One of the few upsides of the patently silly negative watch announcement for US Treasury bonds was that it elicited colorful and instructive commentary (see our view, along with Mark Thoma’s and Barry Ritholtz’s at the New York Times’ Room for Debate). Some sightings:
Read more...The FDIC has released a document that purports to show how it could have successfully resolved Lehman Brothers using its new Title II resolution authority granted under Dodd Frank.
All I can say is that this is an interesting piece of creative writing. The Lehman counterfactual rests on a series of assumptions, which as I will discuss shortly, look pretty questionable. The most charitable assessment one can make comes from a famous exchange between two technologists. Trygve Reenskaug says: “In theory, practice is simple.” Alexandre Boily asks: “But, is it simple to practice theory?”.
But some longstanding Administration cheerleaders have jumped on the bandwagon, arguing that “pundits” have asserted “without evidence or analysis” that the resolution authority can’t work. That’s pretty amusing, given that Shiela Bair herself concedes, per the Financial Times, that the resolution authority will not work on a major international bank with retail and investment banking operations:
Read more...Admittedly, this act of rebellion against MERS, the electronic mortgage registry by a Pennsylvania county is comparatively minor, but nevertheless illustrates the efforts various local bodies are taking to assert their authority against a system imposed without regard to state and local real estate laws.
Montgomery County estimates that it has lost $15 million in recording fees due to MERS, which its Recorder of Deeds, Nancy Becker, says has also made a mess of title records. She is working to get the county to cease doing business with banks that make use of MERS, and has launched an effort to get other counties in the state to follow suit.
Read more...Yves here. This post by Bill Black is important because it presents and dissects an ugly example of failure of morality and common sense within what passes for the elite in the US.
Earlier this week, Matthew Yglesias defended the Administration’s distaste for pursuing fraud investigations against financial players:
….the Obama administration felt it was important to restabilize the global financial system. That meant, at the margin, shying away from anxiety-producing fraud prosecutions. And faced with a logistically difficult task, that kind of pressure at the margin seems to have made a huge difference. There simply was no appetite for the kind of intensive work that would have been necessary.
I’m not as persuaded as, say, Jamie Galbraith is that the failure to do this is a key causal element in our economic problems. Indeed, I’d say that if you look at the situation literally, Tim Geithner’s judgment was probably correct.
This line of thinking is a favorite of authoritarians. Democracy, justice, and capitalism are messy affairs. All sort of repressive measures can be justified in the name of stability and safety. And the irony here is that the firms directly responsible for the most disruptive economic event of the last eighty years are to be shielded from the long arm of the law….in the name of stability, the one output they have clearly failed to provide.
Read more...Funny what a difference a few months makes. Whenever this blog would suggest that Greece, and potentially other eurozone members, might have to restructure their debts, the idea was treated by some readers as a nefarious euroskeptic plot, particularly since badmouthing embattled governments could worsen their conditions by raising their funding costs.
It might now be accurate to upgrade discussion of a Greek default to being an Anglo-Saxon plot.
Read more...It’s more than a tad ironic that Senator Carl Levin released a strongly-worded report on Wall Street’s role in the financial crisis, focusing on abuses and failures of oversight in the residential mortgage and CDO markets, when the officialdom is engaged in yet another whitewash of further crisis fallout, that of servicing and foreclosure related abuses.
One effort at pushback comes via a bill proposed today by Senator Sherrod Brown and Representative Brad Miller, the Foreclosure Fraud and Homeowner Abuse Prevention Act of 2011. While some provisions need further work, it’s an ambitious and badly needed effort that targets many servicer abuses.
Read more...Yves here. I managed to miss this post last week, but since it did not get the notice it deserved, I thought I’d feature it.
One of the recent disturbing indicators of the triumph of the doomsday machine known as modern finance is Timothy Geithner’s vision that banks will continue to grow via increased penetration of emerging economies. From a recent interview by Noam Scheiber in The New Republic:
He told me he subscribes to the view that the world is on the cusp of a major “financial deepening”: As developing economies in the most populous countries mature, they will demand more and increasingly sophisticated financial services, the same way they demand cars for their growing middle classes and information technology for their corporations. If that’s true, then we should want U.S. banks positioned to compete abroad.
“I don’t have any enthusiasm for … trying to shrink the relative importance of the financial system in our economy as a test of reform, because we have to think about the fact that we operate in the broader world,” he said. “It’s the same thing for Microsoft or anything else. We want U.S. firms to benefit from that.” He continued: “Now financial firms are different because of the risk, but you can contain that through regulation.”
As anyone one with an operating brain cell realizes, “can contain” is not the same as “have contained” or “have a snowball’s chance in hell of containing”. Simon Johnson was also not happy with the Geithner vision of US financial firms occupying even bigger swathes of the world economy.
