Edward Harrison here. The post by Randall Wray below is an interesting one because it points out how the world has changed since the end of the gold standard and why the sovereign debt crisis is centered in the euro zone. While I have an Austrian bias overall, for me, MMT is the best way […]
Read more...By Delusional Economics, who is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.
Well, it looks like Santa finally stuck his head out of the dark cave for a look around. It is yet to be seen if he rams it straight back in again because he doesn’t like the weather, but at least he has appeared for one night.
Read more...Quite a few housing market experts have argued that principal modifications to viable borrowers are the best way to resolve the housing market malaise. In the stone ages when banks kept the mortgages they originated, mortgage modifications, including principal mods, were standard practice when a borrower got in financial difficulty but was still salvageable. And because these restructurings were done behind closed doors, no one but the banker and his grateful customer were the wiser. But now that servicer bad incentives have meant they don’t do mods unless cajoled or bribed by the government (and not much even then), the topic has entered the public debate.
It had appeared that any principal mod program was going to come over the dead bodies of the banks, who have been feigned compliance with various Federal programs but either dragged their feet and/or gamed the schemes. So it was surprising to read that the acting head of the FHAF, Edward DeMarco, is considering what amounts to a principal mod program implemented through bankruptcy courts.
Read more...Yves here. It has been striking how little commentary a BIS paper by Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat, “Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link?” has gotten in the econoblogosphere, at least relative to its importance.
As most readers probably know, Ben Bernanke has developed and promoted the thesis that the crisis was the result of a “global savings glut,” which is shorthand for the Chinese are to blame for the US and other countries going on a primarily housing debt party. This theory has the convenient effect of exonerating the Fed. It has more than a few wee defects.
Read more...By Wolf Richter, San Francisco based executive, entrepreneur, start up specialist, and author, with extensive international work experience. Cross posted from Testosterone Pit.
Nicolas Sarkozy will be the only French president since World War II with two recessions under his watch, if the forecast by the National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) turns out to be correct. Recessions are rare in France: between the end of the war and the beginning of the financial crisis, there were two. Then came the four negative quarters of 2008/2009. Now, Insee forecasts another contraction: -0.2% in the fourth quarter of 2011 and -0.1% in the first quarter of 2012.
After an uptick over the summer, economic indicators have gone south.
Read more...Bill Black, the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Cross posted from New Economic Perspectives
Sixty Minutes’ December 11, 2011 interview of President Obama included a claim by Obama that, unfortunately, did not lead the interviewer to ask the obvious, essential follow-up questions.
I can tell you, just from 40,000 feet, that some of the most damaging behavior on Wall Street, in some cases, some of the least ethical behavior on Wall Street, wasn’t illegal.
Obama did not explain what Wall Street behavior he found least ethical or what unethical Wall Street actions he believed was not illegal. It would have done the world (and Obama) a great service had he been asked these questions. He would not have given a coherent answer because his thinking on these issues has never been coherent. If he had to explain his position he, and the public, would recognize it was indefensible.
I offer the following scale of unethical banker behavior related to fraudulent mortgages and mortgage paper (principally collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)) that is illegal and deserved punishment. I write to prompt the rigorous analytical discussion that is essential to expose and end Obama and Bush’s “Presidential Amnesty for Contributors” (PAC) doctrine.
Read more...By Delusional Economics, who is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.
Yet another interesting night in Europe. Spain managed to over sell as it latest auction with €6.03 billion sold versus €3.5 billion targeted which in the current environment is seen as a good result.
Read more...Yves here. One of our ongoing frustrations at NC is when the media and blogosphere get up in arms about what we think are secondary issues.
We’ve been loath to comment on a Thomson Reuters article that claimed that rehypothecation of assets in customer accounts was the reason MF Global customer funds went missing. The reason we’ve stayed away from this debate is that the article, despite its length, did not provide any substantiation for its claim. While it did contend that US customer accounts were set up so as to allow assets to be rehypothecated using far more permissive UK rules, and described how rehypothecation could be abused, it did not provide any proof that this was what took place at MF Global. Note that this does NOT mean we are saying that rehypothecation did not play a role, merely that the article was speculative.
The bombshell testimony of CME chief Terry Duffy yesterday, that a CME auditor heard an MF Global employee say that “Mr Corzine was aware of the loans being made from segregated [customer] accounts,” suggests that some of the money went missing via much more straightforward means, namely, taking it and hoping to be able to give it back if the firm survived.
