Category Archives: Real estate

The Coming Housing Finance Train Wreck

The interaction of immovable objects and inexorable forces is seldom pretty. One example is housing finance in the US. If no one blinks, an ugly situation could get even worse.

Have Four Pension Funds Blown Up the $8.5 Billion Bank of America Settlement?

A ruling in the Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago et al v. Bank of New York Mellon is a game-changer in mortgage investor litigation.

Looking at a Foreclosure Ground Zero: Jacksonville, Florida

Ben Geddes of the Florida Coastal School of Law, working with April Charney, has been putting together Google Maps of vacant properties in Jacksonville, with the aim of cataloging all of Jacksonville and northeastern Florida.

These images help give a sense of the scale of the problem in high distress areas.

Moody’s Foresees 10% Drop in US Housing Prices

Recall when yours truly attended Americatalyst, a real housing/mortgage nerd conference last November, and the panel that was asked to forecast housing had no one predicting more than a 2-3% decline? I was gobsmacked because no one seemed to be acknowledging the huge number of foreclosures in process plus those likely to happen (“shadow inventory”).

Moody’s has focused on one aspect of the issue and does not like what it sees.

Michael Olenick: Housing Pundit Thomas Lawler and the Genesis of Lawlessness

By Michael Olenick, creator of FindtheFraud, a crowd sourced foreclosure document review system (still in alpha). You can follow him on Twitter at @michael_olenick or read his blog, Seeing Through Data

While researching a HUD database for clues on Thomas Lawler, the frequently-cited foreclosure and heavy-metal loving “housing economist” often cited by the business media, and a favorite of Calculated Risk, I came across background information that raises more questions than it answers.

Starting in 1998 Thomas Lawler held the job of SVP Portfolio Management, SVP Financial Strategy, and SVP of Risk Strategy at Fannie Mae until he unceremoniously left in January, 2006, following an $8 billion financial fraud that occurred under his watch.
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Abigail Field: Mortgage Settlement Institutionalizes Foreclosure Fraud

Yves here. I hope you’ll take the time to read this important post. There has been a great deal of discussion of the many deficiencies of the mortgage settlement, but its biggest has gone pretty much unnoticed. It isn’t just that the settlement gives the banks a close to free pass for past predatory, illegal conduct, but it also has such lax servicing standards and weak enforcement provisions so as to give the banks license to carry on with servicing abuses.

By Abigail Caplovitz Field, a freelance writer and attorney who blogs at Reality Check

The mortgage settlement signed by 49 states and every Federal law enforcer allows the rampant foreclosure fraud currently choking our courts to continue unabated. Yes, I realize the pretty servicing standards language of Exhibit A promises the banks will completely overhaul their standard operating procedures and totally clean up their acts. But promises are empty if they’re not honored, and worthless if not enforceable.

We know Bailed-Out Bankers’ promises are empty, so what matters is if the agreement is enforceable. And when it comes to all things foreclosure fraud, the enforcement provisions are laughable. But before I detail why, let’s be clear: I’m not being hyperbolic.

Housing Bubbles, House Prices, and Interest Rates

It might surprise readers to learn that economists are still debating whether low interest rates in countries like Ireland and Spain were responsible for their housing bubbles. A new paper by Christian Hott and Terhi Jokipii at VoxEU looked at housing prices in 14 OECD countries from 1985 onward to assess the impact of protracted periods of low short term interest rates. Their conclusion was that they explained up to 50% of housing overvaluation in bubble-afflicted markets.

The interesting part of the paper is that they created a model for fundamental housing market values:

Sheila Bair Told Administration Its Housing Programs Would Bomb, Was Rebuffed on Better Solutions

No wonder Geithner and the other financial regulators complained about Sheila Bair not being a team player. If you want to do what is expedient and you are confronted with someone who cares about fixing the problem, then yes, they aren’t on your side. And bully for them.

