Category Archives: Credit markets

Bill Black: Dawn of the Gargoyles – Romney Proves He’s Learned Nothing from the Crisis

By Bill Black, an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is a white-collar criminologist, a former senior financial regulator, and the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives

Mitt Romney chose to unveil the economic plank of his campaign for the Republican nomination with a speech in Aurora, Colorado decrying banking regulation. He could not have picked a more symbolic location to make this argument, for Aurora is the home and name of one of the massive financial frauds that caused the Great Recession. Lehman Brothers’ collapse made the crisis acute and Lehman’s subsidiary, Aurora, doomed Lehman Brothers. Lehman acquired Aurora to be its liar’s loan specialist. The senior officers that Lehman put in charge of Aurora, which was inherently in the business of buying and selling fraudulent loans, set its ethical plane at subterranean levels.

Aurora sealed Lehman’s fate by serving as a “vector” that spread an epidemic of mortgage fraud throughout the financial system and caused catastrophic losses far greater than Lehman’s entire purported capital. Aurora epitomizes what happens when we demonize the regulators and create regulatory “black holes.” Romney literally demonized banking regulators as “gargoyles” and claimed that banking regulations and regulators were the cause of the economy’s weak recovery.

OCC Gives Banks Another Blow Job

The acting head of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, John Walsh, has unwittingly revealed himself to be running a heretofore stealth operation: The Ministry of Truth According to Banks. In the past, his remarks have had just the right combination of occasional intersection with the truth plus lots of nebulous phrasemaking for him to be able to sound dimly plausible as a regulator, provided you were on reader craazyman’s preferred cocktail of Xanax and Jack Daniels.

Of course, what Walsh really has going for him is the optics: he is the straight-out-of-central-casting image of the head of a largish financial firm somewhere in the heartlands. Given that no one who has been awake in America in the last five years trust banks, and most people have already reasoned from that that a banking regulator who sounds a lot like a banker is probably not such a hot idea either, Walsh’s looking so much the part ought to set off alarm bells. But the conditioning of seeing well preserved middle aged white men with gravitas and decent tailoring as trustworthy has been so deeply programmed into most Americans that it is pretty hard to overcome.

JP Morgan Pays $153.6 Million to Settle SEC Charges on Toxic Magnetar CDO

The SEC announced that JP Morgan has agreed to pay $153.6 million to settle charges related to a $1.1 billion heavily synthetic CDO called Squared which JP Morgan placed in early 2007 and was managed by GSC Partners, a now defunct CDO manager. The SEC has a cute but not all that helpful visual on the site, save it reflects the role of Magnetar as the moving force behind the deal.

Per the SEC’s complaint against JP Morgan, Magnetar provided $8.9 million in equity and shorted $600 million notional, or more than half the face amount of the CDO (this is consistent with our analysis, which had suggested that Magnetar, unlike Paulson, did not take down the full short side of its deals, since it like staying cash flow positive on its investments. The size of its short position was limited by the cash to be thrown off by the equity tranche). And needless to say, this was a CDO squared, meaning a CDO made heavily of junior tranches of other CDOs, so it was a colossally bad deal.

The complaints (one against JP Morgan and the other against GSC employee Edward Steffelin) make clear that the SEC had gotten its hands on some pretty damning e-mails. The core of the allegation against JPM was that all the marketing materials represented that the assets in the CDO were selected by GSC when they were in fact to a significant degree chosen by Magnetar.

Magnetar made clear that it regarded its equity position as “basically nothing” and really wanted to “buy some protection”, meaning get short and that Magnetar was actively involved in choosing the exposures for the deal.

Alex Andreou: Democracy vs Mythology – The Battle in Syntagma Square

By Alex Andreou, a successful lawyer turned actor living in London. Cross posted from SturdyBlog

I have never been more desperate to explain and more hopeful for your understanding of any single fact than this: The protests in Greece concern all of you directly.