But there is plenty of reason to be worried about rehypothecation.
Read more...By Delusional Economics, who is horrified at the state of economic commentary in Australia and is determined to cleanse the daily flow of vested interests propaganda to produce a balanced counterpoint. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.
For some time now I have been pointing out poor economic policy implementations within the European economy and how those policies are likely to effect the real economies of European nations. As I re-stated on Monday, my major concern with the current thinking from European economic leaders is their misguided belief that implementing austerity before credit write-downs/offs is a credible policy for a highly indebted, non-export competitive nation with a non-deflatable currency.
Read more...By Wolf Richter, San Francisco based executive, entrepreneur, start up specialist, and author, with extensive international work experience. Cross posted from Testosterone Pit.
“I’m very happy with the result,” Chancellor Angela Merkel told the cameras on Friday morning as she climbed out the limo. She talked about the start of a stability and fiscal union and didn’t want to accept any “lazy compromises.” But the vague agreement that emerged may be illegal under European Union law and may devastate weaker economies.
Read more...This Real News Network segment was recorded before the supposed “this time we’re really gonna fix it” Eurozone deal was announced today. Nevertheless, it is a useful discussion of the political dynamics that drove the pact.
Read more...As we’ve discussed repeatedly, bank stress tests have been a confidence building exercise, an effort to talk bank CDS spreads down and bank stock prices up. That was clearly the intent of the first effort by the US Treasury in 2009 and it succeeded so well as a PR exercise that the Eurozone copied it last year, incredibly finding that obviously undercapitalized Eurobanks needed a mere €3.5 billion euros more in equity. Mere months after the release of the results, lenders were being much more stringent and shunning banks who had been given an official clean bill of health.
This pattern has continued. Earlier this year, the EBA said the Eurobanks needed €80 billion in additional capital. We hooted:
Read more...By Wolf Wagner, Professor of Economics, University of Tilburg. Cross posted from VoxEU
As government advisors and central bankers race through the different options to save the euro, this column argues that one such proposal, Eurobonds, will actually increase the risk that several Eurozone countries fail together. It shows using basic arithmetic that these bonds, sometimes labelled ‘stability bonds’, may actually be more likely to harm Eurozone stability.
Read more...Yves here. As the headline indicates, the steps taken Bank of America that Michael Olenick describes in this article call into question the idea that Bank of America can shield itself by putting Countrywide into bankruptcy. Note that, some litigants, particularly AIG in its petition in opposition of the proposed $8.5 billion settlement of putback liability on 530 Countrywide trusts, made a persuasive case that Bank of America has operated Countrywide in such a way post acquisition so that it is no longer bankruptcy remote from BofA (that is, you can’t BK Countrywide and deny Countrywide creditors access to BofA assets).
Nevertheless, as attorney and former monoline executive Tom Adams noted by e-mail, the reason Bank of America might want the servicing at BofA rather than Countrywide if Countrywide is put into bankruptcy is probably to avoid a servicing termination event. If the servicer is bankrupt, the trustee or investors could, in theory, terminate them as servicer. This is really only theory, because almost no one (other than BofA) would want to be servicer for these loans, so it would be hard to see it as a driver of the changes Olenick describes.
An interesting related issue is that BofA, like other servicers in this new world of costly and lengthy foreclosures, is at risk of over advancing on mortgages. Servicers advance principal and interest even after a borrower has defaulted and reimburse themselves when the foreclosed property is sold. In theory, they can stop when a loan is clearly irrecoverable. In practice, historically many servicers have kept advancing up to the full principal balance of the loan. With loss severities rising and more borrowers fighting foreclosures, they can incur more costs than the house is worth, but on average, they still recover their advances. But with foreclosure timelines attenuating, legal costs escalating, and foreclosures grinding to a halt in states like Nevada, New York, and New Jersey, where they are now real sanctions for filing questionable foreclosure documentation, servicers face increasing doubts about their ability to recover advances from the proceeds of home sales. I hope the FDIC is watchful enough not to allow deposits to be used to fund servicer advances.
By Michael Olenick, founder and CEO of Legalprise, and creator of FindtheFraud, a crowd sourced foreclosure document review system (still in alpha)
Read more...The denial about the existential nature of the Eurozone crisis seems to be lifting. The press has featured reports of companies and banks doing contingency planning for the possibility of a Euro dissolution or exits by some member states.
In keeping, the Wall Street Journal tonight reports that even central banks are starting to contemplate what had heretofore been unthinkable:
Read more...