Category Archives: Banking industry

Will “False Claims” Lawsuit Against AIG, Goldman, Deutsche, BofA, SocGen on Fed Funding Lead to New Round of Embarrassing Revelations?

Litigation may be slowly doing the job missed or only partially completed by various governmental investigations into the financial crisis. The Valukas report on the Lehman bankruptcy was revealing, and numerous foreclosure defense attorneys have opened cans of worms that the powers that be would rather pretend simply don’t exist.

The New York Times reports tonight that a case filed last year was unsealed last week. It plumbs a continuing sore point with the public, namely the generous terms of the AIG bailout, both to the company (which defied the government and insisted on remaining largely intact when the plan had been to sell its various units to repay the government funding) and to its credit default swap counterparties. The litigation has the potential to be revealing, particularly if it goes into discovery (various depositions are likely to become public in pre-trial jousting, um, motions). The Times gives an overview:

Jamie Dimon Says Banks Are Being Nice to You When They Take Your House

Jamie Dimon has finally managed the difficult feat of making Lloyd Blankfein look good.

When Blankfein said Goldman was “doing God’s work,” as offensive and laughable as that sounds, it’s an arguable position.

Are the Chinese Hoarding Certain Commodities to Obtain Cheap Funding?

As much as it may sound barmy to stockpile commodities to obtain better terms on financing, Michael Pettis claims that’s one of the factors behind what looks to be unduly aggressive purchases of copper by the Chinese. An excerpt from his latest newsletter, courtesy Michael Shedlock:

UBS’s Magnus Warns of Risk of Chinese Minsky Moment

UBS strategist George Magnus helped popularize economist Hyman Minsky’s thinking in the runup to the financial crisis by warning of the likelihood of a “Minsky moment.” For those not familiar with Minsky’s work, a short overview from ECONNED:

Hyman Minsky, an economist at Washington University, observed [that] periods of stability actually produce instability. Economic growth and low defaults lead to greater confidence and, with it, lax lending.

In early stages of the economic cycle, thanks to fresh memories of tough times and defaults, lenders are stringent. Most borrowers can pay interest and repay the loan balance (principal) when it comes due. But even in those times, some debtors are what Minsky calls “speculative units” who cannot repay principal. They need to borrow again when their current loan matures, which makes
them hostage to market conditions when they need to roll their obligation. Minsky created a third category, “Ponzi units,” which can’t even cover the interest, but keep things going by selling assets and/or borrowing more and using the proceeds to pay the initial lender. Minsky’s observation:
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Deutsche Bank Sued by Department of Justice for Over $1 Billion on FHA Loans: Sound and Fury Signifying Not Much

If you were to read the news headlines and the fierce-sounding lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice against DeutscheBank on it “egregious” violations of FHA lending standards, you might be persuaded that Team Obama was getting serious about mortgage abuses.

Think again.

Goldman Cheats and Wins Again: Gets Special Treatment in UK Tax Abuse Settlement

How does Goldman get away with it again and again? Is it simply bribery? Well, we don’t call it bribes in advanced economies, since big fish typically have more complicated and indirect ways of rewarding people who help them out, but it amounts to the same thing. Or do they have the five by seven glossies on people in key positions of influence?

The latest sighting is in Private Eye, courtesy Michael Thomas. This is comparatively penny-ante stuff compared to other instances of Goldman winning at the expense of the general public. Here, the firm engaged in what is politely called a tax avoidance scheme:

Silver Down 12%, Big Default Rumored at Comex

We managed to miss out on the parabolic rise of silver, which has now been followed by a stomach-churning 12% fall in thin holiday trading. And commodity markets are less deep than securities markets. Recall that the famed peak of gold in 1980 to $850, was a violent spike up, vasty high than the level two days earlier or two days later.

Silver in particular has been closely watched due to the presence of very large short interests which were apparently partially closed out late last week leading to some very serious intraday volatility. Today we have this cheery development, courtesy Jesse:

Arizona Representative Drops Chain of Title Notification Provision After Apparent Bribe by Servicer

If you thought the Friends of Angelo program, via which Countrywide gave very favorable mortgage terms to assorted Congresscritters, was pretty bald-faced, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

It appears the best way to get a deep principal mod in America is to represent a clear and present danger to the mortgage industrial complex.

