Category Archives: The dismal science

Did Sheila Bair Save the US From Complete Financial Meltdown?

When a moderate (meaning anachronistic) Republican proves to be a more tough minded regulator than Democrats, it serves as yet another proof of how far the county has moved to the right. Bair, in a long “exit interview” with Joe Nocera, says a number of things that would have been regarded as commonsensical and obvious in the 1980s, yet have a whiff of radicalism about them in our era of finance uber alles. For instance: Bear should have been allowed to fail, TBTF banks are a menace (well, she doesn’t say that, but makes it clear she regards them as repugnant), bank bondholders should take their lumps.

Bair was alert to the dangers of subprime, having recognized how dangerous it could be in the early 2000s (when a smaller version of the market blew up, taking homeowners along with it), and was not a believer of the Paulson/Bernanke party line that subprime would be “contained”. She long championed mortgage mods as better for lenders, borrowers, and the economy, and has fought an uphill battle with the Administration on that front. With the IndyMac failure, which put the subprime lender/servicer in the FDIC’s lap, she pushed hard to develop a template for how to do them, which then was ignored by the Administration (they did HAMP instead, an embarrassment which she refused from the outset to endorse).

The piece serves as an indictment of the banking industry toadies in the officialdom, namely the Treasury, Fed, and OCC. One priceless quote:

The Phantom Bond Market Vigilantes

Assuming current fiscal policies remain in force, our economic model suggests that interest rates will rise considerably over the next decade, with the yield on the 10-year Treasury note reaching nearly 9% by 2021. – Private interest rates will rise as federal borrowing competes for saving that might otherwise finance private investment. – In addition, […]

The Sorrow and the Pity of Economists (Like DeLong) Not Learning from Their Mistakes

I hate to seem to be beating up on Brad DeLong. Seriously.

As I’ve said before, he is one of the few economists willing to admit error and not try later to minimize or recant his admission (unlike, say, Greenspan). And he seems genuinely perplexed and remorseful. This puts his heads and shoulders above a lot of his colleagues, at least the sort whose opinion carries weight in policy circles.

Even with DeLong making an earnest effort to figure out why he went wrong, his latest musings, via a Bloomberg op-ed, “Sorrow and Pity of Another Liquidity Trap,” show how hard it is for economist to unlearn what they think they know. And as the great philosopher Will Rogers warned us, “It’s not what you know that gets you in trouble. It’s what you know that ain’t so.”

So it’s important to regard DeLong as an unusually candid mainstream economist, and treat his exposition as reasonably representative if you could somehow get his peers to take a hard, jaundiced look at how wrong they have been of late.

DeLong’s mea culpa is about how he and his colleagues refused to take the idea that the US could fall into a liquidity trap seriously. As an aside, this is already a troubling admission, since many observers, including yours truly, though the Fed was in danger of creating precisely that sort of problem if if dropped the Fed funds rate below 2%. It would leave itself no wriggle room if the crisis continued and it had to lower rates further into the territory where further reductions would not motivate changes in behavior. That’s assuming we were in a “normal” environment. But the big abnormality is that we are in what Richard Koo calls a balance sheet recession. And as we will discuss below, Keynes (and Minsky) had a very keen appreciation of the resulting behavior changes, but those ideas were abandoned by Keynesians (it is key to remember that Keynesianism contains significant distortions and omissions from Keynes’ thinking.

But notice how he starts his piece:

On Dangerous Disconnect Between Economics and Ecology

William Rees is one of the pioneers of ecological economics and is the originator and co-developer of ‘ecological footprint analysis’. This video contains some basic facts about current consumption levels in advanced economies that are attention-grabbing. I’d normally say “Enjoy” but this is not that sort of video.

Randy Wray: A PROGRESSIVE APPROACH TO FEDERAL BUDGETING – Or, Can One Take Billionaire Pete Peterson’s Money and Remain Progressive?

By L. Randall Wray, a Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Cross posted from FireDogLake

Yves Smith set off a firestorm in her criticism of several progressive groups that have joined forces with Pete Peterson to whip up deficit hysteria. There are three issues that need to be addressed:

1. Can a progressive take tainted money and remain progressive?
2. Did the Roosevelt Institute (in particular) take tainted money and remain progressive?
3. What would a progressive approach to federal budgeting look like?

Andrew Sheng Says Sustainability Means Caging Godzillas

Andrew Sheng, Chief Adviser to the China Banking Regulatory Commission, is wonderfully straightforward and realistic for an economist. He is willing to say, as he does in this video, things that are obvious yet somehow unacceptable to ‘fess up to in policy circles, like the planet simply cannot support 3 billion people in Asia living European lifestyles. He warns of the danger of creating the mother of all crises if governments cannot stem the tide of leveraged capital flows, and also discusses the role of China on the global stage.

Philip Pilkington: Economic Fetishism – Three Objects of Perverse Intellectual Pleasure

By Philip Pilkington, a journalist and writer based in Dublin, Ireland

Watch out, I have a large, very large fur, with which I could cover you up entirely, and I have a mind to catch you in it as in a net.
– Leopold von Sacher-Masoch

Many aspects of contemporary economic theory certainly seem to have their origins in the mythic and the moral rather than in the realm of the rational. But while this seems to be an accurate description of the system as a whole, it does not seem quite able to account for certain aspects of this system which appear to be rather obsessive in the minds of its adherents.

