Category Archives: The dismal science

Richard Alford: If War Is Too Important To Be Left To The Generals, Isn’t Economic Policy Too Important To Be Left To Economists?

By Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed. Since then, he has worked in the financial industry as a trading floor economist and strategist on both the sell side and the buy side.

Apologies to both Clemenceau (Prime Minister of France 1917-1920) and General Jack D. Ripper (Dr. Strangelove 1964)

The recent crisis and continuing economic and financial dislocations has led many to question the usefulness of the current macroeconomic paradigm, if not economics more generally. Raghuram Rajan, whose paper, “Has Financial Development made the World Riskier,” was summarily dismissed at the Fed Jackson Hole Conference in 2005, has recently posted a piece titled “Why Did Economists Not Foresee the Crisis?” In this piece, Rajan rejects three popular explanations for the failure of economics and economic policy, i.e. the absence of “models that could account for the behavior”, “ideology”, and “corruption”. Rajan offers alternative explanation(s): “I (Rajan) would argue that three factors largely explain our (economists) collective failure: specialization, the difficulty of forecasting, and the disengagement of much of the profession from the real world.” The logical conclusion of Rajan’s explanation(s) is that to avoid future crises, the role of economists, or at least academic economists, in the policy formulation process should be reduced. More troubling yet for economists, including Rajan, is some recent work by Frydman and Goldberg which argues that current economic models are inherently flawed.

Rajan dismisses the argument that economics lacked relevant models. He cites the fact that academic economists have studied and modeled many of the factors that contributed to the crisis. Rajan does, however, cite the compartmentalization of economics which leaves macroeconomists ignorant of findings in other sub-disciplines of economics.

In Rajan’s view, the inability to forecast accurately reflects shortcomings in the current model. All models of the economy abstract from the complexities of the economy and financial system. Models are simplifications of realty. Hence the models are incorrect. (We will return to this point later.) The only questions are how large and costly will the model-driven errors be.

Observers should not be surprised by the fact that the models employed by economists contained simplifying assumptions. However, they should be disturbed by the recent performance of policymakers. They ought to ask the question: why did economists remain wedded to their model despite the growth of all the macro-economically important economic and financial imbalances and unsustainabilities that existed in the years prior to the crisis?

Steve Keen: Dude! Where’s My Recovery?

By Steve Keen, Associate Professor of Economics & Finance at the University of Western Sydney, and author of the book Debunking Economics. Cross posted from Steve Keen’s Debtwatch.

I initially planned to call this post “Economic Growth, Asset Markets and the Credit Accelerator”, but recent negative data out of America makes me think that this title is more in line with conversations currently taking place in the White House.

According to the NBER, the “Great Recession” is now two years behind us, but the recovery that normally follows a recession has not occurred. While growth did rise for a while, it has been anaemic compared to the norm after a recession, and it is already trending down. Growth needs to exceed 3 per cent per annum to reduce unemployment—the rule of thumb known as Okun’s Law—and it needs to be substantially higher than this to make serious inroads into it. Instead, growth barely peeped its head above Okun’s level. It is now below it again, and trending down.

Philip Pilkington: Down in the Hole – Is America Becoming the Next Japan?

Philip Pilkington is a journalist currently sinking, together with the rest of his fellow countrymen, down into the hole in the Irish banking system

Will all your money
Keep you from madness
Keep you from sadness
When you’re down in the hole

Cause you’ll be down in the gutter
You’ll be bumming for cigarettes
Bumming for nylons
In the American Zone
–‘Down in the Hole’, The Rolling Stones

Everyone who is anyone is saying it: the US looks set to become the next Japan. Yet the particulars of the argument are never really trashed out. Certainly both countries suffer from the same malady – namely, a bursting asset bubble punching gigantic holes in private sector balance sheets. This leads to similar policy approaches – not to mention similar policy failures. But beyond this overarching comparison people tend not to tread.

Let’s start from the beginning; the asset bubbles that set off the crises.

Philip Pilkington: Debt, public or private?: The necessity of debt for economic growth

By Philip Pilkington. Journalist, writer, economic anti-moralist and aficionado of political theatre

‘Tis not due yet; I would be loath to pay him before
his day. What need I be so forward with him that
calls not on me? – Falstaff, ‘Henry VII’

The Anxieties of Government and Debt

Apart from debt, there is perhaps one other economic phenomenon that generates exceptionally large amounts of emotive nonsense both on the internet and in real life – and that is government. So it’s quite unsurprising that when government debt is the discussion of the day, passions flare, accusations are hurled and the coming apocalypse is invoked.