Join Us At FireDogLake’s Book Salon on Saturday to Discuss Treasure Islands by Nicholas Shaxson

eaders may know that Nicholas Shaxson’s Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens, has created a big stir in the UK by shedding light on the scale of offshore banking and the numerous types of harm it does. We’ll be hosting a FireDogLake Book Salon tomorrow at 5 PM Eastern 2 PM Pacific.

Not only did I enjoy this book (it manages the difficult feat of being a lively and accessible discussion of banking and taxation), but it is certain to be one of the most important books of the year.

From the FDL overview of the book:

The Booger Rule of Antitrust in the Debit Card Fight

Although we were big fans of the HuffPo piece yesterday on the DC war over debit card regulation, Adam Levitin was a bit less happy since the article focused on the politics and was on why the card fees were burdensome to merchants.

Although a few readers tried arguing the bank position and did not get a terribly enthusiastic reception, Levitin explains the real problem: the actions of the Visa/MasterCard duopoly are pretty clear antitrust violations, but as he pointed out via e-mail, the US pretty much does not do antitrust any more. The Chicago school of economics indoctrination of judges via an orchestrated “law and economics” movement (see ECONNED for an overview) has resulted in judges not seeing competitive problems anywhere. The Department of Justice has lost a slew of recent antitrust cases at the Supreme Court, so they’ve lost the appetite to pursue them.

But (to give an indication of how bad the behavior of the card networks is), the normally supine DoJ has been active in payment cards.

David Miles: What is the optimal leverage for a bank?

Yves here. Please be sure to read to the end of the post, where Miles discusses what level of equity he thinks banks should carry.

By David Miles, Monetary Policy Committee Member, Bank of England. Cross posted from VoxEU.

The global crisis has called into question how banks are run and how they should be regulated. Highly leveraged banks went under, threatening to drag down the entire financial system with them. Here, David Miles of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, shares his personal views on the optimal leverage for banks. He concludes that it is much lower than is currently the norm.

HuffPo Expose on the Biggest, Ugliest Fight in DC: Debit Card Fees

If you want to understand inside the Beltway politics, proceed immediately to a superb article by Zach Carter and Ryan Grim at Huffington Post, “The Swipe Fee War”. It is a meticulously reported piece over the number one fight in the nation’s capital, which contrary to headlines, is not the budget battle but proposed regulations over debit card fees, otherwise known as “interchange” fees. As Felix Salmon, Katie Porter, and Adam Levitin have written, the reason this battle is so hard fought is that it pits two big spending constituencies against each other: banks versus retailers, or as one Senator broke it down further:

The big greedy bastards against the big greedy bastards; the big greedy bastards against the little greedy bastards; and some cases even the other little greedy bastards against the other little greedy bastards

IRS Likely to Expand Mortgage Industry Coverup by Whitewashing REMIC Violations

As established readers know, we’ve been writing since mid 2010 about the widespread, possibly pervasive, failure of mortgage securitization originators to convey the notes (the borrower IOU) to securitization trusts as stipulated in the deal documents, well before the robo signing scandal broke. This abuse matters because the transaction procedures were designed carefully to satisfy certain legal requirements, among them rules contained in the 1986 Tax Reform Act regarding REMICs, or real estate mortgage investment conduits, which required that the securitization trust receive all its assets by 90 days after closing and that all assets conveyed to the trust have to be “performing”, as in not in default. Failure to comply with the rules is a prohibited act and subject to taxation at a rate of 100%, and additional penalties may apply.

Now, with the Federal government under enormous budget pressure, shouldn’t the authorities be keen to go after tax cheats? The headline of a Reuters article, “IRS weighs tax penalties on mortgage securities,” would suggest so. But don’t get your hopes up. The lesson is don’t jump to conclusions when big finance is involved.

Marshall Auerback: QE2 – The Slogan Masquarading as a Serious Policy

By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist and hedge fund manager Cross posted from New Deal 2.0.

Bernanke’s QE2 program has hurt savers, done nothing for banks, and eviscerated middle class living standards.

The U.S. Federal Reserve signaled the end of its controversial $600 billion bond-buying program as planned. And not a moment too soon.