What is going on in Athens at the moment is resistance against an invasion; an invasion as brutal as that against Poland in 1939. The invading army wears suits instead of uniforms and holds laptops instead of guns, but make no mistake – the attack on our sovereignty is as violent and thorough. Private wealth interests are dictating policy to a sovereign nation, which is expressly and directly against its national interest. Ignore it at your peril. Say to yourselves, if you wish, that perhaps it will stop there. That perhaps the bailiffs will not go after the Portugal and Ireland next. And then Spain and the UK. But it is already beginning to happen. This is why you cannot afford to ignore these events.

Eurozone Brinksmanship: Ministers Walk Back Greek Rollover Commitment, Demand Austerity Measures First

One of the interesting features of the seemingly unending Eurozone crisis is that the half life of rescue measures is decreasing.

The elephant in the room, which we will put aside to focus on the current state of play, is that everyone knows the Greek debts must be restructured. To have Greece pay out punitive rates on past debt will simply grind the economy into a deeper hole, worsening its debt to GDP ratio and eroding its physical and human infrastructure. All the delay of the inevitable does is allow for more extend and pretend while Western financial firms strip the economy for fun and profit. And this is terribly inefficient looting; their profits from this pilferage will be small relative to the pain inflicted on the Greek populace.

Late last week, various commentators made a bit too much of the clearing of one obstacle to the extension of yet another short lifeline to Greece, namely, that Angel Merkel had relaxed one of conditions that stood in the way of a planned €12 billion credit extension. She had wanted private creditors to share in the pain, and agreed that a rollover of currently maturing debt would do. Before she had insisted on a full bond exchange, which would have resulted in a much more significant hit to investors.

This concession did not go over well in Germany.

Another Layer of the Mortgage Mess: “Zombie Notes”

One of the claims we’ve heard throughout the mortgage crisis is that all the systems and records are fine, that the banks have just made a few “mistakes” and when they find out about them, they correct them promptly and cheerfully.

If you believe that, I have a bridge I’d like to sell you. Not only is evidence of widespread, and very likely systematic abuses piling up in courtrooms all over the US, but even at this late date, new types of misconduct are coming to light.

More Dubious Research: “It Would Take 62 Years in New York to Repossess the Homes in Severe Default or Foreclosure”

An article at the New York Times, “Backlog of Cases Gives a Reprieve on Foreclosures,” is more than a little frustrating in that it takes some high level factoids about the mortgage mess and fails to draw the right inferences from them.

The premise of the piece is that in some states, the average time to foreclosure has become so attenuated that it would take decades at current rates to clear the backlog. Consider these dramatic-sounding statistics:

In New York State, it would take lenders 62 years at their current pace, the longest time frame in the nation, to repossess the 213,000 houses now in severe default or foreclosure, according to calculations by LPS Applied Analytics, a prominent real estate data firm.

Clearing the pipeline in New Jersey, which like New York handles foreclosures through the courts, would take 49 years. In Florida, Massachusetts and Illinois, it would take a decade.

In the 27 states where the courts play no role in foreclosures, the pace is much more brisk — three years in California, two years in Nevada and Colorado — but the dynamic is the same: the foreclosure system is bogged down by the volume of cases, borrowers are fighting to keep their houses and many lenders seem to be in no hurry to add repossessed houses to their books.

The convention in writing is to list the most important cause first. Thus by giving “the foreclosure system is bogged down by the volume of cases” pride of place implies that the “foreclosure system” being overloaded is the biggest cause.

But this level of abstraction is misleading. There is no “foreclosure system”; that turn of phase implies a single overarching set of procedures. As the mere mention of judicial versus non-judicial states indicates, each state has its own laws and case history as to what is proper practice. Referring to a “system” when there is none is also likely to lead many readers to think in term of the system that is involved in the foreclosure process, the judicial system, and to incorrectly infer that courts being overloaded is a major culprit. The vagueness of the expression, in other words, has the effect of directing attention away from the fact that it is the banks’ own machinery that is the most gunked up.

