Category Archives: Credit markets

Are Fannie and Freddie Giving Banks Yet Another Bailout by Not Pursuing PMI Claims?

The further you look at the banking mess, the more the same problems keeps staring back: too many losses, not anywhere enough equity or reserves, and a lot of tap dancing by the officialdom to pretend otherwise.

We wrote yesterday, thanks to some sleuthing by Chris Whalen, that Fannie and Freddie might be sitting on north of $100 billion of unreported losses. If they started realizing those losses, one of the first parties that would take a hit would be the private mortgage insurers, since on high loan to value loans (over 80% of appraised value), they were in the business of guaranteeing the loan balance in excess of 80%. So while the failure of the GSEs to act is no doubt part of the extend and pretend shell game, it serves to keep PMIs that would otherwise be as dead as certain notorious parrots alive.

Matt Stoller: The Federal Reserve’s Wheezy Independence Takes Another Hit

By Matt Stoller, a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. His Twitter feed is:
http://www.twitter.com/matthewstoller

You might have noted a few days ago that the Supreme Court ruled against Federal Reserve secrecy. The case had to do with a lawsuit by Bloomberg’s Mark Pittman demanding access to emergency loan documents relating to the Fed’s bailout of Bear Stearns. As the case traveled up the court system, major banks joined the Fed’s attempt to shield the information from public scrutiny. Eventually, the Fed dropped the suit, but the banks didn’t give up.

A few days ago, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case, letting a lower court decision in favor of Pittman stand. The Fed will now be releasing Bear Stearns-related emergency lending documents in a few days.

It’s a historic case. You wouldn’t know that, however, by the response from Wall Street.
You might have noted a few days ago that the Supreme Court ruled against Federal Reserve secrecy. The case had to do with a lawsuit by Bloomberg’s Mark Pittman demanding access to emergency loan documents relating to the Fed’s bailout of Bear Stearns. As the case traveled up the court system, major banks joined the Fed’s attempt to shield the information from public scrutiny. Eventually, the Fed dropped the suit, but the banks didn’t give up.

Fannie and Freddie Hiding Over $100 Billion of Losses?

Bank expert Chris Whalen has a little bombshell in his current newsletter. It’s so obvious that it should not only have occurred to me but pretty much everyone on the real estate beat. And that begs the question why no one has even mentioned it.

Beware the Predatory Pro Se Borrower!

Somehow, “predatory pro se borrower” reminds me of “The Attack of the Killer Tomatoes.” Pro se defendants are generally lost souls in the court system. They typically get up, flail around before a frustrated judge, and lose (cinematic examples to the contrary, like “Find Me Guilty”, notwithstanding). So the idea that they could rise to the level of being threatening enough to be “predatory” seems like more than a bit of an oxymoron.

But this document depicts these usually hapless defendants as a danger (hat tip April Charney):

Sleaze Watch: NY Fed Official Responsible for AIG Loans Joins AIG As AIG Pushes Sweetheart Repurchase to NY Fed

The corruption in high places is getting more and more brazen with every passing day. The only thing that separates the US from conventional banana republic status is that no one leaves keys to new luxury cars on the desks of officials to secure their cooperation. It’s just not enough of an inducement to get anyone to take action.

More on the Lack of Criminal Prosecutions: Was the SEC Deterred by a Widely Overlooked Ruling?

Bloomberg’s Jonathan Weil, who is normally an effective critic of bank chichanery and weak regulatory oversight, may have missed the mark on a key issue in an article last week, “Moral for CEOs Is Choose Your Fraud Carefully“. In it, he criticizes the SEC for failing to attack accounting fraud:

It seems the Securities and Exchange Commission won’t be doing anything to challenge that pretense, either, and that this may be by design. The SEC for years has been bending over backward to avoid accusing major financial institutions of cooking their books, even when it’s obvious they did. So much for upholding financial integrity.

Weil cites a series of object lessons where the SEC has not gone after financial firms executives for accounting fraud: Fannie Mae’s Donald Mudd, Countrywide’s Angelo Mozilo, and three executives at Indy Mac. Weil charges them with “see no accounting evil”.

