Category Archives: Credit markets

Yanis Varoufakis: It is Now Official – The Eurozone’s Monetary Transmission System is Broken

By Yanis Varoufakis, Professor of Economics at the University of Athens. Cross posted from his blog

Under normal conditions, the interest rates that you and I must pay on a home loan, a car loan, our credit card, a business loan are pegged onto two crucial rates. One is the rate that banks charge one another in order to borrow from each other. The other is the Central Bank’s overnight rate. Alas, neither of these interest rates matter during this Crisis. While such ‘official’ rates are tending to zero (as Central Banks try to squeeze the costs of borrowing to nothing), the interest rates people and firms pay are much, much higher and track indices of fear and subjective estimates of the Eurozone’s disintegration.

Philip Pilkington: The New Monetarism Part I – The British Experience

By Philip Pilkington, a writer and journalist based in Dublin, Ireland. You can follow him on Twitter at @pilkingtonphil

While there are pretty stark dissimilarities between the current quantitative easing (QE) policies of many governments and the old monetarism that prevailed in the late-70s and early-80s, the reason that these both policies were ineffective is because they were based on the same flawed ideas. The key difference between the two is that where monetarism was implemented as a deflationary and contractionary policy, QE is currently being implemented as an inflationary and expansionary policy. As a result, examining the failure of monetarist policies thirty years ago provides important lessons considering QE and its offshoots.

Before looking at the similarities between these two doctrines, we will explore the actual historical trial of monetarism.

Sheila Bair on Bill Moyers: “Libor Always Troubled Me”

Bill Moyers starts with the Libor scandal as a way to get Sheila Bair’s perspective on the failure to get meaningful bank reforms. It’s refreshing to see how direct she is in saying the fixes aren’t hard, the problem is lack of will. She also discusses the death of moderate Republicans, and “free for all markets”.

Will the Libor Scandal Lead to Prosecutions? Some Hidden History and Current Prospects

We have a video double header, with both clips addressing the question of what action officials might take as a result of the escalating Libor scandal.

Marshall Auerback: The Pain in Spain

By Marshall Auerback, a hedge fund manager and portfolio strategist. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives.

Just when you think that things can get no worse in Spain, they do. Take a look at this chart, courtesy of Credit Suisse via FT’s Alphaville

So How Much Did the Banksters Make on Libor-Related Ill-Gotten Gains?

Commentators and analysts have been starting to estimate what the costs to banks for their Libor manipulation might be. We’ve pointed to an estimate by the Economist that says the damages for municipal/transit authority swaps due to Libor suppression (during the crisis and afterwards) could be as high as $40 billion. Cut that down by 75% and you still have a pretty hefty number. Other observers (CFO Magazine) have argued that the losers were mainly other banks, and since banks are pretty much certain not to sue each other, the implication is the consternation is overdone. But these markets were so huge ($564 trillion was the 2011 trading volume in one contract, the CME Eurodollar contract, which uses dollar Libor as its reference rate) that even a little leakage to end customers still adds up to a lot of exposure.

Libor Investigation Extended to US Mortgages, but What About TALF Loans?

A good report by Shahien Nasiripour recounts that the OCC has woken up to what a hot potato the Libor scandal has become, and has identified the mortgages that might (stress might) have been hurt by the rate diddling.

To start with, the universe that might have been affected is not that large. Per the Financial Times account:

The Mortgage Condemnation Plan: Fleecing Municipalities as Well as Investors (Updated)

Beware of financiers bearing gifts.

A scheme proposed by a group called Mortgage Resolution Partners, which is being considered by San Bernardino, CA, to use the traditional power of eminent domain to condemn mortgages, was pretty certain to be a non-starter, so I’ve ignored it. But it’s gotten enough attention to have roused the ire of a whole host of financial services industry lobbying groups, as well as endorsements from Bob Shiller and Joe Nocera, and a thumb’s down from Felix Salmon, so it looked to be in need of serious analysis.

Are the Mice Starting to Roar? Municipalities Turn Defiant with Wall Street

Municipal finance has long been a cesspool. States, towns, hospitals, transit authorities, all have long been ripe for the picking. Sometimes local officials are paid off (anything from cold hard cash to gifts to skybox tickets), but much of the time, there’s no need to go to such lengths, since preying on their ignorance will do. As we’ve pointed out, even though these bodies often hire consultants, those advisors are often either not up to the task (how can people who don’t know finance vet an expert?) and/or have bad incentives (more complicated deals, which are generally more breakage prone, tend to produce higher consulting fees).

Dave Dayen highlighted one example yesterday: the city of Oakland has decided rather than pay $15 million in termination fees to get out of an interest rate swap deal gone bad:

The Eurozone: A Twenty Year Crisis?

As markets quickly shrugged off the news including that of further central bank rate cuts. Spanish bond yields rose over 7%, as Mr. Market clearly wanted a resumption of bond buying or some other decisive action, rather than a mere reduction of its benchmark rate to 0.75%.

Some commentators, such as Edward Hugh, are a bit flummoxed, since the supposed clarification of key points of the deal, most importantly, how and when Spanish banks will get money, has not answered these basic questions. Wolfgang Munchau argues in his current column, “Eurozone crisis will last for 20 years” that the Europatchup of last week wasn’t simply underwhelming, but was a major step backwards.

Eurozone Banking Union: Who Pays for Past Mistakes?

By Daniel Gros, Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. Cross posted from VoxEU

The EZ crisis – born as a debt crisis (Greece) – has grown up into a banking crisis (Ireland, Cyprus, Spain, …). This column argues that Spain is symptomatic of larger banking problems, so the EU Summit decisions on banking union are welcome and critical to any long-term solution. Yet someone must pay for Spanish bank losses. Spanish politics is shielding Spanish creditors, European politics is shielding EZ taxpayers, so the Spanish government will pay – and in doing so may go the way of Ireland. This crisis is far from over.

Former Senior Barclays Staffer Charges Diamond with Lying to MPs in Select Committee Testimony

It’s hardly surprising to think that Barclay’s CEO Bob Diamond shaded the truth more than a tad in his Parliamentary testimony earlier this week. Recall that he said the manipulation was the doing of 14 traders, and in context, he was clearly saying only those 14, their immediate supervisors, and the lax compliance types were at fault out of all of Barclays. The FSA’s letter to Barclays shows that to be untrue. It clearly says “at least” 14 traders were involved, as well as various “submitters” which were in a completely different unit operationally.

The Independent has posted an interview with a former senior executive who calls out Diamond for his biggest howler, that he had no idea that anything untoward was happening until about two weeks ago.

Schneiderman (Technically, Obama) Financial Fraud Task Force Takes Credit for Busting Barclay’s on Libor, Peter Madoff

Normally I try to avoid dumping on the same person twice in a short period of time, no matter how much they deserve it, but a post by masaccio at Firedoglake on the PR exercise known as the Financial Fraud Task Force deserves amplification.

Yes, Virginia, the Real Action in the Libor Scandal Was in the Derivatives

As the Libor scandal has given an outlet for long-simmering anger against wanker bankers in the UK, there have been some efforts in the media to puzzle out who might have won or lost from the manipulations, as well as arguments that they were as “victimless” or helped people (as in reporting an artificially low Libor during the crisis led to lower interest rate resets on adjustable rate loans pegged to Libor; what’s not to like about that?)

What we have so far is a lot of drunk under the streetlight behavior…