Category Archives: Regulations and regulators

Guest Post: The Price of Oil – Where the Outrage?

By Payam Sharifi, an economics Graduate Student at the University of Missouri-Kansas City

Here in the United States, discussions of our troubled times revolve around any of the following: the housing crisis, the federal debt, unemployment, the fiscal health of particular states, and sometimes even income inequality. Overseas, discussions can include these topics, as well as the plight of the Euro. One issue that I personally feel has gotten the short end of the stick is that of commodity prices, and in particular food and oil. There is a special significance to this issue: its ramifications affect nearly every human being in the world. As seen in prices on the NYMEX and other markets, oil and food prices are beginning to soar again, with the price of WTI futures hitting $90/barrel and Brent crude going over $100/barrel. This issue ought to be discussed again with a renewed interest – but the media and much of the populace at large have simply accepted high food and oil prices as an unavoidable fact of life, without any discussion of the causes of these price rises aside from platitudes. For example, a recent AP report quoted an opinion that gasoline was going to hit $4/$5 a gallon in 2011, but did not mention the possible relevance of speculation in the futures market. It seems that everyday observers (as well as even the financial media) find this issue so complex that they shrink from discussing it. I will now give my opinion on these issues, buttressed by what I have learned from a recent interview with commodities trader Daniel Dicker. His new book “Oil’s Endless Bid” is due out in April.

“Project Merlin” keeps on giving

Well, it was obvious that this bullet point from the Merlin agreement: implementing and applying European and international rules to create a level playing field in both policy and practice whilst protecting and maintaining the particular strength of UK financial services, and without pre-judging the outcome of the Independent Commission on Banking (IBC). was a […]

Another Attempt at Outflanking Mervyn King – this time, by the UK Treasury

We posted last week about the NYT’s smear of Mervyn King (as did London Banker), and followed that up with some observations on the UK Chancellor’s dreary capitulation to the banks, aka “Project Merlin”; we concluded somewhat world-wearily by promising more sightings of attempts to nobble the UK’s radical bank reformers. Well, here’s the first, […]

The 7 Things Really Wrong with the Treasury’s GSE Reform Plan

As readers no doubt know, the Treasury Department released its overdue plan for reform of the Fannie and Freddie, otherwise known as GSEs (for “government sponsored enterprise”) last Friday. We were surprised that some normally astute commentators, such as Mike Konczal and Felix Salmon, were taken in by this thin and misleading document. As banking expert Chris Whalen said by e-mail, “The proposal is completely disingenuous. Read 180 degrees opposite what it says.”

What is particularly striking is it is not very difficult to difficult to see through the stage management. Throughout the document, the Treasury calls its proposal a “plan” when it is anything but. Putting some stakes in the ground and then offering three mutually exclusive alternatives and no timetable for resolution is not a plan.

The reason for this failure to put forward a real proposal is that Treasury is trying to present itself as a fair broker of a politically fraught process. But that’s bunk. The outcome, unless the public wakes up to this new effort at looting, is already clear.

The fix is just about in.

Our Response to the Center for American Progress Objection to Our Post on Its GSE Reform Proposal

Readers have hopefully had the opportunity to read “The Center for American Progress Objects to Our Critique of Its GSE Reform Plan”, which contained an e-mail by David Min of the Center for American Progress presenting its bones of contention.

While we appreciate that the CAP has gone to the trouble to communicate with us directly, we are not persuaded by its arguments.

We’ll recap the e-mail and then address the issues individually:

1. You need to have some form of government guarantee to have a mortgage product that is fair to middle class consumers (his writing is a bit confused, at one point he uses “no” when he means “yes”, but this is the drift of his gist).

2. We’ve mistated who would eat “catastrophic risk” under the CAP scheme, since the Catastrophic Risk Fund and the new mortgage insurer investors would take losses first

3. Not all “banks” are behind or support the CAP proposal

4. This plan is the best option for the public and less lucrative to the financial services industry than a “privatization” model

Let’s dispatch these arguments in order.