Let’s be clear: I’m no fan of the SEC’s actions in the wake of the crisis. The regulator has been kept resource starved. Under Arthur Levitt (hardly the most aggressive of SEC chiefs) any effort at enforcement led to threats from Congress of budget cuts (Joe Lieberman was particularly aggressive). Chris Cox was put in charge, as far as I can tell, to make sure the agency did at little as possible. So the SEC only knows how to do insider trading cases, and on any other type of action, it seeks to get a settlement, when a trial in some cases might have more value as a deterrent (plus you don’t get to be good at litigating if you never litigate).

Moreover, the SEC also seems to believe it needs to win pretty much all of its cases to be perceived as a threat. That isn’t true either. Look at the Green Bay Packers, who were correctly the favorites to win the Super Bowl despite having a lousy win/loss record prior to the playoffs. But all those losses had been close, in hard-fought, well-played games. In litigation, embarrassing revelations in discovery or on the stand can also have deterrent value, and can serve as building blocks for future cases.

Let’s deal with the misconstructions in Weil’s article. He argues:

Satyajit Das: Controlling Sovereign CDS Trading – The Dysfunctional Debate

By Satyajit Das, author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (Forthcoming September 2011) and Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

In an opinion piece entitled “Hedging bans risk pushing up debt costs” published on 9 March 2011 in the Financial Times, Conrad Voldstad, the chief executive of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) and formerly a senior derivatives banker with JP Morgan and Merrill Lynch, made the case against the EU ban on “naked” credit default swap (“CDS”) contracts on sovereigns.

Just as “patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel”, arguments citing market efficiency and the benefits of speculation seem to be the first resort of dealers.

The Elizabeth Warren Rorschach Test

The spectacle of a bunch of Republican Congressmen spending over two hours pillorying Elizabeth Warren, following weeks of death of a thousand unkind and generally offbase cuts coverage in the Wall Street Journal has led a lot of folks from what passes for the left, and even not so left, to ride in to her defense. A partial list includes Paul Krugman, Simon Johnson, Joe Nocera, Mike Konczal, and Adam Levitin.

The last time I can recall the Journal becoming quite so unhinged about an individual was over Eliot Spitzer. And since Warren seems pretty unlikely to be found to have similar personal failings, the specter of the right throwing what look to be ineffective punches at her makes for a peculiar spectacle. What is the real aim behind this drama?

Clearing Up Some Misperceptions on the Mortgage Modification/Second Lien Debate

A fairly long discussion, by blogosphere standards, has broken out over second liens. For those comparatively new to the topic, a recap is in order.

Second liens are either second mortgages or home equity lines of credit on homes. The bone of contention is that mortgage servicers, which also happen to units within the biggest US banks, have not been playing nicely at all with stressed borrowers out of an interest in preserving the value of their parent banks’ second liens. And the reason for that is that writing down second liens to anything within hailing distance of reality, given how badly underwater a lot of borrowers in the US are, would blow a very big hole in the equity of major banks and force a revival of the TARP. That is one of the very last things Team Obama would like to see happen, hence its eagerness to promote various extend and pretend policies.

The mortgage settlement proposal includes a provision that would call for second liens to be reduced pro-rata with the firsts. That, as Gretchen Morgenson noted, and Jesse Eisinger amplified, is contrary to long-standing principles of priority of creditor payments. Felix Salmon then argued that the banks were within their rights to try to extract some value from the seconds, which led to further rebuttals…

On the Clouded Title Mess and the Difficulties of Cleaning It Up

Abigail Field’s latest piece at Daily Finance is a great one-stop summary of the most thorny problem underlying the securitization mess: how can we clean up title given how badly it has been screwed up? As we and many others have noted, integrity of property ownership is an essential foundation of development; this is straight Hernando de Soto gospel. And as our Richard Smith has pointed out, the various fixes to get around this mess run roughshod over well established court procedures that date back to the 1677 Statute of Frauds. Why was it necessary to implement those rules? Because without them, wealthy people could use the court system to steal property. Sound familiar?

