Category Archives: Regulations and regulators

Levin Optimistic That DoJ Will Act on Goldman Disclosures

The Financial Times interviewed Senator Carl Levin, whose report contained a great deal of information pointing to what at a minimum can be called bad faith dealing by Goldman. Matt Taibbi has argued in his characteristic forceful manner that Goldman execs clearly perjured themselves in their testimony.

Keep your champagne corked. The DoJ has been missing in action for so long I can’t imagine that they will actually put in an appearance, particularly on Goldman, but I’d be delighted to be proven wrong.

On Short-Termism and the Institutionalization of Rentier Capitalism

Andrew Haldane and Richard Davies of the Bank of England have released a very useful new paper on short-termism in the investment arena. They contend that this problem real and getting worse. This may at first blush seem to be mere official confirmation of most people’s gut instinct. However, the authors take the critical step of developing some estimates of the severity of the phenomenon, since past efforts to do so are surprisingly scarce.

A short-term perspective is tantamount to applying an overly high discount rate to an investment project or similarly, requiring an excessively rapid payback. In corporate capital budgeting settings, the distortions are pronounced:

Lehman, Resolution Regime Failure, and Credentialism as a Mask for Weak Arguments

It’s telling in extended blogosphere debates when one side starts resorting to cherry picking, distortions, ad hominem attacks, and projection as its main lines of attack. In his last offering on the FDIC’s paper which uses Lehman to show how it would use its new Dodd Frank resolution authority, Economics of Contempt proves only one thing: that he’s not interested in open or fair-minded discussion (see here to see what that might look like) and that he wants to put a stop to it.

So, mindful of the possibility that I might simply be feeding a modestly upmarket troll, it seems that all I can do now is illustrate how he has misrepresented my arguments; for instance, by absurdly suggesting that I missed the fact that the FDIC would be on site, in its Lehman counterfactual, when I raised a completely different issue, that their presence would become too large and too intrusive to keep secret (EoC seems blissfully unaware of the fact the word was all over the markets when the FDIC went in to kick the tires of Citi’s portfolio of loans to see-through buildings in the early 1990s).

New York AG Schneiderman Investigating Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America Mortgage Operations

New York attorney general Eric Schneiderman has announced that he is investigating Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America on their mortgage securitization activities. His office made a broad document request in recent weeks and has also asked to meet with these banks.

It is not yet clear what the focus of the probe is, but since Goldman and Morgan Stanley were not lenders, it could relate to their mortgage originations, their servicing operations (Litton for Goldman Saxon for Morgan Stanley) or their role as CDO issuers. With Bank of America, the investigation could cover additional ground.

Note that this announcement effectively blows up the 50 state attorney general settlement talks.

Doug Smith: Shock Therapy For Economics, Part 1

By Douglas K. Smith, author of On Value and Values: Thinking Differently About We In An Age Of Me

In “Economics In Crisis”, professor Brad DeLong notes:

The most interesting moment at a recent conference held in Bretton Woods … came when Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (asked) Larry Summers, “[Doesn’t] what has happened in the past few years simply suggest that [academic] economists did not understand what was going on?”

DeLong agreed with Summers’ response: “the problem is that there is so much that is “distracting, confusing, and problem-denying in…the first year course in most PhD programs.” As a result, even though “economics knows a fair amount,” it “has forgotten a fair amount that is relevant, and it has been distracted by an enormous amount.” DeLong then goes on to call for serious change in what economics departments do and teach.

In Part 2 of this post, I’m going to address the realities of ‘serious change’; and, in that context, what is troubling for INET about Summers’ presence at the recent Bretton Woods gathering. I’ll do this from my experience in leading and guiding real change as well as by contrasting INET with another, smaller, and more nascent effort called Econ4.

For now, though, let’s put aside the serious lack of self-respect in paying any attention at all to a world historical failure like Summers (Why is this arrogant sophist even on anyone’s C list, let alone A list? Why isn’t Summers wearing sack cloth and rolling in ashes?). Instead, let’s respond to DeLong’s ‘fessing up to the crisis in economics:

Feds Reviewed Only 100 Foreclosure Files in Servicer Whitewash

Not only are the authorities engaged in a coverup of servicer abuses, they aren’t even bothering to pretend that the effort is serious. A post on Housing Wire offers some choice tidbits:

Guest Post: Not far enough – Recommendations of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking

By Charles A.E. Goodhart and Avinash Persaud. Cross posted from VoxEU

The UK’s Independent Commission on Banking was set up last year to consider reforms to promote financial stability and competition. This column reacts to the commission’s interim report released on 11 May 2011. It argues that the commissioners have a lot to ponder before the final report is due in September – they have not gone far enough.

Raghuram Rajan on Delineating the Role of Government

In this interview, Rajan, who famously told Greenspan at his last Jackson Hole conference that recent changes in financial services industry policy had increased risk, takes on the question of the role of government. He contends that economists have neglected this issue due to overspecialization.