The Center for American Progress Objects to Our Critique of Its GSE Reform Plan

We received this e-mail from David Min on February 11 about our post titled, “Wall Street Co-Opting Nominally Liberal Think Tanks; Banks Lobbying to Become New GSEs.” That piece took a dim view of a GSE “reform” proposal from the Center for American Progress, which we pointed out is “THE mainstream Democratic think tank for Congress and the administration”.

We must note that this message mischaracterizes some aspects of our post (for instance, we discussed at length in the our post why we thought the catastrophic risk fund would come up short, and this e-mail does not address our argument). Nevertheless, we thought readers would be interested in his message. From Min:

Shoddy Anti Derivatives Reform “Study” From Firm That Falsely Claimed Top Academics as Advisor

t’s high time that reporters start lifting the veil to look at exactly who is behind the “research” put out by think tanks. Even drug company research, which many members of the public now know to view with some doubt, at least has an actual investigation of some sort underpinning it (the doubts about them usually involve study design and/or interpretation of results). Think tank end product should be taken with even more salt, since it too often is the intellectual equivalent of a CDO: taking junk ideas and dressing it up in a structure and a brand name so that most people will regard it as AAA-rated thinking.

A piece by Andrew Ross Sorkin at the New York Times is an all-too-rare and badly need hard look at the less than savory process of creating impressive-looking arguments in favor of special-interest serving policies.

Why are Half of the FCIC Interviews Being Withheld?

The FCIC has made a great show of being transparent, but if you are going to make that your signature, you can’t engage in halfway measures. Lambert Strether, in an e-mail titled “A data conversion effort that shows FCIC’s “Resource Library” is farcically bad and obfuscatory” noted:

Obviously, any independent evaluation of the material is not at all a priority with these guys. Yes, they’ve made it easy enough to DISTRIBUTE, and no doubt there will be an iPhone app any day now. Yay. But as far as making it easy to EVALUATE, which takes data you can interchange and manipulate and search, everything they have done makes that harder. Every single thing.

More tooth gnashing from Lambert here and here.

Another mystery is why so many interviews are being withheld.

“Project Merlin” Flags a New Phase of the Bankers vs Regulators Showdown

I was reining myself too much when I wrote this. Or rather, I just wasn’t going far enough. On reflection, two or three more bullet points from the malodorous Treasury press release are worthy of comment, and there’s some extra context to add.

First, the purported object of Project Merlin was to achieve a new understanding between banks and government after the 2008 crash, the 2008-9 bailouts, and the 2009-2010 bonus rows. A Magna Carta-like settlement of rights and responsibilities, perhaps. So you’d think there’d be some public undertaking by the banks, promising never to screw up so mightily again: not to drift stupidly into massive dependence on market-based funding, perhaps, or simply, to manage credit risk better; or not to incentivize risk taking via heads-I win-tails-you-lose bonuses; or not to award performance-unrelated bonuses immediately after massive infusions of taxpayer support.

Oddly, none of that is in the Treasury press release

Paulson Denies Culpability in Crisis, Yet Even Bear Turned Down His Deals

The release of the first batch of FCIC interview reveals interesting finger-pointing among some of the major players. We’ve argued (and in ECONNED, provided a considerable amount of supporting analysis) that the subprime shorts drove the demand for bad mortgages. There is no other explanation for the explosion of demand for “spready,” meaning bad, mortgages that started in the third quarter of 2005. As Tom Adams and I describe in a recent post:

Signs of recklessness were more visible in 2004 and 2005, to the point were Sabeth Siddique of the Federal Reserve Board, who conducted a survey of mortgage loan quality in late 2005, found the results to be “very alarming”.

So why, with the trouble obvious in the 2005 time frame, did the market create even worse loans in late 2005 through the beginning of the meltdown, in mid 2007, even as demand for better mortgage loans was waning? It’s critical to recognize that this is an unheard of pattern. Normally, when interest rates rise (and the Fed had begun tightening), appetite for the weakest loans falls first; the highest quality credits continue to be sought by lenders, albeit on somewhat less favorable terms to the borrowers than before.

