Category Archives: Credit markets

OCC Makes Patently False Claim That Slap-on-the-Wrist Servicing Penalties Could Hurt Banks

It’s time we come up with a new handle for the Office of the Controller of the Currency. It is difficult to convey how shameless this regulatory-agency-turned-slut for the banking industry has become. It’s the Stage 4 disease version of where our government is heading at a rapid clip: officials masquerading as serving the public interest when they are uber lobbyists for the pet whims of their supposed charges.

So what do we call the OCC? The Office of Capital Corruption? The Office of Criminal Capitulation? I have no doubt readers will have even better ideas (and don’t be constrained by the acronym).

So How Exactly Does Buffett Get Information Like This?

Reader Hubert soliders on in the lonely task of continued Lehman spadework. He highlighted this section of FCIC testimony from Warren Buffett:

I think that if Lehman had been less leveraged there would have been less problems in the way of problems. And part of that leverage arose from the use of derivatives. And part of the dislocation that took place afterwards arose from that. And there’s some interesting material if you look at, I don’t exactly what Lehman material I was looking at, but they had a netting arrangement with the Bank of America as I remember and, you know, the day before they went broke and these are very, very, very rough ﬁgures from memory, but as I remember the day before they went broke Bank of America was in a minus position of $600 million or something like that they had deposited which I think J.P. Morgan in relation to Lehman and I think that the day they went broke it reversed to a billion and a half in the other direction and those are big numbers.

Hubert muses:

Mirabile Dictu! Economists Agree All the Fed Has Done is Goose Financial Markets!

You heard it first in the blogopshere. From the New York Times:

The Federal Reserve’s experimental effort to spur a recovery by purchasing vast quantities of federal debt has pumped up the stock market, reduced the cost of American exports and allowed companies to borrow money at lower interest rates.

But most Americans are not feeling the difference, in part because those benefits have been surprisingly small….

Another Class Action Suit Filed in Federal Bankruptcy Court Against Lender Processing Services

The noose is tightening around Lender Processing Services.

Last week, various news outlets revealed that Federal banking regulators had issued consent orders against major servicers, MERS, and LPS. Kate Berry of American Banker pointed out that LPS is exposed to making payments to servicers:

In addition to the 14 biggest mortgage servicers, two of the biggest vendors to the industry received cease-and-desist orders from regulators Wednesday. One was stronger than the other.

Lender Processing Services Inc. and Merscorp Inc.’s Mortgage Electronic Registration System were both cited for “significant compliance failures” and “unsafe and unsound business practices” related to foreclosures. Regulators are requiring both companies to hire independent consultants, take remedial steps to address past failures and hire additional staff.

But only LPS, a publicly traded company in Jacksonville, Fla., that provides foreclosure-related services to banks, faces the possibility of having to reimburse servicers and borrowers if an independent review finds anyone was financially harmed by its failure to properly execute mortgage documents….

S&P Negative Watch Smackdown Wrap

One of the few upsides of the patently silly negative watch announcement for US Treasury bonds was that it elicited colorful and instructive commentary (see our view, along with Mark Thoma’s and Barry Ritholtz’s at the New York Times’ Room for Debate). Some sightings:

The FDIC’s Rosy, Theoretical, Misleading Lehman Resolution Counterfactual (or Why TBTF is Still TBTF)

The FDIC has released a document that purports to show how it could have successfully resolved Lehman Brothers using its new Title II resolution authority granted under Dodd Frank.

All I can say is that this is an interesting piece of creative writing. The Lehman counterfactual rests on a series of assumptions, which as I will discuss shortly, look pretty questionable. The most charitable assessment one can make comes from a famous exchange between two technologists. Trygve Reenskaug says: “In theory, practice is simple.” Alexandre Boily asks: “But, is it simple to practice theory?”.

But some longstanding Administration cheerleaders have jumped on the bandwagon, arguing that “pundits” have asserted “without evidence or analysis” that the resolution authority can’t work. That’s pretty amusing, given that Shiela Bair herself concedes, per the Financial Times, that the resolution authority will not work on a major international bank with retail and investment banking operations:

More Shots Across MERS’s Bow

Admittedly, this act of rebellion against MERS, the electronic mortgage registry by a Pennsylvania county is comparatively minor, but nevertheless illustrates the efforts various local bodies are taking to assert their authority against a system imposed without regard to state and local real estate laws.

Montgomery County estimates that it has lost $15 million in recording fees due to MERS, which its Recorder of Deeds, Nancy Becker, says has also made a mess of title records. She is working to get the county to cease doing business with banks that make use of MERS, and has launched an effort to get other counties in the state to follow suit.

Bill Black: Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum (Let Justice be Done, Though the Heavens Fall)

Yves here. This post by Bill Black is important because it presents and dissects an ugly example of failure of morality and common sense within what passes for the elite in the US.