It would be interesting to undertake a psychological study of modern man’s aversion to government and to debt. If I were to guess I would say that many people tend to associate government with authority and debt with obligation. Authority and obligation – surely in our era of selfish hedonism no other potential restraints are so terrifying to so many. These phenomena intrude rudely on one of our most cherished contemporary ideological myths: individualism. More specifically, that outlandish individualism conjured up by marketing men to flog their wares and crystallised in novels and narratives written by lonely and isolated individuals like Ayn Rand. It is, of course, a fantasy individualism; one that few truly adhere to in their day-to-day lives – but it is, like the religions of days gone by, an important determinate in the messages people choose to accept and those they choose to reject.

To put the questions of individualism and of liberty aside though, from an economic point-of-view debt is inevitable.

Bill Black: Bad Cop; Crazed Cop – the IMF and the ECB

By Bill Black, an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is a white-collar criminologist, a former senior financial regulator, and the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One. Cross posted from http://neweconomicperspectives.blogspot.com/2011/05/in-praise-of-sorkins-praise-of.html“>New Economic Perspectives

Greetings again from Ireland. One of the many mysteries about the current crisis is why anyone listens to the IMF or anyone that supported its anti-regulatory policies. Prior to the crisis, even the IMF had begun to confess that its austerity programs made poor nations’ financial crises worse. In the lead up to the crisis the IMF was blind to the developing crises. It even praised nations like Ireland during the run up to the crisis, missing the largest bubble (relative to GDP) of any nation, an epidemic of banking control fraud, and the destruction of any pretense to effective Irish banking regulation.

Crises reveal many deficiencies and one of the most glaring was the European Central Bank (ECB).

Jean Pisani-Ferry on Europe’s Tiger and German Nightmares

This INET interview with Jean Pisani-Ferry gives a useful overview of how Greece and Ireland came to have sovereign debt woes and the viability of the remedies proposed for each. Pisani-Ferry argues, as many other economists do, that austerity measures will not succeed in Greece because they will prove to be politically unsustainable.

Stephanie Kelton: What Happens When the Government Tightens its Belt?

Yves here. This post is certain to annoy some readers. Note that Kelton does not address under what circumstances it is desirable to have the government run a surplus versus a deficit, merely what the implications are. Bill MItchell is rather forceful on this matter:

The US press was awash with claims over the weekend that the US was “living beyond” its “means” and that “will not be viable for a whole lot longer”. One senior US central banker claimed that the way to resolve the sluggish growth was to increase interest rates to ensure people would save. Funny, the same person also wants fiscal policy to contract. Another fiscal contraction expansion zealot. Pity it only kills growth. Another commentator – chose, lazily – to be the mouthpiece for the conservative lobby and wrote a book review that focused on the scary and exploding public debt levels. Apparently, this public debt tells us that the US is living beyond its means. Well, when I look at the data I see around 16 per cent of available labour idle in the US and capacity utilisation rates that are still very low. That tells me that there is a lot of “means” available to be called into production to generate incomes and prosperity. A national government doesn’t really have any “means”. It needs to spend to get hold off the means (production resources). Given the idle labour and low capacity utilisation rates the government in the US is clearly not spending enough. The US is currently living well below its means. But the US government can always buy any “means” that are available for sale in US dollars and if there is insufficient demand for these resources emanating from the non-government sector then the US government can bring those idle “means” into productive use any time it chooses.

Wikileaks: Saudis Warned About Oil Speculators in 2007 and 2008

Kevin Hall of McClatchy wrote about Wikileaks releases showing that the Saudis were concerned about oil market speculation leading to unduly high prices in 2007 and 2008. In 2008, we wrote that the Saudis said they did not see tightness in the market, and they also warned that prices were excessive. The Wikileaks thus confirm that these statements were not just PR, to shift blame from them as the historical swing producer, but were consistent with their private communications.

Paul Jay of the Real News Network interviewed Kevin Hall (hat tip reader Philip Pilkington):

Philip Pilkington: Beyond growth – are we entering a new phase of economic maturity?