One thing that it is important to stress: that the abuses to established real estate transfer and recording processes were not inherent to the securitization model. I’m not a fan of securitization but the sad reality is that no one is prepared to go back to the more costly in terms of equity required, model of on-balance sheet banking (it would result in a shrinkage of credit that every respectable economist would recommend against and hence will never happen). But no one (except the FDIC, which keeps being ignored) is thinking seriously enough about what it would take to make securitization safer.

Class, Social and Traditional Media, and the Mortgage Mess

I’m going to tell one on myself, and since I suspect my reflexes are atypical, I suggest you watch this video by a realtor, Leigh Brown, before reading the balance of the post:

Do We Need Big Banks?

Yves here. I normally let VoxEU articles stand on their own, but this topic, of whether the bank PR that bigger banks are essential stands up to scrutiny, is near and dear to my heart.

Note that the authors point to a 1990s study that finds that a $25 billion in assets bank was the optimal size. There were a fair number of studies done then of bank size versus efficiency. I’m a bit surprised that this is the one that is most often cited, since it also came up with the biggest size threshold at which a negative cost curve kicked in (meaning the bank became more costly to run). One study found that the slightly negative cost curve started at $100 million in assets (!); more typical was somewhere between $1 and $5 billion. And remember, these studies were done in the days when banks returned checks, and check processing was believed to have strong scale economies (ie, if check processing was a bigger proportion of total costs then than now, it could arguably have increased scale economies).

Some academics were frustrated with these results. I recall reading a paper where the author argued that there were theoretical cost savings to being bigger (duh) and basically contended that the empirical data had to be wrong.

Guest Post: Curbing the Credit Cycle

Credit booms sow the seeds of subsequent credit crunches. This column argues that these have their source in cross-bank externalities. To internalise these cross-sectional spillovers, policy should operate “across the system”. It adds that this is the essence of macro-prudential policy, which, for the first time is about to be undertaken internationally.

Obama Pressing for a “Shock and Awe” Mortgage Mod Program, 3 Million in 6 Months

Given how well “shock and awe” worked in the Iraq war, I’d see the Administration’s use of that expression in the context of the mortgage mess as a Freudian slip.

I must confess to being surprised at the report by Shahien Nasiripour of Huffington Post, namely that the Administration is pushing for an even more aggressive-looking mortgage modification program than has been rumored. The reason I’m surprised is that this effort, even though it appears misguided on several fronts and falls far short of what is needed, represents an upping of the demands being made against banks. That is contrary to both the Obama Administration’s past behavior of making great sounding promises and walk them so far back as to wind up in a different country, and of inconveniencing the banks terribly much. But Shahien is an able reporter, so I’m sure he has the facts right.

Will Ireland Threaten to Default?

We were surprised that Ireland capitulated so quickly to pressure from its Eurozone confreres and accepted a punitive bailout of its government, when it was in fact its banks that were a mess. As we noted in November:

Note that the Irish government is still holding out for a banking-system-only bailout, even if the funds are channeled through the government. Since I am not aware of any IMF bailout being done on this format, it’s likely to be a sticking point if the Irish refuse to back down (recall that the government itself is under no immediate funding pressure; they have six months before they need to go to market, which is an eternity in crisis-land).

The other major bone of contention is Ireland’s super-low corporation tax, which served as a significant incentive for multinationals to set up shop in Ireland. The Germans and French are insistent that it be increased to balance the budget. The Irish objections here are plausible, particularly since the low rates are a cornerstone of their national strategy (do you want 12.5%, the current corporate tax rate, of a decent sized number or 25% of a vastly smaller number?). The Irish have made it clear that they are non-negotiable on this point, and as keenly as the rest of the eurozone would like to beat Ireland back into line, I doubt they’d be willing to risk negotiations failing over this issue.

Fast forward, the Irish agree to a deal, the ruling party suffers substantial losses precisely for accepting the terms demanded by the eurozone and the IMF, and the new incumbents are much less willing to play nicely with counterparties who are engaging in what amounts to “every man out for himself” behavior, no matter what spin is put on their demands.