Dubious Research: The More Debt Students Have, The Higher Their Self Esteem

It’s a sign of the times that your humble blogger is having to create finely stratified typologies for the various types of ~~propaganda~~ dubious research being deployed to promote the idea that rule by our new financial overlords, despite the considerable evidence to the contrary, really is for our own good.

We’ve already instituted the Frederic Mishkin Iceland Prize for Intellectual Integrity for special-interest-group- favoring PR masquerading as research.

However, Mishkin is a Respected Personage, and the initial Mishkin Iceland Prize recipients, Charles Calomiris, Eric Higgins, and Joe Mason, presumably knew they were writing utter bunk and were handsomely compensated for attaching their names to less than credible arguments. That suggests we need a separate category for the more mundane, bread-and-butter shilldom that is dressed up to look like serious academic work. Let’s call it the Lobsters Really Want to be Your Dinner Prize.

Durbin Bill Designed to Throw Wrench in Wall Street Infrastructure Heist

Since we so seldom have positive news to report on NC, we thought it was important to highlight a promising development. Senator Richard Durbin has introduced legislation that would considerably complicate the effort of Wall Street players to ~~pillage~~ privatize state and government assets for fun and profit.

It is key to understand what a bad deal these transactions are for ordinary citizens

Fraud, Anyone? Another Type of Mortgage Document Fabrication Finally Getting Attention

One of the strongest testaments to the severity of the mortgage mess is the use of document fabrication as a remedy to otherwise insoluble problems. Although the business has now been shut down, the firm DocX, which was a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, had a notorious price sheet that showed the comparatively modest fees it charged for creating, as in fabricating, documents out of whole cloth. Foreclosure defense attorneys reacted strongly to the publication of this information. The price sheets contained codes, and they had repeatedly seen these very same codes on foreclosure related documents and had wondered what they meant.

Why would lawyers and servicers (and their enabler DocX) resort to fraud

Mirabile Dictu! Central Bankers Getting Concerned About Bank Capital Levels Rather Late in the Reform Game

Something very peculiar is afoot. Well after the bank regulatory reform debate was supposedly settled, central bankers seem to be reopening that discussion. It’s puzzling because the very reason the banks won so decisively was that central bankers were not prepared to get all that tough with their charges.

I’m not clear what has led central bankers to get a bit of religion. Is it the spectacle of the Bank of England talking about breaking up the banks (they won’t get their way thanks to bank lobbyist working over the Independent Banking Commission, but no one doubted their sincerity)? Or the Swiss National Bank imposing 19% capital requirements, which as we discussed, is likely to lead to the investment banking are of UBS being domiciled elsewhere (assuming a country capable of bailing it out will have it)? Or perhaps it is central bankers being forced to recognize that their Plan A of extend and pretend and super low interest rates simply won’t lead banks getting to meaningfully higher capital levels when the staff continues to take egregious amounts out in compensation? Or have they realized how bad bank balance sheets are in the Eurozone and how tight the linkages still are among the major capital markets players, and they belatedly realize they need them to be much more shock resistant?

The bottom line is that various central bankers have taken the surprising step of insisting their banks meet more stringent requirements for the biggest banks than those originally planned to be to be included in Basel III. Per Bloomberg:

Michael Hudson: Free Money Creation to Bail Out Financial Speculators, but not Social Security or Medicare

By Michael Hudson, a research professor of Economics at University of Missouri, Kansas City and a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College

Financial crashes were well understood for a hundred years after they became a normal financial phenomenon in the mid-19th century. Much like the buildup of plaque deposits in human veins and arteries, an accumulation of debt gained momentum exponentially until the economy crashed, wiping out bad debts – along with savings on the other side of the balance sheet. Physical property remained intact, although much was transferred from debtors to creditors. But clearing away the debt overhead from the economy’s circulatory system freed it to resume its upswing. That was the positive role of crashes: They minimized the cost of debt service, bringing prices and income back in line with actual “real” costs of production. Debt claims were replaced by equity ownership. Housing prices were lower – and more affordable, being brought back in line with their actual rental value. Goods and services no longer had to incorporate the debt charges that the financial upswing had built into the system.