By Philip Pilkington, a journalist and anti-economist writing from amidst the devastated ruins of Dublin, Ireland

All successful revolutions are the kicking in of a rotten door – JK Galbraith

What’s the easiest way to embarrass an economist? Okay, that’s a bit of a trick question. After all, economics is a pretty embarrassing profession and there are a million questions you could put to an economist that would likely turn his or her cheeks red. You could, for example, approach your typical ‘academic of ill-repute’ and ask them if they saw the bursting of the US housing bubble coming or the unsustainable debt-overload that accompanied it – yep, that would probably do the trick.

One topic that does cause your average economist a lot of brain-bother, though, is the environment. After all, everyone and their cat cares about the environment these days, but such concern seems irreconcilable with the ‘infinite growth’ assumptions of most economists. It has long been pointed out by environmentalists, concerned citizens and the sane how, if we are to prevent global warming from melting the planet, we have to put some sort of a ceiling on economic growth and industrial development. This is a truly pressing concern – yet it appears that economists and policymakers simply cannot integrate it into their worldview.

But here’s an uplifting thought: what if History is doing our work for us? What if we are already entering a sort of ‘post-growth’ world?

On Short-Termism and the Institutionalization of Rentier Capitalism

Andrew Haldane and Richard Davies of the Bank of England have released a very useful new paper on short-termism in the investment arena. They contend that this problem real and getting worse. This may at first blush seem to be mere official confirmation of most people’s gut instinct. However, the authors take the critical step of developing some estimates of the severity of the phenomenon, since past efforts to do so are surprisingly scarce.

A short-term perspective is tantamount to applying an overly high discount rate to an investment project or similarly, requiring an excessively rapid payback. In corporate capital budgeting settings, the distortions are pronounced:

Doug Smith: Shock Therapy For Economics, Part 1

By Douglas K. Smith, author of On Value and Values: Thinking Differently About We In An Age Of Me

In “Economics In Crisis”, professor Brad DeLong notes:

The most interesting moment at a recent conference held in Bretton Woods … came when Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (asked) Larry Summers, “[Doesn’t] what has happened in the past few years simply suggest that [academic] economists did not understand what was going on?”

DeLong agreed with Summers’ response: “the problem is that there is so much that is “distracting, confusing, and problem-denying in…the first year course in most PhD programs.” As a result, even though “economics knows a fair amount,” it “has forgotten a fair amount that is relevant, and it has been distracted by an enormous amount.” DeLong then goes on to call for serious change in what economics departments do and teach.

In Part 2 of this post, I’m going to address the realities of ‘serious change’; and, in that context, what is troubling for INET about Summers’ presence at the recent Bretton Woods gathering. I’ll do this from my experience in leading and guiding real change as well as by contrasting INET with another, smaller, and more nascent effort called Econ4.

For now, though, let’s put aside the serious lack of self-respect in paying any attention at all to a world historical failure like Summers (Why is this arrogant sophist even on anyone’s C list, let alone A list? Why isn’t Summers wearing sack cloth and rolling in ashes?). Instead, let’s respond to DeLong’s ‘fessing up to the crisis in economics:

Jeffrey Frankel: The ECB’s three mistakes in the Greek crisis and how to get sovereign debt right in the future

Yves here. While Frankel’s take on the ECB’s errors has some merit, his recommendation, of imposing much harder limits on eurozone members who run deficits in excess of permitted levels, is more debatable.

Any country running a large intra-eurozone trade deficit is going to show rising debt levels. If the increase in debt funds investments that increase economic productivity, that might work out fine in the long run, but that seldom proves to be the case. We’ve seen that big debtors either rack up rising government debt levels directly (Greece) or have rising private sector debts that eventually result in outsized financial sectors that produce financial crises that lead to collapses in tax revenues that then lead to rising government debt levels (or directly via bailouts, see Ireland). Note in most countries the explosion in debt to GDP is primarily the result of the impact of the global financial crisis on tax revenues). So fiscal deficits cannot be addressed independent of trade and cross border capital flows.

By Jeffrey Frankel, Professor of Economics at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard. Cross posted from VoxEU

It is a year since Greece was bailed out by EU and IMF and there are many who label it a failure. This column says that while there is plenty of blame to go around, there were three big mistakes made by the European Central Bank. Number one: Letting Greece join the euro in the first place

Raghuram Rajan on Delineating the Role of Government

In this interview, Rajan, who famously told Greenspan at his last Jackson Hole conference that recent changes in financial services industry policy had increased risk, takes on the question of the role of government. He contends that economists have neglected this issue due to overspecialization.