Category Archives: Credit markets

The Fed Twists in the Breeze

Mr. Market so far is not at all impressed with the announcement today that the Fed will be changing the composition of its portfolio by selling $400 billion of near-dated Treasuries and buying the same amount of longer maturity Treasuries. Since the Fed will maintain the same Fed funds target rate, the Fed’s intent is to keep short term rates low and also reduce longer term rates.

The fallacy with the Fed approach, as our Marshall Auerback has pointed out repeatedly, is that targeting a quantity means the central bank has no idea what result it will achieve.

Bill Black: Why do Banking Regulators bother to Conduct Faux Stress Tests?

Yves here. This is a subject near and dear to my heart. There is one bit that Black is missing, however. McKinsey advised the Treasury on the stress tests. They discussed it openly at a presentation at an alumni meeting.

By Bill Black, an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is a white-collar criminologist, a former senior financial regulator, and the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives

One of the many proofs that banking regulators do not believe that financial markets are even remotely efficient is their continued use of faux stress tests to reassure markets. But why do markets need reassurance? If markets do need reassurance that banks can survive stressful conditions, why are they reassured by government-designed stress tests designed to be non-stressful?

The Very Important and of Course Blacklisted BIS Paper About the Crisis

Admittedly, my RSS reader is hardly a definitive check, but it does cover a pretty large number of financial and economics websites, including those of academics. And from what I can tell, an extremely important paper by Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat of the BIS, “Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link?” has been relegated to the netherworld. The Economist’s blog (not the magazine) mentioned it in passing, and a VoxEU post on the article then led the WSJ economics blog to take notice. But from the major economics publications and blogs, silence.

Why would that be? One might surmise that this is a case of censorship.

Richard Alford: The (Re)Education of Ben Bernanke and the FOMC

By Richard Alford, a former New York Fed economist. Since then, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

When you compare Bernanke’s “Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn’t Happen Here” speech of 2002 with his recent Jackson Hole speech, you cannot help but notice changes in his view of the economy and the financial system as well as a significant decline in his confidence in the ability of monetary policy to insure full employment,. The changes between the speeches and the possible explanations for the changes have implication for the course of Fed policy in the near and medium terms as well as the long-run health of the US economy. They suggest that the FOMC sees less upside to further stimulative policy actions and at the same time sees possible downsides where it had not seen them before. This, in turn, suggests that the FOMC will be more tentative in adopting further nonconventional stimulative measures than past behavior would indicate.

Satyajit Das: The Financial Compass

By Satyajit Das, the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk

Roddy Boyd (2011) Fatal Risk: A Cautionary Tale of AIG’s Corporate Suicide; John Wiley & Sons Inc, New Jersey

Justin Cartwright (2010) Other People’s Money; Bloomsbury, London

Nicholas Dunbar (2011) The Devil’s Derivatives: The Untold Story of the Slick Traders and Hapless Regulators Who Almost Blew Up Wall Street…And Are Ready To Do It Again; Harvard Business Press, Boston, Massachusetts

Barry Eichengreen (2011) Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar; Oxford University Press, Oxford

Diana B. Henriques (2011) The Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust; Times Books/ Henry Holt & Company & Scribe Publications, Melbourne

Graeme Maxton (2011) The End of Progress: How Modern Economics Has Failed Us; John Wiley, Singapore

In his novel, Justin Cartwright writes that: “There are beginning and there are ends, and there are also many ways of telling the same story.” The problem is that the great 2007 financial crisis shows no signs of ending. Far from ending, the crisis has shown a virus’ capacity to reconstitute itself. Given the literary difficulty of an uncertain end, publishers and editors have improvised in telling the story – a multiple points of the compass approach to “credit lit”.

The Fed Bails Out Eurobanks Yet Again

Watching re-enactments of scenes from the global financial crisis is a very peculiar experience indeed. The opening by the Fed of currency swap lines to allow the ECB and other central banks to extend dollar funding to Eurobanks was seen as an extreme measure the first time around, a sign of how close to the abyss the financial system had come. This time, allegedly because the powers that be acted before things got quite so dire, bank stocks rallied impressively. Similarly, the media treated this move as just another episode in the ongoing Perils of Pauline drama running on the other side of the Atlantic. The $2 billion loss by a UBS rogue trader got far more extensive coverage, even though rogue traders also seem to be all of a muchness.