Financial crashes came suddenly. They often were triggered by a crop failure causing farmers to default, or “the autumnal drain” drew down bank liquidity when funds were needed to move the crops. Crashes often also revealed large financial fraud and “excesses.”

This was not really a “cycle.” It was a scallop-shaped a ratchet pattern: an ascending curve, ending in a vertical plunge. But popular terminology called it a cycle because the pattern was similar again and again, every eleven years or so. When loans by banks and debt claims by other creditors could not be paid, they were wiped out in a convulsion of bankruptcy.

How the Mortgage Industry Bullies Lawyers Who Sue Them (With the Help of PR Outlet Housing Wire)

One of the striking things, as the mortgage crisis has ground on, is how persistent and to some degree effective the industry incumbents have been in influencing news stories. One can argue they’ve been more successful than the TBTF banks, perhaps because if you can tank the global economy, keep your job, and still continue to pay yourself egregious bonuses, you don’t need to stoop to throttling every bit of negative coverage. The fact that near-urban legends like strategic defaults are trumpeted in the media as if they are a meaningful phenomenon, or that defenses of securitization practices by firms like K&L Gates, which have liability on their legal opinions, dominated the coverage on that issue for quite some time until more and more court decisions showed their analysis to be sorely wanting, illustrates how much spin there is in what purports to be news.

For instance, the website Housing Wire, which appears to aspire to cover the mortgage/housing space comprehensively, nevertheless has had some pretty telling omissions. You saw nary a peep of the bombshell of a story by lawyer Abigail Field in Fortune, which found that all of the mortgages securitized by Countrywide and a large proportion of those that it serviced had not been transferred to the trusts as stipulated in the pooling and servicing agreements that govern then. As we have discussed in this blog at some length, this has devastating consequences. If the borrowers challenge a foreclosure, unless the judge is bank friendly, they will probably prevail. No one wants the party that would be in a position to foreclose (someone earlier in the securitization chain) to do so; that’s an admission the securities are not mortgage backed at least in part if not in full and the investors were defrauded. And there are no retroactive fixes (why do you think document fabrications have become so common?)

Similarly, we have commented on how remarkable it is that foreclosure mills all over the US participated in widespread, systematic frauds on courts (robosigining, forgeries, affidavits being filed without the requisite personal knowledge of the affiant, document fabrication) and yet there has been a failure of state bar associations to sanction the attorneys involved.

But there is a long and proud tradition of small firm attorneys being harassed in various ways when the go up against the big dogs, and attorneys taking on the mortgage-industrial complex are getting their share of i

The Greek Restructuring Debate

Cross-posted with Credit Writedowns Yesterday I was on BNN’s Headline with Philip Coggan of the Economist and presenter Howard Green. The issue of greatest importance that we discussed yesterday was Greece. Last week, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble indicated readiness to accept a soft restructuring and bond exchange which would defer interest payments on Greek […]

Mirabile Dictu! SEC Probes Relationship Among Toxic CDO Sponsor Magnetar, Merrill, and CDO Manager

It has taken forever for the SEC to probe the workings the biggest sponsor of toxic CDOs and of course the agency is going after only one highly publicized doggy deal. Nevertheless, the SEC has finally decided to look at the less than arm’s length relationship between the hedge fund Magnetar, whose Constellation program played a central role in blowing up the subprime bubble, and its collateral manager, which in this case a Merrill affiliated firm called NIR. As we will discuss, collateral managers were critical because they effectively served as liability shields for the other participants.

Note that Magnetar does not appear to be the target; the Financial Times reports that the SEC is examining how the deal’s underwriter Merrill sold the deal and how it worked with NIR.