddle in it as long as the other doesn’t (which was not Saudi’s practice before Bin Salman).

Ironically, this understanding would make possible even a security alliance with Iran. If this were to happen—a prospect that is at least being discussed—a defense alliance bringing together Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, and perhaps other smaller or less compromised countries, would definitely change the power architecture of the Middle East. Israel and the UAE, on their current trajectories, are on opposite sides and stand to lose the most from such a regional realignment.

6. Conclusion

The security or power architecture of the Middle East is undergoing a great shift, partly because of the U.S. intention to partially disengage, at least physically, from being the arbiter and the ultimate security provider. This much has been acknowledged by the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, which, in turn, creates a power vacuum.

Contrary to common depictions, what happens in the Middle East is not solely governed by the interest of global powers like the U.S., China, and Russia. The current dynamics—from Yemen to Sudan to shifting alliances—show that regional powers exercise real agency and that the two axes described in the table offer a way to understand how the region’s security architecture is being transformed.