Euro SOS

This is a lively discussion on RT which starts from the contrarian perspective of trying to find a silver lining in the Eurozone crisis. One of the panelists is Michael Hudson, who has been a vocal critic of how austerity programs are being used to strip Greece of sovereignity (on top of the minor complication that these programs are certain to fail). It also discusses the prospects for the survival of the euro and who the winners and losers would be in a breakup.

Jurgen Stark = Credit Anstalt 2.0 (and Euromarkets Reacting Accordingly)

It is remotely possible that the EU officialdom will temporarily reverse the train wreck that started last Friday with the resignation of Jurgen Stark from the ECB. That was seen as a sign that Germany has adopted bailout fatigue as official policy. That in turn would mean that Greece will not get any more money lifelines (which as commentators predicted some time ago, means a likely banking crisis, which was the reason for them not to exit the Eurozone).

Mr. Market is giving a big vote of no confidence in European leadership, although the FTSE has reversed some of its early-session losses.

Banks Have Hissy Fit, Cancel Meeting With Attorneys General Due to FHFA Mortgage Litigation

Yours truly has said for months that the negotiations among major banks, state attorneys general, and Federal regulators to reach a settlement of various types of mortgage liability were not going to result in a meaningful deal. Further confirmation of our views came today, via Time’s Swampland (hat tip Lisa Epstein).

The five biggest banks cancelled a session today with the state attorneys general.

Payday Loans Are Dead! Long Live Payday Loans!

In yet another example of finance double-speak, major financial players have moved into that netherworld of the functional equivalent of loansharking known as payday lending.

While in theory short-term loans can be a boon to cash-strapped individuals, in practice, the usurious interest of payday loans result in many borrowers falling into a debt treadmill

More Proof of DoJ Lack of Interest in Enforcing the Law: The Case of the Kickback-Demanding Banks

In this world of rampant banking miscreance, it may seem hard to get worked up about $6 billion in impermissible kickbacks. But this is a case of a clear-cut legal violation, with the particulars sent to the Department of Justice by the HUD Inspector General’s office on a silver platter. And one of the alleged big bad actors was the ever-sanctimonious Wells Fargo.

American Banker has a detailed write-up of a kickback scheme between major banks who were mortgage originators, in particular Wells, Citigroup, Countrywide, and SunTrust and mortgage insurers.

“Welcome to Phase 2 of the Eurozone Crisis”

By Richard Baldwin, Professor of International Economics, Graduate Institute, Geneva. Cross posted from VoxEU

The Eurozone crisis moved into phase 2 this August when the contagion spread to Italian debt, Spanish debt, and most EZ banks. Radical ECB actions prevented a disaster. This column argues that the ECB emergency policies are unsustainable politically and perhaps legally. The only policy combination that EZ leaders could agree on quickly enough involves political cover for ECB bond buying in exchange for national fiscal reforms of the German “debt brake” type.

Quelle Surprise! Partitioning Bank Retail and Wholesale Operations Won’t Cost Much

One of the most annoying aspects of Life After the Crisis is the utter refusal of banks to take responsibility for the costs they have imposed on the rest of us. This is directly related to their efforts to fight any and all interference with their God-given right to loot.

Philip Pilkington: The Irish Establishment – Mad as Goats?

By Philip Pilkington, a journalist and writer living in Dublin, Ireland

Learn to say the same thing
What defeats people is a double confession
One time they will confess one thing
And the next they will confess something else
Talk to them, they will say:
Learn to say the same thing
Let us hold fast to saying the same thing”
– Cat Power, ‘Say’

In Ireland we used to measure our economic performance based on GDP (GNP actually, but we won’t go into that). Pretty standard fare for any advanced economy, really. Not so anymore. These days we measure our economic performance based on the government’s ability to extract tax revenue out of the general populace to pay for extortionate loans to our EU masters.