This post is important because it tackles a very basic question: when does the financial sector become so large as to be unproductive? And the answer is at levels of GDP that the US passed shortly after 1980.
Read more...As readers may know, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations just issued another report, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis. This is a far more focused and damning document than the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report, which was produced at considerably more expense and was undermined by dissent among its commissioners (which in fairness appears to have been by design).
I confess to having only gotten partway through the document and plan to issue a more thorough discussion in the next few days. However, some things are clear at this juncture.
Read more...Last week, we inveighed against an effort by Federal banking regulators to undermine the 50 state attorney general settlement negotiations on foreclosure and mortgage abuses. This affair is becoming a pathetic spectacle, in that the state initiative, which looks to be an exercise in form over substance, still might prove to be enough of a nuisance to the banks that the Powers that Be in Washington feel compelled to do what they can to hamstring it. The first effort was to have a joint settlement, which we dismissed as a barmy idea given the disparity in state and Federal issues. Not surprisingly, the Feds withdrew after the first negotiating session with the banks.
The current end run is apparently led by the Ministry of Bank Boosterism more generally known as the OCC and comes via consent decrees that were issued Wednesday.
Read more...By Satyajit Das, author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (Forthcoming in Q3 2011) and Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)
Quantitative easing (“QE”), the currently fashionable form of voodoo economics favoured by policymakers in the US, is primarily directed at boosting asset values and creating inflation. By essentially creating money artificially, central bankers are seeking to return the world to stability, growth and prosperity.
The underlying driver is to generate growth and inflation to enable the problems of excessive debt in the economy to be dealt with painlessly. It is far from clear whether it will work
Read more...It seems more than a bit peculiar that, per American Banker, financial services industry participants have paid for three academics to issue a lengthy paper attacking a leaked draft settlement between state attorneys general and mortgage servicers. We have pointed out in multiple posts that the state AGs bargaining position is weak due to the lack of investigations. If the banks don’t like the terms, they can tell the AGs to see them in court.
But far more interesting is how embarrassingly bad this paper, “The Economics of the Proposed Mortgage Servicer Settlement,” by Charles Calomiris, Eric Higgins, and Joe Mason, is, yet how the economics discipline continues to tolerate special-interest-group- favoring PR masquerading as research.
In real academic disciplines, investigators and professors who serve big corporate funders have their output viewed with appropriate skepticism, and if they do so often enough, their reputation takes a permanent hit. Scientists who went into the employ of tobacco companies could anticipate they’d never leave that backwater. Even the great unwashed public knows that drug company funded research isn’t what it is cracked up to be.
But in the never-never realm of reality denial within the Beltway, as long as you can get a PhD or better to grace the latest offering from the Ministry of Truth, it gives useful cover to Congresscritters or other message amplifiers who will spout whatever big donor nonsense they are being asked to endorse this week.
Read more...A ruling in a Louisiana bankruptcy court case, In re Wilson, provides compelling evidence that many of the assertions made by Lender Processing Services, which both acts as the servicing platform and provider of default services for mortgage services industry, about how limited its role and hence its legal liability is, simply do not comport with reality.
Read more...By Satyajit Das, the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (Forthcoming in Q3 2011) and Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)
Quantitative easing (“QE”) is the currently fashionable form of voodoo economics favoured by policymakers in the US.
QE, loosely “printing money”, entails central banks buying government bonds, which are held on the central bank’s balance sheet to inject money into the banking system thatcan be exchanged by banks for higher return assets, such as loans to clients. The purchases also increase the price of governments bonds, reducing interest rates.
Advocates of QE believe that it will lower interest rates promoting expenditure, growth, reduce unemployment and increase the supply of credit to underpin a strong economic recovery. In reality, QE is primarily directed at boosting asset values, subsidising banks, weakening the currency, helping the government finance its deficits and creating inflation.
Read more...n the film Ferris Bueller’s Day Off, an economics teacher, played by Ben Stein, launches into an improvised soliloquy: “… Anyone know what this is? Class? Anyone? Anyone? Anyone seen this before? The Laffer Curve. Anyone know what this says? It says that at this point on the revenue curve, you will get exactly the same amount of revenue as at this point. This is very controversial. Does anyone know what Vice President Bush called this in 1980? Anyone? Something-d-o-o economics. “Voodoo” economics.”
In the late twentieth century, US President Ronald Reagan discovered voodoo economics. In framing policy responses to the global financial crisis, central bankers and governments have increasingly embraced more exotic forms of voodoo.
Read more...Contingent Convertible bonds (“CoCos”) are supposed to address this nonsensical phenomenon: During the financial crisis a number of distressed banks were rescued by the public sector injecting funds in the form of common equity and other forms of Tier 1 capital. While this had the effect of supporting depositors it also meant that Tier 2 capital […]
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