Earlier this week, Matthew Yglesias defended the Administration’s distaste for pursuing fraud investigations against financial players:

….the Obama administration felt it was important to restabilize the global financial system. That meant, at the margin, shying away from anxiety-producing fraud prosecutions. And faced with a logistically difficult task, that kind of pressure at the margin seems to have made a huge difference. There simply was no appetite for the kind of intensive work that would have been necessary.

I’m not as persuaded as, say, Jamie Galbraith is that the failure to do this is a key causal element in our economic problems. Indeed, I’d say that if you look at the situation literally, Tim Geithner’s judgment was probably correct.

This line of thinking is a favorite of authoritarians. Democracy, justice, and capitalism are messy affairs. All sort of repressive measures can be justified in the name of stability and safety. And the irony here is that the firms directly responsible for the most disruptive economic event of the last eighty years are to be shielded from the long arm of the law….in the name of stability, the one output they have clearly failed to provide.

Will German Push for Greece Restructuring Tank the Greek Banking System?

Funny what a difference a few months makes. Whenever this blog would suggest that Greece, and potentially other eurozone members, might have to restructure their debts, the idea was treated by some readers as a nefarious euroskeptic plot, particularly since badmouthing embattled governments could worsen their conditions by raising their funding costs.

It might now be accurate to upgrade discussion of a Greek default to being an Anglo-Saxon plot.

Proposed Bill on Foreclosure Fraud and Servicer Standards Shows Shortcomings of Attorney General and Federal Regulatory Responses

It’s more than a tad ironic that Senator Carl Levin released a strongly-worded report on Wall Street’s role in the financial crisis, focusing on abuses and failures of oversight in the residential mortgage and CDO markets, when the officialdom is engaged in yet another whitewash of further crisis fallout, that of servicing and foreclosure related abuses.

One effort at pushback comes via a bill proposed today by Senator Sherrod Brown and Representative Brad Miller, the Foreclosure Fraud and Homeowner Abuse Prevention Act of 2011. While some provisions need further work, it’s an ambitious and badly needed effort that targets many servicer abuses.

Guest Post: Too Much Finance?

Yves here. I managed to miss this post last week, but since it did not get the notice it deserved, I thought I’d feature it.

One of the recent disturbing indicators of the triumph of the doomsday machine known as modern finance is Timothy Geithner’s vision that banks will continue to grow via increased penetration of emerging economies. From a recent interview by Noam Scheiber in The New Republic:

He told me he subscribes to the view that the world is on the cusp of a major “financial deepening”: As developing economies in the most populous countries mature, they will demand more and increasingly sophisticated financial services, the same way they demand cars for their growing middle classes and information technology for their corporations. If that’s true, then we should want U.S. banks positioned to compete abroad.

“I don’t have any enthusiasm for … trying to shrink the relative importance of the financial system in our economy as a test of reform, because we have to think about the fact that we operate in the broader world,” he said. “It’s the same thing for Microsoft or anything else. We want U.S. firms to benefit from that.” He continued: “Now financial firms are different because of the risk, but you can contain that through regulation.”

As anyone one with an operating brain cell realizes, “can contain” is not the same as “have contained” or “have a snowball’s chance in hell of containing”. Simon Johnson was also not happy with the Geithner vision of US financial firms occupying even bigger swathes of the world economy.

This post is important because it tackles a very basic question: when does the financial sector become so large as to be unproductive? And the answer is at levels of GDP that the US passed shortly after 1980.

Senator Levin Claims Goldman Execs Perjured Themselves Before Congress on Mortgage Testimony

As readers may know, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations just issued another report, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis. This is a far more focused and damning document than the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report, which was produced at considerably more expense and was undermined by dissent among its commissioners (which in fairness appears to have been by design).

I confess to having only gotten partway through the document and plan to issue a more thorough discussion in the next few days. However, some things are clear at this juncture.

Regulators Issue Weak Consent Orders to Whitewash Mortgage Abuses

Last week, we inveighed against an effort by Federal banking regulators to undermine the 50 state attorney general settlement negotiations on foreclosure and mortgage abuses. This affair is becoming a pathetic spectacle, in that the state initiative, which looks to be an exercise in form over substance, still might prove to be enough of a nuisance to the banks that the Powers that Be in Washington feel compelled to do what they can to hamstring it. The first effort was to have a joint settlement, which we dismissed as a barmy idea given the disparity in state and Federal issues. Not surprisingly, the Feds withdrew after the first negotiating session with the banks.

The current end run is apparently led by the Ministry of Bank Boosterism more generally known as the OCC and comes via consent decrees that were issued Wednesday.

Satyajit Das: Deflating Inflation/ Inflating Deflation

By Satyajit Das, author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk (Forthcoming in Q3 2011) and Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010)

Quantitative easing (“QE”), the currently fashionable form of voodoo economics favoured by policymakers in the US, is primarily directed at boosting asset values and creating inflation. By essentially creating money artificially, central bankers are seeking to return the world to stability, growth and prosperity.

The underlying driver is to generate growth and inflation to enable the problems of excessive debt in the economy to be dealt with painlessly. It is far from clear whether it will work