Foreclosure Fraud 101: A Step-By-Step Look at One of the Most Common Fixes for Securitization Fail

We’ve written from time to time that the train wreck in foreclosure-related procedures is the direct result of widespread, possibly pervasive failure to convey borrower IOUs (notes) to securitization trusts as stipulated in the governing documents (the pooling & servicing agreement). Because key actions had to be taken by dates long past, and the contracts that governed these deals are rigid, there isn’t a permissible way to get notes that weren’t conveyed properly to trusts on time there now. So the fix has been document fabrication and forgeries. We thought we’d provide a specific example for reader edification.

Not-So-Dumb Consumers Shun OCC’s Bogus Foreclosure Reviews

Consumers seem to have wised up to the fact that the Administration is not on their side, particularly as far as housing is concerned.

A Qualified Defense of DeMarco, the Administration’s Favorite Scapegoat for Its Failed Housing Policies (Updated)

There’s been an interesting contretemps over an article by Gretchen Morgenson over the weekend, “A Bailout by Another Name.” Morgenson made the hardly-controversial observation that writing down Fannie and Freddie first mortgages without wiping out any relate second is a back door bailout. Remember, this was one of our key objections to the bank-friendly mortgage settlement, that a requirement to write down firsts and only write down related seconds to a degree is a subsidy to banks when if you were to believe the PR, the settlement is supposed to redress past abuses.

Morgenson also defends DeMarco’s refusal to do principal mods on Fannie and Freddie loans, arguing that he is subject to a requirement to preserve taxpayer assets and that the studies on this have been inconclusive. She adds that the focus is again incorrectly on Fannie and Freddie and not the banks. HAMP mods on GSE paper appear to be roughly proportional to their market share of original lending (around 40% before the crisis) when given their much lower default/delinquency rates, you’d expect them to represent a smaller share than they do relative to mods of bank owned and private label securitized loans.

The fact that this article has gotten heated responses from Felix Salmon and Dean Baker appears to be more a function of tribalism of various sorts than about the policy issues at hand.

Victory in Oakland County Transfer Tax Case Paves Way for Other Michigan Suits Against Fannie and Freddie

A few counties have filed litigation against various securitization players (originators, servicers, MERS) for the underpayment of recording fees. Similarly, New York attorney general Eric Schneiderman filed a wide ranging suit against MERS and three banks that used it and settled it for $25 million (it included a mention of $2 billion in unpaid recording fees but we were skeptical of viability of his argument).

However, counties in Michigan have scored an important victory.

Bank of America Launches Test “Mortgage to Lease” Program – Should We Be Impressed?

The Wall Street Journal and New York Times have reports on a pilot program at Bank of America to allow homeowners who are likely to default a graceful exit. The Charlotte bank will allow 1000 borrowers in New York, Arizona, and Nevada to turn in the deeds to their houses in return for a one year lease with a two one year renewal options at or below market rates. The program will be only with borrowers invited by the bank, which will target homeowners who are at least two months behind on payments but can demonstrate that they can pay the rent. The Journal cites an example of a Phoenix home with a $250,000 mortgage with payments of $1600 a month. It estimates the rent as $900.

This is clearly a preferable alternative for homeowners to foreclosure. They escape the credit score damage, stress and indignity of the foreclosure process and save moving costs. They are also spared the difficulty of finding a landlord who will accept a tenant with a tarnished payment record. It isn’t clear how the program will handle the usual rental deposit. So what’s not to like?

Yet Another Reason to Hate the Mortgage Settlement: The Release is Botched

Do you remember the brouhaha before the mortgage settlement was announced about the release? Recall, sports fans, as we stressed often, that this was a cash for release deal. The only motivating factor for the banks was the scope of the release. The Administration and attorneys general kept claiming the release was narrow, even as both the messaging (unintentionally) and snippets of disclosure suggested otherwise.

Neil Barofsky, Matt Stoller, and Your Humble Blogger on Why the Mortgage Settlement Sucks

This Bloomberg interview gives a nice high-level overview of why the mortgage settlement is terrible. It’s particularly useful if you are looking for a few key issues to present to someone who has bought the Obama administration PR or is late to the topic.