These obsessions, or ‘fetishes’, can be explained in like terms, that is: compared to certain primitive rituals and superstitions. To do so we will first have to form a better understanding of the fetish itself; an Enlightenment concept that has a long and interesting history.

The specific fetishes we will explore will be the most important today: the government, inflation and gold. All these phenomena are interconnected in neoclassical economic theory (yes, even gold, or at least the ghost thereof), however, they tend to lead their own individual existence outside of the Grand Neoclassical System itself. In and of themselves they are, for economists and economic commentators, fetishes that can be worshipped in dark rooms away from the great hall. They are like fragments of the main theory that adherents smuggle out of the temple and obsess over in their own private shrines.

DeLong Illustrates Why We Should Be Scared of Economists

Several readers sent me links to a Brad DeLong post which they took to be a rebuttal to a takedown I did of a recent Ezra Klein piece.

Since DeLong did not link to or mention my post, I doubt his piece had anything to do with mine. But his post is noteworthy for a completely different reason: it illustrates how economists have refused to learn much, if anything, from the crisis.

Martin Wolf: Why China Could Fail Like Japan

The Financial Times’ economics editor Martin Wolf takes up the theme treated at some length by China-based economist MIchael Pettis: that Chinas’ economy has moved into unknown and dangerous terrain. No sizeable economy has had investment and exports combined constitute nearly 50% of GDP, and that model is not sustainable. As we have indicted, there is evidence that investment is becoming less and less productive. China is taking $7 of debt to generate $1 of GDP, when the US at the tail end of the bubble needed a mere $4 to $5 of debt for each incremental $1 of growth.

We’ve often recapped Pettis here and are glad to see Wolf take up his analysis.

Wolf does recite the optimist case on China, with the biggest factor being that China has a long way to go in improving the incomes of its citizens, and that alone can give it a very long lasting growth trajectory.

On the risks, Wolf sets aside commodities scarcity and environmental issues to focus solely on the economics case.

“Economics Upside Down” or Why “Free Markets” Don’t Exist

This is an instructive interview with Ha-Joon Chang, author of the new book “23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism.” He debunks some widely accepted beliefs, such at the existence of “free markets” or the necessity of “free trade” for the development of capitalism.

Enjoy!

Richard Alford: If War Is Too Important To Be Left To The Generals, Isn’t Economic Policy Too Important To Be Left To Economists?

By Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed. Since then, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

Apologies to both Clemenceau (Prime Minister of France 1917-1920) and General Jack D. Ripper (Dr. Strangelove 1964)

The recent crisis and continuing economic and financial dislocations has led many to question the usefulness of the current macroeconomic paradigm, if not economics more generally. Raghuram Rajan, whose paper, “Has Financial Development made the World Riskier,” was summarily dismissed at the Fed Jackson Hole Conference in 2005, has recently posted a piece titled “Why Did Economists Not Foresee the Crisis?” In this piece, Rajan rejects three popular explanations for the failure of economics and economic policy, i.e. the absence of “models that could account for the behavior”, “ideology”, and “corruption”. Rajan offers alternative explanation(s): “I (Rajan) would argue that three factors largely explain our (economists) collective failure: specialization, the difficulty of forecasting, and the disengagement of much of the profession from the real world.” The logical conclusion of Rajan’s explanation(s) is that to avoid future crises, the role of economists, or at least academic economists, in the policy formulation process should be reduced. More troubling yet for economists, including Rajan, is some recent work by Frydman and Goldberg which argues that current economic models are inherently flawed.

Rajan dismisses the argument that economics lacked relevant models. He cites the fact that academic economists have studied and modeled many of the factors that contributed to the crisis. Rajan does, however, cite the compartmentalization of economics which leaves macroeconomists ignorant of findings in other sub-disciplines of economics.

In Rajan’s view, the inability to forecast accurately reflects shortcomings in the current model. All models of the economy abstract from the complexities of the economy and financial system. Models are simplifications of realty. Hence the models are incorrect. (We will return to this point later.) The only questions are how large and costly will the model-driven errors be.

Observers should not be surprised by the fact that the models employed by economists contained simplifying assumptions. However, they should be disturbed by the recent performance of policymakers. They ought to ask the question: why did economists remain wedded to their model despite the growth of all the macro-economically important economic and financial imbalances and unsustainabilities that existed in the years prior to the crisis?

Steve Keen: Dude! Where’s My Recovery?

By Steve Keen, Associate Professor of Economics & Finance at the University of Western Sydney, and author of the book Debunking Economics. Cross posted from Steve Keen’s Debtwatch.

I initially planned to call this post “Economic Growth, Asset Markets and the Credit Accelerator”, but recent negative data out of America makes me think that this title is more in line with conversations currently taking place in the White House.

According to the NBER, the “Great Recession” is now two years behind us, but the recovery that normally follows a recession has not occurred. While growth did rise for a while, it has been anaemic compared to the norm after a recession, and it is already trending down. Growth needs to exceed 3 per cent per annum to reduce unemployment—the rule of thumb known as Okun’s Law—and it needs to be substantially higher than this to make serious inroads into it. Instead, growth barely peeped its head above Okun’s level. It is now below it again, and trending down.