In other words: who wanted bad loans?…

So Why is the FCIC Protecting Bernanke & Co?

Yes, the question in the headline is rhetorical. We know that great efforts have been made and are continuing to be made not to reveal certain aspects of the financial crisis, and the only rationale that makes an iota of sense is the information would embarrass certain people in power.

The latest object lesson is the failure of the FCIC to post the full recording of its 2009 interview with Bernanke. The rationale is that the interviews contain “legal or proprietary information”, so it is being withheld for five years. Are these people unable to use a calendar? The critical phase of the crisis was pretty much over as of end of 2008. Any sensitive customer or transaction position information from that period is now stale.

Deep T: Australian Banking System on Unstoppable Path to Collapse or Government Bailout

Yves here. This long and informative post on the pending train wreck in the Australian financial system might seem to be too narrow a topic for most Naked Capitalism readers, but it makes for an important object lesson. Australia managed to come out of the global financial crisis largely unscathed because its banks did not swill down toxic assets from the US (chump quasi retail investors were another matter) and it benefitted from the commodities boom.

Nevertheless, one might think its bank regulators might see what happened abroad as a cautionary tale. Mortgage debt took center stage in the crisis, and Australia is in the throes of a serious housing bubble. Yet as this post describes, the regulators seem asleep at the switch as to one of its major drivers.

By Deep T., a senior banking insider who is fed up with his colleague’s reliance on public support. Cross posted from MacroBusiness.

Previously I have posted on how the major banks recycle capital in The Capital Rort. I want to extend that subject by showing how mortgage ‘rehypothecation’ in Australia has led to the massive expansion in liquidity available to Australian banks which is at the root of the mortgage affordability issues in Australia and has put Australia’s banking system on the unstoppable path to collapse or government bailout.

Is the Proposed NYSE-Deutsche Börse Merger All It’s Cracked Up to Be?

The financial media is duly falling in line and giving a thumbs up to the proposed merger between the New York Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse. Mayor Bloomberg contends it is both good for New York City and provides customers better service in an era of increasingly global equity trading. Industry analysts approved. Not surprisingly, stocks of other exchanges are up based on takeover speculation.

Your truly is wary about concentrations of power in the financial arena, and consolidation of stock exchanges has the potential to go in that direction. One critic of the deal was former Goldman Sachs co-chairman John Whitehead. Admittedly, some of his objections sound quaint, echoing the hand wringing of the 1980s when the Japanese acquired trophy assets such as the Rockefeller Center. From Bloomberg:

“I speak out rarely, and this is one time when I can’t hold myself back,”

GSE Headfake: Yet More Looting Branded as “Reform”

As time goes on, the various Ministries of Truth just get better and better at their stock in trade. We’ve gone from artful obfuscation like “extraordinary rendition”, and “Public Private Investment Partnerships” to stress free “stress tests” (particularly the Eurozone version) designed to get bank stocks up and credit default swap spreads down, to even grosser debasement of language. What passes for the left has for the most part been dragged so far to the right that the use of once well understood terms like “liberal” and “progressive” virtually call for definition. And the word “reform” has virtually been turned on its head. Financial services reform was so weak as to be the equivalent of a jaywalking ticket; health care reform was a Trojan horse for even large subsidies to Big Pharma and the health care insurers. But GSE reform takes NewSpeak one step further by turning the “reform” concept on its head and using the label to describe an effort to institutionalize even bigger subsidies to the mortgage industrial complex.

While Team Obama appears to have backed down from the trial balloon floated by the Center for American Progress (note that press reports give another rationale) and is expected to offer a menu of choices for “reform” in its overdue white paper on Friday, don’t be fooled. The proposals coming from the lobbyists expected to have real influence on which ideas get the green light are virtually without exception serving up such a narrow menu of choices as to constitute unanimity. We offered our take as of the release of the CAP report; a subsequent proposal by Moody’s Mark Zandi (see details here) is more of the same.

It’s as if a population suffering from a toxic reaction to mustard was now offered options ranging from Dijon to pommery to spicy brown as meaningful improvements.