FDIC Filed Suit Against Lender Processing Services for $154 Million

Ooh, this is getting fun. Peter W found this tidbit in the May 10 Lender Processing Services 8K:

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its capacity as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank, filed a complaint on May 9, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to recover alleged losses of approximately $154,519,000. The FDIC contends these losses were a direct and proximate result of the defendants’ alleged breach of contract with WAMU and alleged gross negligence of the defendants with respect to the provision of certain services by LPS’s subsidiary LSI Appraisal, an appraisal management company.

On Dubious Defenses of the FDIC’s Lehman Resolution Plan

EoC has written a rejoinder to our post on FDIC’s paper on how it would have wound up Lehman with its new Dodd Frank powers. Since it’s a mix of smears and broken-backed arguments, it is nowhere near the standards he can attain when he is behaving himself. But as a tell about the officialdom’s propaganda preoccupations and methods, it isn’t entirely devoid of interest.

Before turning to the meat of his post, such as it is, I wanted to point out the biggest slur in the piece: his repeated assertion that Satyajit Das and I did not read the FDIC paper in full. That’s false, and brazenly so: somehow the fact that Das and I can crank out an analysis, quickly, gets twisted into anchoring a more general effort to discredit this site. Regular readers, including EoC, have no doubt seen other occasions where we’ve produced detailed and on target assessments before most of our peers. And Das is in Australia, giving him the ability to respond to evening releases in the US during his business day (in this case, one with specific page references).

EoC’s entire post fails when you look at its and the FDIC’s three central, obtuse misconstructions:

Quelle Surprise! 50 State Attorneys General Settlement Talks Beating a Retreat

As readers know, we’ve been very critical of the 50 state attorneys general mortgage “settlement” talks. The reason has been very simple. The leader of the negotiations, Tom Miller of Iowa, early on cast his lot with the Administration’s banking regulators, who are at best cognitively captured and at worst corrupt, rather than siding with the rule of law or the interests of the nation’s citizens. He took their lead and pushed for a quick resolution, when any “settlement” by definition depends on the prosecutors having a real case with decent odds of serious damages as a cudgel to bring the perps to the table and extract real concessions from them.

In the absence of doing investigations to develop a case, all the banks have to “settle” is robosigning abuses, which since they are sorta cleaning those up anyhow, does not add up to any kind of threat. Thus all the banks have to do is the obvious: call Miller’s bluff.

Seeking Reader Questions on Fixing Mortgage Securitization for the House Financial Services Committee Hearings

I participate in various e-mail threads where people chat among themselves (my hedgie bunch can be wickedly funny on slow market days) and one of the groups is focused on the mortgage mess.

I thought readers might be able to help with a query from one of the participants:

On May 23 the House Financial Services Committee will be having a briefing session on Securitization and risk retention proposals under Dodd-Frank. The following parties will be presenting and available for questions:

· David Moffitt, Global Head of Structured Solutions and Securitization, Morgan Stanley
· Tom Deutsch, Executive Director, American Securitization Forum
· Evan Siegert, Managing Director, Senior Counsel, American Securitization Forum
· Jim Johnson, Managing Director, Public Policy, American Securitization Forum

He is skeptical of the Dodd Frank risk retention rules and asked:

Does anybody who thinks differently have any questions regarding risk retention that should be asked of a person listed above? How about questions for any of these participants regarding securitization generally?

I find it impressive that the American Securitization Forum, which to date has been consistently in the wrong on foreclosure fraud and chain of title issues, is still treated with such deference, particularly since the sell side of the securitization industry, which is what the ASF represents (despite its pious claims otherwise) has fought meaningful securitization reform tooth and nail, with the result that the industry is almost entirely on government life support. Therefore I hope readers can come up with some suitable questions.

More on Greece Restructuring and Eurozone Worries

While the Euro recovered from its stumble last week and the EU officialdom put out a round of denials of a story on Friday that Greece was considering an exit from the eurozone, the Euro tea leaf readers are still chewing over the significance of a not at all secret secret meeting over the weekend. The trigger is the fact that Greece is already on the verge of breaking the terms of its loans last year. This is hardly a surprise; austerity does not work and the Greek debt burden was clearly unsustainable. Per the Guardian:

A New Zombie Lumbers On: The Mortgage Settlement Negotiations

The kindest thing that can be said about the 50 state attorneys’ general negotiations over foreclosure abuses is that it is increasingly obvious that there will not be a deal. The leader of the effort, Iowa’s Tom Miller, has completely botched the effort. There was no way to have any negotiating leverage with intransigent banks in the absence of investigations. Miller has changed his story enough times on this and other fronts so as to have no credibility left. But whether there were no investigations (as other AGs maintain) or whether they did some (as Miller, contrary to a staffer’s remarks, now insists), they were clearly inadequate.

We’ve found the rumor, that Miller was angling to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, credible. It would explain his unduly cozy relationship with Federal banking regulators, as well as his efforts to wrap up negotiations quickly, which reduced what little bargaining power he had (time pressure means a party that drags its feet can extract concessions).

But like so many zombies that inhabit the financial landscape, the mortgage settlement negotiations refuse to die.